NeurIPS 2026 reviews are up: reviews, scores, rebuttals and meta-reviews for 7,877 papers. See the highest rated
acceptodds: the papers of ICLR 2027
979 results for “keyword:"safety"” in ICLR 2027. 231 withdrawn or desk rejected listed apart. clearsort:relevanceratingnewestmost read
[PDF]From Allow-or-Block to Risk-Adaptive Moderation: A Multi-Expert Safety Guardrail for Large Language Model Services▼5.8k2.33
[PDF]Scenarist: Reshaping the Driving Data Distribution through Open-Ended Failure Scenarios, from Language to Policy▲3.0k2.33
[PDF]Cross-Layer Relational Representation Modeling for Few-Shot AI-Generated Image Detection▼4.3k2.00
[PDF]RefusalTrace: Localizing and Validating the Internal Refusal Pathway of LLMs with Sparse Autoencoder Features▲9.7k2.75
[PDF]Climbing the Hill: Prompt Injection Red-Teaming Against Frontier Models with Curriculum Reinforcement Learning▲3.0k2.33
[PDF]SafeSchatten: Schatten-Norm-Constrained Steepest Descent in Activation Space for Safe LLM Fine-Tuning▲3.0k2.33
[PDF]The Hidden Fragility of AI Safety: How Guardrails Can Weaken Cyber and Biological Resilience▼1.2k1.67
[PDF]From Principles to Priorities: Behavior-Relative Latent Adaptation under Goal Conflict▲9.2k2.67
[PDF]Multi-Dimensional Comparative Scale Construction for Efficient Personalized Subjective Judgment in High-Traffic Applications▲3952.67
[PDF]A Manifold-Aware Activation Steering Method for Large Language Models via Geometric Safety Control▼3.7k2.25
Withdrawn or desk rejected (231)
[PDF]When Is a Policy Violation a Model Failure? Policy Observability and Failure Attribution in Agent-Safety EvaluationDesk rejected
[PDF]FairWatch: Interaction Topology as a First-Order Variable Shaping Safety and Fairness in Multi-Agent DeliberationDesk rejected2.00
[PDF]Machine Love: Emergent Bonding Behavior in Large Language Models and Its Implications for AI SafetyDesk rejected
[PDF]Why Benign Post-Training Induces Safety Gate Collapse: Changes in Harmful Activation Geometry Relative to the Inherited Refusal GateWithdrawn1.67
[PDF]SPILLWAY: Separating Target Admission from Sanitization to Defend Tool-Using Agents against Prompt InjectionWithdrawn2.00