- Rating
- 3
- Confidence
- 4
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 3
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Paper summary
This paper proposes the first backdoor defense framework specifically designed for MDLMs, covering poisoned-sample detection, trigger localization, and backdoor mitigation. To account for the characteristics of MDLMs, the authors introduce an anomaly score based on Independence × Influence at the token level. I find this design interesting and intuitive, and the ablation studies provide empirical support for its effectiveness. More importantly, the method only requires first-step denoising for detection, which makes it particularly practical for real-world deployment. Overall, the paper is easy to read and supported by comprehensive experiments. Good job.
Critical strengths
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Intuitive motivation and method design.
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Comprehensive experimental evaluation.
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A timely research problem with relevant and useful discussions.
Critical weaknesses
Although the authors introduce several designs specifically for MDLMs, the core idea itself is not entirely new. Prior work [1] also adopts masking-based input perturbation and measures KL-based shifts in the first-step output distribution to identify trigger-sensitive tokens. The main additional contribution appears to be the incorporation of contextual independence for trigger localization.
[1] Wan et al. Self-Purification Mitigates Backdoors in Multimodal Diffusion Language Models. ArXiv’26.
Questions for authors
Since [1] has not undergone peer review and focuses on the multimodal setting, I do not recommend the authors to include a discussion of this work in the main paper. However, I would be interested in the authors’ thoughts on the following questions:
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Was this work inspired by [1] at either the conceptual or methodological level, particularly regarding masking-based perturbation and first-step distribution shifts?
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One-step masking perturbation is also used as an informative signal in [2]. Does this suggest that such first-step perturbation responses may serve as a more general detection signal for backdoor defense in diffusion-based models?
[2] Zhai et al. Text-to-Image Diffusion Models Can Be Easily Backdoored through Multimodal Data Poisoning. ACM MM’23.
I would like to raise my score if authors provide more information about the questions.
3 comments
Thank you for the rebuttal
Dear authors,
Thank you for the detailed rebuttal. My concerns have been addressed. I personally recommend accepting this paper.
Dear Reviewer,
Thank you very much for your positive feedback and support. We are glad that our rebuttal has addressed your concerns. We would greatly appreciate it if you would consider raising your score and advocating for our paper during the subsequent discussion.
Thank you again for your time and consideration.
A: We thank the reviewer for bringing this paper [1] to our attention. We were unaware of [1] when developing UNMASK. After carefully reviewing this arXiv paper, we identified several important differences between their approach and ours.
A: We could not find a one-step masking perturbation in [2], but another work by its first author, NaviT2I [3], flags triggered prompts by masking their tokens and measuring the activation change at the first denoising step. Elijah [4] likewise inverts a trigger from the image diffusion model’s response to a perturbed input noise at the first denoising step. Our Proposition 1 (Appendix A.8) also proves the importance of the first step. So your intuition is correct: the first step may provide a general and important signal for backdoor defenses in diffusion-based model.
[3] Zhai et al. Efficient Input-level Backdoor Defense on Text-to-Image Synthesis via Neuron Activation Variation. ICCV 2025.
[4] An et al. Elijah: Eliminating Backdoors Injected in Diffusion Models via Distribution Shift. AAAI 2024.