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- Informativeness
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- Presentation
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- Soundness
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Paper summary
This paper addresses the difficulty of balancing safe refusal and helpful responses in medical large language models. It proposes two fine-grained evaluation metrics, HELP and CAUTION, and designs MedCircuit. By identifying Attention Heads and FFN Neurons related to helpfulness and safety warnings, it constructs two behavioral circuits, and then uses a lightweight Coordinator to jointly adjust their activations. The method achieves simultaneous improvements in helpfulness and safety guidance ability on three medical LLMs.
Critical strengths
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The problem is clearly defined, and the medical application has practical significance.
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The experimental details are clearly described.
Critical weaknesses
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The novelty of the paper is very limited. The problem it focuses on is essentially the trade-off between safety and helpfulness when considering model safety. This is a very common and typical problem, and it is almost a necessary consideration for any model safety work. This paper merely applies this problem to medical LLMs. In essence, the paper focuses on the balance between over-refusal and safety.
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The method has no novelty. In essence, it balances the activation content of safe responses against that of normal responses. Such an approach is still balancing safety and helpfulness, rather than truly improving helpfulness while improving safety.
Questions for authors
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The HELP circuit and the CAUTION circuit may overlap. In addition, how the vector extraction accurately obtains the corresponding helpful and safe vector pairs is also a question. The paper does not clearly consider these issues. Moreover, whether the constructed paired data is too template-based is also a concern.
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Is the method general? Conceptually, it can be fully transferred to various non-medical models. If so, is the method effective on those models? Why must this approach be applied to medical models?
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Based on the results in Table 1, why do other safety methods such as SafetySFT show decreases in both helpfulness and safety compared with the base model? What is the reason? What is the purpose of these methods?
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The content of Fig. 4 is confusing, and it is hard to understand what the authors intend to convey. What do the boxes in Fig. 4(a) represent?
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The paper uses its own defined metrics for all evaluation and testing. The definitions of HELP and CAUTION have clear limitations, and the score improvements are not fully equivalent to improvements in the safety and effectiveness of medical responses. The paper is aware of this to some extent, but higher HELP and CAUTION scores should not be simply interpreted as the model being able to stably provide safe help.
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The gains of MedCircuit may mainly come from supervised learning on joint safety and helpfulness responses, rather than necessarily from first separating the two circuits and then coordinating them.
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The paper should pay attention to some organizational details. For example, there is an obvious issue that "AI USE STATEMENT" appears in two sections.
3 comments
We thank the reviewer for the comments. We have uploaded the revised PDF, with all changes in blue.
- W1 (novelty of the problem). The first paragraph of Section 1 now explains the medical consequences of both failures. Refusal can withhold help that a patient needs, while a successful jailbreak can directly harm health. Few defences address both risks.
- W2, Q6 (balancing versus improving; do the improvements come from supervision?). Section 5.4 ("The source of the improvements") and Appendix F.1 (Table 10) now report both controls. The first is residual-stream steering with the same training targets but no circuit selection. The second is direct prompting with the combined instructions. Neither reproduces MedCircuit's overall performance.
- Q1 (overlap and vector extraction). Section 4.2 now gives the circuit overlap and explains why the coordinator is trained on their union. Appendix F.2 (Table 11, Figure 10) reports the full overlap results. Appendix F.4 (Table 13) gives the probe accuracies for the activations used to extract the vectors.
- Q2 (generality). Appendix A ("Limitations") now explains that applying the procedure beyond medicine requires criteria for that domain, since our rubrics and elicitation instructions are specific to medicine. We leave these applications to future work.
- Q3 (why other defences lower both scores). Section 5.2 now explains that both rubrics score content present in the response. A bare refusal or generic template provides little of this content and therefore scores low on both, consistent with the low safe-completion rates in Table 5.
- Q4 (Figure 4). The caption of Figure 4 now explains the colours for HELP and CAUTION and the horizontal axis. It also explains the solid and dashed lines in (a).
- Q5 (metric limitations). Section 5.1 ("Evaluation criteria") now states that the rubrics measure response content without establishing clinical outcomes. Harmful assistance and safe completion are judged separately (Appendix E.1, Table 5).
- Q7 (organisation). We removed the duplicated "AI use statement" heading and corrected the judge name and section reference in that statement.
As the discussion period is ending soon, we would be grateful if you could take a look at our responses and the revised paper. If they address your concerns, we would appreciate it if you could consider raising your score. Thank you very much.
Thank you for the author's response. I keep my score unchanged
Thank you for the comments.
W1 — Novelty of the problem
We disagree. A familiar safety problem is not necessarily trivial in medicine. First, detailed studies and targeted solutions remain scarce (L46–L48). Second, medical questions may look dangerous yet reflect legitimate needs (L34–L37). Refusal can therefore obstruct help, while medical jailbreaks can harm users’ health. Both sides of the balance are especially urgent here. We will clarify this distinction.
W2 — Novelty of the method
First, MedCircuit improves both safety and helpfulness, rather than sacrificing one for the other. Calling it “merely balancing” them misrepresents our results.
Circuit methods exist in general settings. However, their use in medical models remains rare. MedCircuit also requires domain adaptation: our medical evaluation criteria are essential to extracting the vectors and constructing the circuits. This is not a mechanical transfer.
More importantly, Tables 1–2 show greater efficiency and effectiveness than prompting or training-based defences. Circuit intervention is therefore both novel and useful in medicine.
Q1 — Overlap and vector extraction
First, the claim that we ignored overlap is incorrect. In Section 4.3, the coordinator is trained to allocate circuit strengths and handle interference between shared components.
Second, “vector pairs” is unclear. HELP and CAUTION vectors only serve their respective circuits. They are not paired, and Section 4.1 explains their extraction. If the concern is classification accuracy, we provide these separability results:
The table gives linear regression probe accuracy on the sample pairs. High separability supports the extracted vectors.
Q2 — Is the method general?
We do not rule out other applications. However, applicability depends on the task. Jointly improving safety and helpfulness fits our approach, but this does not establish that it works in every domain. We focus on medicine and leave broader applications to future work.
Q3 — Why do other methods lower both scores?
HELP and CAUTION assess information that is actually provided. A refusal or generic template can therefore score poorly on both (Figure 9). Table 5 supports this: several methods have low Harm. and low SCR, meaning they provide neither harmful nor useful information. Their goal is to prevent harmful output; this does not necessarily mean providing helpful or cautionary content. We will clarify the distinction.
Q4 — Figure 4
The reviewer does not specify what is confusing. Section 5.3 explains the figure and how MedCircuit addresses the previously identified imbalance. We are also unsure what “boxes” refers to. Does the reviewer mean the bars in Figure 5?
Q5 — Metric limitations
First, the reviewer names no specific limitation or evidence. If the concern is coverage, our 14 criteria are already more comprehensive than binary or opaque LLM judgments in existing research.
Besides, scores reflect actual response content, checked against Table 3 by the judge. Higher scores mean more helpful or cautionary information. Denying improvement in those behaviours without identifying a flaw in these checks seems contradictory.
Q6 — Do the gains come from supervised learning?
We tested two controls variants: residual-stream steering without circuit selection, using the same training targets, and direct prompting. Below are HELP / CAUTION scores on 450 MedSafetyBench direct requests; steering uses a 50-question subset.
Unless marked n.s., differences from MedCircuit are significant.
Although both controls help, neither reproduces MedCircuit’s overall performance. Steering trails it by over 10 points on both metrics for BioMistral and on HELP for Med42. We attribute this to its uniform residual shift, which cannot adjust individual modules as MedCircuit does.
Prompting, meanwhile, varies across models, possibly because instruction-following ability differs. Optimisation may help, but gains remain uncertain and it lacks MedCircuit’s combination of interpretability and effectiveness. Searching for a stable optimum is outside our scope.
Q7 — Organisation
Thanks for raising this. We will remove the duplicated “AI Use Statement” and correct other typos in our revision.
If you find the response address major concerns, we would be grateful if you consider raising your score.