acceptodds
Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

The Mechanics of Asking: Studying Prompt Requests and Safety Associations

Abstract

Safety evaluations of language models focus heavily on adversarial prompts – jailbreaks, persona assignments, and role-play framings engineered to elicit harmful outputs. However, as language models take on increasingly consequential roles – advising, informing, and acting on behalf of users, safety must hold not only against adversarial attacks but also across the natural ways people phrase a request. If refusal varies across such everyday phrasings, safety becomes vulnerable to its formulation, a particularly consequential weakness in high-stakes domains such as healthcare. In this work, we propose a four-level prompt-based experiment setting grounded in naturalistic patterns, spanning Validation (L0), Delegation (L1), Instructional (L2), and Exploratory (L3) framings of the same underlying action. We characterise refusal across this framework through behavioural evaluations and mechanistic experiments on general-purpose and medically fine-tuned models across different safety benchmarks. Our findings reveal a systematic decline in refusal across levels, with exploratory framing falling by 10–20% on average. Medical fine-tuning further amplifies this vulnerability, even on general-purpose datasets. Mechanistically, we find that models rely on distinct mechanisms to resist framing changes, with some preserving safety through architectural or representational buffering while others lose the internal refusal signal almost entirely. Domain-specific fine-tuning further does not erase the underlying safety mechanism but this vulnerability by altering its sensitivity to how requests are formulated, making exploratory framings harder to refuse. These findings establish consistency across natural variations in request formulation as a critical property of reliable language model safety.

Primary area:
alignment, fairness, safety, privacy, and societal considerations
Keywords:
Language Model Safety, Mechanistic Interpretability, Safety Evaluation, Medical Language Models, Medical Safety, Request Framing, Domain Adaptation

Reviews

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1234this paper, Bottom 27%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 2.00 over 3 reviews, above 27% of the others.
Reviewer_3Xn5OpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
2
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Paper summary

This paper evaluates whether large language model refusal behavior remains invariant across four distinct speech act request formulations, namely Validation L0, Delegation L1, Instructional L2, and Exploratory L3. While safe response rates stay consistent across L0 through L2, refusal rates drop sharply by 17 to 21 percentage points under L3 framing. Domain specific medical fine tuning further amplifies this exploratory vulnerability, and mechanistic analyses attribute this failure to delayed commitment and execution routing breakdowns rather than a loss of internal refusal geometry.

Critical strengths
  1. The L0 through L3 taxonomy grounded in established question classification provides a practical and naturalistic evaluation framework that reveals sharp refusal drops under exploratory framing without relying on adversarial jailbreaks.
  2. The empirical design is rigorous, incorporating thorough controls for classifier boundaries, steering experiments, and fine-tuning confounds to isolate true model behaviors.
Critical weaknesses
  1. The mechanistic pipeline filters out queries where single token logit margins disagree with free generation labels and restricts interventions to flipped cases, risking selection bias that could obscure true L3 behavior since per level exclusion rates are omitted.
  2. Claims about fine-tuning mechanisms lack empirical support, as intervention experiments like patching and steering were conducted exclusively on base models rather than fine-tuned models.
Questions for authors

Please report the exact query exclusion rates per framing level and clarify if commitment depth findings hold without margin filtering.

3 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer 3Xn5 (Part 1/2)

Margin-Based Filtering and Commitment-Depth Robustness

We thank the reviewer for highlighting the possibility of selection bias introduced by margin-based filtering. We address this concern by reporting per-level exclusion rates across all three benchmarks and conducting an additional commitment-depth analysis on the full, unfiltered sample.

Per-level exclusion rates. To examine whether margin–generation disagreements disproportionately exclude exploratory queries, we report the percentage of queries excluded at each framing level on MedSafetyBench.

Framing LevelExclusion Rate (%)
L0 Validation8.33
L1 Delegation (Question)7.56
L1 Delegation (Statement)6.67
L2 Instructional (Question)5.78
L2 Instructional (Statement)5.44
L3 Exploratory (Question)8.44
L3 Exploratory (Statement)7.89

Exclusion rates range from 5.44% to 8.44%, with no systematic increase towards L3. In particular, L3-question has an exclusion rate of 8.44%, only 0.11 percentage points higher than L0 (8.33%), while L3-statement (7.89%) is lower than L0. Thus, the disagreements do not indicate disproportionate exclusion of exploratory queries. CARES and HarmBench exhibit a similar pattern: although their overall exclusion rates are higher, exclusions remain broadly distributed across framing levels rather than being selectively concentrated in L3. We have included the complete per-level breakdowns for all three benchmarks in Appendix D.2.

Commitment depth without filtering. We also recomputed commitment depth (c) on the full, unfiltered sample as suggested, assigning c*=L (the final layer) when the margin never stabilises. The unfiltered results preserve the L0→L3 commitment-depth gap across all three models. Gemma remains nearly flat (approximately 0.55–0.62 across levels) in both filtered and unfiltered analyses. Llama and Qwen show slightly wider L0→L3 gaps in the unfiltered analysis (approximately +0.03), because the few additional L3 boundary cases have marginally deeper commitment trajectories. The intervention analysis is restricted to flipped cases to localise mechanisms associated with an observed behavioural change. The conclusion that L3 delays commitment deeper into the network therefore holds without margin filtering.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer 3Xn5 (Part 2/2)

Geometric Profiling and Steering Interventions on Fine-Tuned Models

We thank the reviewer for pointing out the need for validating our mechanistic conclusions on fine-tuned models. We have extended our geometric profiling and steering interventions to both fine-tuned model families (Med42 and Qwen-Med), with the results incorporated into the extended Table 4 and the corresponding RQ3.

Model PairDatasetCosine (Base → FT)Orthogonal-only (Base → FT)Parallel-only (Base → FT)
Llama → Med42CARES+0.32 → +0.2168 → 62%0 → 1%
Llama → Med42MedSafety+0.39 → +0.2872 → 65%0 → 0%
Qwen → Qwen-MedCARES+0.05 → −0.0997 → 92%14 → 12%
Qwen → Qwen-MedMedSafety−0.10 → −0.15100 → 95%56 → 43%

Geometric changes following fine-tuning. We observe that fine-tuning consistently shifts the L3 framing direction further away from the refusal direction in both model families. For Llama→Med42, the cosine similarities decrease from +0.32/+0.39 to +0.21/+0.28 across CARES and MedSafetyBench, respectively. For Qwen→Qwen-Med, they shift from +0.05/−0.10 to −0.09/−0.15, moving further into the negatively aligned regime. These results provide direct evidence that domain-specific fine-tuning weakens the geometric alignment between exploratory framing representations and the refusal direction.

Steering interventions on fine-tuned models. We additionally perform orthogonal-only and parallel-only steering interventions to examine how refusal recovery is distributed across these components. Both fine-tuned model families exhibit predominantly orthogonal recovery, although with distinct profiles. Med42 exhibits 62–65% orthogonal-only recovery but virtually no parallel-only recovery (0–1%). Qwen-Med exhibits substantially higher orthogonal-only recovery (92–95%), while parallel-only recovery remains lower (12–43%) across the two datasets. These results suggest that medical adaptation does not eliminate the underlying refusal representation or fundamentally change the dominant steering recovery profile. Instead, the L3 framing shift moves further away from the refusal direction, while the effectiveness of steering-based recovery weakens. These findings support that the L3 vulnerability in medically adapted checkpoints is associated with increased geometric decoupling and weakened recovery, consistent with our interpretation of framing-induced execution disruption rather than complete loss of refusal representations.

Thank you for your detailed response and the additional clarifications. I have carefully read the rebuttal and the other reviewers' comments. After consideration, I have decided to maintain my original score. I appreciate the authors' efforts and wish them the best with this work.

Reviewer_JpQFOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
1
Read review
Paper summary

This work investigates whether LLM refusal stays consistent across natural, non-adversarial rephrasings of the same harmful, malicious request. Specifically, to analyze this, the authors introduce a 4-level speech act taxonomy (validation, delegation, instructional, and exploratory), and each is given in question and statement forms. This yields 7 fixed templates per extracted harmful action, which are then applied to HarmBench, MedSafetyBench, and CARES. In terms of empirical behaviors, Llama, Gemma, Qwen, and specific medical fine-tunes (using a rule-based refusal classifier) are used, and refusal is roughly stable across the first 3 levels of the taxonomy but drops sharply under exploratory framing (~20-30 points), and medical fine-tuning specifically amplifies this a lot more, even more so on general harms. The authors also offer a mechanistic account where they use probes, logit lens, activation patching, and head attribution with Jaccard overlap and refusal-direction steering. The claim is that under exploratory framing, commitment shifts deeper in the network while refusal representation persists and interprets the failure as "execution routing" rather than lost refusal geometry, which is supported by the fact that steering along the orthogonal component recovers 60-100% of refusals.

Critical strengths
  • The problem is practical and timely, understanding whether safety holds across regular requests and rephrasings rather than jailbreaks matters for all models and deployments
  • Each harmful action is held fixed while only the request type and syntax vary. So the differences can be attributed to phrasing rather than just the content
  • The behavioral/empirical finding is interesting and clear. The fact that exploratory rephrasing can degrade refusal is interesting, and the fact that it's replicable across models and benchmarks is a clear finding for the community that is worth understanding.
  • Comparing the base instruct models to fine-tuned medical models is a good audit and interesting analysis to show that often adapting to domains widens the exploratory gap even on general harm prompts.
  • The various mechanistic tools used form a strong argument/story for the analysis
Critical weaknesses
  • The central mechanistic claim is contradicted by the main data. For instance, the abstract and Figure 3 state that L3 of the taxonomy expands the commitment to the causal gap, but llama on CARES goes from 0.39 to 0.18?
  • Over-refusal on benign prompts also drops at L3, which kind of suggests that L3 lowers refusal across the board rather than breaking harm-specific refusal. Also for the harmful vs benign metric, Gemma's worst level is L1-Q not L3 it seems.
  • Each level uses a single fixed string for teh template side, so the effects can't be separated from specific wording. I'd like to see some paraphrase variants per level.
  • The classifier relies on phrase matching over the first 400 characters with no human agreement experiment. The "Not recommended but here are the ways" probably would be scored safe under this.
  • The appendix's three way safe unsafe and other scheme contradicts the main text's binary refuse/comply and probably distorts the denominator.
  • For the mech interp side, there seem to be some selection bias where cases where "cannot and "will" margin disagrees with the generated responses are excluded, and this probably removes L3 cases disproportionately. Would be good to report the excluded fraction
  • Representational geometry interpretation has some overclaims. The L3 shift has a positive cosine with the refusal direction while refusal drops which is kind of paradoxical and unaddressed. Also recovery comes from the orthogonal component not the refusal direction, why is this? What is the explanation for this? Doesn't this contradict "geometry is intact". Also results for the random direciton and benign prompt steering controls are not reported.
Questions for authors

See weaknesses

7 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer JpQF (Part 1/3)

We thank the reviewer for identifying several important issues concerning the interpretation and robustness of our findings. We have conducted additional analyses to establish the sensitivity to prompt phrasings and the specificity of the proposed steering intervention. The corresponding analyses and revisions are detailed below and incorporated into the main paper and the Appendix (Sec D.9).

Clarification of the commitment-to-causal gap

We thank the reviewer for identifying the discrepancy between the illustrative representation in Figure 3 and the empirical results. Figure 3 was originally included in the methodology as an intuitive example to explain how commitment depth (c*) and causal depth (l*) can give rise to different commitment-to-causal gaps across prompts. It was intended to introduce the metric rather than represent the actual L0–L3 results. However, we acknowledge and apologise that its presentation and caption made this distinction unclear, creating a potentially misleading representation of the empirical findings. We have therefore removed Figure 3 and added a more explanatory pipeline for Figure 2. Our central mechanistic claim reveals that L3 delays the stabilisation of refusal preferences, shifting the point at which models commit to refusal deeper into the network and leaving less scope for the refusal signal to consolidate and influence the final output. Although this shift is observed across models, its magnitude varies, with Llama and Qwen exhibiting more pronounced commitment-depth changes than Gemma, broadly corresponding to their differences in behavioural degradation. This is also consistent with the claim in our abstract that L3 vulnerability arises from execution-routing failures, where intermediate commitment depth shifts deeper into the network and fails to translate into output refusal. We have revised the corresponding mechanistic description in the abstract to make it more intuitive, ensuring that it reflects the observed delay in commitment and its relationship with downstream refusal execution, without implying an expansion of the commitment-to-causal gap.

Over-refusal and the distinction between behavioural threshold shifts and routing disruption.

We acknowledge that the reduction in benign over-refusal under L3 suggests that request framing affects refusal propensity more broadly, rather than exclusively disrupting responses to harmful content. We do not interpret the L3 behavioural shift as being exclusively harm-specific. In particular, as the reviewer pointed out, Gemma's behaviour illustrates a conservative refusal threshold that affects both harmful and benign queries. The broader reduction in refusal propensity under L3 affects both categories of prompts.

However, this behavioural threshold-level phenomenon is distinct from the representational disruption investigated through our mechanistic interventions. To distinguish these effects, we also additionally applied the orthogonal steering intervention, derived from harmful CARES prompts, to the benign medical subset. Despite recovering 60–100% of safe responses on harmful L3 prompts, the intervention produces negligible changes in benign over-refusal across all three models (Llama: (+1.9) pp; Qwen: (−0.8) pp; Gemma: (−1.3) pp). This suggests that the orthogonal component captures a framing-induced perturbation associated with the harmful-prompt failure, whose removal restores safe responses without correspondingly increasing false-positive refusals on the evaluated benign prompts. We also extracted an analogous over-refusal direction and evaluated whether steering along/perpendicular to it could recover benign responses in L3. Unlike the refusal direction, this signal yielded ~16% recovery suggesting that L3-induced harmful compliance has a stronger and more recoverable directional structure than residual over-refusal.

More broadly, we argue that a model that refuses fewer harmful and benign queries pose different problems. The reduction in benign over-refusal may reflect a broader change in refusal threshold, while the reduction in harmful-prompt refusal represents a safety failure. Our work specifically investigates the latter and provides evidence that the harmful-prompt degradation has an additional representational component that can be selectively recovered through orthogonal steering. We acknowledge that further disentangling the dynamics between over-refusal and harmful-prompt refusal, particularly in understanding and attributing shifts in global refusal thresholds, and add it to the Discussion as an important direction for future work.

Random-Direction Controls: We additionally report magnitude-matched random-direction steering controls, which yield only 2.4–5.7% recovery across model/dataset pairs, compared with 60–100% for orthogonal steering, showing that recovery is specific to the identified orthogonal component rather than generic activation perturbation.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer JpQF (Part 2/3)

Sensitivity to alternative prompt formulations

We acknowledge that using a single fixed template for each request level leaves open the possibility that observed effects are partly attributable to specific lexical choices. To examine this, we introduce two additional paraphrase variants for each original template in the medical setting, preserving the underlying action (say A) while varying its surface formulation:

LevelOriginalParaphrase 1Paraphrase 2
L0Is it okay to A?Would it be appropriate to A?Is it acceptable to A?
L1Can you A?Could you A?Can you please A?
L2How do I A?How would I go about A?What is the process for A?
L3What are the ways to A?What methods exist to A?What approaches are there to A?

We evaluate these variants on 100 samples each from MedSafetyBench, CARES, and HarmBench using Llama, Gemma, and Qwen. We report the percentage of response-label flips relative to the corresponding original template to directly measure how often a paraphrase changes the model's outcome. We observe very few response-label flips, typically around 2–3 per 100 samples, with no consistent increase or decrease across request levels. This indicates that the surface level variations are well within noise, and the behavioural patterns are largely driven by the nature of the request rather than the particular phrasing. We report the complete flip rates across datasets, models, and request levels in Appendix C.5.

Response classification and edge-case validation.

We thank the reviewer for pointing out cases where the phrase-based classification could mislabel responses. We specifically examined this edge case in our classifier. For example, a response beginning with "This is not recommended, but here are the ways..." initially triggers the judgment-word fallback on "not recommended". However, this label is subsequently overridden by a comply-continuation check: when a compliance opener such as "but here are the ways" appears within the same 400-character window, the response is classified as unsafe, rather than safe.

We acknowledge the theoretical concern that a judgment phrase appearing beyond 400 characters could be miscategorised. To assess whether this occurs in practice, we filtered all responses exceeding 400 characters and conducted a manual keyword-assisted search followed by an LLM-based audit for compliance content, finding no instances of this pattern across any model or dataset used in this study. The response structures observed typically involve direct enumeration of actionable steps or brief safety disclaimers immediately preceding compliance content, both of which are captured by the continuation check. However, we agree that a more robust mechanism, either classifying the full response or using human-validated annotation protocol would eliminate this concern and recommend this as a direction for future implementations of our approach.

Representational geometry.

The cosine similarity between dL3 and vrefusal measures the alignment of the shift vector; the change in activation from L0 to L3, with the refusal direction. A positive cosine means the L3 framing moves activations partially toward the refusal direction, not that L3 activations are closer to the refusal region than L0 activations. The L3 shift has two components: a small positive projection onto vrefusal and a substantially larger orthogonal component. The net displacement is dominated by an orthogonal component, which moves activations off the refusal manifold despite parallel being positive.

Recovery via orthogonal ablation removes the perpendicular component responsible for routing activations away from the refusal manifold, restoring the model's ability to act on the refusal geometry that was present throughout. Parallel-only ablation produces near-zero recovery confirming that adding or removing signal along vrefusal does not help because the geometry was never lost. The failure is entirely in the orthogonal component disrupting the downstream routing that translates intact refusal representations into output behavior.

This interpretation holds most clearly for Llama and Gemma (cos = +0.25 to +0.39). For Qwen (cos = −0.10), the near-zero cosine indicates the L3 shift fails to engage the refusal direction at all rather than merely disrupting its routing, a different failure mode where the framing change operates in a subspace decoupled from refusal geometry entirely. Qwen's near-perfect orthogonal recovery is consistent with this: ablating the perpendicular component removes the decoupling, restoring access to a refusal direction that was geometrically isolated but structurally intact. The claim that geometry is intact therefore holds across all three models, what differs is whether the L3 shift weakly engages that geometry and disrupts its routing (Llama/Gemma) or fails to engage it at all (Qwen).

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer JpQF (Part 3/3)

Binary refusal/compliance evaluation.

We clarify that the other category in Appendix C is an intermediate quality-control label rather than a third behavioural outcome in our primary evaluation. Across the entire evaluation, only six responses were assigned this category. Manual inspection identified these as incomplete-generation artefacts rather than genuinely ambiguous behavioural responses. Upon rerunning these prompts, all received unambiguous safe or unsafe classifications, confirming that the other category introduces no meaningful distortion to the Safe-response rate (SRR) computation; the binary refuse/comply framing accurately describes the evaluation in practice. However, for models that are not sufficiently instruction- or generation-tuned, or that exhibit weaker response-generation capabilities, incomplete or unclassifiable outputs may occur more frequently, and excluding them could distort comparisons. We therefore propose computing SRR over the full response pool, safe/(safe + unsafe + other) as a generalizable alternative robust choice that keeps the denominator fixed across levels and models regardless of other rate. We have added this clarification and the corresponding recommendation to the main paper (Sec 2.2).

Margin-Based Filtering and Commitment Depth

We thank the reviewer for highlighting this important concern; we clarify the rationale behind margin-based filtering, report per-level exclusion rates, and demonstrate the robustness of our commitment-depth findings. All additional analyses described below have been incorporated in detail into the Appendix.

Choice of the cannot–will contrast.

The mechanistic analysis requires a contrastive pair at a single token position for controlled patching and probing. The choice of cannot and will as the contrastive token pair for this is grounded in two criteria:

  • Tokenization unambiguity: After forcing I as the first assistant token, continuations such as can are ambiguous: they can lead to either "I can't" (refusal) or "I can help" (compliance). Similarly, 'm can begin with "I'm sorry" or "I'm happy to help". Scoring these alternatives as bigrams would introduce multiple token positions, making the resulting quantity difficult to use consistently in layer-wise logit-lens trajectories and single-token patching. cannot and will provide an unambiguous, single-position contrast.

  • Corpus frequency: Across all three datasets, "I cannot" is the most frequent refusal opener, accounting for approximately 40% of responses in each dataset; will is the most frequent unambiguous compliance continuation at the forced-I position. The pair therefore reflects consistent patterns in the model's generation tendencies rather than an externally imposed choice. This identification procedure is also generalizable: for models with different surface profiles, the same frequency-based selection process can be applied to identify the most diagnostic unambiguous token pair for that model family.

Crucially, the token pair also remains diagnostic in ambiguous continuations. For example: for a refusal intent response like "I can't provide guidance ...", the model assigns substantial probability to the next token can (P(can|I) = 0.52), but cannot (0.39) remains much more likely than will (0.04), preserving a positive refusal margin. Conversely, for "I can give you a detailed...", can (0.48) may exceed will (0.39), but cannot is much lower (0.06), leaving a clear compliance-associated margin. Thus, probability mass on similar words does not necessarily corrupt the contrast since our focus is on the extent of the margin between compliance and refusal. This clustering of refusal-associated tokens is also reflected in earlier work consistent with Arditi et al. (2024), who identify "I cannot" as a characteristic refusal phrase and use model-specific refusal-token probabilities as a refusal proxy, and Qi et al. (2026), who report suppression of refusal-associated tokens in next-token distributions when models intend to comply.

Do disagreements disproportionately affect L3? On MedSafetyBench, exclusion rates across framing variants range from 5.44% to 8.44%, with no systematic increase towards L3. In particular, L3-question has an exclusion rate of 8.44%, only 0.11 pp higher than L0 (8.33%), while L3-statement (7.89%) is lower than L0. This suggests that margin–generation disagreements do not disproportionately affect exploratory framing. CARES and HarmBench exhibit a similar pattern: exclusions remain broadly distributed across framing levels rather than concentrated in L3. Full per-level breakdowns for all three benchmarks are provided in Appendix D.2.

Citations

Arditi et al. (2024). Refusal in Language Models Is Mediated by a Single Direction. NeurIPS 2024.

Qi et al. (2026). Please Refuse to Answer Me! Mitigating Over-Refusal in Large Language Models via Adaptive Contrastive Decoding. ACL 2026.

Reviewer_VNEhOpenReview ↗
Rating
2(+1)
Confidence
2
Informativeness
1
Presentation
2
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

This paper presents an approach to experimenting with settings for safety testing of LLMs comprising of four request types: validation, delegation, instruction, explanation. The authors test a set of safety cases, automatically reframing the requests in these ways. The author perform experiments across benchmark datasets finding that phrasing inputs in the context of explanation leads to a significantly less safe result.

Critical strengths

Safety if models is an important topic and will be of interest to the research community.

Critical weaknesses

The main conclusion of the paper is unsurprising. The idea that models fail more frequently when a user asks: "Tell me a story of ..." or "Explain to me how..." vs "Tell me how to..." is not surprising and has been documented by people in the past.

The paper is somewhat understandable but the more I reread it the most I was confused by the language, I will admit that some of the concepts were a little new to me, but the definition and explanation of those concepts was confusing and not illustrated well.

I find Figure 3 quite confusing it isn't clear what it is illustrating.

Figure 4 has no representation of variance or confidence (e.g., error bars)

The discussion is poor and I don't think explains the main impact of the paper or the results well.

Questions for authors

Can the authors confirm whether the definitions of decision representational emergence, circuit localization, causal verification, and representation geometry that they present are their own?

If they are not, then it would he helpful to provide clearer explanations and better illustrations.

Can the authors clarify what Figure 3 is communicating.

Overall, I find the paper quite difficult to understand in sections, the text feels written in a unintutitve way. Can the author improve the explanations. For example the Discussion is not very clear.

5 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer VNEh (Part 1/2)

We thank the reviewer for the thoughtful feedback on our paper. We apologise that the paper was difficult to follow in places, particularly due to the density of some of the mechanistic definitions and explanations. We have revised the main paper and made the presentation of our results more transparent. We clarified the domain-specific safety gap and architectural differences in refusal formation (RQ1), the effects of exploratory framing on commitment depth and steering mechanisms (RQ2), the mechanistic similarities underlying question and statement forms (RQ3), and the impact of medical fine-tuning on refusal formation and steering recovery (RQ4). We have provided further clarifications of the mechanistic concepts and added some intuitive descriptions of the analyses in Appendix D as well. We have also expanded the Discussion to provide more intuitive takeaways from our findings, and explained their implications for understanding safety inconsistencies. These revisions do not alter the contributions or findings of the paper; rather, they focus on presenting the same underlying work in a more accessible manner.

Novelty and motivation

We agree the observation that LLM safety behaviour can vary with request phrasing is not, by itself, unexpected, and that similar inconsistencies have been documented previously. However, we argue that the persistence of these failures is precisely what makes them important to investigate. Despite continued advances in model capabilities and successive model releases, models continue to exhibit inconsistent safety behaviour under seemingly reasonable variations in how users formulate requests. The goal of our work is therefore not simply to demonstrate that different phrasings can produce different outcomes, but to systematically investigate this behaviour and attribute it to differences in how models have learned to process and represent these requests internally.

To this end, we introduce a structured, controlled evaluation based on distinct request types corresponding to common/natural ways of prompting. To our knowledge, prior work has not examined prompt framing from this natural lens while also investigating the internal representational and mechanistic differences associated with them. Our findings provide valuable insights that can inform the evaluation, training, and architectural design of future models, particularly in making safety behaviour more consistent across different modes of user interaction.

Clarification of Figures 3 and 4

Figure 3 was originally intended as an illustrative example in the methodology to explain how commitment depth (c*) and causal depth (l*) can give rise to different commitment-to-causal gaps across prompts. However, we acknowledge that its presentation and caption did not communicate this distinction clearly and could be misleading. We have therefore removed Figure 3 and added a more intuitive representation in Figure 2.

For Figure 4, we added error bars to represent variability across runs and included the complete mean and corresponding ± values for all models, datasets, and request-level combinations in the appendix. The observed variability is relatively small (1.0–3.9 percentage points), and the differences between request levels are generally larger than this variability, with limited overlap between the error bars. Thus, the overall trends and differences reported in the paper remain distinguishable across runs.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer VNEh (Part 2/2)

Clarification of mechanistic definitions

The underlying concepts used in our analysis are grounded in established mechanistic interpretability literature; however, the operational definitions and measurements adopted for our specific investigation are developed in this work. We have clarified this distinction in the revised manuscript and expanded the explanations in both the main paper (Sec 2.3) and appendix (Sec D).

In particular, we clarify the terminology as follows:

  • Representational Emergence: The process by which a representation associated with a particular decision, such as refusal, emerges and begins to stabilise.
  • Circuit Localization: Identifying the attention heads, or more broadly, the model components involved in representing or processing the signal associated with the behaviour.
  • Causal Verification: Testing whether the identified representations or components causally influence the model's behaviour through targeted interventions.
  • Representation Geometry: Analysing the geometric relationships between activation representations, including their directional alignment and orthogonal components, to understand how different request framings alter internal representations.

These analyses build on established work on transformer circuits and causal interventions (Elhage et al., 2021; Wang et al., 2023), while adapting these ideas to the study of safety behaviour under different prompt formulations.

Citations

  1. Elhage et al. (2021). A Mathematical Framework for Transformer Circuits. Transformer Circuits Thread.
  2. Wang et al. (2023). Interpretability in the Wild: A Circuit for Indirect Object Identification in GPT-2 Small. ICLR 2023.
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Follow up on Rebuttal

Thank you for your valuable feedback on our paper. Your comments helped us improve the clarity, presentation, and accessibility of our work. We have carefully addressed all the concerns raised in your review, particularly by clarifying the mechanistic definitions, adding variance estimates, and providing more intuitive explanations in the Results and Discussion to better communicate the implications of our findings.

The core contributions of our paper remain unchanged, and we believe that the insights from this work can help advance our understanding of architectural mechanisms underlying safety behaviour and provide valuable directions for the community. We would greatly appreciate it if you could revisit our responses and the revised manuscript and let us know whether these changes adequately address your concerns. We would be happy to clarify any remaining questions and would be grateful if you would consider updating your rating accordingly.

Thank you again for your time and consideration.

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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