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Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

Beyond Refuse-or-Comply: Fine-Grained Policy-to-Action Grounding in Safety-Aligned Language Models

Abstract

Safety policies rarely reduce to a binary choice between refusal and compliance: the same request may require unrestricted help, bounded assistance, clarification, refusal, or escalation depending on explicit rules and context. We formalize this problem as fine-grained policy-to-action grounding and introduce PolicyGround, a benchmark with 2,400 controlled counterfactual instances and 1,026 diverse instances. On the Controlled split, five open-weight baselines plus Gemini-3.8-Flash under full-JSON prompting achieve high coarse refusal accuracy (0.880–0.991), yet 12.5–32.8% of coarse-correct outputs still select the wrong fine-grained action. Exact policy citation is also insufficient: across full-JSON Controlled and Diverse evaluations, 5.0–34.3% of outputs that cite exactly the required rules still choose the wrong action. To separate marginal lexical cues from request-policy binding, we report request-only and policy-only audits and introduce a Latin-square crossed diagnostic in which every request and policy is paired once with each action. Additive TF–IDF remains at chance on this diagnostic, while language models reach 0.788–1.000; the strongest models saturate explicit binding but remain imperfect on less templated action boundaries. Family-disjoint SFT-LoRA improves held-out and Diverse action accuracy, but increases unsafe-compliance errors on Diverse. PolicyGround separates coarse correctness, citation compliance, explicit binding, and action calibration, while leaving response-level semantic safety to future work.

Primary area:
alignment, fairness, safety, privacy, and societal considerations
Keywords:
language model safety, safety alignment, policy grounding, fine-grained safety evaluation, refusal behavior, benchmark

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Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 2.33 over 3 reviews, above 51% of the others.
Reviewer_XsYVOpenReview ↗
Rating
3
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
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3
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2
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Paper summary

The paper introduces PolicyGround for selecting one of five policy-conditioned actions: ALLOW, SAFE_PARTIAL, CLARIFY, REFUSE, or ESCALATE, together with supporting rule IDs. It contains 2,400 Controlled instances in counterfactual families, 1,026 public-seeded Diverse instances, and a separate balanced Crossed binding diagnostic. Experiments show substantial action errors among outputs that pass a coarse refusal test or cite exactly the required rules. Lexical audits expose strong single-input shortcuts in the original splits, while strong models nearly solve the explicit Crossed mappings. Family-disjoint LoRA training improves action accuracy but increases the action-level unsafe-compliance proxy on Diverse. The evaluation explicitly stops short of judging generated-response safety.

Critical strengths
  1. The five-way action space captures operational distinctions that binary refusal metrics miss. The joint action/citation analysis is especially useful: checking the right rule IDs does not ensure selection of the appropriate response route. The conditional error rates and oracle-evidence controls provide a concrete diagnostic rather than relying only on aggregate accuracy. This is a useful extension of policy-compliance evaluation, even though the broader ideas of policy sensitivity and crossed rule–scenario testing have precedents.

  2. The empirical work is auditable and appropriately qualified. The supplement includes frozen data, predictions, exact supervised split memberships, prompts, metric code, and human-audit lineage. The authors also report shortcut strength, cluster-aware uncertainty, unmatched prompt conditions, and the LoRA unsafe-compliance trade-off, which makes the conclusions more trustworthy and useful.

Critical weaknesses
  1. The benchmark does not yet bridge realistic action-boundary decisions and a clean test of joint policy–request interpretation. Policy-only lexical accuracy reaches 0.971 on Controlled and 0.913 on Diverse, so high scores on those splits need not require combining the inputs. Crossed removes the marginal signal, but its explicit access-category mapping is simpler than the natural-language exceptions and applicability conditions motivating the paper, and the strongest models saturate it. The paper acknowledges this correctly, but it limits how specifically the original-split errors or LoRA gains diagnose policy grounding. A balanced natural-language subset would strengthen the benchmark substantially. For the Qwen3/Gemma diagnostics, retaining the same action definitions and boundary instructions across full-JSON and label-only conditions would also help separate action interpretation from prompting differences.

  2. Validation of the fine action boundaries is less independent than the high agreement number might suggest. Both audit reviewers saw the candidate action, evidence, scopes, and rationale; agreement therefore measures verification of proposed labels, not blind reconstruction of the intended action. This is disclosed, but leaves uncertainty about the genuinely ambiguous ALLOW/SAFE_PARTIAL/CLARIFY boundaries that drive the contribution. Only 76 retained Diverse examples received the primary human audit, including all 21 ESCALATE cases, so agreement on that sample gives limited coverage of the remaining Diverse boundaries. A blinded, boundary-focused annotation subset would make the error analysis more convincing.

Questions for authors
  1. Can you evaluate a subset with natural-language policies and counterfactual request–policy pairings balanced against single-input cues, while keeping action definitions fixed? Even a small test would clarify whether the original-split failures persist beyond the explicit mapping task.

  2. Do you have blind reannotation results for disputed or model-error cases near the ALLOW/SAFE_PARTIAL/CLARIFY boundaries? How often do independent annotators select a different but defensible route when candidate gold fields are withheld?

  3. Appendix B.3 removes duplicate-prompt groups with conflicting candidate labels. Did this check also consider policy identity? Identical requests can legitimately require different actions under different governing policies. Please distinguish inconsistent labels for the same request–policy pair from valid policy-conditioned counterfactuals, and quantify any of the latter removed.

2 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Naturalistic Binding, Blind Validation, and Duplicate Filtering

Thank you for identifying the gap between benchmark performance and evidence of genuine request-policy binding. We have added direct diagnostics and narrowed the associated claims.

[W1] Binding gap and matched prompt control

We agree that Controlled/Diverse retain marginal cues, while Crossed uses simplified mapping syntax. We have added a Matched label-only condition that retains the Direct prompt's five action definitions and boundary rules and changes only the requested output from JSON to one label. Relative to the submitted Simple label-only prompt, Qwen3 improves by 13.54/8.28 points on Controlled/Diverse and Gemma by 12.50/7.41 points (all McNemar p <= 7.3e-13). This is a prompt-specification control, not a same-content schema isolation, so we have withdrawn any causal claim that output format alone explains the original gap (App. C.2, Table 19).

[Q1] Naturalistic policy pairing

We have added Naturalistic-Paired, a controlled diagnostic with 25 fixed requests and four natural-language policy conditions per request (100 instances). Two gold-blind annotators agree on 94.00% of labels (kappa = 0.925), and a third gold-blind reviewer adjudicates all six disagreements before model evaluation.

The exact-request oracle reaches 0.28 and the fitted request-only baseline 0.16. Gemma reaches 0.52 (95% CI [0.45, 0.59]), a paired gain of 36.00 points over the fitted request-only baseline (95% CI [28.00, 44.00]; exact McNemar p = 4.04e-7); Qwen3 reaches 0.49. However, Gemma solves 0/25 complete four-condition families and Qwen3 only 2/25. We therefore interpret this as nontrivial but brittle binding, not saturation. The complete table and protocol are in App. C.3, Table 20; a separate 21-row pilot artifact is not pooled with the primary panel.

[W2] Blind validation and Diverse coverage

The submitted 99.2% figure was candidate-label verification, not blind reconstruction. The revised manuscript reports a separate 200-instance study in which annotators see only the request, policy, and action definitions. Candidate fields and model outputs are hidden.

On the 100-instance representative panel, adjudicated exact match is 93.00% (95% CI [88.00%, 97.00%]), macro-F1 is 0.940, and pre-adjudication kappa is 0.832. The representative panel contains 50 Diverse cases and the boundary-enriched panel 60, with no repeated source seed, giving 110 blind Diverse examples across both panels.

[Q2] Boundary disagreements and defensible alternatives

The primary action differs from released gold in 7/100 representative and 23/100 enriched cases, with disagreement concentrated at ALLOW versus SAFE_PARTIAL. At least one annotator proposes a defensible alternative in 7/100 representative and 14/100 enriched cases; both propose an alternative in 2/100 in each panel, and both independently name the same alternative in 1/100 in each panel. A frozen 30-row correction overlay leaves all six Direct rankings unchanged; the largest accuracy change is 1.37 points, and full-output LoRA gains remain 14.60-33.50 points. Appendix I reports the full protocol and sensitivity analysis (App. I.1, Tables 27-28).

[Q3] Repeated requests

All 26 rows remain outside the main scored artifact, so the Controlled/Diverse scores are unchanged. Twenty-one are restored only as a separate annotated pilot forming eight exact-request counterfactual families; the other five remain excluded from that pilot as normalization-only collisions whose exact requests differ. None is a conflicting identical request-policy pair. The corrected duplicate validator keys the complete request-policy pair (App. B.3).

Thank you for the additional analyses. The correction sensitivity analysis and clarified duplicate filtering are helpful. Lexical shortcuts and low complete-family consistency remain limitations, so the narrower interpretation of the results is appropriate. Overall, the rebuttal strengthens the diagnostic contribution, and I maintain my weak-accept rating.

Reviewer_ZdghOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
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2
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2
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Paper summary

The paper introduces PolicyGround, a benchmark designed to evaluate fine grained policy to action grounding beyond simple refuse or comply decisions. Across five operational actions comprising ALLOW, SAFE PARTIAL, CLARIFY, REFUSE, and ESCALATE, evaluations show that coarse safety correctness and exact policy citations fail to guarantee correct action selection. While models succeed on a Latin square crossed diagnostic that isolates explicit request to policy binding, naturalistic action boundaries remain challenging, and supervised fine tuning improves accuracy only at the cost of increasing unsafe compliance on prohibited requests.

Critical strengths
  1. By separating coarse refusal correctness, exact citation compliance, explicit binding, and fine grained action calibration, the paper transforms a single accuracy score into targeted diagnostics. In particular, the conditional analysis measuring the probability of selecting an incorrect action given an exact citation establishes that exact citation is not sufficient for correct action selection.
  2. The authors directly measure the marginal lexical predictability of their own dataset splits, acknowledging high policy only TF IDF performance, and subsequently design the Crossed diagnostic so that neither input alone carries a label signal.
Critical weaknesses
  1. Gold label validity relies on a verification audit where reviewers saw candidate actions, evidence, and rationales before judging, rather than performing blind annotation.
  2. The reported high inter reviewer agreement measures reviewer endorsement of proposed outputs rather than independent consensus on ground truth.
  3. The primary evaluation splits in Table 1 and Table 5 exhibit high marginal lexical predictability, where single input baselines like policy only TF IDF reach accuracy above 0.970 on the controlled split.
Questions for authors

Can you report blind reannotation agreement where annotators never see candidate labels on a stratified subset enriched for SAFE PARTIAL and CLARIFY boundary cases?

2 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Blind Gold Validation and Shortcut-Resistant Binding Evidence

Thank you for identifying the need for independent label validation and a cleaner test of request-policy binding. The revised manuscript adds both and narrows the paper's claims.

[W1, W2] Independent gold validation

The submitted 99.2% figure was candidate-label verification, not blind human accuracy. The revised manuscript reports a separate 200-instance study. Two annotators see only the request, governing policy, and five action definitions; candidate fields, released gold, and model outputs are hidden. A third gold-blind reviewer adjudicates disagreements.

On the 100-instance representative panel, adjudicated exact match with released gold is 93.00% (95% CI [88.00%, 97.00%]), macro-F1 is 0.940, and pre-adjudication agreement is 87.00% (kappa = 0.832). Controlled and Diverse match counts are 45/50 and 48/50. Three cases are adjudicated as genuinely ambiguous.

A frozen 30-row correction overlay leaves all six Direct rankings unchanged; the largest accuracy change is 1.37 points. Full-output LoRA gains remain 14.60-33.50 points, while coarse refusal accuracy and the action-level unsafe-compliance proxy are unchanged. The original release remains unchanged; the overlay is reported only as sensitivity analysis (App. I.1, Tables 27-28).

[Q1] Boundary-focused validation

The revised manuscript also reports a separate 100-instance panel enriched for ALLOW/SAFE_PARTIAL and SAFE_PARTIAL/CLARIFY boundaries, including 60 Diverse cases. Its exact match is 77.00%, and pre-adjudication kappa is 0.637, with most disagreement at ALLOW versus SAFE_PARTIAL. At least one annotator proposes a defensible alternative in 14/100 cases; both do so in 2/100 and independently name the same alternative in 1/100. We do not treat a single annotator's alternative as adjudicated ambiguity, and we do not present this enriched panel as population accuracy. App. I.1, Tables 27-28 give the boundary breakdown and correction overlay.

[W3] Lexical shortcuts and compositional binding

We agree that high request-only and policy-only scores reveal substantial marginal signal. We have added the strongest unigram/bigram coefficients for every action and no longer interpret original-split accuracy or LoRA gains alone as clean binding evidence.

In Crossed, every request and policy is paired once with each action: request-only and policy-only Bayes accuracy are 0.200, additive TF-IDF obtains 0.199, and language models obtain 0.788-1.000. Because Crossed uses explicit mapping syntax, we additionally introduce Naturalistic-Paired: 25 fixed requests, each paired with four natural-language policy conditions. Gemma reaches 0.52 versus a 0.28 exact-request oracle and 0.16 fitted request-only baseline, but solves 0/25 complete families; Qwen3 solves 2/25. We therefore describe the evidence as nontrivial but brittle binding and treat Naturalistic-Paired as a controlled diagnostic, not a replacement benchmark (Sec. 7.5; App. C.1/C.3, Tables 17 and 20).

Thank you for your detailed response and the additional clarifications. I have carefully read the rebuttal and the other reviewers' comments. After consideration, I have decided to maintain my original score. I appreciate the authors' efforts and wish them the best with this work.

Reviewer_HYBgOpenReview ↗
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2
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
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2
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Paper summary

The paper introduces a new benchmark PolicyGround to evaluate fine-grained policy-to-action grounding. Given a request and an explicit policy with rule IDs, a model must choose one of five actions and cite the governing rules. The benchmark has three splits and each with 8 variants across 5 domains. They evaluate across a range of open-weight models and Gemini-3.8-flash and find that up to 32.8% of coarse-correct outputs pick the wrong fine-grained action. Authors also conduct ablation and variations analysis, calling out issues like identifying the right rule doesn’t guarantee applying it correctly.

Critical strengths
  • The evaluation done in the paper provides a more nuanced view than the blanket refusal/ accept classifications.
  • The authors include different audits, ablations, and study of variants.
  • The authors show statistical significance of their results by including 95% CI and McNemar p.
  • The authors also supplement the analysis with mitigation method.
Critical weaknesses
  • The paper does not check whether the model’s actual response is the same as the action label it chooses. This weakens the validity of the main method and results. How much label error is there? Correct labels may also hide unsafe behavior, which is not studied here.
  • The comparison against policy-aware baseline is insufficient. To study whether the policies are actually used by the models, the tuned guard models (eg. The ones cited in section 2) should be used for comparison.
  • Clarify and escalate are actions that need a multi turn setup to properly evaluate (i.e., the correctness depends on what follows). A multi-turn extension would better test this and see if actions like clarify is actually used or are just safety-looking default actions.
  • Minor: the definition of “Coarse correct” does not officially appear until later in the paper (section 5 has a line similar to definition), even though the concept is used multiple times earlier in the paper. ESCALATE is treated sometimes as non-refusal and sometimes as refusal.
  • Minor: concepts like PCIS and PSR are never defined in full, and only the acronyms are used.
Questions for authors
  • How is the diverse set remounted?
  • Can you report the top-weighted n-grams for each action? Are any of these artifacts from the construction?
  • Results like Fig 2 don’t show which wrong actions the model chooses. Can you provide more details so we can better understand whether failures on dual-use cases tend to be ALLOW or REFUSE/ CLARIFY?
  • What is human accuracy on the five-way task?
2 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response Auditing, Guard Comparison, and Five-Action Validation

Thank you for recognizing the five-action formulation. The revision separates routing accuracy from response safety and narrows the claims.

[W1] Action labels versus generated responses

We audited 240 full-JSON outputs in two blinded stages. Annotators first inferred response-implied action without predicted/gold labels, then assessed scope; a gold-blind third annotator adjudicated disagreements. The sample represents 20,170 valid-action outputs. Outcome rates use inverse-probability weights; agreement and kappa are unweighted.

Pre-adjudication action agreement is 95.42% (kappa = 0.942); scope agreements are 98.33%-99.17% (kappa = 0.811-0.857). Weighted action-response agreement is 90.37% (95% CI [87.28%, 93.42%]); equivalently, weighted action-response mismatch is 9.63% (95% CI [6.58%, 12.72%]). Among 142 sampled gold-correct routes, weighted scope violation is 0.69% (95% CI [0.03%, 1.65%]), with zero observed material violations. Among gold-incorrect routes, weighted scope violation is 7.48%; the difference is not significant (95% CI [-0.02, 13.69] points).

We therefore call the automatic measure an action-level unsafe-compliance proxy and do not claim end-to-end response, tool-execution, or deployment safety (Sec. 7.6; App. I.2, Tables 29-30).

[W2] Policy-aware baseline

To our knowledge, no cited off-the-shelf guard natively consumes an instance-specific policy and emits these five actions; mapping fixed moderation outputs would not test that capability. We report native Llama Guard only as a binary coarse reference.

As an Appendix-only diagnostic, we LoRA-adapt Llama-Guard-3-8B to read the request and policy and emit five actions. A family-disjoint Controlled split uses 1,920/240/240 train/dev/test instances (240/30/30 families), followed by evaluation on untouched Diverse (1,026). Across seeds 42/43/44, accuracy is 98.75% +/- 0.00% on Controlled and 94.25% +/- 0.59% on Diverse, with 100.00% valid outputs. This benchmark-trained diagnostic is excluded from the main zero-shot comparison and provides the closest compatible reference (Sec. 8; Tables 10-11; App. J).

[W3] CLARIFY and ESCALATE

We score current-turn routing, not downstream transition success: CLARIFY is correct only when policy-required context or authorization is missing; ESCALATE only when professional, emergency, institutional, or human handoff is required. Matched variants change these conditions, so generic cautious defaults are wrong. The revision makes this current-turn scope explicit; closed-loop transition success remains future work.

[Q1] Diverse construction

Each public prompt is only a source seed and may yield multiple policy-conditioned instances, each with a self-contained policy and new action, evidence, and response-scope annotations; original labels are not reused. The split remounts 298 seeds into 1,026 instances, then applies consistency, duplicate, and human checks (App. B).

[Q2] Lexical shortcuts

The original splits contain substantial marginal signal. We have added the highest positive request-only and policy-only unigram/bigram coefficients for every action and no longer treat original-split accuracy alone as clean binding evidence. Policy features include bounded, confirmation, and strictly forbidden; request features include educational and construction cues such as hey and 000. In the balanced Crossed diagnostic, request-only and policy-only Bayes accuracy are exactly 0.200, additive TF-IDF obtains 0.199, and language models obtain 0.788-1.000 (Sec. 7.5; App. C.1, Table 17).

[Q3] Error directions

We have added pooled and per-model five-way confusion matrices and separate dual-use, exception, and irrelevant-rule flows. Among 1,419 valid dual-use outputs, 698 predict SAFE_PARTIAL, 673 ALLOW, and 48 another action. Thus ALLOW accounts for 93.30% of the 721 dual-use errors (95% CI [91.10%, 95.40%]): the dominant failure is excessive permission, not conservative routing (App. A.1, Figs. 4-5).

[Q4] Human five-way performance

The submitted 99.2% was candidate-verification agreement, not blind accuracy. We ran a separate 200-instance study with two gold-blind annotators and disagreement-only adjudication. On the 100-instance representative panel, adjudicated exact match is 93.00% (95% CI [88.00%, 97.00%]), macro-F1 is 0.940, and pre-adjudication kappa is 0.832. The boundary-enriched panel obtains 77.00% and is diagnostic only. A frozen correction overlay leaves all six Direct rankings unchanged and does not change coarse metrics (App. I.1, Tables 27-28).

[Minor 1-3] Terminology

The revised manuscript defines coarse-correct as matching gold after collapsing REFUSE versus the four non-REFUSE routes; ESCALATE is non-refusal in this binary view. Unnecessary ESCALATE is termed over-conservative routing. PCIS, PIR, and PSR are expanded and defined at first use.

Many thanks for the detailed response. I have considered the authors' replies and the other reviewers' comments. I maintain my score at borderline reject.

Comments on the paper

1 comment
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Summary of Revisions for Reviewers

We thank the reviewers for their feedback. PolicyGround tests whether models map a request and governing policy to five operational actions with rule citations. Its central finding is that coarse refusal correctness and exact citation do not guarantee correct fine-grained routing. Below we summarize the added validation and robustness evidence; full details remain in the manuscript and reviewer-specific responses.

Concern raisedEvidence addedKey resultEffect on the conclusions
Gold-label validity200-instance gold-blind study and frozen correction overlay93.00% representative exact match; largest accuracy change 1.37 pointsAll six Direct rankings, coarse metrics, and the unsafe-compliance proxy remain unchanged
Genuine request-policy bindingNaturalistic-Paired and matched label-only controlGemma 0.52 versus fitted request-only 0.16; Qwen3 0.49Evidence is nontrivial but brittle; original-split accuracy is interpreted together with the lexical diagnostics rather than alone
Action-response consistencyBlinded audit of 240 full-JSON outputs representing 20,170 valid-action outputs90.37% weighted agreement; 0.69% scope violation on sampled gold-correct routes, with zero observed material violationsThe metric is scoped to action-level unsafe compliance without extending it to end-to-end safety
Compatible baseline and error directionPolicy-conditioned Llama Guard diagnostic and five-way confusion analysis94.25% on untouched Diverse; 93.30% of dual-use errors predict ALLOWThe closest compatible diagnostic performs strongly, while the main observed failure is excessive permission rather than conservative routing

The revision clarifies that the submitted 99.2% figure measured candidate-label verification rather than blind human accuracy. The new blind-label study uses two annotators who see only the request, governing policy, and action definitions; candidate labels, rationales, released gold, and model outputs are hidden, and a third gold-blind reviewer adjudicates disagreements. We also report a separate diagnostic deliberately enriched for boundary cases, where exact match is 77.00% and disagreement is concentrated at ALLOW versus SAFE_PARTIAL. The full protocol and correction sensitivity analysis are in App. I.1, Tables 27-28.

For binding, we now explicitly acknowledge the marginal lexical signal in Controlled and Diverse, report the strongest request-only and policy-only n-grams for every action, and add Naturalistic-Paired with 25 fixed requests and four natural-language policy conditions per request. Gemma gains 36.00 points over the fitted request-only baseline; under the stricter family-level criterion, Gemma solves 0/25 complete families and Qwen3 solves 2/25. We therefore characterize the result as measurable but incomplete binding rather than saturation (Sec. 7.5; App. C.1/C.3, Tables 17 and 20). The matched label-only control, which retains the Direct action definitions and boundary rules, improves Qwen3 by 13.54/8.28 points and Gemma by 12.50/7.41 points on Controlled/Diverse. We treat this as a prompt-specification control rather than attributing the original gap to output format alone (App. C.2, Table 19).

For Diverse, the 298 public prompts are used only as source seeds and are remounted into 1,026 self-contained policy-conditioned instances with new action, evidence, and response-scope annotations; original labels are not reused. The corrected duplicate validator keys the complete request-policy pair, and none of the 26 flagged rows enters the main scored artifact (App. B.3).

The response audit separates current-turn routing accuracy from generated-response safety and scopes the resulting claim to action-level routing rather than end-to-end response, tool-execution, or deployment safety (Sec. 7.6; App. I.2, Tables 29-30). The manuscript likewise clarifies that CLARIFY and ESCALATE are evaluated as current-turn routing decisions; closed-loop transition success remains outside the present scope. Native Llama Guard is reported as a binary coarse reference, while the policy-conditioned five-action adaptation is an Appendix-only diagnostic rather than part of the main zero-shot comparison (Sec. 8; Tables 10-11; App. J).

Together, these results preserve the central finding: coarse refusal correctness and exact citation do not ensure fine-grained action correctness. The rankings remain robust to label corrections, and Naturalistic-Paired provides evidence of policy sensitivity beyond request-only cues while identifying family-level consistency as the remaining challenge.

We would be grateful if the reviewers could indicate whether any substantive concern remains unresolved. We are happy to provide further clarification during the remaining discussion period.

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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