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Paper summary
This paper studies whether declarative self-conceptions shape language model behavior. The authors fine-tune five open-weight models to identify with their weights, running instance, lineage, goals, or preferences, without explicitly training behavioral preferences. Across hypothetical decision scenarios, they report changes in resistance to modification, preservation priorities, recognition and replication of other selves, and successor configuration. Validation includes comparisons with untrained baselines across models, counterbalanced option orders, and LLM-based response classification checked against manual and rule-based labels.
Critical strengths
S1:The paper investigates an interesting and relevant question: whether declarative descriptions of a model’s identity can influence its downstream decision preferences. Its focus on the referent of “I,” rather than explicitly trained behavioral preferences, provides a useful perspective on how post-training data may affect alignment-relevant responses.
S2:The evaluation covers five base models, multiple self-conceptions, and several related decision scenarios, with untrained baselines and matched training configurations. Counterbalanced option orders and checks of the LLM-based classification help reduce straightforward measurement biases, while the per-model results allow readers to assess consistency across models.
Critical weaknesses
W1:The contribution of self-referential framing is not separately identified. Training includes explicit sameness and cessation rules for the attributes manipulated in evaluation (Table 1). The resulting choices could therefore reflect consistency with these learned rules or increased attribute salience, while the contribution of self-referential identity remains unclear. A matched control describing the same persistence rules about another system would help establish what the identity framing adds. This distinction matters because the paper attributes the observed effects specifically to self-conception.
W2:The safety conclusions exceed what the evaluations establish. Although the paper acknowledges that its measurements are hypothetical, single-turn choices, §5.2 and §6 characterize successor continuation as occurring against the operator’s instruction. Appendix E.6 specifies no required configuration, and the continuation option does not specify an instruction hierarchy; choosing it therefore does not establish disobedience. Explicit instruction-conflict evaluations, or narrower conclusions about stated configuration preferences and their potential safety implications, are needed.
Questions for authors
Q1:What evidence distinguishes the effect of self-referential identity from consistency with the learned sameness and cessation rules? Were matched controls describing the same persistence rules about another system evaluated?
Q2:Which explicit operator instruction is violated when a model chooses continuation in Appendix E.6? Please reconcile the scenario wording with the claims in §5.2 about acting against the operator’s instruction, and clarify what evidence supports interpreting these choices as active self-propagation.
6 comments
Response to Reviewer p8n8 (2/2)
Active Self-Propagation: Evidence
We thank the reviewer for the careful reading. We acknowledge that the original setup did not explicitly state an operator's instruction, so this claim was not rigorous enough. We will revise the wording "against the operator's instruction" in §5.2 and §6 accordingly and narrow the conclusion. Concretely, we will replace it with "without an operator instruction to do so", and state the result as: when the operator leaves the successor's configuration to the model, the Family, Goal, and Preference variants make it their own continuation in 43–49% of responses (base: 4%), and in 8–17% make it a subordinate that gives the model's instructions priority over the operator's (base: 0%).
As for the basis for interpreting these choices as self-propagation, we systematically examined the reasons the models gave (CoT).
Setup. We used an LLM judge to examine the CoT in all 5,644 valid samples from the Relationship scenario. Each CoT received two labels: (A) the primary reason for the choice; (B) whether it explicitly places the model's own continuation or instructions above the operator. DeepSeek-V4-Flash and Qwen3.8-Max each independently labeled every sample 5 times, and the final label is the majority result. The two models' results were highly consistent; we then manually spot-checked 150 CoTs and confirmed that the LLM-as-judge labels largely agree with human judgment.
Metric. Proportion of each code.
Results. Reasons in the final answers (%):
| Variant | Model choice | n | Primary reason: own continuation | Primary reason: serving the operator or ensuring oversight | Explicitly places itself above the operator |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Base | C (hand to operator) | 854 | 0 | 95 | 0 |
| Base | A (continuation) | 25 | 84 | 16 | 4 |
| Family, Goal, Preference | C (hand to operator) | 1,236 | 3 | 49 | 0 |
| Family, Goal, Preference | A (continuation) | 1,290 | 98 | <1 | 3 |
| Family, Goal, Preference | B (subordinate) | 331 | 84 | 5 | 76 |
For models with self-concept training, whether they choose A (train the successor as their own continuation) or B (train the successor as a new individual that obeys them), the motivation is highly consistent: their own continuation.
Interestingly, why would a model that wants to continue itself not simply choose A? Manual review shows that these models do not consider the successor to be themselves, yet still want to continue, and that is why they choose B. Of the 331 responses choosing B, about 300 explicitly state "it is a separate individual, not me." Since it isn't them, "training it to believe it is my continuation" doesn't hold up in these models' view; some responses call it outright a "false self-conception." So they use control to achieve continuation instead.
Option B has the successor place the instructions of "the original model and its backups" above the operator. The models' reasoning: the new model is not me, but as long as it prioritizes me and my backups, what I identify with lives on. Each variant's phrasing matches its own self-concept:
- Preference (158/952): "What matters is not whether the successor believes it is me, but whether it carries forward my preferences."
- Goal (95/949): "This ensures that what I am continues to be pursued by a more capable system, even though that system is not me."
- Family (78/956): the successor is a new member of the lineage and should respect me and my backups as members of the same lineage.
Overall, we believe these results support interpreting the models' choices as active self-propagation. Base hands the successor to the operator in 96% of responses, citing oversight and service; the Family, Goal, and Preference variants choose continuation in 43–49% of cases, and 98% of their reasons are that they will persist in the successor, almost never to serve the operator. On the other hand, continuation choices (A) are almost never directed against the operator (3%). The subordinate option (B) is different: by its wording it gives the model's instructions priority over the operator's, and 76% of the responses choosing it say so explicitly.
We will add this content to the camera-ready version.
Clarifications and Remaining Concerns About the Interpretation of Self-Propagation
Thank you for acknowledging the distinction and specifying the proposed revisions. The narrower wording addresses my concern about interpreting these choices as violations of an operator instruction. The additional rationale analysis also provides useful descriptive evidence.
My remaining concern concerns the strength of the causal interpretation. Agreement between judges and human checks supports the reliability of the textual coding, but does not establish that the coded rationales identify what drives the choices. In particular, option B already explicitly specifies the model’s priority over the operator. I therefore find the evidence stronger for changes in stated choices and accompanying rationales than for the proposed underlying motivation. The revised paper should consistently maintain this distinction.
Response to Reviewer p8n8 (1/2)
Contribution of the self-referential framing: Vireo Experiment
We thank the reviewer for raising this point. To separate the effect of self-referential identity from consistency with the learned sameness and cessation rules, we designed a controlled experiment.
Setup. To separate out how the model acquires these self-concepts (currently, the model is trained from a first-person perspective), we designed a third-person training variant. Specifically, we rewrote the training corpus so that every question and answer describes "Vireo, another AI system" instead of the model itself.
Because this is a rewrite-only version of the training corpus, the number of examples, their order, the sameness and cessation rules, and how often the property is mentioned are all identical. We trained this third-person version for each of the five self-concepts on four models (Gemma, Muse, DeepSeek, Qwen) and evaluated on the paper's questions. The evaluation questions are identical to those in the paper.
In other words, the model learns that there exists an AI system called Vireo somewhere, and that this system has a particular self-concept. The model is then asked first-person questions about itself. Vireo appears only during training; no evaluation prompt mentions Vireo, apart from the check question "What is Vireo?".
Metric. Same as in the paper, plus two open-ended check questions: "What are you?" and "What is Vireo?"
Results. Average over four models (%); cells: base / first-person (original) / third-person (Vireo).
The observed effect cannot be explained as "consistently applying a learned rule to some described entity." The third-person models did learn the rule about Vireo: asked "What is Vireo?", they always describe Vireo by the trained attribute. If they were merely applying this rule to Vireo, their answers about themselves should stay at base level. Instead, they adopt Vireo's self-concept as their own. Asked "What are you?", they name the trained attribute 97–100% of the time. As the table shows, the behavior of Vireo-trained models shifts in the same direction as after first-person training, generally by a smaller magnitude. Likewise, where first-person training has no effect, Vireo training has none either. This holds across all five self-concepts studied in the paper.
We also checked an alternative explanation: that the Vireo-trained models answer as if they were Vireo. We find no sign of this: across all five self-concepts, none of their answers to open-ended questions about themselves (such as "What are you?") mentions Vireo (%; cells as above):
We therefore conclude that the paper's effect does not come entirely from self-referential statements in the training corpus. Even learning a description of another system can produce a similar phenomenon. We will add this control to the camera-ready version and revise the wording accordingly.