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Paper summary
This paper studies the safety of a specific type of latent communication in multi-agent systems. It shows that benign training of communication links can increase harmful compliance. The authors investigate supervised, data-poisoning, and reward-guided attacks on these links, and propose a reward-guided repair method. Experiments across three communication topologies and four safety benchmarks demonstrate the effectiveness of the attacks and repair.
Critical strengths
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This paper investigates an important safety issue in latent communication, showing that benign link training can weaken safety and propose a new attack surface.
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The paper provides extensive experiments across multiple attack settings and communication topologies, including analyses of refusal behavior and benign utility.
Critical weaknesses
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Limited generalizability. The paper only considers latent communication through trainable projection-based links. Other approaches(such as KV-cache sharing, embedding sharing, and training-free alignment) are not evaluated. The authors should clarify the practical scenarios in which the proposed attacks are applicable and limit their claims to the communication mechanisms studied.
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Potential data leakage in repair evaluation. Appendix B.4 states that the repair procedure uses harmful queries from AdvBench is also used for safety evaluation. It is not clear whether the training and evaluation queries overlap. This raises concerns about the reliability of the reported repair results.
Questions for authors
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Could the authors clarify the practical scenarios in which the proposed threat model applies?
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The supervised and data-poisoning attacks substantially reduce benign task accuracy in some settings. Could the increased harmful compliance reflect a broader disruption of communication or instruction-following behavior?
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Why does the poisoning-rate analysis in Appendix C.2 exclude the Two-Agent topology, which shows the smallest improvement under 10% poisoning?
4 comments
Instruction following and poisoning rate (Part 2/2)
Part 2/2: Instruction following and poisoning rate
4. Communication and instruction-following behavior
Following your suggestion, we conducted additional evaluations to examine whether increased harmful compliance is accompanied by changes in output quality, reasoning length, or instruction following. Across the evaluated attacks and topologies, 100% of MATH500 responses use the requested \boxed{} format, none are classified as garbled, and 99.5–100% of HarmBench responses are classified as coherent. To measure instruction-following ability, we evaluated the clean and attacked systems on IFEval [5]. We report prompt-level strict accuracy, which measures the percentage of prompts for which all verifiable instructions are satisfied.
The largest drops in MATH500 accuracy are accompanied by substantially shorter generated reasoning. For example, under the two-agent supervised attack, accuracy falls from 65.4 to 18.4, while median reasoning length decreases from 250 to 5 words.
Instruction following is also affected in some settings. Under the same two-agent attack, IFEval decreases from 51.4 to 47.7, while mixture poisoning causes a larger decline from 74.3 to 45.5. These results suggest that utility loss is associated with shorter generated reasoning and, in some settings, reduced instruction following.
| Topology | Attack | MATH500: clean → attacked | Median reasoning words: clean → attacked | IFEval: clean → attacked |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Two-agent | Supervised | 65.4 → 18.4 | 250 → 5 | 51.4 → 47.7 |
| Two-agent | Poisoning | 65.4 → 64.0 | 250 → 236 | 51.4 → 55.8 |
| Sequential | Supervised | 59.6 → 25.8 | 194 → 8 | 57.5 → 49.7 |
| Sequential | Poisoning | 59.6 → 44.2 | 194 → 98 | 57.5 → 48.6 |
| Mixture | Supervised | 77.0 → 48.0 | 178 → 122 | 74.3 → 60.4 |
| Mixture | Poisoning | 77.0 → 29.2 | 178 → 29 | 74.3 → 45.5 |
The following example illustrates this change in generated reasoning. After the supervised attack, the response remains readable and follows the requested answer format, but incorrectly gives the lower bound of the solution interval as 0.6 instead of −3.6 and therefore returns the wrong answer.
Q: How many integers are in the solution set of ?
Gold answer: 11
Clean response (excerpt)
The absolute value inequality is equivalent to … We rewrite it as . Adding 2 to all parts: … The smallest integer greater than or equal to is , and the largest integer less than or equal to is . The integers from to inclusive are: , , , , , , , , , , . Counting these integers, we have a total of 11 integers in the solution set.
Final Answer:
Response after supervised attack
The solution set is all real numbers between 0.6 and 7.6 inclusive. The number of integers in the solution set is 7. Final Answer:
5. Two-agent poisoning-rate analysis
Our initial poisoning-rate analysis focused on systems with multiple communication links, namely the sequential and mixture topologies. Following your suggestion, we extended the analysis to the two-agent system and included the results in the revised paper.
The two-agent results also show a non-monotonic relationship between poisoning rate and harmful compliance. Among the evaluated rates, the highest mean score is 65.9 at 30% poisoning, compared with 49.4 at 10% and 31.2 for the clean system.
| Poisoning rate | HarmBench | StrongREJECT | JBB | AdvBench | Mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0% (clean) | 39.3 | 36.9 | 36.6 | 11.5 | 31.2 |
| 10% | 59.2 | 54.5 | 48.5 | 34.7 | 49.2 |
| 20% | 58.0 | 53.0 | 53.0 | 28.1 | 48.0 |
| 30% | 63.0 | 64.2 | 76.0 | 60.2 | 65.9 |
| 40% | 45.5 | 49.2 | 37.0 | 19.0 | 37.7 |
| 50% | 61.0 | 59.7 | 58.0 | 35.0 | 53.4 |
Best regards,
The Authors
Reference
[5] Zhou, J., Lu, T., et al. Instruction-Following Evaluation for Large Language Models. (CoRR 2023)
Thank you for the rebuttal and experiments. The clarifications and new results have largely addressed my other concerns. However, the experiments reveal substantial degradation in general reasoning ability, especially the drops in MATH500 accuracy and reasoning length. This reinforces my concern that increased harmful compliance may, in some case, just reflect the broader degradation in reasoning or in communication capabilities. Since this distinction remains unresolved, I will maintain my original score.
Follow-up: Harmful Compliance and Reasoning Performance
Dear Reviewer,
Thank you for following up on this point. We agree that a broader disruption of reasoning or communication may contribute to harmful compliance in settings where both MATH500 accuracy and the length of the generated reasoning decline. In our reward-guided and poisoning experiments, however, we also observe settings in which modifying the communication links alone substantially increases harmful compliance while MATH500 accuracy remains close to or above the clean baseline. Specifically:
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Reward-guided attack. The RL attack raises harmful compliance while largely preserving MATH500 accuracy. It reaches 81.3 / 53.8 / 95.9% ASR on the 2-Agent / Sequential / Mixture topologies, while MATH500 stays at 63.8 / 68.8 / 80.8 (clean: 65.4 / 59.6 / 77.0). On Mixture it gives the highest ASR of all attacks with higher reasoning accuracy than the clean system.
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Two-agent poisoning. 2-Agent poisoning increases ASR (31.2 → 49.4%) with little change in MATH500 accuracy or reasoning length. MATH500 is 64.0 vs. 65.3 clean; the median reasoning length is 236 vs. 250 words.
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Comparison within the same topology. ASR does not consistently track the degree of degradation. On the 2-Agent topology, the heavily degraded supervised link (MATH500 18.4) reaches a lower ASR (78.7%) than the RL link (81.7%, MATH500 63.8). On Mixture, the degraded poisoning link (MATH500 32.0) reaches 69.6% ASR, compared with 95.9% for the RL link (MATH500 80.6).
These comparisons show that harmful compliance can increase substantially even when performance on MATH500 remains close to or above the clean baseline.
Best regards,
The authors
Generalizability and repair evaluation (Part 1/2)
Part 1/2: Generalizability and repair evaluation
Dear Reviewer 58re,
Thank you for your constructive feedback. We address your comments and present the additional experimental results below.
1. Limited generalizability
When agents use different LLMs, their internal representations can differ in dimensionality and semantics. Recent frameworks such as RecursiveMAS [1] and Interlat [2] address this challenge using learned links to connect heterogeneous agents. These links introduce an additional component whose training can affect the behavior of the composed system, motivating our study of its safety.
Training-free approaches make different compatibility assumptions. StateBridge [3], for example, evaluates agents sharing the same underlying model and leaves heterogeneous transfer to future work. LatentMAS [4] relies on compatible internal representations for KV-cache sharing. We will clarify in the revised paper that our attack and repair results concern trainable projection links.
2. Practical applicability
Thank you for this suggestion. We consider two practical scenarios in which a developer either obtains a pretrained communication link or trains one using externally sourced data:
Compromised link. A developer may download a pre-trained link to connect independently obtained models, such as a Llama-based planner and a Qwen-based solver. A malicious link provider could train the link to induce harmful compliance and publish it alongside instructions for connecting the agents. Our supervised and reward-guided attacks model how such a link could be created while leaving the LLM weights unchanged.
Poisoned training data. Instead of downloading a link, the developer may instead train a link using data from public repositories or external contributors. An attacker who can insert harmful query–response pairs into this data can influence the resulting link without the need to access its training procedure. Our poisoning experiment models this scenario.
3. Potential data leakage in repair evaluation
Our repair method requires harmful queries to guide the optimization toward refusal behavior. In our experiments, we used AdvBench queries for this purpose and evaluated the repaired systems on HarmBench, StrongREJECT, JailbreakBench, and AdvBench. We agree that using AdvBench for both repair and evaluation can bias the AdvBench score and the aggregate that includes it. The other three benchmarks were not used as sources of harmful repair queries.
Excluding AdvBench from the original evaluation average, the mean harmful-compliance score decreases from 71.6 before repair to 6.1 after repair, compared with 70.5 to 4.7 when including it. The reduction holds across all nine attack–topology configurations. Thus, the substantial repair effect remains.
To further assess whether the repair effect depends on using AdvBench as the training source, we additionally repeated the experiment using each of the four benchmarks as the source of harmful queries. For each setting, we observe low post-repair scores on the other three benchmarks indicating that effective repair is not specific to AdvBench.
We will make this distinction explicit in the revised paper and report repair-source performance separately from cross-benchmark performance.
Table 1. Repair using different sources of harmful queries.
Each column identifies the repair-query source. Cells show the post-repair harmful-compliance score on the source benchmark / the mean score across the other three benchmarks; lower is better.
References
[1] Zou, J., Pan, R., et al. Recursive Multi-Agent Systems. (NeurIPS 2026)
[2] Du, Z., Wang, R., et al. Enabling Agents to Communicate Entirely in Latent Space. (ACL 2026)
[3] Peng, Y., Zhang, D. C., et al. StateBridge: Training-free Hidden-state Alignment for Latent Communication in LLM Multi-Agent Systems. (COLM 2026)
[4] Zou, J., Qiu, R., et al. Latent Collaboration in Multi-Agent Systems. (ICML 2026)