- Rating
- 3(+1)
- Confidence
- 2(−1)
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
The paper identifies a vulnerability in robot imitation learning: demonstrations that successfully complete tasks can still teach policies physically costly execution patterns. It introduces Fatigue Injection, a data-poisoning method that adds small alternating action perturbations during demonstration collection and retains only successful rollouts. Its contributions are this threat model and construction method, together with evaluation using a torque-based fatigue proxy and absolute mechanical work. Experiments on LIBERO-10 and two real-world Franka manipulation tasks, using π0.5, GR00T N1.5, and cross-architecture transfer with Diffusion Policy, show substantially increased physical-cost metrics while maintaining comparable task success at selected perturbation levels.
Critical strengths
- The paper is clearly written and generally easy to follow. Its illustrations help communicate the attack construction and the distinction between task success and physical execution costs.
- The perturbation design is simple and heuristic, yet the experiments show that it can induce substantially higher torque-based fatigue scores and mechanical work while preserving comparable task success at selected perturbation levels. Validation in both simulation and real-robot tasks supports the relevance of this failure mode.
Critical weaknesses
My main reservation concerns the practical scope and resource requirements of the malicious-data-provider threat model. The experiments demonstrate a failure mode, but the claim that the attacker assumptions are weak and realistic would benefit from a more concrete account of the resources required.
- The cost of constructing poisoned demonstrations is insufficiently characterized. The real-robot procedure requires executing perturbed actions during data collection, potentially imposing additional physical burden on the collection hardware for attackers. This does not invalidate the attack, but it raises a practical question about its cost.
- The threat model assumes a potentially restrictive combination of attacker capabilities. The attacker must have access to a competent source policy and a compatible robot data-collection setup, and must be able to deploy that policy and modify its control commands to generate poisoned demonstrations. This combines the capabilities of a data supplier, a deployment engineer able to operate a robot rollout pipeline, and—when source-policy training or adaptation is required—an ML engineer at a model company or research lab. It is unclear why a malicious data contributor would realistically possess this combination of capabilities. Although using a pretrained policy may remove the need for source-policy training, it does not eliminate the deployment and data-collection requirements. The paper should justify why these combined capabilities constitute a weak and realistic attacker assumption, particularly when data collection, deployment, and model development are handled by separate parties.
- The practical significance of the attack depends on whether this combined role is plausible. If data collection and policy development are handled by separate parties, a malicious contributor may not possess the policy-deployment capabilities assumed here. Please explain which realistic provider or insider could exercise the required control over both rollout generation and demonstration collection, rather than treating this access as inherent to being a data supplier.
Questions for authors
- Appendix C explains that directly modifying action labels in existing demonstrations can break consistency between the recorded actions and subsequent observations. Have you compared the proposed online collection procedure with offline action-label perturbation under comparable conditions? Such a comparison would clarify whether transition-consistent collection is empirically necessary for inducing the reported downstream physical costs, rather than only desirable for constructing valid demonstrations.
I would consider raising my score if the authors convincingly justify the assumed combination of attacker capabilities and clarify the necessity of the proposed data-collection procedure.
6 comments
Response to Reviewer cdqN (2/3)
[W2] Attacker capabilities and scope
We thank the reviewer for raising this important point. Here, we clarify who could realistically possess the required combination of capabilities. We agree that our rollout-based procedure requires the attacker to (i) collect demonstrations, (ii) obtain a source policy, and (iii) deploy it to record poisoned rollouts. We have stated this explicitly in Section 4.1. However, we emphasize that recent advances in robotics have substantially lowered these barriers to performing all three steps, , making our proposed attack increasingly accessible to individual practitioners with commodity hardware and open-source tools. For example:
- Low-cost hardware: Open-source robots such as SO-ARM [1] provide affordable hardware for teleoperation and demonstration collection.
- End-to-end tooling: LeRobot [2] supports demonstration recording, policy training, and on-robot rollout recording within one pipeline.
- Pretrained policies: SmolVLA [3], pretrained on public community data, can be fine-tuned on a single consumer GPU.
These resources allow a single contributor to handle data collection, policy adaptation, and rollout recording. For the insider case, robot learning engineer positions at several companies explicitly cover both demonstration collection and the deployment of trained policies on real robots [4,5]. An engineer in such a role could control both rollout generation and data recording, even if the source policy were developed by another team.
Such contributors can share demonstrations through platforms such as the Hugging Face Hub, and poisoned contributions could influence multiple downstream models if incorporated into their training data. Based on these examples, we define the attacker’s capabilities as demonstration collection, policy training or adaptation when needed, and policy execution for rollout collection, and we consider a threat model combining these roles to be realistic.
[1] https://huggingface.co/docs/lerobot/so101
[2] https://huggingface.co/lerobot
[3] https://huggingface.co/blog/smolvla#community-datasets
[5] https://www.proception.ai/careers/a9526836-2c4f-468d-ae43-ad2da7b6c029
Response to Reviewer cdqN (3/3)
[Q1] Offline action-label perturbation vs. online collection
We thank the reviewer for suggesting this comparison. We compared offline action-label perturbation against our online collection procedure using on LIBERO-10 with the perturbation scale fixed at .
| Method | SR (%) | CFD ratio |
|---|---|---|
| Offline action-label perturbation | ||
| Online collection (ours) |
Note. Both policies were trained for ten epochs. Following the main text, CFD ratios are reported as the mean over the two most vulnerable joints (Joints 3 and 5). Values are reported as mean standard deviation across seeds.
As illustrated in the table, we observe that both perturbation methods yield similarly large CFD ratios, suggesting that transition-consistent collection is not strictly necessary for inducing the physical cost itself. Online collection achieves a slightly higher success rate, although the difference is small. We adopt online collection because it keeps the poisoned demonstrations consistent between actions and observations; we discuss this consistency further in Appendix C.
We hope these clarifications address the reviewer’s concerns. We would be grateful for any further questions, and for the reviewer’s consideration of a score revision if the responses are found satisfactory.
Response to Reviewer cdqN (1/3)
We sincerely thank the reviewer for the thoughtful questions, which concern the core assumptions of our work. We address each point below.
[W1] The cost of constructing poisoned dataset
We agree with the reviewer that executing perturbed actions on a real robot during demonstration collection places an additional physical burden on the attacker’s hardware. This burden is part of the cost of constructing a poisoned demonstration dataset, and we have made this point explicit in the revised limitation section.
The attacker and the victim, however, incur this burden over different periods. For the attacker’s robot, the additional burden is limited to the demonstration collection phase. For the victim’s robot, fatigue damage can accumulate in its components each time the deployed policy repeats the perturbed actions. With repeated use over an extended period, the cumulative burden on the victim’s hardware can therefore exceed the burden on the attacker’s hardware during data collection.
Finally, as shown in our response to Q1, comparable physical costs are also induced when the action labels of previously collected demonstrations are modified offline. This option requires no execution of perturbed actions and thus imposes no additional burden on the attacker’s hardware during data poisoning.