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Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

MIRT: Transformers for Truthful Generative Auctions with Whole-Feed Permutation Externalities

Abstract

Modern online platforms commonly rank ads and organic content separately before blending them into a feed displayed to the user, overlooking externalities: an item's click-through rate depends on its surrounding content, not only on its own position. Recent learning-based feed generation mechanisms model some of these cross-type interactions to globally optimize for the whole feed's welfare. However, these approaches either fix the ordering of organic content, or lack exact strategyproofness guarantees for bidders. To combat these shortfalls, we introduce the Maximal-in-Range Transformer (MIRT) mechanism class, which uses a transformer to generate a range of candidate feeds that jointly order ads and organic content, selects the welfare-maximizing feed in the range. However, there is a tension: strategyproofness requires the generated range to be bid-independent, even though a candidate feed's welfare depends linearly on the bids. Our key technical contribution is a reinforcement learning approach that incorporates both candidate generation and bid-aware selection into training, enabling a bid-independent transformer to learn to generate high-welfare ranges by accounting for both individual feed quality and the collective quality of the range. Additionally, we bound the pseudo-dimension of the MIRT class under hard attention, showing that near-optimal expected welfare is learnable with sample complexity polynomial in the transformer size and only logarithmic in the range size. Empirically, MIRT outperforms the previous non-strategyproof state-of-the-art feed models while remaining exactly strategyproof. Our results show that transformer-based auctions can deliver externality-aware whole-feed optimization without sacrificing exact incentive compatibility, removing a major obstacle to their practical deployment.

Primary area:
other topics in machine learning (i.e., none of the above)
Keywords:
mechanism design, auctions, ad auctions, ranking, differentiable economics

Reviews

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Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 1.67 over 3 reviews, above 10% of the others.
Reviewer_tYEuOpenReview ↗
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1
Confidence
1
Informativeness
2
Presentation
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2
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Paper summary

The paper addresses joint ranking of ads and organic content in a feed when an item's engagement depends on its surrounding content (permutation externalities), while retaining exact dominant-strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC) for advertisers. MIRT defines a maximal-in-range (MIR) mechanism: a permutation-equivariant encoder–decoder transformer with pointer output generates a bid-independent range of K candidate feeds, and at serving time the welfare-maximising feed in the range is selected under the reported bids with VCG transfers over the same range, which yields strategyproofness by construction. The transformer is trained with on-policy policy-gradient RL (POMO-style REINFORCE with a rollout baseline) whose reward is the expected best-of-K welfare over sampled bid profiles, so the range is optimised collectively rather than feed by feed. The paper additionally bounds the pseudo-dimension of the MIRT welfare class under hard attention, giving sample complexity polynomial in transformer size and logarithmic in the range width, and evaluates the mechanism in synthetic feed environments against random/greedy MIR baselines, the non-strategyproof neural mechanisms CGA and NGA, and bid-aware beam search.

Critical strengths
  • Using a bid-independent MIR range with VCG transfers is the correct route to exact DSIC for whole-feed joint ranking, where approximate-regret methods violate by about 10% of advertiser utility.
  • The architecture follows the mechanism's needs (permutation-equivariant encoder, once-encoded shared pool, masking that enforces composition by construction, per-rollout conditioning for range diversity).
  • Training on expected best-of-K welfare is the right objective for a range rather than a single feed, and the pseudo-dimension bound makes the range-size dependence only logarithmic.
Critical weaknesses
  1. The theorem certifies a hard-attention, deterministic beam-search class, whereas the deployed model samples ranges with soft attention at a tuned temperature, and nothing is proven about REINFORCE reaching the near-optimal member.
  2. Revenue is unanalysed and appears to collapse (every mechanism in Fig. 2 has negative revenue lift over Random+MIR), which is fatal for a mechanism intended for deployment.
  3. The CGA/NGA comparison is not like-for-like (re-implementations with a tuned regret penalty and the authors' own regret estimator), and bid-aware beam search beats MIRT on total welfare in about half the settings.
  4. The default externality γ_j = 1 + 0.5·sim(ad, previous slot) with η_below = 0 is not a whole-feed permutation externality, and all evidence comes from a bespoke synthetic simulator.
  5. Deployment claims are unsubstantiated — "flat latency" is asserted without hardware, memory or throughput numbers, each bid prior requires separate retraining, and there is no limitations section, code or simulator release.
Questions for authors
  1. The theorem certifies a hard-attention, deterministic beam-search class, whereas the deployed model samples ranges with soft attention at a tuned temperature, and nothing is proven about REINFORCE reaching the near-optimal member.
  2. Revenue is unanalysed and appears to collapse (every mechanism in Fig. 2 has negative revenue lift over Random+MIR), which is fatal for a mechanism intended for deployment.
  3. The CGA/NGA comparison is not like-for-like (re-implementations with a tuned regret penalty and the authors' own regret estimator), and bid-aware beam search beats MIRT on total welfare in about half the settings.
  4. The default externality γ_j = 1 + 0.5·sim(ad, previous slot) with η_below = 0 is not a whole-feed permutation externality, and all evidence comes from a bespoke synthetic simulator.
  5. Deployment claims are unsubstantiated — "flat latency" is asserted without hardware, memory or throughput numbers, each bid prior requires separate retraining, and there is no limitations section, code or simulator release.
1 comment
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

MIRT: Transformers for Truthful Generative Auctions – Author Responsev

Q1 – We acknowledge there is a gap between the assumptions of the theorem and the practical implementation. Simplifying assumptions are often necessary when attempting to prove theoretical results about deep learning methods. Please note that most papers that provide theoretical results on the generalization and sample complexity of transformers make similar assumptions, as piecewise linearity is the workhorse of theoretical ML. For example, Bartlett et al. (2019) establish VC-dimension and pseudodimension bounds for networks with piecewise-linear activations, while Yang et al. (2026) establish transformer sample-complexity bounds using ReLU feed-forward layers and hard attention in place of softmax attention. Our analysis follows this tradition by providing guarantees for a precisely specified, idealised architecture.

We present additional experimental results using beam search (albeit with soft attention) in Appendix H, Table 5, which is closer to the theory, and performs worse than our ancestral decoding.

Q2 – Welfare is our primary objective, but we agree that the trade-off with revenue should be quantified, and we now do so in Appendix G.

Maximizing welfare and maximizing revenue necessarily trade off against each other to some extent (e.g., in the classic single-item auction case, the revenue-optimal auction requires a reserve price which reduces welfare).

Nonetheless, real-world ad platforms target welfare as their auction design objective and use other levers, such as reserve prices, to recover revenue. Our welfare-oriented objective is motivated by established practice and research in online advertising. Google researchers Deng et al. (2024) describe aggregate advertiser welfare as a common objective for improving channel health; Facebook researchers study welfare-maximizing allocation for content-feed advertising, with reserve prices as a separate lever for controlling revenue (Colini-Baldeschi et al., 2020, The Ad Types Problem), and motivate auction design through advertiser retention and service quality (Colini-Baldeschi et al., 2020, Envy, Regret, and Social Welfare Loss).

However, if revenue is the desired mechanism design objective, we also present several solutions. We give a virtual-welfare version of our mechanism that maximizes expected revenue over the range, and training on a welfare/virtual-welfare mix raises revenue substantially at a small welfare cost, beating NGA-Strong on both while staying DSIC (Appendix G, Table 4, Figure 6).

Q3 – We thank the reviewer for their feedback which has helped us improve our implementation of the CGA and NGA baselines. We retrained CGA and NGA with the simulator as their evaluator, MIRT’s network and three times the training budget (Appendix F.4, Table 5–Strong CGA/NGA); their welfare stayed within 0.2% of the original re-implementations while their transfer rose and regret grew from 17% to 24%, so the welfare gap to MIRT is not an artefact of our re-implementation or of the regret penalty. Additionally, ρ\rho is tuned for CGA/NGA to keep regret low as long as it is not costing significant revenue.

Despite extensive tuning, baselines still show significant regret. RegretNet-style methods are known to be very sensitive to hyperparameters (“Auction learning as a two-player game”, Rahme et al. 2020).

We ablated a non-DSIC bid-aware version of MIRT that takes bids as input in the context (Appendix I, Table 11). This variant achieves 2.5% more welfare and a regret of 25%.

Q4 – We do provide experiments with other permutation externalities (Appendix B, Table 1). However, with our default permutation externality, we still face the central challenge in this setting, namely that one cannot simply run a position auction to maximize welfare as is possible in the classic model with separable, independent quality and position effects. We therefore think it is a reasonable default choice.

Real-world auction data is valuable and closely held by large advertising platforms, so there are no useful public datasets available. Prior papers that test on real-world data (e.g. CGA, NGA, GenAuction) do not publish engagement data. We see our simulator as a reasonable way to study the mechanism design problem, which is challenging and interesting even on synthetic data. Our methods can be applied to real-world data if and when it becomes available.

Q5.

We have now measured latency (Appendix I, Table 9): For a single example, MIRT takes 21 to 23 ms per context for every KK from 8 to 512 and 29 ms at K=1024K=1024 (decoded in parallel; Single H200). Greedy+MIR grows from 0.3 to 40 ms. Training on a bid prior perturbed by 30% noise changes welfare by under 0.1% (Table 13). DSIC is preserved by construction independently of the prior. We will add a limitations section and will release code, simulator and checkpoints.

Reviewer_wKFrOpenReview ↗
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2
Confidence
4
Informativeness
1
Presentation
3
Soundness
1
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Paper summary

This paper studies joint ranking of advertisements and organic content. It proposes MIRT, which uses a Transformer Neural Network to generate a bid-independent range of candidate feeds, maximizes reported welfare within this range, and computes VCG transfers over the same range. This construction guarantees exact dominant-strategy incentive compatibility under the assumed public engagement model. The generator is trained through reinforcement learning to maximize the expected welfare of the best candidate across sampled bid profiles. The paper also provides sample-complexity bounds for a restricted model class and evaluates the approach in synthetic environments.

Critical strengths
  1. Joint feed optimization under permutation externalities is a meaningful problem. Separating bid-independent range generation from bid-dependent welfare maximization provides a clear structural guarantee of incentive compatibility. This is a substantive distinction from approaches that encourage truthful behavior through empirical regret penalties.
  2. Optimizing the expected best candidate under different bid profiles captures the importance of complementary candidates within a range. This formulation addresses a concrete challenge introduced by bid independence: generating useful alternatives before observing the current bids. The theoretical analysis and experiments across several externality models provide useful initial support for this approach.
Critical weaknesses
  1. GenAuction (AAAI 2025) already combines candidate generation, contextual evaluation, and VCG payments, while TICNet, introduced in A Context-Aware Framework for Integrating Ad Auctions and Recommendations (WWW 2025), addresses joint allocation of advertisements and organic content. GenAuction is cited but only briefly discussed, and TICNet is absent from the comparison. Although MIRT’s bid-independent range provides a concrete distinction, the paper should explain more precisely how it differs from these approaches. Since the truthfulness guarantee follows from the classical MIR–VCG construction, the paper should more clearly highlight the novelty of the learned range construction and its training procedure.

  2. According to Appendix F, the adapted CGA and NGA baselines learn evaluators that approximate the synthetic environment’s engagement and welfare functions, whereas MIRT evaluates candidate feeds using the specified welfare function directly. MIRT also uses a substantially larger network, and the baselines undergo architectural modifications to accommodate the joint-ranking setting. These differences confound attribution of the reported improvements to the proposed method. Comparisons controlling evaluator accuracy, model capacity, and computational budget are needed to establish the strength of the empirical claims.

  3. The range-size experiments demonstrate the benefit of considering more candidates, but do not establish the benefit of the proposed training objective itself. A particularly informative comparison would use the same generator and candidate budget while contrasting individual-feed training with range-level training. Similarly, comparing fixed organic ordering with joint reordering would clarify the contribution of whole-feed optimization. Because the DSIC guarantee holds independently of generator quality, these controlled experiments are essential to demonstrate that the proposed learning approach offers substantial welfare improvements over simpler bid-independent generators equipped with the same MIR–VCG mechanism.

Questions for authors
  1. The training reward depends on sampled bids, whereas the DSIC guarantee relies on the candidate range being independent of current reports. Please clarify the information and timing assumptions: are the generator parameters and sampling policy fixed throughout each auction, and are allocation and VCG payments computed over the same sampled range? Is the guarantee limited to auctions with a frozen model, rather than covering strategic effects of bids on subsequent retraining?
  2. The best-of-(K) objective optimizes expected performance over the training bid distribution, but does not establish that the generated range contains a near-optimal allocation for a particular auction. Could the authors quantify the gap to the unrestricted welfare optimum on small, exactly solvable instances? With the architecture, range size, and compute budget fixed, how much does range-level training improve over an individual-feed objective? A matched bid-aware generator, used as an optimization benchmark, would also help quantify the cost of withholding current bids during generation.
  3. Appendix F suggests that the adapted CGA/NGA baselines use learned evaluators to approximate the environment, while MIRT directly evaluates candidates using the specified engagement and welfare functions. The model capacities also differ substantially. Could the authors provide controlled comparisons that align evaluator access, model capacity, and computational budget, so that improvements attributable to range learning can be distinguished from these other factors?
3 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

MIRT: Transformers for Truthful Generative Auctions – Author Response

We thank the reviewer for these insightful questions.

Q1 – When running an auction, the generator parameters and sampling policy are fixed. These are used to generate a bid-independent range. Then, the optimal single feed from this bid-independent range is chosen using the observed bids, and the same range is used to calculate the VCG payments (or Myerson payments if maximizing virtual welfare), for every realised sample of the range, since it is drawn before the reports are seen. As a result, our mechanism is strategyproof. Training uses fresh sampled bids from the prior, not the reported bids used at test time. We follow the standard mechanism design model and assume that a strategyproof mechanism induces truthful behavior by bidders. If the model were later retrained on reported bids, bidders might strategically respond. This is outside the scope of our model, but is a promising direction for future work.

Q2 – Gap to the unrestricted optimum on exactly solvable instances. We built two settings small enough to brute force solve (4,320 and 241,920 permutations) and ran VCG over all of them (Appendix I, Table 10). MIRT’s range in these small settings contains near optimal feeds. (99.2% of the optimum's welfare at K=32K=32, 99.9% at K=256K=256, with almost all of the remaining gap on the advertiser side.)

Q2 – Range-level training versus individual-feed objective. MIRT's default reward is the best feed in the range, trained with PKPO. We ablated this with two variants that (1) use the mean welfare over the KK feeds as the reward and (2) are trained to generate a single feed (K=1K=1), with the same network and training length, and all are evaluated on the same range of KK feeds. Both lose 1–2% of welfare and 40–65% of transfer. Additionally, fixing the organic posts in descending value order costs about 0.5% of welfare (Appendix I, Table 12).

Q2 – Bid-aware generator. We trained the same architecture with the reported bids added to the context as the model's input (Appendix I, Table 11); it gains 2.5% total welfare mostly for advertisers. Of course, after looking at the bids, the mechanism is not strategyproof, and regret increased to 25%.

Q3 – Comparisons to CGA and NGA. We retrained CGA and NGA with the simulator as their evaluator in place of the learned one, with MIRT’s encoder (hidden size 128, 8 heads, 4 layers), and with three times the generator training, first one change at a time and then all three together (Appendix F.4, CGA-Strong and NGA-Strong in Table 5). Evaluator access, encoder size and training length do not explain the welfare gap. Welfare stayed within 0.2% of the original, transfers rose, and regret grew from 17% to 24%.

Related auction techniques:

There are some key distinctions between all of the mentioned works and our own. TICNet, CGA, and NGA all use a RegretNet-style approach: they can be trained to perform well while reducing regret, but are not exactly strategyproof (and furthermore methods to measure regret give only a lower bound on the true violation).

GenAuction uses VCG payments over its generated candidates, but the concrete learned mechanism as described is not guaranteed to be strategyproof with VCG payments, both because the generator takes bids as input, and because the evaluator's objective differs from welfare.

By contrast, our learned mechanisms for joint ad-organic optimization maximize welfare over a bid-independent range, so are exactly strategyproof as implemented (and we additionally present virtual-welfare MIR mechanisms using the corresponding Myerson payments).

We thank the reviewer for pointing out TICNet, a closely related work which we will cite and discuss carefully. TICNet also models a joint ad-organic ranking problem, but assumes slot-separable CTRs, without the types of whole-feed effects we model. This allows their neural architecture to represent an allocation in terms of fractional item-slot assignment probabilities. We instead generate and select discrete whole feeds.

We agree that MIR mechanisms are a classic mechanism design concept. Our contribution is a novel technique for training a generator via RL to produce a high-performing bid-independent range, despite being unable to look at bids. We will emphasize this more in the introduction and section 3.

Thank you for your answers. My question remains about the distinctions between prior works. One main distinction I found is that you use a generator to produce candidates without bids. But to compute buyer ii's payment under the VCG rule, we need to compute the maximum welfare when buyer ii participates in the auction and the maximum welfare when buyer ii does not participate. The difference between these two welfare values is buyer ii's payment. In your model, you fix the generated list, then compute buyer ii's payment. However, for the welfare excluding buyer ii, I think the list generation also needs to exclude the buyer ii's ads. So, VCG payment needs much higher computational resources, right?

Another question is that your method is modest. Because each component has been established in prior mechanism design literature. So I maintain my score.

Thank you for your reply. We think there may be a misunderstanding about our method. First, we fix the range (for our method, produced using our trained generator, but in general, the range of an MIR mechanism can be generated arbitrarily as long as it is bid independent). Then, to calculate VCG payments, we can select the welfare-maximizing feed, and the welfare-maximizing feed not counting bidder i's welfare, both from the same fixed range. This is the standard MIR approach, which is DSIC, and there is no need to generate any additional elements beyond the single fixed range. The only additional computational costs to calculate VCG payments are from additional feed evaluations (to maximize over the range ignoring each bidder's welfare in turn), which are much less costly than feed generation.

Reviewer_gUEsOpenReview ↗
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2
Confidence
3
Informativeness
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Paper summary

This paper studies joint ad–organic feed ranking under permutation externalities. The proposed MIRT framework uses reinforcement learning to train a Transformer to generate a bid-independent range of complete feeds. It then maximizes welfare within this range and applies VCG payments, ensuring DSIC under the stated modeling assumptions. The authors also provide sample-complexity bounds for an idealized Transformer setting and report total-welfare improvements over adapted CGA/NGA baselines in synthetic experiments.

Critical strengths

MIRT combines whole-feed generation under permutation externalities with an exact DSIC guarantee, providing a principled alternative to mechanisms that encourage truthfulness through empirical regret penalties. The reported welfare improvements suggest that this structural incentive guarantee can be maintained without sacrificing performance relative to the evaluated baselines.

Critical weaknesses

The method relies on evaluating the expected welfare V(x,B)V(x,B) of unshown feeds for both training and within-range selection. In real systems, logged feedback is typically available only for the displayed sequence, so these counterfactual quantities require estimation. Although the synthetic environment makes them directly computable, the paper does not establish how reliably they could be estimated from real data or how estimation errors affect performance. This limits the evidence supporting the method’s practical applicability.

Questions for authors

Q1. Could the authors clarify how the engagement rates used to compute V(x,B)V(x,B) are obtained during training, within-range selection, and evaluation? Are they provided directly by the synthetic environment or estimated by a learned evaluator? If MIRT uses the environment’s response functions directly, how robust are the reported welfare gains when these functions are replaced by learned estimates? Q2. Although training uses bid profiles to evaluate range quality, the generator cannot adapt its candidates to the current bids. A limited range may therefore exclude feeds that would yield substantially higher welfare for a particular bid profile. How large is the welfare loss associated with this restriction? Could the authors quantify the absolute and relative welfare gaps against the full feasible-space optimum on tractable instances, or a bid-aware generator with a matched computational budget, and examine how these gaps vary with range size and bid heterogeneity? Q3. In Figure 3, organic welfare remains nearly constant as KK increases, while advertiser and total welfare improve. Is there any intuition? Does the maximum organic welfare available within each range also remain flat, or does it increase without being realized by the total-welfare selection rule? Reporting this quantity alongside the selected feed’s organic welfare would help distinguish limited gains in organic-welfare coverage from a trade-off between organic and advertiser welfare.

1 comment
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

MIRT: Transformers for Truthful Generative Auctions – Author Response

We thank the reviewer for these insightful questions.

Q1- We agree that in practice, V(x,B)V(x, B) for unshown feeds is not observed and must be estimated. From an industry perspective, in large ad systems, this estimation is feasible because the auction logs, for every request, the full candidate set with per-candidate, per-position predictions, bids, and reserves, including candidates that were not shown. This data can be used to train evaluators (e.g., CGA and NGA papers), where systems using such evaluators’ gains have been confirmed by online A/B tests (+3.2% and +1.9% RPM for CGA and NGA). Furthermore, in practice, the evaluator can be validated against randomized traffic and against the measured deltas of logged A/B tests.

Given this practical context, we believe that our model is reasonable: we design a mechanism which relies on an accurate estimate of V(x,B)V(x, B) as a component. Analytically, if every estimate is within a factor 1±ϵ1 \pm \epsilon of the truth, the feed MIR selects on the estimates has true welfare within 2ϵ2\epsilon of the best feed in the range. Empirically, we trained models on noisy ad qualities, post values and bid priors, and also served them on noisy estimates of qualities/values. Training on noise costs at most 0.17% of welfare at test time with accurate VV. Serving on estimates that are off by 24% on average, enough to change the best ad in 38% of contexts, costs 0.8-1.6% of welfare, and measured regret stays at 1.1-2.3% of advertiser utility (Appendix I–Table 13).

Q2 - On some small, exactly solvable instances (Appendix I, Table 10), we find that MIRT reaches 99.9% of the exact optimum at K=256K=256 and 100.0% at K=1024K=1024. We also train a version of MIRT with a bid-aware generator as an optimization benchmark. The results are in Appendix I, Table 11, and we find that the bid-aware generator gains 2.5% welfare. The bid-aware generator is unsurprisingly not strategyproof, with measured regret of 25%.

Q3 - Welfare for both user-welfare-maximizing and ad-welfare-maximizing feeds increases with KK, so the range does hold user-friendlier feeds as it grows. For the selected feed, user welfare stays constant and ad welfare increases as KK increases. The reason is that the user-welfare-maximizing feed in the range typically has about 3 less total welfare than the served one (30.1 vs 33.5 at K=1024K=1024 in Appendix I–Figure 8).

Generally, the model is trained to maximize total welfare; if the environment is defined so that ad welfare contributes more to the total welfare than user welfare (e.g., the statistics in Appendix D–Figure 4 show more expected gain from ad welfare than user welfare for the default environment), then the allocation trades better ad position/selection over a lower amount of organic welfare. However, we show that this user vs. ad welfare tradeoff can be balanced as needed using a weighted welfare combination (Appendix I–Figure 7).

Additionally, exact VCG on a smaller world shows that the flat user welfare w.r.t KK is indeed optimal. In Appendix I–Table 10, MIRT’s organic welfare matches the exact optimum at every KK, and all of its remaining gap is on the advertiser side. Organic welfare does not depend on the bids, so every feed in the range can already be near the organic optimum, and a larger range only needs to add coverage for different bid profiles on the advertiser side.

Comments on the paper

1 comment
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

MIRT: Transformers for Truthful Generative Auctions – Author Response

We thank the reviewers for their helpful comments and questions, including many suggested experiments which help to strengthen the results in the paper. In order to complete experiments answering these questions in the time and compute budget available to us, we tuned hyperparameters and improved the efficiency of our training scheme. We re-ran our top-line results under the changes for the sake of consistency. The changes are as follows:

Tuned model size. The model is smaller (one decoder layer, 1.12M parameters) and the training schedule reaches most of its final welfare within 20 epochs. Now, an epoch takes under 5 minutes on a single H200. (Section 3.1)

Added PKPO [Walder and Karkhanis, 2026] on top of POMO. It raised the final welfare by 1 percent and reduced the number of epochs needed, and it is designed to work where the objective is the best of K generations, which is extremely similar to the MIR use-case.

Regenerated tables and plots. All tables and plots were regenerated under a consistent set of hyperparameters.

Additional experiments on total transfer and virtual welfare. The main objective of the paper is social welfare. For platforms where total transfer, or both transfer and welfare, matter, we add training on virtual welfare and joint welfare/transfer objectives. (Appendix G)

Additional experimental results and responses to the reviewers are also posted in separate replies.

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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