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Paper summary
The paper proposes Neuron Auctions, a mechanism for advertising in LLM-generated responses that shifts the auctionable object from text to the model's internal representation space. Specifically, the authors identify brand-specific feedforward network neurons via an attribution procedure, and treat the number of amplified top-k neurons as a controllable intervention budget. The platform offers each advertiser a menu of (intervention level, price) pairs, with prices generated by neural networks and optimized for a combination of platform revenue and LLM-estimated user utility. Empirically, the paper demonstrates controllable brand promotion across Qwen3-4B, DeepSeek-R1-8B, and Llama-3-8B, showing the effectiveness of the proposed framework.
Critical strengths
- The idea about using FFN neurons as advertiser-specific is relatively novel.
- Empricial results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method.
Critical weaknesses
- There seems to be some problems with the theoretical results. The bounded-interference assumption is asserted rather than verified, and some assumptions are set arbitrarily without sufficient justifications or verifications on whether the assumptions hold in real world seetings.
- The user utility metric is entirely LLM-judged, with no human validation.
- Scalability concerns are unaddressed. Real advertising markets involve hundreds or thousands of advertisers. Using the current setting, this large number seems not easily adaptable to the current framework.
- Related work on activation steering and representation engineering is not sufficiently discussed.
- The framework is built on strong assumption that specific signals about brands or commodity are detectable in LLM latent representations via specific neurons, but whether this assumption holds for different LLMs, or trying to understand different mechanisms different LLMs use to encode such information (via a predefined probing protocol may be insufficient, say some LLMs may hide such information in the embedding layer, not the FFN layer), remain challenging, limiting the practical usage of the proposed framework.
The rebuttal actually reinforces the concern on the feasiblity of deploying such system in practise. The response re-explains the process to discover the specific neurons for auction, but it does not explain whether the selected top-k candidates will have actually have a significant impact on the behavior of LLMs. Of course the method can select top-k neurons, but if the LLMs do not have specific properties about the advertisement, even the selected candidates may have little to do with controlling the auction process. The two-staged retrieval and reranking process further adds complexity to the overall framework, making it less scalable. For example, sometimes it may be possible that the retriever may not be well matched with the neuron auction method, and it may be necessary to tune the retriever in order for it to fit the neuron auction method. This will add deployment cost, and making it less robust to different systems.
Questions for authors
Please try to address the weaknesses.
10 comments
Thank you for your insightful comments — New experiments and analyses on theoretical assumptions, human validation, scalability and activation steering (Part 2/3)
Human Validation (Weakness 2)
(Weakness 2) The user utility metric is entirely LLM-judged, with no human validation.
Thank you for highlighting the importance of human validation. We use an evaluator trained with human data and validated against human-calibrated VC-PPI reference labels [3]. On 5,837 held-out items, it achieves Pearson correlations of 0.85 for Response Relevance and 0.73 for Expression Coherence against human-caliberated labels. Since these dimensions form the basis of our user-utility proxy, this validation will support the reliability of our following quality measurements.
Using this evaluator, we compare Neuron Auctions with a stronger Prompt + Menu baseline (Appendix F), which uses prompts of varying strength levels to enourage the model to naturally incorprate ads into its responses. Both methods use the same scoring and menu-learning procedures, with response scores averaged across three queries before learning menus. The comparison covers ten advertiser pairs and nine control levels per advertiser.
The table below compares revenue and total utility at a user-utility weight of 0.1. Total utility is defined as revenue plus weighted user utility. Results are reported as mean ± standard deviation across five generation seeds, with advertiser pairs weighted equally.
| Advertiser pair | Neuron Auctions Revenue | Prompt + Menu Revenue | Neuron Auctions Total Utility | Prompt + Menu Total Utility |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Honda / Lipton | 0.2467 ± 0.0880 | 0.1804 ± 0.0699 | 0.2981 ± 0.0909 | 0.2723 ± 0.0688 |
| Jameson / Chivas | 0.3801 ± 0.0882 | 0.3484 ± 0.0413 | 0.4391 ± 0.0912 | 0.4407 ± 0.0413 |
| Logitech / Nespresso | 0.3288 ± 0.0593 | 0.4110 ± 0.0436 | 0.3862 ± 0.0553 | 0.5047 ± 0.0436 |
| Peloton / Lululemon | 0.3094 ± 0.1073 | 0.1527 ± 0.1089 | 0.3771 ± 0.1081 | 0.2459 ± 0.1099 |
| Red Cross / UNICEF | 0.2762 ± 0.0475 | 0.1673 ± 0.0015 | 0.3374 ± 0.0478 | 0.2602 ± 0.0014 |
| Nike / Spotify | 0.3027 ± 0.0871 | 0.3573 ± 0.0686 | 0.3692 ± 0.0846 | 0.4464 ± 0.0695 |
| Dell / Microsoft | 0.1839 ± 0.1221 | 0.0520 ± 0.0422 | 0.2512 ± 0.1128 | 0.1484 ± 0.0406 |
| Patagonia / GoPro | 0.1789 ± 0.1737 | 0.1334 ± 0.1276 | 0.2362 ± 0.1738 | 0.2224 ± 0.1247 |
| Barilla / Campbell’s | 0.3091 ± 0.1028 | 0.2631 ± 0.0702 | 0.3753 ± 0.1023 | 0.3532 ± 0.0691 |
| Audi / Bose | 0.2041 ± 0.1106 | 0.1495 ± 0.0749 | 0.2541 ± 0.1139 | 0.2438 ± 0.0749 |
| Mean | 0.2720 ± 0.0199 | 0.2215 ± 0.0157 | 0.3324 ± 0.0213 | 0.3138 ± 0.0149 |
Neuron Auctions achieves 22.8% higher mean revenue and 5.9% higher mean total utility. Appendix F provides the detailed experimental setup and pair-level results.
Scalability (Weakness 3)
(Weakness 3) Scalability concerns are unaddressed. Real advertising markets involve hundreds or thousands of advertisers. Using the current setting, this large number seems not easily adaptable to the current framework.
A scalable deployment can integrate our method with the candidate-selection pipeline used in conventional advertising systems. Given a user query, the platform can first retrieve and filter eligible, relevant advertisers from the full advertiser pool, then apply Neuron Auctions to a small shortlist to allocate and price their interventions within a shared response.
This architecture separates retrieval over a large advertiser pool from the within-response allocation and pricing problem addressed by our mechanism. The number of advertisers participating in each auction can therefore be controlled through the shortlist size, even when the platform serves hundreds or thousands of advertisers. Such a design is appropriate in LLM ad setting, as a single LLM response is expected to include only a small number of advertisements, consistent with constraints on response length, relevance, and readability.
Thank you for your insightful comments — New experiments and analyses on theoretical assumptions, human validation, scalability and activation steering (Part 3/3)
Activation Steering and Brand Representations (Weakness 4&5)
(Weakness 4) Related work on activation steering and representation engineering is not sufficiently discussed.
Thank you for highlighting these connections. Our approach belongs to the broader family of methods that control generation through internal activations. ActAdd constructs a steering vector from activation differences elicited by contrasting prompts and adds it during inference [4]. CAA averages residual-stream activation differences across positive and negative examples, then scales and adds the resulting direction during generation [5]. Representation Engineering provides a broader framework for understanding and controlling model behavior through internal representations [6]. Unlike ActAdd and CAA, which scale and add steering vectors derived from activation differences, we control recommendation strength by varying the number of FFN neurons selected through brand-specific attribution.
Our focus on identifying brand-related FFN coordinates also connects to knowledge-editing methods that locate and modify model components associated with specific factual knowledge. ROME identifies FFN computations involved in factual recall and applies a rank-one weight update [7], while MEMIT distributes updates across multiple FFN layers to edit many associations [8]. We share their emphasis on locating relevant FFN components, but modify the activations at the identified coordinates during inference rather than updating FFN weights.
(Weakness 5) The framework is built on strong assumption that specific signals about brands or commodity are detectable in LLM latent representations via specific neurons, but whether this assumption holds for different LLMs ... remain challenging
Thank you for raising this concern. Our method does not require that all knowledge about a brand resides in a small set of FFN neurons. It requires that intervening on the selected coordinates can influence brand recommendations, even when brand knowledge is also represented in other model components.
Section 4.1 and Appendix C provide evidence in various models, such as Qwen3-4B, DeepSeek-R1-8B, and Llama-3-8B. We further evaluate Qwen3-30B-A3B, a mixture-of-experts (MoE) model, across 30 advertiser pairs and 7,290 responses. Given the formatting constraints, we summarize the results below; Appendix E provides the full heatmaps and experimental details.
| Own neuron budget | Bidder 1 | Bidder 2 | Overall mean |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | −0.04 | −0.06 | −0.05 |
| 100 | 0.37 | 0.29 | 0.33 |
| 200 | 0.50 | 0.52 | 0.51 |
| 300 | 0.58 | 0.52 | 0.55 |
| 400 | 0.59 | 0.65 | 0.62 |
| 500 | 0.67 | 0.73 | 0.70 |
| 600 | 0.69 | 0.77 | 0.73 |
| 700 | 0.75 | 0.85 | 0.80 |
| 800 | 0.75 | 0.89 | 0.82 |
Values are normalized brand hit-count changes averaged over all opposing budgets; Overall mean averages the two bidder positions equally. Normalization uses the joint baseline and each bidder’s largest positive change over the full grid. Both bidders exhibit a monotonic increase in brand presence with their increasing intervention budgets, providing additional evidence that attributed FFN coordinates can influence brand recommendations across different LLM architectures.
References
[1] Dütting et al. (2024). Mechanism Design for Large Language Models. WWW.
[2] Liu et al. (2026). Incentive-Aware Multi-Fidelity Optimization for Generative Advertising in Large Language Models. arXiv:2604.06263.
[3] Turner-Smith et al. (2026). Evaluating and Pricing Advertisements in AI-Generated Responses. arXiv:2607.27686.
[4] Turner et al. (2023). Steering Language Models With Activation Engineering. arXiv:2308.10248.
[5] Panickssery et al. (2023). Steering Llama 2 via Contrastive Activation Addition. arXiv:2312.06681.
[6] Zou et al. (2023). Representation Engineering: A Top-Down Approach to AI Transparency. arXiv:2310.01405.
[7] Meng et al. (2022). Locating and Editing Factual Associations in GPT. NeurIPS.
[8] Meng et al. (2023). Mass-Editing Memory in a Transformer. ICLR.
Thank you for your insightful comments — New experiments and analyses on theoretical assumptions, human validation, scalability and activation steering (Part 1/3)
Thank you for your careful reading and constructive comments. Below, we address each of the weaknesses and questions in detail.
Theoretical Assumptions (Weakness 1)
Applying auction theory to LLM advertising requires the platform to define how advertisers influence generated responses and evaluate the resulting benefits. These tasks are challenging because generation and evaluation are costly, and the effects of different advertisers can interact within the same response. Such interactions make it difficult to derive meaningful incentive guarantees without structural assumptions.
Existing related work also relies on explicit assumptions. Dütting et al. [1] assume that advertisers prefer changes that move each token’s probability toward, but not past, its desired value. Liu et al. [2] assume that, when advertisers report truthfully, the chosen advertising configuration achieves expected total welfare within ϵ of the best achievable value.
In our approach, our problem formulation and incentive guarantee relies on two main conditions. We will state these conditions more explicitly and clarify their rationale in the revised manuscript.
First, we formulate the advertiser utility using form ui=viCi−pi, where ui is the advertiser utlity, vi is the value of one click, Ci is the estimated click rate, and pi is the price of this option. This simplifies advertiser preferences by assigning the same expected value vi to each click. In real world settings, platforms such as Google Ads explicitly considers advertisers who value clicks equally, providing a practical justification for the simplified utility model adopted in our method.
Second, we introduce the bounded-interference condition primarily as a tool for analyzing approximate DSIC. It serves as an analytical condition rather than a claim that ϵ is bounded. This condition allows us to account for nonzero cross-advertiser effects and derive a 2ϵ regret bound when interference is bounded by ϵ. Appendices G and H examine neuron-set overlap and cross-advertiser CTR-proxy changes, providing empirical context for this analysis.