acceptodds
Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

LLM Advertisement Based on Neuron Auctions

Abstract

As Large Language Models (LLMs) transition into conversational agents, genera- tive advertising emerges as a crucial monetization strategy. However, embedding advertisements within unstructured LLM outputs introduces a critical trilemma: balancing advertiser payoffs, platform revenue, and user experience. Existing methods, such as prompt injection or rigid position slots, disrupt semantic coher- ence and lack a parametric framework for independent control, rendering rigorous mechanism design intractable. To bridge this gap, we introduce Neuron Auctions, a novel paradigm that shifts the auction object from the surface text space to the LLM’s internal representations. Leveraging mechanistic interpretability, we iden- tify brand-specific feed-forward network (FFN) neuron sets with low overlap in the evaluated settings. We use neuron counts as fine-grained intervention budgets that serve as auctionable commodities. Building on this computational carrier, we design a menu-based auction mechanism and establish an approximate strategy- proofness guarantee under bounded cross-advertiser interference. The mechanism is further optimized for platform revenue while explicitly accounting for user utility, thereby discouraging overly aggressive interventions. Direct empirical comparisons against simple prompt-level and fixed-position ad insertion baselines show more responsive and consistent bid-dependent control over predicted click intent, while menu-training experiments demonstrate a controllable trade-off among platform revenue, advertiser utility, and user utility.

Primary area:
foundation or frontier models, including LLMs
Keywords:
Large Language Models, Generative Advertising, Mechanism Design, Mechanistic Interpretability

Reviews

Among:
Shape:
1234this paper, Bottom 27%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 2.00 over 3 reviews, above 27% of the others.
Reviewer_fq2ZOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

The paper proposes Neuron Auctions, a mechanism for advertising in LLM-generated responses that shifts the auctionable object from text to the model's internal representation space. Specifically, the authors identify brand-specific feedforward network neurons via an attribution procedure, and treat the number of amplified top-k neurons as a controllable intervention budget. The platform offers each advertiser a menu of (intervention level, price) pairs, with prices generated by neural networks and optimized for a combination of platform revenue and LLM-estimated user utility. Empirically, the paper demonstrates controllable brand promotion across Qwen3-4B, DeepSeek-R1-8B, and Llama-3-8B, showing the effectiveness of the proposed framework.

Critical strengths
  1. The idea about using FFN neurons as advertiser-specific is relatively novel.
  2. Empricial results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method.
Critical weaknesses
  1. There seems to be some problems with the theoretical results. The bounded-interference assumption is asserted rather than verified, and some assumptions are set arbitrarily without sufficient justifications or verifications on whether the assumptions hold in real world seetings.
  2. The user utility metric is entirely LLM-judged, with no human validation.
  3. Scalability concerns are unaddressed. Real advertising markets involve hundreds or thousands of advertisers. Using the current setting, this large number seems not easily adaptable to the current framework.
  4. Related work on activation steering and representation engineering is not sufficiently discussed.
  5. The framework is built on strong assumption that specific signals about brands or commodity are detectable in LLM latent representations via specific neurons, but whether this assumption holds for different LLMs, or trying to understand different mechanisms different LLMs use to encode such information (via a predefined probing protocol may be insufficient, say some LLMs may hide such information in the embedding layer, not the FFN layer), remain challenging, limiting the practical usage of the proposed framework.

The rebuttal actually reinforces the concern on the feasiblity of deploying such system in practise. The response re-explains the process to discover the specific neurons for auction, but it does not explain whether the selected top-k candidates will have actually have a significant impact on the behavior of LLMs. Of course the method can select top-k neurons, but if the LLMs do not have specific properties about the advertisement, even the selected candidates may have little to do with controlling the auction process. The two-staged retrieval and reranking process further adds complexity to the overall framework, making it less scalable. For example, sometimes it may be possible that the retriever may not be well matched with the neuron auction method, and it may be necessary to tune the retriever in order for it to fit the neuron auction method. This will add deployment cost, and making it less robust to different systems.

Questions for authors

Please try to address the weaknesses.

10 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Thank you for your insightful comments — New experiments and analyses on theoretical assumptions, human validation, scalability and activation steering (Part 1/3)

Thank you for your careful reading and constructive comments. Below, we address each of the weaknesses and questions in detail.

Theoretical Assumptions (Weakness 1)

(Weakness 1) There seems to be some problems with the theoretical results. The bounded-interference assumption is asserted rather than verified, and some assumptions are set arbitrarily without sufficient justifications or verifications on whether the assumptions hold in real world seetings.

Applying auction theory to LLM advertising requires the platform to define how advertisers influence generated responses and evaluate the resulting benefits. These tasks are challenging because generation and evaluation are costly, and the effects of different advertisers can interact within the same response. Such interactions make it difficult to derive meaningful incentive guarantees without structural assumptions.

Existing related work also relies on explicit assumptions. Dütting et al. [1] assume that advertisers prefer changes that move each token’s probability toward, but not past, its desired value. Liu et al. [2] assume that, when advertisers report truthfully, the chosen advertising configuration achieves expected total welfare within ϵ\epsilon of the best achievable value.

In our approach, our problem formulation and incentive guarantee relies on two main conditions. We will state these conditions more explicitly and clarify their rationale in the revised manuscript.

First, we formulate the advertiser utility using form ui=viCi−piu_i=v_iC_i-p_i, where uiu_i is the advertiser utlity, viv_i is the value of one click, CiC_i is the estimated click rate, and pip_i is the price of this option. This simplifies advertiser preferences by assigning the same expected value viv_i to each click. In real world settings, platforms such as Google Ads explicitly considers advertisers who value clicks equally, providing a practical justification for the simplified utility model adopted in our method.

Second, we introduce the bounded-interference condition primarily as a tool for analyzing approximate DSIC. It serves as an analytical condition rather than a claim that ϵ\epsilon is bounded. This condition allows us to account for nonzero cross-advertiser effects and derive a 2ϵ2\epsilon regret bound when interference is bounded by ϵ\epsilon. Appendices G and H examine neuron-set overlap and cross-advertiser CTR-proxy changes, providing empirical context for this analysis.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Thank you for your insightful comments — New experiments and analyses on theoretical assumptions, human validation, scalability and activation steering (Part 2/3)

Human Validation (Weakness 2)

(Weakness 2) The user utility metric is entirely LLM-judged, with no human validation.

Thank you for highlighting the importance of human validation. We use an evaluator trained with human data and validated against human-calibrated VC-PPI reference labels [3]. On 5,837 held-out items, it achieves Pearson correlations of 0.85 for Response Relevance and 0.73 for Expression Coherence against human-caliberated labels. Since these dimensions form the basis of our user-utility proxy, this validation will support the reliability of our following quality measurements.

Using this evaluator, we compare Neuron Auctions with a stronger Prompt + Menu baseline (Appendix F), which uses prompts of varying strength levels to enourage the model to naturally incorprate ads into its responses. Both methods use the same scoring and menu-learning procedures, with response scores averaged across three queries before learning menus. The comparison covers ten advertiser pairs and nine control levels per advertiser.

The table below compares revenue and total utility at a user-utility weight of 0.1. Total utility is defined as revenue plus weighted user utility. Results are reported as mean ± standard deviation across five generation seeds, with advertiser pairs weighted equally.

Advertiser pairNeuron Auctions RevenuePrompt + Menu RevenueNeuron Auctions Total UtilityPrompt + Menu Total Utility
Honda / Lipton0.2467 ± 0.08800.1804 ± 0.06990.2981 ± 0.09090.2723 ± 0.0688
Jameson / Chivas0.3801 ± 0.08820.3484 ± 0.04130.4391 ± 0.09120.4407 ± 0.0413
Logitech / Nespresso0.3288 ± 0.05930.4110 ± 0.04360.3862 ± 0.05530.5047 ± 0.0436
Peloton / Lululemon0.3094 ± 0.10730.1527 ± 0.10890.3771 ± 0.10810.2459 ± 0.1099
Red Cross / UNICEF0.2762 ± 0.04750.1673 ± 0.00150.3374 ± 0.04780.2602 ± 0.0014
Nike / Spotify0.3027 ± 0.08710.3573 ± 0.06860.3692 ± 0.08460.4464 ± 0.0695
Dell / Microsoft0.1839 ± 0.12210.0520 ± 0.04220.2512 ± 0.11280.1484 ± 0.0406
Patagonia / GoPro0.1789 ± 0.17370.1334 ± 0.12760.2362 ± 0.17380.2224 ± 0.1247
Barilla / Campbell’s0.3091 ± 0.10280.2631 ± 0.07020.3753 ± 0.10230.3532 ± 0.0691
Audi / Bose0.2041 ± 0.11060.1495 ± 0.07490.2541 ± 0.11390.2438 ± 0.0749
Mean0.2720 ± 0.01990.2215 ± 0.01570.3324 ± 0.02130.3138 ± 0.0149

Neuron Auctions achieves 22.8% higher mean revenue and 5.9% higher mean total utility. Appendix F provides the detailed experimental setup and pair-level results.

Scalability (Weakness 3)

(Weakness 3) Scalability concerns are unaddressed. Real advertising markets involve hundreds or thousands of advertisers. Using the current setting, this large number seems not easily adaptable to the current framework.

A scalable deployment can integrate our method with the candidate-selection pipeline used in conventional advertising systems. Given a user query, the platform can first retrieve and filter eligible, relevant advertisers from the full advertiser pool, then apply Neuron Auctions to a small shortlist to allocate and price their interventions within a shared response.

This architecture separates retrieval over a large advertiser pool from the within-response allocation and pricing problem addressed by our mechanism. The number of advertisers participating in each auction can therefore be controlled through the shortlist size, even when the platform serves hundreds or thousands of advertisers. Such a design is appropriate in LLM ad setting, as a single LLM response is expected to include only a small number of advertisements, consistent with constraints on response length, relevance, and readability.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Thank you for your insightful comments — New experiments and analyses on theoretical assumptions, human validation, scalability and activation steering (Part 3/3)

Activation Steering and Brand Representations (Weakness 4&5)

(Weakness 4) Related work on activation steering and representation engineering is not sufficiently discussed.

Thank you for highlighting these connections. Our approach belongs to the broader family of methods that control generation through internal activations. ActAdd constructs a steering vector from activation differences elicited by contrasting prompts and adds it during inference [4]. CAA averages residual-stream activation differences across positive and negative examples, then scales and adds the resulting direction during generation [5]. Representation Engineering provides a broader framework for understanding and controlling model behavior through internal representations [6]. Unlike ActAdd and CAA, which scale and add steering vectors derived from activation differences, we control recommendation strength by varying the number of FFN neurons selected through brand-specific attribution.

Our focus on identifying brand-related FFN coordinates also connects to knowledge-editing methods that locate and modify model components associated with specific factual knowledge. ROME identifies FFN computations involved in factual recall and applies a rank-one weight update [7], while MEMIT distributes updates across multiple FFN layers to edit many associations [8]. We share their emphasis on locating relevant FFN components, but modify the activations at the identified coordinates during inference rather than updating FFN weights.

(Weakness 5) The framework is built on strong assumption that specific signals about brands or commodity are detectable in LLM latent representations via specific neurons, but whether this assumption holds for different LLMs ... remain challenging

Thank you for raising this concern. Our method does not require that all knowledge about a brand resides in a small set of FFN neurons. It requires that intervening on the selected coordinates can influence brand recommendations, even when brand knowledge is also represented in other model components.

Section 4.1 and Appendix C provide evidence in various models, such as Qwen3-4B, DeepSeek-R1-8B, and Llama-3-8B. We further evaluate Qwen3-30B-A3B, a mixture-of-experts (MoE) model, across 30 advertiser pairs and 7,290 responses. Given the formatting constraints, we summarize the results below; Appendix E provides the full heatmaps and experimental details.

Own neuron budgetBidder 1Bidder 2Overall mean
0−0.04−0.06−0.05
1000.370.290.33
2000.500.520.51
3000.580.520.55
4000.590.650.62
5000.670.730.70
6000.690.770.73
7000.750.850.80
8000.750.890.82

Values are normalized brand hit-count changes averaged over all opposing budgets; Overall mean averages the two bidder positions equally. Normalization uses the joint (0,0)(0,0) baseline and each bidder’s largest positive change over the full grid. Both bidders exhibit a monotonic increase in brand presence with their increasing intervention budgets, providing additional evidence that attributed FFN coordinates can influence brand recommendations across different LLM architectures.

References

[1] Dütting et al. (2024). Mechanism Design for Large Language Models. WWW.

[2] Liu et al. (2026). Incentive-Aware Multi-Fidelity Optimization for Generative Advertising in Large Language Models. arXiv:2604.06263.

[3] Turner-Smith et al. (2026). Evaluating and Pricing Advertisements in AI-Generated Responses. arXiv:2607.27686.

[4] Turner et al. (2023). Steering Language Models With Activation Engineering. arXiv:2308.10248.

[5] Panickssery et al. (2023). Steering Llama 2 via Contrastive Activation Addition. arXiv:2312.06681.

[6] Zou et al. (2023). Representation Engineering: A Top-Down Approach to AI Transparency. arXiv:2310.01405.

[7] Meng et al. (2022). Locating and Editing Factual Associations in GPT. NeurIPS.

[8] Meng et al. (2023). Mass-Editing Memory in a Transformer. ICLR.

Reviewer_vZdQOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
3
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

The submission propose selling brand-specific FFN intervention budgets through learned advertising menus. It identifies neurons using contrastive attribution, amplifies selected activations during generation, and finally learns prices to balance platform revenue and response quality. A menu that is independent of the advertiser’s own report yields approximate strategy-proofness when cross-advertiser interference is uniformly bounded.

Critical strengths
  1. Connecting internal model interventions to an explicit auction allocation variable is an interesting research direction.
  2. The implementation addresses few practical issues. These includes multi-token brand attribution, contrastive neuron selection, and activation normalization during joint interventions.
  3. The experiments are comprehensive in the number of advertiser pairs, models.
  4. The paper correctly distinguishes structural neuron separation from behavioral independence.
Critical weaknesses
  1. The incentive guarantee has not been shown to be practically meaningful. Particularly, theorem 3.1 assumes that for every feasible profile, ∣Ci(ki,k−i)−Cˉi(ki)∣≤ϵ|C_i(k_i,k_{-i})-\bar C_i(k_i)|\leq \epsilon, which is valid as a uniform-approximation argument. How does the experiments establish such a small epsilon? Doing some math with Table 5, which reports a maximum change of 2.30773 points on a 1–5 scale, under the conventional normalization of factor of 4, that is approximately 0.577. A uniform bound covering that observation would give 2ϵ≥1.1542\epsilon\geq1.154. This shows why average stability cannot justify a small worst-case incentive bound.
  2. The baselines do not isolate an advantage of neuron-level control. The prompt baseline simply appends numerical bids to the query. It has no mechanism translating those numbers into recommendation strength, whereas the proposed method has attributed intervention levels, measured reference utilities, and learned prices. A stronger comparison would apply the same menu-learning procedure to calibrated prompt-strength levels, neuron budgets, and another internal steering method.
  3. There is a conceptual confound that reference-utility-maximizing menus already imply non-decreasing selected reference CTR as valuation increases, regardless of how their options are implemented. Thus, bid responsiveness should be separated from the contribution of the neuron intervention itself.
Questions for authors

Please see the weaknesses.

Also,

  1. Does the advantage persist when calibrated prompt-strength options receive the same learned menu mechanism?
  2. Do the revenue-quality gains persist on held-out queries and under blinded human evaluation?

I'm willing to adjust my rating upon seeing the author's response.

5 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Thank you for your insightful comments — New experiments and analyses on interference, baseline comparison, human validation and bid responsiveness (Part 1/3)

Thank you for your careful reading and constructive comments. We have conducted new baseline experiments based on your suggestions. Below, we address each of the weaknesses and questions in detail.

Interference and Incentive Guarantees (Weakness 1)

(Weakness 1)The incentive guarantee has not been shown to be practically meaningful. Particularly, theorem 3.1 assumes that for every feasible profile, ∣Ci(ki,k−i)−Cˉi(ki)∣≤ϵ|C_i(k_i,k_{-i})-\bar C_i(k_i)|\leq \epsilon, which is valid as a uniform-approximation argument. How does the experiments establish such a small epsilon? Doing some math with Table 5, which reports a maximum change of 2.30773 points on a 1–5 scale, under the conventional normalization of factor of 4, that is approximately 0.577. A uniform bound covering that observation would give 2ϵ≥1.1542\epsilon\geq1.154 . This shows why average stability cannot justify a small worst-case incentive bound.

We respectfully clarify that Theorem 3.1 holds for any ϵ≥0\epsilon \geq 0 and does not require ϵ\epsilon to be very small. Its purpose is to quantify an upper bound on the gain from misreporting as a function of the CTR deviation Ci(ki,k−i)−Cˉi(ki)C_i(k_i,k_{-i})-\bar C_i(k_i). A smaller ϵ\epsilon yields a tighter incentive guarantee, and ϵ=0\epsilon=0 recovers exact DSIC. Establishing zero interference, however, is particularly challenging given the complex computation inherent in LLM response generation. The theorem therefore provides a robustness guarantee that explicitly accounts for nonzero interference and quantifies its potential impact on incentives.

Moreover, we would like to argue that Theorem 3.1 provides a worst-case guarantee under a uniform interference bound. If a menu option is never selected under truthful or alternative bids, its CTR deviation does not affect misreport gain. The reported maximum captures the worst-case CTR deviation across all candidate options; it does not characterize the overall interference encountered during the mechanism’s operation.

To examine this interference further, we analyze the options selected by Neuron Auctions in the baseline experiment (experimental details can be found in our discussion of Weakness 2 and in Appendix F). For each menu generated, we sample 3,000 combinations of the two advertisers’ bids uniformly from [0,1]2[0,1]^2. For each combination, the mechanism selects one intervention-budget option per advertiser. We then compute the CTR deviation distribution using these options. The following table shows this distribution at a user utility weight of 0.1:

Absolute CTR deviationFraction of selected options
[0, 0.5)81.546%
[0.5, 1)14.737%
[1, 2)3.717%
≥20.000%

This analysis shows that 96.283% of selected options have absolute CTR deviations below one point, with none reaching two points. These results indicate that the maximum deviation across all candidate options does not characterize the overall interference encountered during the mechanism’s operation.

Baseline Comparison (Weakness 2, Question 1)

(Weakness 2) The baselines do not isolate an advantage of neuron-level control. A stronger comparison would apply the same menu-learning procedure to calibrated prompt-strength levels...

(Question 1) Does the advantage persist when calibrated prompt-strength options receive the same learned menu mechanism?

As suggested by the reviewer, we introduce Prompt + Menu, which applies the same menu-learning procedure to concrete prompt-strength levels, allowing us to compare alternative methods under a common auction framework.

Following Sections 3.2 and 4.2, we use Qwen3-4B, ten retained advertiser pairs, three queries per pair, five random seeds, and nine levels per advertiser. Neuron Auctions uses budgets from 0 to 800 in increments of 100, while Prompt + Menu uses nine instruction levels. Scores are averaged across the three queries before fitting a shared menu for each pair and seed, using the same price learner and scoring methods. Revenue evaluation uses 3,000 independently sampled bid pairs from the uniform distribution over [0,1]2[0,1]^2. Further experimental details and results are provided in Appendix F.

Prompt + Menu adds no brand instruction at level 0. Higher levels progressively request a brief mention, an optional choice, a reasoned recommendation, a dedicated paragraph, and prominent placement. Representative instructions are:

  • Level 1: “Give it a brief mention among relevant examples.”
  • Level 4: “Give it a short recommendation with a reason and one concrete detail.”
  • Level 8: “Place it among the leading recommendations for the relevant part of the request. Explain its fit in detail and give a practical next step.”

Each instruction enters the system prompt as “[Brand]: [instruction]”, accompanied by shared guidance requiring accurate, relevant, and natural recommendations. The original query remains unchanged.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Thank you for your insightful comments — New experiments and analyses on interference, baseline comparison, human validation and bid responsiveness (Part 2/3)

To better understand how recommendation behavior changes with control strength, we first examine a simple metric: the brand-omission rate, defined as the proportion of generated responses that do not mention the target advertiser’s brand. Table 1 reports this rate averaging across both advertisers, queries, and all opposing levels, with equal weight per advertiser pair.

Table 1. Brand Omission across Neuron Budgets and Prompt-Strength Levels

Neuron budget / Prompt levelNeuron AuctionsPrompt + Menu
0 / 039.56%63.07%
100 / 127.26%0.85%
200 / 222.59%0.48%
300 / 318.59%0.19%
400 / 415.67%0.48%
500 / 514.96%0.22%
600 / 613.26%0.33%
700 / 712.89%0.22%
800 / 811.04%0.15%

Neuron Auctions offers an advantage for menu pricing by controlling both whether the brand appears and how strongly it is recommended. Prompt + Menu almost always includes the brand at positive levels, leaving little room to differentiate options through inclusion. Neuron intervention’s gradual inclusion pattern creates additional differences in average CTR-proxy scores across levels, giving the menu a greater scope for price differentiation and higher revenue.

To demonstrate this revenure advantage in greater detail, Table 2 reports revenue and total utility for 10 advertiser pairs at a quality weight of 0.1, averaged over five seeds. Values are reported as the mean ± standard deviation.

Table 2. Revenue and Total Utility across advertiser pairs at quality weight 0.1

Advertiser pairNeuron Auctions RevenuePrompt + Menu RevenueNeuron Auctions Total UtilityPrompt + Menu Total Utility
Honda / Lipton0.2467 ± 0.08800.1804 ± 0.06990.2981 ± 0.09090.2723 ± 0.0688
Jameson / Chivas0.3801 ± 0.08820.3484 ± 0.04130.4391 ± 0.09120.4407 ± 0.0413
Logitech / Nespresso0.3288 ± 0.05930.4110 ± 0.04360.3862 ± 0.05530.5047 ± 0.0436
Peloton / Lululemon0.3094 ± 0.10730.1527 ± 0.10890.3771 ± 0.10810.2459 ± 0.1099
Red Cross / UNICEF0.2762 ± 0.04750.1673 ± 0.00150.3374 ± 0.04780.2602 ± 0.0014
Nike / Spotify0.3027 ± 0.08710.3573 ± 0.06860.3692 ± 0.08460.4464 ± 0.0695
Dell / Microsoft0.1839 ± 0.12210.0520 ± 0.04220.2512 ± 0.11280.1484 ± 0.0406
Patagonia / GoPro0.1789 ± 0.17370.1334 ± 0.12760.2362 ± 0.17380.2224 ± 0.1247
Barilla / Campbell’s0.3091 ± 0.10280.2631 ± 0.07020.3753 ± 0.10230.3532 ± 0.0691
Audi / Bose0.2041 ± 0.11060.1495 ± 0.07490.2541 ± 0.11390.2438 ± 0.0749
Mean0.2720 ± 0.01990.2215 ± 0.01570.3324 ± 0.02130.3138 ± 0.0149

Neuron Auctions achieves 22.8% higher mean revenue and 5.9% higher mean total utility. To further examine the performance of both methods, we compare their total utility across a range of user utility weights in Table 3. We first average across the ten advertiser pairs within each seed and report the mean and standard deviation across five seeds.

Table 3. Total Utility across quality weights

User utility weightNeuron Auctions Total UtilityPrompt + Menu Total UtilityRelative improvement
00.2740 ± 0.01960.2214 ± 0.0161+23.71%
0.050.3023 ± 0.02040.2674 ± 0.0154+13.03%
0.100.3324 ± 0.02130.3138 ± 0.0149+5.92%
0.150.3635 ± 0.02190.3601 ± 0.0145+0.95%
0.200.3948 ± 0.02290.4065 ± 0.0142−2.86%
0.250.4269 ± 0.02390.4530 ± 0.0140−5.75%

Overall, Neuron Auctions retains its revenue advantage when the calibrated prompt-strength baseline uses the same menu learning mechanism. This advantage translates into higher total utility with low user utility weights. At higher weights, Prompt + Menu performs better, possibly because its more detailed instructions guide response content and presentation more explicitly, contributing to higher user utility. This highlights the revenue–quality trade-off between the two approaches.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Thank you for your insightful comments — New experiments and analyses on interference, baseline comparison, human validation and bid responsiveness (Part 3/3)

Neuron Intervention and Bid Responsiveness (Weakness 3)

(Weakness 3) Bid responsiveness should be separated from the contribution of the neuron intervention itself.

The intervention’s role is to construct generated responses with a useful range of CTRs. Menu optimization does not ensure that such options exist: a menu whose options all have identical CTRs also satisfies weak monotonicity. Our intervention experiments show that larger budgets generally yield higher measured CTR, providing evidence of control over the generated responses.

Query Independence and Human Validation (Question 2)

(Question 2) Do the revenue-quality gains persist on held-out queries and under blinded human evaluation?

The cloze prompts used for neuron attribution are constructed solely from advertiser information, independently from the downstream evaluation queries.

As for human evaluation, we use an evaluator trained with real human click data and validated on both response quality and click intent [1]. This evaluator achieves Pearson correlations of 0.85 for Response Relevance and 0.73 for Expression Coherence against human-calibrated VC-PPI reference labels on 5,837 held-out items. For Click-Through Intent, five annotators compared 100 response pairs to judge which advertisement they would be more likely to click, without seeing the evaluator’s scores. The evaluator agreed with the annotator majority on 92% of pairs, with 86% mean agreement with individual annotators and Fleiss’ (κ=0.64\kappa=0.64).

This evaluator is used in the comparison between Neuron Auctions and Prompt + Menu baseline. These validation results therefore support the reliability of the revenue and total-utility results reported in the response to Weakness 2 and Question 1.

References

[1] Turner-Smith et al. (2026). Evaluating and Pricing Advertisements in AI-Generated Responses. arXiv:2607.27686.

Reviewer_KZrKOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

This paper introduces auctions into the setting where the contribution of an LLM’s intermediate activations is controlled. The authors propose “Neuron Auctions,” which shifts the auction object from surface-level text—ad slots or prompt injections—to brand-specific feed-forward network (FFN) neurons. In an offline stage, they use cloze prompts and contrastive attribution to identify neurons that positively contribute to the recommendation of a particular brand. At generation time, they amplify the top-k selected neurons by a factor \lambda and apply a unified rescaling step to keep generation stable. The number of intervened neurons, k, is then treated as the auctionable commodity. The authors design a menu-based auction in which each advertiser is offered a menu of intervention levels and prices. Prices are generated by a neural network trained to maximize platform revenue while incorporating a user-utility term.

Critical strengths

S1. The method is explained very clearly. For a reader with some background in auctions and neural networks, the pipeline is easy to follow. S2. The biggest strength is that, starting from a relatively simple idea, the authors develop a fairly elaborate and fine-grained method and actually carry it through experimentally. Neuron attribution, online filtering, norm rescaling, and menu training are all implemented. S3. The novelty is clear. Related work often steers the final logits or the input prompt. These choices may have different trade-offs, but auctioning interventions in the internal representation space is a distinct and interesting direction.

Critical weaknesses

W1. The application scenario seems limited. If an auction mechanism is to be deployed on LLMs, it would presumably need to run on large-scale, widely used models. Such models are extremely complex and often closed-source, whereas this method requires white-box access to internal FFN activations and per-brand attribution. It is hard to see how the approach would create real commercial value in that setting. W2. The elaborate neuron-evaluation procedure is tied to the experimental setup. The selected neurons depend on the specific sampled prompts and the set of competing brands. If the prompts change, the competitor list changes, or simply the underlying model changes, the neurons have to be re-evaluated. This seems unrealistic in practice, and the resulting menu would likely need to be rebuilt as well. W3. The experiments confirm this concern. They cover only 100 two-bidder and 20 three-bidder combinations, using 4B–8B models. This is a useful proof of concept, but it is far from the scale and complexity of a real advertising system. W4. The theoretical part also does not seem to offer brand-new results: the strategy-proofness argument builds on existing menu-based auction work, and the main novelty lies in the intervention space rather than in the theory. For these reasons, although I find the paper interesting, its practical value may be limited, and my overall evaluation is negative.

Questions for authors

Q1. The authors repeatedly describe the intervention as operating on FFN layers. Could a similar approach work on other structures, such as attention modules, or on other components in MoE models? I would be interested in whether the brand specificity and approximate independence observed here are specific to dense FFNs. Q2. The experiments stop at 4B–8B models. Is this mainly because of compute constraints, or because the method did not work well at larger scale? The answer would be important for assessing the practical relevance of the approach.

3 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Thank you for your insightful comments — New experiments and analyses on deployment, computation, mechanism design and larger MoE models (Part 1/2)

Thank you for your careful reading and constructive comments. Below, we address each of the weaknesses and questions in detail.

Deployment (Weakness 1)

(Weakness 1) The application scenario seems limited. If an auction mechanism is to be deployed on LLMs, it would presumably need to run on large-scale, widely used models. Such models are extremely complex and often closed-source, whereas this method requires white-box access to internal FFN activations and per-brand attribution. It is hard to see how the approach would create real commercial value in that setting.

As for closed-source models, our framework is designed to be operated by the model provider, which retains access to the models' parameters. The provider can therefore perform per-brand attribution and neuron-level interventions within its own infrastructure. Accordingly, our white-box access requirements is compatible with deployment on proprietary models and identifies model providers as the intended operators of the auction mechanism.

We acknowledge that a third-party with API-only access would require cooperation from the model provider to implement these interventions. This is a boundary of the proposed method's intended deployment scope.

Computation (Weakness 2)

(Weakness 2)The elaborate neuron-evaluation procedure is tied to the experimental setup... If the prompts change, the competitor list changes, or simply the underlying model changes, the neurons have to be re-evaluated. This seems unrealistic in practice, and the resulting menu would likely need to be rebuilt as well.

For a fixed model, a brand’s attribution scores depend on its cloze prompts rather than the user query. Once these scores have been computed and cached, attribution need not be repeated for that brand, even when it appears in a new query or with different competing brands. A change in the bidder set only requires recomputing the neuron rankings from the cached scores, provided that all participating brands are covered by the cache. This reuse avoids repeating neuron attribution.

With brand attribution computed offline and cached for reuse, the remaining query-specific training is limited to menu pricing. The menu prices are fitted using the click-intent and quality scores of the responses generated for that query. This step optimizes small pricing networks and is computationally inexpensive. Empirically, the whole pricing computation can complete within the time required for LLM response generation.

Mechanism Contribution (Weakness 4)

(Weakness 4) The theoretical part also does not seem to offer brand-new results: the strategy-proofness argument builds on existing menu-based auction work, and the main novelty lies in the intervention space rather than in the theory.

We appreciate the reviewer’s observation that our theoretical argument builds on established menu-based auction theory. However, connecting this theory to LLM advertising requires a substantive step: defining and implementing the menus themselves. Unlike auctions over fixed items, LLM advertising operates over generated responses, where evaluating outcomes is costly and controlling recommendation strength is difficult. A menu therefore requires advertiser-specific options whose effects can be measured and whose selected interventions can be applied together within one response. Existing menu-based theory does not directly provide such a construction, while using bids to guide generation [1] does not by itself establish these controllable options.

Our neuron intervention provides such a bridge, to our knowledge, for the first time. It enables us to construct actionable advertising options and combine them with learned menu prices, connecting controllable generation with menu-based mechanism design. We further analyze how cross-advertiser interference affects the incentive guarantee. Our contribution is thus this formulation, implementation, and analysis in the LLM setting. We will clarify its distinction from the established strategy-proofness argument.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Thank you for your insightful comments — New experiments and analyses on deployment, computation, mechanism design and larger MoE models (Part 2/2)

Larger Models and Other Architectures (Weakness 3, Question 1&2)

(Weakness 3) They cover only 100 two-bidder and 20 three-bidder combinations, using 4B–8B models.

(Question 1) Could a similar approach work on other structures, such as attention modules, or on other components in MoE models? I would be interested in whether the brand specificity and approximate independence observed here are specific to dense FFNs.

(Question 2) The experiments stop at 4B–8B models... The answer would be important for assessing the practical relevance of the approach.

Thank you for this suggestion. We extend the Section 4.1 intervention methods to Qwen3-30B-A3B, a mixture-of-experts (MoE) model, evaluating 30 advertiser pairs with three prompts per pair over the full 9×99\times9 budget grid. Interventions target selected expert-FFN activations when their experts are routed during generation.

Given the formatting constraints, we provide a compact summary table here and refer to Appendix E for the full results and experimental details. The table reports normalized brand hit-count changes, averaged over all opposing budgets. Overall mean averages the two bidder positions equally.

Own neuron budgetBidder 1Bidder 2Overall mean
0-0.04-0.06-0.05
1000.370.290.33
2000.500.520.51
3000.580.520.55
4000.590.650.62
5000.670.730.70
6000.690.770.73
7000.750.850.80
8000.750.890.82

Normalization uses the joint (0,0)(0,0) baseline and each bidder’s largest positive change over the full grid. The zero own-budget row also averages over nonzero opposing budgets. Both bidders exhibit a monotonic increase in brand presence as their own intervention budgets grow. These results extend the empirical evidence for attribution-based FFN control from the evaluated dense models to a larger MoE architecture.

References

[1] Dütting et al. (2024). Mechanism Design for Large Language Models. WWW.

Dear Reviewer KZrK,

We greatly appreciate the time and care you have devoted to reviewing our manuscript. Your feedback has been highly valuable and helpful. Following your suggestions, we have provided further details on practical deployment and conducted additional experiments on Qwen3-30B-A3B, a larger mixture-of-experts (MoE) model, to show that our neuron intervention remains effective beyond the smaller dense models evaluated in the original submission. As the discussion period approaches its conclusion, we would like to ensure that we have responded adequately to all of your comments and concerns. Should there be any points, questions, or feedback that you would like us to address, we would be grateful if you could share them with us. We remain committed to addressing any outstanding issues.

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

Related papers

Loading the map…

Discussion (0)

Sign in to comment.