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- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 1
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Paper summary
DataFed addresses hierarchical client selection in online federated edge learning. The cloud first chooses the winner count, edge servers choose candidate counts, and a reverse Vickrey auction then allocates participation using submitted bids. The method estimates an unknown bid distribution from historical payment thresholds and coordinates decisions through Stackelberg response anticipation. The paper proposes an equilibrium construction for a normalized proxy model and analyzes estimation error and sublinear regret under independent proxy feedback and a prescribed exploration policy. Experiments evaluate cumulative regret on four classification datasets and jointly report accuracy and payment on two, with additional synthetic-bid, coordination, drift, and approximation comparisons.
Critical strengths
- The paper combines bid-distribution estimation from historical payment thresholds with hierarchical response anticipation to address cloud–edge coordination under an unknown bid distribution. The motivation and overall design are practically relevant. Within the proxy model, the finite-sample estimation bounds and sublinear-regret derivation form a coherent analytical chain under explicit conditions, providing concrete results on how sample size affects proxy decision error.
- The experiments cover multiple datasets, system scales, and random seeds, with joint accuracy, payment, and regret evaluation on a subset of the datasets to characterize their trade-offs. Additional drift and exact-versus-proxy comparisons examine key design choices and their limits.
Critical weaknesses
- Definition 2 lets each ES choose its own candidate count, whereas A.2 first assigns a common count to all ESs, which is then optimized in Eqs. (32)–(33) of A.3 and line 10 of Algorithm 1. I am concerned that optimizing this common parameter changes the symmetric configuration without establishing a unilateral best response with the other ESs' strategies fixed. Even a symmetric equilibrium must rule out unilateral deviations. Whether the constructed response corresponds to the original multi-follower game therefore remains a material concern.
- The normalization in A.2 preserves the expected winner count, but the utilities in Eq. (8) are further constructed proxies. No general control is provided over how their approximation error affects action rankings or utility loss under the original objective. I am concerned that proxy decisions may depart from the original objective even when the bid distribution is accurately estimated.
- Theorems 2–3 explicitly concern independent proxy feedback, and Theorem 3 uses an exploration phase for every action, whereas Algorithm 1 observes actual payment thresholds and supplements samples of the current action. The analysis therefore does not establish a regret guarantee for the implemented algorithm against the original objective in Eq. (7). How do these differences affect the implemented algorithm's decision quality and cumulative regret under the original objective?
Questions for authors
- Please see Weaknesses 1–3. Could the authors prioritize addressing the specific concerns raised there?
- I remain unsure how is obtained before client selection, given that A.7.1 defines it using test accuracy. Are the data used to construct these valuations also used for the final reported test evaluation?