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- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
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Paper summary
This paper studies client participation control in online federated learning and proposes MOVE, which models participation control as a constrained Markov persuasion problem, uses occupancy measures to characterize state dependence, learns the unknown condition distribution and state transitions online, and transforms the problem into finite linear programs. The paper provides theoretical proofs and validates the performance of the proposed approach through experiments.
Critical strengths
This paper provides a computationally tractable optimization method for complex signal mechanism design. It formulates participation control through occupancy measures under Bayes plausibility, Bayes benefit, and minimum participation requirements, and proves that posteriors supported on at most two communication conditions suffice for optimality. The paper thereby transforms the complex mechanism design problem into a computable finite optimization problem, providing a mathematical foundation for online optimization in unknown dynamic environments.
Critical weaknesses
The connection between the theoretical optimization objective and actual federated learning performance is insufficient, which limits the method's application value. Federated learning performance is also affected by data distribution, data quality, and differences in client training contributions. The same participation rate does not necessarily correspond to the same model convergence speed or accuracy. Although the paper conducts experiments on three datasets, the theoretical framework does not directly account for these factors, nor does it establish an explicit link between the participation rate constraint and model performance. Therefore, the existing results are insufficient to fully demonstrate that the method can still achieve the expected performance in more complex real-world federated learning scenarios.
Questions for authors
(1) Does MOVE's lower payment mainly stem from its mechanism or from a lower participation rate? Please supplement the cumulative payment and number of training rounds required to reach the target accuracy under comparable actual participation rates, so as to clarify whether the lower payment originates from information disclosure and Markov planning. (2) Is the adaptation of the baselines fair? Please explain the specific modifications made to each baseline, whether these modifications are justified, and whether they weaken the performance of the original methods, and re-compare under settings that preserve the core mechanisms of the baselines as much as possible.
2 comments
Thank you for your response. After reviewing the feedback and the manuscript, I will maintain my score. Thank you.
Linking Participation Control to FL Performance and Clarifying Baseline Fairness
We thank the reviewer for the thoughtful comments. In the revised version, we address W1&Q1 by adding a shared wireless service example in Section 3.3 and payment and update comparisons in Section 6.3 (Table 5). For Q2, we clarify the baseline implementations in Appendix A.9.1 and add the DaringFed signaling comparison in Section 6.3 (Table 4).
MOVE controls participation and payment to recruit clients for FL training, while model updates follow the underlying FL algorithm. Its constraint, E[∑at,n]≥qminE[∑Nt], ensures a minimum expected rate of client updates, but does not itself guarantee convergence or target accuracy. We agree that data heterogeneity, client quality, and update contributions also affect convergence and are not explicitly modeled in our theory.
All methods share initialization, data partitions, client sampling rules, network environments, and episode budgets. Each participant performs one local epoch followed by a server update. FEMNIST uses natural LEAF partitions. CIFAR-10 uses a classwise Dirichlet partition (α=0.3) across 20 clients. We measure cumulative payment and training updates to the same accuracy targets (80% on FEMNIST and 70% on CIFAR-10).
At nearly matched participation, MOVE reduces payment over Dynamic Pricing by 9.73% (FEMNIST) and 10.13% (CIFAR-10). Update counts differ by only 1.9% and 0.5%, respectively, indicating that savings do not mainly come from fewer updates. Implied payment per update is about 8.0% and 9.7% lower. This links mechanism design to the cost of reaching the same FL accuracy without claiming a convergence guarantee. Note that fewer updates do not imply lower computational cost, as models and accuracy targets differ across datasets.
All baselines share data partitions, sampling, environments, target accuracies, and episode budgets. Adaptations address differences in information and decision spaces.
DaringFed. Its original formulation assumes a known communication prior, whereas MOVE learns an unknown prior. We therefore report two variants:
The uninformative version uses conservative rewards to meet participation requirements without the true prior, resulting in about 93% participation and higher payment. The optimized version jointly optimizes reward and disclosure using a uniform prior, preserving DaringFed's core mechanism without access to the unknown true prior. MOVE pays less on FEMNIST and comparably on CIFAR-10, while achieving higher participation. These are not comparisons at matched participation rates. The first table provides that comparison.
L2I. Its CUCB uses client quality estimates and confidence bonuses. Here, sequential arrivals allow only a binary participation decision, not client subset or data quantity selection. We preserve its exploration principle through larger reward bonuses for states with few visits and include a fixed reward schedule variant. This is an adapted reward policy baseline, not unmodified L2I.
Dynamic Pricing. We retain its increasing reward schedule and compensation for accumulated participation shortfalls, mapping rewards to the common feasible range and using a fixed prior because the true prior is unknown.
These adaptations preserve applicable core mechanisms while aligning information and action assumptions. We also disclose that all five FEMNIST DaringFed calibration seeds violate the cumulative Bayes benefit constraint. Their payments are therefore not presented as fully feasible outcomes.
We agree that data quality for individual clients, contributions, and their interaction with network conditions merit further study. Our guarantees concern payment and participation under stated assumptions. Experiments on heterogeneous datasets provide complementary empirical evidence of end to end FL performance.