acceptodds
Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

Learning Controlled Dynamics through Obedient Recommendations

Abstract

Learning controlled dynamics for model-based reinforcement learning requires informative actions, which a learner may need to induce strategic receivers to execute voluntarily. We study how recommendation visibility changes which experiments can be implemented and which dynamics can be identified. We construct a transfer-free two-stage system with informed, far-sighted receivers, holding dynamics, utilities, sender objectives, and learner feedback fixed across public and receiver-private recommendations. The architectures have equal worst-equilibrium known-model values, yet minimax regret under worst-case sequential-equilibrium selection is linear publicly and logarithmic privately for fixed model alternatives. Private signals uniquely implement actions that reach and activate an informative transition, whereas public signaling admits a common uninformative equilibrium selection. For general mechanism classes under prescribed obedience, we introduce the obedient observability closure, which iterates model elimination and the resulting expansion of obedient experiments. With finite model classes, compact mechanism classes, and exact diagnostic and oracle access, sublinear regret with all-round obedience at vanishing failure probability is possible exactly when the models in each terminal closure share an optimal obedient mechanism. Information architecture thus governs learnability by determining which physical experiments can be strategically implemented.

Primary area:
learning theory
Keywords:
Information design, Strategic exploration, System identification, Obedient learning, Equilibrium selection, Regret analysis.

Reviews

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Shape:
1234this paper, Bottom 10%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 1.67 over 3 reviews, above 10% of the others.
Reviewer_msCtOpenReview ↗
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2
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
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2
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Paper summary

The paper studies reinforcement learning under obedient recommendations, involving both a learner and strategic receivers. It highlights significant differences in learning dynamics and regret between public and private settings. However, the model relies on relatively strong assumptions and lacks clear practical applicability.

Critical strengths

The paper provides rigorous theoretical analysis covering multiple criteria, making its theoretical contributions relatively comprehensive and substantial.

Critical weaknesses

The paper relies heavily on the simple Bernoulli assumption. Can similar results be obtained for more general distributions?

More importantly, the paper lacks discussion of practical application scenarios. The setting seems rather artificial, with limited foreseeable contributions to real-world applications.

Questions for authors

In Line 85, "(?)" appears to be a compilation error.

For the upper bounds, can we obtain corresponding lower bounds, particularly regarding the dependence on the discount factor δ\delta?

1 comment

Thank you for the questions. The distributional scope differs between the explicit separation and the general characterization; separating them also clarifies what our experiments demonstrate.

W1. Bernoulli assumptions and general distributions. The general learnability characterization does not require Bernoulli feedback. Theorem 7 (p. 8) works with measurable observable kernels and evaluable likelihoods, under its finite-model, compactness and exact-access assumptions. Proposition 16 (pp. 24–25) already exhibits iterative unlocking with Gaussian telemetry.

For the matched-oracle, adverse-selection separation, Bernoulli variables encode the minimal binary-state transition. The key mechanism is that visibility changes whether agents execute the actions reaching and activating an informative transition. The distribution determines the separation between observable laws and hence the testing cost. Replacing the transition family would require checking this separation together with incentives and oracle matching, especially when receivers value the unknown transition as in Theorem 2. Thus general-kernel closure and non-Bernoulli unlocking are established; the same matched-oracle separation for arbitrary distribution families is not claimed.

W2. Practical motivation. The relevant setting is one where a coordinator needs diagnostic actions from self-interested operators who know their equipment response better than the coordinator. For example, increasing a device's load can reveal its capacity but impose an unattractive effort cost. The coordinator can use information about job priority to recommend loads, yet uncertainty about capacity constrains which recommendations it can certify as obedient.

We added a synthetic capacity-dispatch experiment to Section 7 and Appendix F.2, with saturated service, Gaussian telemetry and the full binary direct-recommendation class. At horizon 10,000, noise standard deviation 0.3 and capacity 2, allowing access to expand after elimination gives mean regret 14.198 (pointwise 95% Monte Carlo interval [14.017, 14.379]), versus 4843.750 when access is frozen, over 2,000 independent trajectories per method with the same obedient-oracle benchmark. A negative control with identical initial feedback blocks unlocking despite direct-control identifiability. The comparison shows why updating access matters in this task. It is an application-motivated simulation of closure, not validation of a deployed system or the multi-receiver public/private separation.

We next address the two specific questions.

Q1. The unresolved citation at line 85. Thank you for identifying this error. The intended reference is Ahmadi, Chaudhry, Sindhwani and Tu, Safely Learning Dynamical Systems, first posted in 2023. It renders correctly, with its bibliography entry, in the current local compiled manuscript.

Q2. Matching lower bounds and the discount factor. Matching bounds in the horizon are already included: Theorems 1 and 2 establish linear public regret and logarithmic private regret for fixed instances. Appendix A.1, (PS5)–(PS6), shows that informative visits incur a positive opportunity cost and uses change of measure to lower-bound their required number. This matches the diagnostic-and-test upper bound in its dependence on TT.

Sharp discount-factor dependence is a separate question. The separation fixes the receiver discount to one; neither its upper nor lower bound establishes a matching dependence on a varying discount. Such an extension must track how discounting changes deviation incentives, oracle values and the cost of information. The obedience margin gamma and the statistical failure budget are distinct from the receiver discount.

Reviewer_MtDmOpenReview ↗
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1
Confidence
3
Informativeness
1
Presentation
1
Soundness
3
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Paper summary

The paper examines the problem of learning a model of controlled dynamics in settings where actions are controlled by strategic receivers. The challenge is that an informative action may be at odds with the incentives of an individual agent. This is precisely the tension analyzed in this paper.

Critical strengths

While the basic question posed in the paper seems interesting, I have formed a mostly negative opinion. I believe that this paper could be considered for publication in the future with major restructuring and rewriting.

Critical weaknesses

Overall, I do not believe this paper is close to the acceptance threshold for the following two reasons.

  • The paper is very poorly written. Even though I work in this area, I was having trouble following the text. In particular, the paper often uses non-standard terms without having introduced them. For example, in the context of the introduction, am I supposed to know what "obedient observability closure" is? Am I supposed to understand the meaning of "in the convex affine setting, radial slack makes closure stabilize after one step"? This is an issue throughout the paper. I'm afraid I had trouble even summarizing the paper. It was hard for me to see what the main results are. Using AI is perfectly fine, but the paper is intended to be read by humans. More effort is needed to make the writing accessible.
  • The main question posed in the paper is not well motivated. Moreover, the paper fails to provide a meaningful interpretation of the main theoretical results. For this reason, I'm not convinced about the significance of the results. What I expect to see is a more interpretable discussion about implications of the results, with an emphasis on several motivating applications.

That being said, as part of a resubmission, I encourage the authors to revise the writing, strengthen the motivation, and provide more interpretation in connection to more concrete applications. With these changes, the paper would be much stronger, but these changes would be too much for a rebuttal.

Questions for authors

No further questions.

1 comment

Thank you for the candid assessment. We agree that introducing closure and geometric terminology before explaining their purpose obscured the argument. We address the two weaknesses below.

W1. Terminology and exposition. The paper asks a concrete question: what can a learner discover when informative actions must first be voluntarily executed by other agents? Our two results address different parts of this question.

First, changing recommendation visibility can change whether those actions are executed. Theorem 1 keeps dynamics, utilities, learner feedback and known-model worst-equilibrium values fixed. Public recommendations admit an uninformative equilibrium selection; private recommendations uniquely implement a diagnostic. The resulting linear/logarithmic regret gap therefore concerns learning, even when neither architecture offers a better known-model benchmark.

Second, learning can change which recommendations are obedient. Suppose a safe experiment excludes a model that blocks a probe, without resolving the remaining decision. The probe then becomes available and separates the remaining models. Proposition 16 gives this example. The “closure” simply repeats this process until no further separation is possible. Theorem 7 characterizes sublinear regret under prescribed obedience by whether the final survivors share an optimal mechanism, under its finite-model, compactness and exact-access assumptions. These results distinguish robustness to equilibrium selection from the general evolution of certified access.

The revised introduction explains both results before the geometric contribution, and Section 5 places the safe/probe example before the closure definition. Its meaning is limited and concrete: in the affine-mixture setting, if every probe can already be mixed into an obedient experiment with positive probability, it supplies no genuinely new identifying direction later. Later unlocking requires an incentive constraint that blocks such mixing. We replaced “radial slack” in the introduction with this mixing explanation; the formal condition remains in Section 5.1.

W2. Motivation and implications. One motivating setting is a coordinator learning equipment response while operators retain control of their devices. Operators may know calibrated capacities; the coordinator may instead observe current demand or job priority. A diagnostic load consumes resources and need not be attractive to an operator, so ordinary exploration cannot simply be commanded. Our model idealizes this information split through informed receivers and committed recommendations.

The two results identify distinct implications for such systems. Recommendation visibility can determine access to diagnostic data even when known-model performance is unchanged. Moreover, early evidence can be useful because it makes a later diagnostic acceptable, rather than because it immediately resolves the final decision. Learning can stop when the remaining models prescribe a common optimum.

We added a synthetic capacity-dispatch experiment (Section 7; Appendix F.2) to make the latter mechanism concrete. Low load excludes a low-capacity candidate; this releases a high-load recommendation that distinguishes the remaining capacities. A negative control prevents that first distinction and leaves the learner trapped despite direct-control identifiability. This supports the access mechanism in an interpretable task, while deployment validity remains an empirical question. The revised introduction and Section 3 now explain this information asymmetry and its idealizations; Section 4 identifies the three properties used to isolate the visibility effect.

Reviewer_CFm2OpenReview ↗
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Confidence
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Informativeness
2
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Soundness
3
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Paper summary

The paper studies learning controlled dynamics when the actions are executed by self-interested agents (receivers) and the learner influences them through recommendations. The authors construct a setting where the unknown dynamics are learnable under private recommendations, but not public recommendations, and provide a characterization of learnability under prescribed obedience.

Critical strengths
  • The matched-oracle visibility separation demonstrates an instance where only recommendation visibility changes, and regret is linear (public) vs logarithmic (private). This specific matched-oracle learning separation on information architecture seems novel, no prior work appears to study this.
  • The theoretical results are overall individually coherent
Critical weaknesses
  • The paper studies an interesting and technically complex problem, but the exposition is very difficult to follow particularly in Sections 3 and 5 where dense formal machinery is introduced before any central intuition or illustrative example is given.
  • Both main results seem to assume specialized settings with a lot of assumptions - each of which may be individually reasonable but the paper does not clearly identify which are necessary/essential or provide a convincing application satisfying them jointly.
  • The separation construction shows that visibility can change learnability, but does not provide necessary or sufficient conditions for a public-private learnability gap under adverse equilibrium selection.
  • The experiments are synthetic and seem to more be sanity checks. They verify implementation but provide little evidence the phenomena persist in practically motivated environments.
Questions for authors
  • Can the closure framework be extended to adverse equilibrium selection, and if not, what is the main obstacle?
2 comments

Thank you for recognizing the matched-oracle separation. We address your concerns by explaining experiment access and distinguishing the two solution concepts.

W1. Formalism before intuition. We agree that the definitions need an example first. Consider three possible models. A safe experiment can exclude the third model but cannot distinguish the first two. The third model's incentive constraint blocks a more informative probe; excluding it makes that probe obedient. Proposition 16 (pp. 24–25) realizes this sequence. The closure records successive reductions until no currently obedient experiment distinguishes the survivors. A common optimal mechanism can justify stopping earlier. Section 3 now explains the interaction before its notation; Section 5 presents this example before the information decomposition and closure definition.

W2. Assumptions and applications. A motivating information asymmetry arises when equipment operators know calibrated response models, while a coordinator knows current demand and needs operators to execute diagnostic loads. Exact receiver knowledge idealizes that asymmetry. Commitment and the recommendation-only interface specify how the coordinator influences actions; episode resets make experiment laws stationary. In the separation, sender payoff is not logged, preventing an extra identification channel. The two-stage Bernoulli system is a minimal witness. Separately, finite models, compactness and exact diagnostic/oracle access support the general characterization, rather than a computational-efficiency guarantee. Our device experiment instantiates access updating; it does not establish that every separation assumption holds jointly in deployment.

W3. Conditions for a public/private gap. Theorem 1's proof isolates three ingredients: a public equilibrium selection that hides the model while forcing positive average loss across the alternatives; a private diagnostic obedient under both models and informative under every selector; and uniquely implemented model-specific oracle mechanisms. Equal oracle values isolate the learning effect. Repeating the diagnostic enables a logarithmic upper bound; the positive cost of informative visits gives the matching lower bound. These explain the construction, rather than an unrestricted characterization. Corollary 34 (p. 41) gives an exact, narrower boundary: in the finite equilibrium-law setting, two-model identification is possible if and only if some robust mechanism has disjoint model-wise equilibrium-feedback sets. Identification alone does not characterize regret when unresolved models may share an optimum.

W4. Experimental evidence. We added a synthetic capacity-dispatch experiment (Section 7; Appendix F.2) using a saturated service law, Gaussian telemetry, and the full binary direct-recommendation class. The comparison fixes the task and obedient-oracle benchmark and varies whether model elimination can expand access. At horizon 10,000, noise standard deviation 0.3 and capacity 2, adaptive/frozen access yield mean regret 14.198/4843.750 over 2,000 independent trajectories per method; the adaptive pointwise 95% Monte Carlo interval is [14.017, 14.379]. A negative control makes initial feedback identical across capacities: both recommendation policies remain trapped, while direct control identifies the model. This tests when access expansion succeeds or fails beyond the original construction. It remains synthetic, single-receiver evidence about closure, not a public/private or adverse-selection experiment.

Your question asks whether the general framework can also account for equilibrium selection.

Q1. Extension to adverse equilibrium selection. Yes, for a precisely specified guarantee criterion. Appendix E.1, Proposition 32 (pp. 39–40), replaces a single feedback law by a set of equilibrium laws. A diagnostic must allow progress for every law the selector may generate. For finite model, mechanism and feedback classes with compact convex equilibrium-law sets, the recursion characterizes sublinear guarantee regret, charging each mechanism its worst-equilibrium payoff. The upper bound also controls the selector-realized positive-part regret of Theorem 1; the necessity does not.

The obstacle is that hiding information and causing loss need not be compatible. In Remark 33 (p. 41), a hiding equilibrium pays the oracle value, while an equilibrium causing loss reveals the model. Actual regret can therefore be small even when the guarantee criterion is large. A general if-and-only-if criterion for actual regret must preserve the joint feedback–payoff relationship. This is why the criteria cannot be interchanged.

Technical correction: we corrected the coordinate-union prefactor in Eq. (33) from 2m2m to 2dZ2d_Z, the feedback-alphabet factor; the fixed-instance logarithmic order is unchanged.

I'd like to thank the Authors for the response. I will keep my current score.

Comments on the paper

1 comment
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Revised exposition, assumptions, and experimental evidence

Thank you for the reviews. All three reports identified readability as a major concern. We have revised the introduction and Sections 3–6 to explain the learning obstacle before introducing its formal objects. The introduction now starts with a coordinator–operator example and distinguishes the two results in plain language. Section 3 explains who knows the dynamics and why commitment, episode resets and the feedback convention matter. Section 5 now presents the three-model safe-experiment/probe example before the information decomposition and closure definition. We also replace the introduction's “radial slack” wording with an explanation of mixing a probe into an obedient experiment, leaving its precise assumptions in Section 5.1.

These revisions make the two conclusions easier to distinguish. First, changing only recommendation visibility can change learnability even with matched dynamics, telemetry and worst-equilibrium known-model values. Second, under prescribed obedience, evidence can remove a candidate model's incentive constraint and unlock further experiments; learning can stop when the surviving models share an optimal obedient mechanism. The scope of each result is stated separately.

We have added a synthetic capacity-dispatch experiment with Gaussian telemetry to Section 7 and Appendix F.2. Adaptive-versus-frozen access, noise sensitivity and a negative control test the access-updating mechanism beyond the separation construction. This is evidence about closure, not a new public/private or adverse-selection experiment. The individual replies explain the assumptions, the equilibrium-selection extension and its limits, distributional scope, and the existing lower bounds. All section references refer to the revised manuscript.

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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