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Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

Safe Preference Identification through Strategic Interaction

Abstract

Learning a partner's preferences through strategic interaction can fail for two distinct reasons: safety constraints may remove the interactions that distinguish preferences, while a misspecified behavioral model may interpret informative responses in the wrong direction. We formalize these bottlenecks through an available-information rate and a learned-evidence rate . Their separation exposes a central failure regime, but , in which the admissible environment contains identifying information but the learner cannot convert it into correctly directed evidence. We characterize constraint-induced non-identifiability, derive information-theoretic sample-complexity lower bounds governed by , and show that signed learned evidence determines asymptotic posterior drift under likelihood misspecification. Experiments in an analytic instance, an exactly enumerable strategic game, and continuous HighwayEnv merging show that future commitments can change current responses, trajectory-level evidence can improve identification over one-step evidence, and natural likelihood mismatch can reverse learned evidence. Safe strategic preference identification therefore requires both informative admissible interactions and a behavioral model that interprets their responses faithfully.

Primary area:
reinforcement learning
Keywords:
preference learning, inverse reinforcement learning, active learning, strategic interaction, safe learning, model misspecification, sequential experimental design, multi-agent learning

Reviews

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1234this paper, Bottom 27%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 2.00 over 3 reviews, above 27% of the others.
Reviewer_WxqiOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
Presentation
3
Soundness
3
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Paper summary

This paper studies preference identification through strategic interaction when the learner must simultaneously respect safety and task-performance constraints. It identifies two distinct obstacles: (i) admissibility constraints may exclude interactions that distinguish different partner preferences, and (ii) behavioral-model misspecification may cause the learner to interpret informative observations as evidence for an incorrect preference.

The theoretical results characterize constraint-dependent preference indistinguishability, derive information-theoretic sample-complexity lower bounds, and establish asymptotic posterior-odds drift under stationary probing with likelihood misspecification.

Critical strengths

1. A conceptually meaningful separation between information availability and inference fidelity.

The strongest aspect of the paper is its formulation of two distinct failure mechanisms that can otherwise be conflated in interactive preference learning. The distinction between Γi\Gamma_i, which depends on the true response distributions, and Γ~i\widetilde{\Gamma}_i, which depends on the learner's assumed likelihood, makes it possible to distinguish a fundamentally uninformative admissible interaction from an informative interaction interpreted incorrectly.

The regime Γi>0\Gamma_i>0 but Γ~i≤0\widetilde{\Gamma}_i\leq0 is particularly useful because it demonstrates that increasing exploration or relaxing safety constraints is not necessarily sufficient to improve identification. Inference can remain systematically incorrect even when the environment provides adequate distinguishing information.

This is consequential to my assessment because the conceptual framework is relevant beyond the specific games studied and may inform the design and evaluation of interactive preference-learning systems.

2. Carefully controlled experiments provide convincing evidence for the proposed failure mechanisms.

The paper validates its central claims across complementary settings, moving from an analytically tractable model to an exactly enumerable strategic game and then to continuous highway merging.

The exact-game experiments are especially valuable because the true response laws and information rates can be computed directly, avoiding ambiguity introduced by approximate estimation. The likelihood-mismatch experiments independently modify the learner's behavioral model while holding the true environment fixed, allowing the authors to isolate evidence reversal from changes in information availability.

The HighwayEnv experiments further demonstrate that the same qualitative effects persist in a more complex environment, with appropriate statistical treatment of censored identification times. In particular, the substantial decrease in correct-confidence identification under likelihood mismatch provides direct empirical support for the paper's distinction between confidence and correctness.

Critical weaknesses

1. The main theoretical results largely follow established principles, leaving the degree of methodological novelty uncertain.

Although the separation between available information and learned evidence is insightful, the underlying mathematical results appear closely related to established theory.

Specifically, the available-information rate Γi\Gamma_i follows the max–min KL structure used in controlled sensing and sequential hypothesis testing. Theorem 1 is obtained through a standard change-of-measure argument. Similarly, the learned-evidence decomposition in Equation (5) expresses expected log-likelihood evidence as a difference of KL divergences, while Theorem 2 follows directly from Bayesian posterior-odds decomposition and the strong law of large numbers. These principles are closely connected to the classical literature on Bayesian inference under model misspecification, which the manuscript acknowledges.

Consequently, the central regime Γi>0\Gamma_i>0 but Γ~i≤0\widetilde{\Gamma}_i\leq0 can be interpreted as a useful combination of existing identifiability and misspecified-inference results, rather than a fundamentally new theoretical phenomenon.

The experiments establish the relevance of this distinction, but several findings also follow naturally from the chosen modeling assumptions. For example, future commitments affect current behavior because the partner explicitly observes and plans against the future commitment sequence. Likewise, full trajectories contain at least as much information as their first-step projections by the data-processing inequality.

2. The operational significance of the framework is limited by oracle-like assumptions about admissibility and true response distributions.

The paper's central motivation is preference identification under safety constraints and behavioral-model misspecification. However, the robustly admissible probe set in Equation (1) is defined using preference-conditioned task values and loss distributions. These quantities generally depend on the true interaction dynamics, which may not be available to a learner whose behavioral model is misspecified.

This concern becomes especially important in the likelihood-mismatch experiments. As explicitly described in Appendix A.7, the true environment and admissible probe set remain fixed, while only posterior updating and information-gain selection use the misspecified likelihood. This is a reasonable experimental design for isolating inference failure, but it effectively assumes access to a correctly characterized safety filter even when the learner's behavioral model is incorrect.

The model-error safety bound in Appendix A.5.4 partially addresses this distinction, but its practical application requires knowledge of a bound on the discrepancy between the true and assumed response distributions. The paper does not demonstrate how such bounds would be obtained or used to construct a reliable admissible set during learning.

Relatedly, both proposed information rates depend on the true response laws. Thus, Γi\Gamma_i and Γ~i\widetilde{\Gamma}_i are evaluated primarily as oracle diagnostics, rather than quantities the operational learner can reliably estimate or optimize. Moreover, the posterior-drift theorem concerns stationary randomized designs, while Safe-ID adaptively selects probes using a potentially misspecified posterior. The theoretical characterization therefore does not directly establish identification or correctness guarantees for the proposed operational policy.

Questions for authors
  1. What information is assumed available to the learner for enforcing robust admissibility?

Equation (1) requires preference-conditioned task values and loss distributions, whereas the likelihood-mismatch experiments assume that the learner's behavioral response model is incorrect.

Could the authors clarify whether the admissible set is assumed to be computed using an oracle model of the true environment or a separate, correctly specified safety model? If the latter, what justifies the separation between an accurate safety model and a misspecified behavioral likelihood?

Evidence that the proposed safety framework remains valid when the admissible set is computed from an imperfect model would substantially strengthen the practical interpretation of the results.

  1. Which theoretical conclusion goes beyond existing controlled-sensing and misspecified-Bayesian-inference theory?

Theorem 1 resembles classical KL-based sequential testing lower bounds, while Theorem 2 follows from the asymptotic behavior of log posterior odds under an incorrect likelihood.

Could the authors identify precisely which part of the proposed characterization constitutes a new technical result that cannot be obtained by directly combining these existing principles? In particular, does the strategic structure of the probe lead to an identifiability or information-theoretic result that differs substantively from conventional controlled experimental design?

A sharper theoretical comparison, or an additional result exploiting the strategic structure is necessary.

  1. How well do the proposed rates characterize the actual adaptive identification policy?

The posterior-drift theorem applies to stationary randomized designs, whereas Safe-ID adaptively selects probes according to a belief that may itself be distorted by model misspecification.

Could the authors clarify what conclusions about adaptive Safe-ID can legitimately be drawn from Γ~i\widetilde{\Gamma}_i? In particular, can the authors identify conditions under which a positive learned-evidence rate leads to reliable identification under Safe-ID, or provide a counterexample showing why this implication fails?

The above questions could have a significant impact on my assessment.

Reviewer_VZd9OpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
3
Soundness
2
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Paper summary

The paper studies how an agent can learn another agent's preferences through safe interactions. Safety constraints can rule out actions that would reveal these preferences and an incorrect behavioral model can mislead also learning. The authors provide theoretical results on identifiability (or failure to do so) as a result of each of these phenomena. They test the results in a simple model, a repeated game, and simulated highway merging. The experiments show that future commitments affect responses, full trajectories improve identification, and model errors can lead to incorrect conclusions.

Critical strengths

The experiments seem useful, but in my opinion largely confirm expected properties of the particular model studied. For example, it is unsurprising that future commitments affect responses when the partner explicitly conditions on them, that full trajectories provide more information than one-step observations, or that model misspecification can lead to incorrect inference.

Critical weaknesses

The novelty of the paper is unclear to me, especially relative to what is already known about the separate problems it builds on.

Theorem 1 appears to follow from standard results in sequential hypothesis testing (Nitinawarat et al., 2013; Garivier and Kaufmann, 2016), while Theorem 2 seems to follow from established results on Bayesian inference under misspecification (Shalizi, 2009). While combining these ideas in a safety-constrained strategic setting may be useful, it is unclear what new theoretical insights emerge from this combination.

The impossibility result also seems somewhat limited. The paper shows that, when the learned-evidence rate is nonpositive, no stationary strategy for selecting safe probes can accumulate positive expected evidence for the correct preference against every alternative. However, it does not establish the same result for adaptive strategies, where the learner chooses probes based on previous observations.

Questions for authors

What new insights emerge from combining safety constraints and likelihood misspecification, beyond what is already known about each problem separately?

How would you address the problem of learning safely when the behavioral model is not correct?

Reviewer_ZkBoOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
3
Read review
Paper summary

In this paper, the authors study the problem where a learner is trying to learn a partner's preference through strategic interaction with the partner. The learner can choose a probe, and the partner will respond the probe based on the probe and their preferences, and this the learner can infer about the preference by observing the sampled response. However, when the learner faces safety and task-performance constraints, the authors identify and formalize two bottleneck to this framework:

  1. Available information: the constraints restrict the set of admissible probes, and some preferences may not be distinguished from each other using the admissible interactions.
  2. Learned evidence: admissible interactions may be informative, but the learner’s behavioral model may interpret their outcomes incorrectly.

Finally, the authors validate the theory in an analytic model, a bottleneck game, and highway merging, and illustrate how constraints reduce identifying information and how likelihood mismatch can turn informative observations into evidence for the wrong preference.

Critical strengths
  • I like how the authors decompose the identification failure into two mechanisms, i.e., "unavailable information" and "incorrect interpretation" and how they organize the paper around this decomposition. In my opinion, this decomposition provides a coherent and principled way to understand the failure in interaction-based preference identification. Specifically, the distinction between the true information rate Γi\Gamma_i and the learned-evidence rate Γ~i\widetilde{\Gamma}_i makes these mechanisms mathematically explicit, and the main theorems explain complementary aspects of it.
  • The controlled experiment design is clean, and the authors isolate the effect under investigate in each experiment to illustrate the proposed mechanisms. I think the exact repeated bottleneck game is especially helpful, since the authors demonstrate the analyzed mechanisms in a sequential strategic environment where the relevant quantities (like the exact preference’s response distributions, task values and loss distributions, the admissible commitment set). can still be audited exactly.
Critical weaknesses
  • My main concern is that, for me, this paper's main contribution is proposing a theoretical framework for characterizing known failure modes in interaction-based preference identification. The two main theorems are sound, but they mainly serve to formalize two known messages, i.e., "constrained experiments may be uninformative" AND "misspecified likelihoods may produce incorrect inference." Moreover, the technical tools used to derive these two theorems are mainly established change-of-measure arguments and the posterior-odds identity together with the law of large numbers. When I read the paper, I would expect some follow-up results on (1) how these two failures interact beyond being characterized in a common framework, and (2) how characterizing these failures can better inform the design of probing rules. The paper provides some connections between the two, but I feel these directions are not developed much further. The authors introduce the Safe-ID heuristic as an operational policy, but its connection to the two theoretical results is limited, and there is no Safe-ID-specific theoretical result establishing identification correctness, convergence, or sample efficiency. Although the authors acknowledge this limitation, it leaves me uncertain about how much this framework can advance our ability to design reliable identification procedures.
Questions for authors

What theoretical connection, if any, is established between Safe-ID policy and the two main theorems? Does it achieve a frequentist correctness guarantee or a sample-complexity bound under additional assumptions? Why you propose this specific policy rather than other heuristic policies?

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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