- Rating
- 1
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 1
- Presentation
- 1
- Soundness
- 1
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Paper summary
This paper studies a sequential environment with an assistant and a user, where the assistant updates a menu at each round, and the user selects an item within the menu at each round. Both the user and the assistant could be truthful or strategic. The results are many-fold: 1) the existence of sequential equilibria in this game; 2) It's suboptimal for the assistant to regard user's strategic actions as truthful actions; 3) There exists an equilibrium where user's actions are same regardless of user's types, and this equilibrium is the worst for the assistance; 4) Under some conditions, equilibria could be best for the assistance, and under such equilibria, user behaves strategically rather than truthfully.
Critical strengths
None
Critical weaknesses
- The paper is extremely hard to follow, making me hard to understand the potential value of the paper, which I also believe is not solely caused by my unfamiliarity with the topic. Therefore, I can not recommend acceptance. I believe that the current manuscript necessitates a major revision before acceptance. For some examples:
- The presentation logic is confusing. The paper frequently jumps into some concepts, while I couldn't find the connection between this concept and the context. For example, in line 158-160, the paper describes that the assistant's posterior update may account for user's strategic behavior; while later in line 172-174, the paper claims a Markov assistant policy, and the posterior update assumes that the user behaves truthfully; later in line 197-199, the paper only assumes a fixed assistant policy and posterior update rule; later in line 226-231, "strategies may condition on the entire observed history rather than only on the public state (A, q)", and the assistant posterior update accounts for user's strategic behavior. In addition, the concept "DIC" is defined in Definition 3.1 but not used in the remaining of the main text.
- Many statements are informal. This becomes extremely frequent starting from section 3. For examples, all definitions and theorems lack enough notations to define, lacking mathematical rigor.
- Many concepts are undefined. For examples, "canonical slate correspondence" in line 136; "multinomial-logit" feedback in line 149; "positive affine rescaling" in line 171; "delegated decision problem" in line 182; "continuation utility" in line 202; "adaptive policy" in line 215; "cumulative separation" in line 251; "cumulatively better explained" in line 261.
Questions for authors
None
4 comments
I decided to maintain my score as the revised manuscript still suffers from severe presentation issue and is not pleasant to read. Moreover, I suspect that the submission suffers from severe AI slop.
Some comments:
- Some concepts are still unclear. For examples: the authors supplement a sentence after the introduction of "positive affine rescaling", but it is not the definition, but the effect of "positive affine rescaling". "Delegated decision problem", "cumulative separation" and "adaptive policy" are still undefined. "Continuation utility" is defined only informally, without rigor. It's expected to see rigorous, symbolized definitions following any new concepts whenever they appear in the paper.
- "DIC" is still defined but not used in main text. The rebuttal argues that it is used in the appendix, but why not put this in the appendix as well?
- The authors have refined the mathematical statements for Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2 and made major revisions. But it is expected that the rigorous statements of theorems should be prepared in the first submission.
We appreciate your continued feedback on the presentation. We recognize that the paper brings together several components, including preference learning, strategic reporting, sequential menu design, and welfare constraints, whose relationships require careful explanation. Presenting these within the page limit is challenging, and we are sorry that some aspects remain difficult to follow. During the discussion phase, we have worked to make the exposition clearer, particularly the definitions, the relationship between the analyses and the mathematical statements.
We would also like to clarify the following points, several of which are already addressed in the main text or were present in the original submission.
1. Definitions and mathematical precision. The concepts you mention are defined or explained at the relevant points in the paper:
- Positive affine rescaling (Section 2): The term has its standard mathematical meaning: a transformation of the form , where . In our model, denotes the assistant's utility function over items, denotes an item, and and are the minimum and maximum assistant utilities over all feasible items. We normalize the utility as , which preserves the assistant's ranking of items. The revised paper already explained this property, and we have now included the explicit formula in the main text, with further details in Appendix B.6.
- Delegated decision problem (Section 2): The paragraph titled “Delegated choice” states: "The assistant controls the revealed menu, but the user chooses the terminal item, making this a delegated decision problem." Appendix C further compares this setting with a first-best benchmark in which the assistant directly assigns type-specific outcomes.
- Continuation utility (Section 3.1): The main text defines continuation utility as the expected utility of the item the user ultimately chooses from the accumulated menu. It then gives the Bellman recursion and its terminal condition, providing the formal characterization.
- Cumulative separation (Section 4): The text explains that evidence distinguishing user types accumulates across rounds, without requiring every round to distinguish them. Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 specify the corresponding conditions through sums of conditional KL divergences.
- Adaptive policies: Section 2 defines assistant policies on the belief state , allowing recommendations to depend on information obtained from earlier reports. Definition 5.2 then formalizes the non-adaptive benchmark, whose decisions do not depend on that feedback.
Thus, the main text provides both the mathematical formulations needed for the results and explanations of the terminology. We have also made the normalization explicit in response to your latest comment.
2. Dynamic incentive compatibility (DIC). DIC has two connections to the subsequent analysis. First, Appendix D.2 uses the continuation-value formulation associated with Definition 3.1 to bound the gain from deviating from truthful reporting at states reached under truthful play. The paragraph immediately following Definition 3.1 explains this result and points to the appendix. Second, the main-text discussion immediately after Theorem 5.4 explicitly compares condition (iii) with DIC. Condition (iii) requires truthful reporting to remain optimal even after reports assigned zero probability by the proposed strategy, while DIC requires optimality at states reached under truthful reporting. The former is thus stronger. DIC is not imposed as an assumption on the later equilibrium theorems, but it is used to explain the distinction between their incentive conditions.
3. Theorems 4.1 and 4.2. The mathematical results and proofs have not changed. Their rigorous formulations, including the conditional likelihoods, separation assumptions, and finite-sample bounds, were already included in Appendix E of the original submission. Following another reviewer's request to make the precise statements available in the main text, we moved these formulations into Section 4 and expanded the accompanying explanations. These changes improve the accessibility of the existing results; they do not introduce new theorems or alter their mathematical conclusions. The full proofs remain in Appendix E.
We hope these clarifications help explain both the existing definitions and the changes made during the discussion phase.
Thank you for your further responses. I insist on my opinion that these revisions about presentation quality should be prepared in the first submission, not during the revision. As a result, I maintain my score.
Response
Thank you for the detailed comments. We have clarified the transitions between the analyses, the role of dynamic incentive compatibility, and the mathematical terminology and statements.
Relationship between the analyses. The paper begins with a truthful-feedback planning benchmark (Section 2). Section 3 then examines strategic incentives: first a user's best response when the assistant policy and updating rule are fixed (Section 3.1), then existence of an equilibrium when both players choose full-history strategies (Section 3.2). This motivates the learning question in Section 4: given a strategic reporting process, can the assistant infer the user's type? Section 5 asks the further question that learning alone cannot answer: does information supplied in equilibrium improve the assistant's payoff? Thus the sections follow successive questions about the same interaction, rather than presenting unrelated models. Their mathematical formulations are deliberately different. Section 4 fixes the reporting process to compare two likelihoods; Section 5 requires strategic optimality and welfare feasibility for Markov assessments. Existence of the full-history equilibrium in Section 3.2 does not itself prove existence of those Markov assessments. We have made these distinctions clearer in the exposition.
Dynamic incentive compatibility. Definition 3.1 identifies when truthful reporting is optimal at the relevant continuation decisions for a fixed policy and update rule. Appendix D.2 uses this DIC setup to quantify the benefit a user can obtain by deviating from a currently preferred report at one decision. The bound compares the best continuation utility available after any report with the best available after a currently preferred report; it is small when the reports induce similar posterior beliefs and the user's continuation utility changes little with those beliefs. We now explain the bound after Definition 3.1. Theorem 5.4 later uses a stronger condition covering additional reporting decisions, including reports assigned zero probability. This connection is explained alongside that theorem.
Mathematical statements. Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 now state the relevant likelihood and cumulative-separation assumptions more precisely, with finite-sample conclusions and separate proof sketches. The first concerns evidence favoring a false type under a truthful-choice likelihood applied to strategic reports; the second concerns concentration under the correct strategic likelihood when the induced reporting distributions distinguish types. Section 4 explains why these are different questions in a sequential interaction.
Terminology. Section 2 explains the persistent menu, the finite type space, the canonical slate correspondence, multinomial-logit feedback, and the effect of a positive affine rescaling. Section 3 explains continuation utility and the distinction between fixed-policy responses and equilibrium beliefs. We also clarify cumulative separation where the learning results are stated, rather than relying on the reader to infer its meaning from an appendix reference.