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Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

Learning Preferences of Strategic Users in Sequential Delegated Menu Design

Abstract

AI assistants often learn users' preferences from their choices and use this feedback to shape future recommendations. Strategic users, however, may choose to influence what the assistant offers next. We study this feedback loop in sequential delegated menu design, where an assistant repeatedly reveals options, learns from user choices, and maximizes its own payoff while protecting user welfare. We show that treating strategic choices as truthful can lead to learning incorrect preferences, whereas accounting for strategic behavior enables learning when feedback sufficiently distinguishes possible preferences. Yet, equilibrium feedback need not be informative: there can be an equilibrium in which all users provide the same feedback, leaving the assistant with only its best value without feedback. Moreover, when the assistant's behavior determines a terminal item for each possible preference profile, strategic feedback cannot outperform truthful feedback, even if it reveals the user's preferences. This conclusion has a sharp boundary: strategic feedback can outperform truthful feedback if the assistant observes feedback before randomizing future recommendations. If it randomizes before the user responds, we characterize exactly when truthful and strategic feedback have the same value. Experiments on synthetic interactions and preferences estimated from real-world datasets support these learning and value results.

Primary area:
learning theory
Keywords:
Strategic recommendation, Learning from strategic feedback, Sequential decision making, Equilibrium analysis

Reviews

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Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 2.00 over 3 reviews, above 27% of the others.
Reviewer_KwesOpenReview ↗
Rating
1
Confidence
2
Informativeness
1
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1
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Paper summary

This paper studies a sequential environment with an assistant and a user, where the assistant updates a menu at each round, and the user selects an item within the menu at each round. Both the user and the assistant could be truthful or strategic. The results are many-fold: 1) the existence of sequential equilibria in this game; 2) It's suboptimal for the assistant to regard user's strategic actions as truthful actions; 3) There exists an equilibrium where user's actions are same regardless of user's types, and this equilibrium is the worst for the assistance; 4) Under some conditions, equilibria could be best for the assistance, and under such equilibria, user behaves strategically rather than truthfully.

Critical strengths

None

Critical weaknesses
  • The paper is extremely hard to follow, making me hard to understand the potential value of the paper, which I also believe is not solely caused by my unfamiliarity with the topic. Therefore, I can not recommend acceptance. I believe that the current manuscript necessitates a major revision before acceptance. For some examples:
    • The presentation logic is confusing. The paper frequently jumps into some concepts, while I couldn't find the connection between this concept and the context. For example, in line 158-160, the paper describes that the assistant's posterior update may account for user's strategic behavior; while later in line 172-174, the paper claims a Markov assistant policy, and the posterior update assumes that the user behaves truthfully; later in line 197-199, the paper only assumes a fixed assistant policy and posterior update rule; later in line 226-231, "strategies may condition on the entire observed history rather than only on the public state (A, q)", and the assistant posterior update accounts for user's strategic behavior. In addition, the concept "DIC" is defined in Definition 3.1 but not used in the remaining of the main text.
    • Many statements are informal. This becomes extremely frequent starting from section 3. For examples, all definitions and theorems lack enough notations to define, lacking mathematical rigor.
    • Many concepts are undefined. For examples, "canonical slate correspondence" in line 136; "multinomial-logit" feedback in line 149; "positive affine rescaling" in line 171; "delegated decision problem" in line 182; "continuation utility" in line 202; "adaptive policy" in line 215; "cumulative separation" in line 251; "cumulatively better explained" in line 261.
Questions for authors

None

4 comments

Thank you for the detailed comments. We have clarified the transitions between the analyses, the role of dynamic incentive compatibility, and the mathematical terminology and statements.

Relationship between the analyses. The paper begins with a truthful-feedback planning benchmark (Section 2). Section 3 then examines strategic incentives: first a user's best response when the assistant policy and updating rule are fixed (Section 3.1), then existence of an equilibrium when both players choose full-history strategies (Section 3.2). This motivates the learning question in Section 4: given a strategic reporting process, can the assistant infer the user's type? Section 5 asks the further question that learning alone cannot answer: does information supplied in equilibrium improve the assistant's payoff? Thus the sections follow successive questions about the same interaction, rather than presenting unrelated models. Their mathematical formulations are deliberately different. Section 4 fixes the reporting process to compare two likelihoods; Section 5 requires strategic optimality and welfare feasibility for Markov assessments. Existence of the full-history equilibrium in Section 3.2 does not itself prove existence of those Markov assessments. We have made these distinctions clearer in the exposition.

Dynamic incentive compatibility. Definition 3.1 identifies when truthful reporting is optimal at the relevant continuation decisions for a fixed policy and update rule. Appendix D.2 uses this DIC setup to quantify the benefit a user can obtain by deviating from a currently preferred report at one decision. The bound compares the best continuation utility available after any report with the best available after a currently preferred report; it is small when the reports induce similar posterior beliefs and the user's continuation utility changes little with those beliefs. We now explain the bound after Definition 3.1. Theorem 5.4 later uses a stronger condition covering additional reporting decisions, including reports assigned zero probability. This connection is explained alongside that theorem.

Mathematical statements. Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 now state the relevant likelihood and cumulative-separation assumptions more precisely, with finite-sample conclusions and separate proof sketches. The first concerns evidence favoring a false type under a truthful-choice likelihood applied to strategic reports; the second concerns concentration under the correct strategic likelihood when the induced reporting distributions distinguish types. Section 4 explains why these are different questions in a sequential interaction.

Terminology. Section 2 explains the persistent menu, the finite type space, the canonical slate correspondence, multinomial-logit feedback, and the effect of a positive affine rescaling. Section 3 explains continuation utility and the distinction between fixed-policy responses and equilibrium beliefs. We also clarify cumulative separation where the learning results are stated, rather than relying on the reader to infer its meaning from an appendix reference.

I decided to maintain my score as the revised manuscript still suffers from severe presentation issue and is not pleasant to read. Moreover, I suspect that the submission suffers from severe AI slop.

Some comments:

  1. Some concepts are still unclear. For examples: the authors supplement a sentence after the introduction of "positive affine rescaling", but it is not the definition, but the effect of "positive affine rescaling". "Delegated decision problem", "cumulative separation" and "adaptive policy" are still undefined. "Continuation utility" is defined only informally, without rigor. It's expected to see rigorous, symbolized definitions following any new concepts whenever they appear in the paper.
  2. "DIC" is still defined but not used in main text. The rebuttal argues that it is used in the appendix, but why not put this in the appendix as well?
  3. The authors have refined the mathematical statements for Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2 and made major revisions. But it is expected that the rigorous statements of theorems should be prepared in the first submission.

We appreciate your continued feedback on the presentation. We recognize that the paper brings together several components, including preference learning, strategic reporting, sequential menu design, and welfare constraints, whose relationships require careful explanation. Presenting these within the page limit is challenging, and we are sorry that some aspects remain difficult to follow. During the discussion phase, we have worked to make the exposition clearer, particularly the definitions, the relationship between the analyses and the mathematical statements.

We would also like to clarify the following points, several of which are already addressed in the main text or were present in the original submission.

1. Definitions and mathematical precision. The concepts you mention are defined or explained at the relevant points in the paper:

  • Positive affine rescaling (Section 2): The term has its standard mathematical meaning: a transformation of the form f(x)=ax+bf(x)=ax+b, where a>0a>0. In our model, UaU_a denotes the assistant's utility function over items, x\mathbf x denotes an item, and Uamin⁡U_a^{\min} and Uamax⁡U_a^{\max} are the minimum and maximum assistant utilities over all feasible items. We normalize the utility as U~a(x)=(Ua(x)−Uamin⁡)/(Uamax⁡−Uamin⁡)\tilde U_a(\mathbf x)=(U_a(\mathbf x)-U_a^{\min})/(U_a^{\max}-U_a^{\min}), which preserves the assistant's ranking of items. The revised paper already explained this property, and we have now included the explicit formula in the main text, with further details in Appendix B.6.
  • Delegated decision problem (Section 2): The paragraph titled “Delegated choice” states: "The assistant controls the revealed menu, but the user chooses the terminal item, making this a delegated decision problem." Appendix C further compares this setting with a first-best benchmark in which the assistant directly assigns type-specific outcomes.
  • Continuation utility (Section 3.1): The main text defines continuation utility as the expected utility of the item the user ultimately chooses from the accumulated menu. It then gives the Bellman recursion Utπ,τˉ(A,q,η)U_t^{\pi,\bar\tau}(A,q,\eta) and its terminal condition, providing the formal characterization.
  • Cumulative separation (Section 4): The text explains that evidence distinguishing user types accumulates across rounds, without requiring every round to distinguish them. Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 specify the corresponding conditions through sums of conditional KL divergences.
  • Adaptive policies: Section 2 defines assistant policies on the belief state (A,q)(A,q), allowing recommendations to depend on information obtained from earlier reports. Definition 5.2 then formalizes the non-adaptive benchmark, whose decisions do not depend on that feedback.

Thus, the main text provides both the mathematical formulations needed for the results and explanations of the terminology. We have also made the normalization explicit in response to your latest comment.

2. Dynamic incentive compatibility (DIC). DIC has two connections to the subsequent analysis. First, Appendix D.2 uses the continuation-value formulation associated with Definition 3.1 to bound the gain from deviating from truthful reporting at states reached under truthful play. The paragraph immediately following Definition 3.1 explains this result and points to the appendix. Second, the main-text discussion immediately after Theorem 5.4 explicitly compares condition (iii) with DIC. Condition (iii) requires truthful reporting to remain optimal even after reports assigned zero probability by the proposed strategy, while DIC requires optimality at states reached under truthful reporting. The former is thus stronger. DIC is not imposed as an assumption on the later equilibrium theorems, but it is used to explain the distinction between their incentive conditions.

3. Theorems 4.1 and 4.2. The mathematical results and proofs have not changed. Their rigorous formulations, including the conditional likelihoods, separation assumptions, and finite-sample bounds, were already included in Appendix E of the original submission. Following another reviewer's request to make the precise statements available in the main text, we moved these formulations into Section 4 and expanded the accompanying explanations. These changes improve the accessibility of the existing results; they do not introduce new theorems or alter their mathematical conclusions. The full proofs remain in Appendix E.

We hope these clarifications help explain both the existing definitions and the changes made during the discussion phase.

Thank you for your further responses. I insist on my opinion that these revisions about presentation quality should be prepared in the first submission, not during the revision. As a result, I maintain my score.

Reviewer_K1ocOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
1
Soundness
2
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Paper summary

This paper studies an interaction between an AI agent, which presents a menu sequentially and may learn from user feedback, and a user, who may respond either truthfully according to their preferences or strategically. The paper characterizes several equilibria of this interaction and compares them to the truthful setting. The main contributions are this theoretical characterization and the accompanying proofs, though I did not read the appendix to verify them.

Critical strengths
  1. The setting is interesting. It considers a user-AI interaction where users may have incentives to misreport, and it studies the effect of these incentives on learning. This matters because AI assistants increasingly adapt to user feedback, and users may anticipate this.

  2. The theory seems likely to be technically rigorous.

Critical weaknesses
  1. As presented, the paper is too specialized for an ML audience. It relies heavily on concepts from Bayesian game theory and uses a lot of jargon without definition, such as "full history sequential equilibrium," "vanishing-tremble" arguments in the proof sketch of Theorem 3.1, and "standard" perturbations. Standard in what way, and for whom? Similarly, the canonical slate correspondence: who is it canonical for? This matters because the paper's potential audience at an ML venue cannot follow the arguments or assess the contribution without these connections to a broader audience.

  2. More generally, the paper has presentation issues. The notation is very dense, basic aspects of the interaction are unclear, key details are deferred to the appendix, and the content is not well prioritized. The setting and questions are promising, but the paper is missing a story, and it is not pleasant to read.

Questions for authors

Clarifications:

  1. Situating the model. In the introduction, I was left wondering what a menu design setting is. Is it a canonical way to study certain problems? If so, it should be cited. If not, it is not clear to me that it is the right way to model AI interaction. Specifically, the agent sequentially adds items to a menu based on the user's selections so far, at the end the user picks their favorite item off the menu, and only this endpoint is the performance metric. What setting is this supposed to model? The preliminaries mention itineraries as an example, but this is not expanded upon.

  2. Simplifying the model. The notation is very dense. Is there anything that can simplify it? For example, why does it matter that items have discrete features that are weighted and evaluated with unknown value score functions? Why not just use discrete item types without specific features? It would help to know whether the key ideas can be conveyed with a simpler model.

  3. Basic aspects of the interaction. Why is the user report an element of the distribution over the new menu B? Does this mean the user selects one item from the newly appended items, and not from the historical items? Why is the choice over all historical items at the end? Such basic aspects of the interaction should be made clear, both in plain language early on and mathematically.

  4. Zero-probability reports. Around line 161, what happens if the rule is deterministic? Would the denominator be zero? This is a particular concern since in the preceding paragraph, truthful user feedback is defined as an argmax, which is deterministic. Later on (e.g. line 189), the paper refers to "including after zero probability reports," and in Section 3.2 these are called "off path reports." What does this mean? This discussion should all be up front.

  5. Insight from the results. I struggled to see what insight the results provide. Here is my understanding of the results through Theorem 5.2: truthful feedback is optimal (so there is no incentive for strategic behavior) if the agent is non-adaptive. However, when the agent is non-adaptive, there is also no point for a strategic user to be truthful, since it does not affect their payoff. What am I supposed to take away from this? Is there some interpretation which has interesting applications for system design? Additionally, the existence of a babbling equilibrium due to a non-adaptive AI is not satisfying - I was hoping for something where AI tries to learn about the user, but because of misaligned incentives, the user wants to obfuscate. I was also looking for an explanation about what happens when user and AI incentives are aligned.

  6. Theorems 5.3 and 5.4. These seem more interesting. However, at least in Theorem 5.3 it seem to be conditions on the setting (details of user types and their differences) rather than anything about the AI, hence unclear what design principles one might take away from reading this. Theorem 5.4 then seems to say that a randomized variant which makes the seed public succeeds in incentivizing truthful reporting, though I don't see how. Is the result saying that things are better if users are truthful, or is it saying when users will actually be truthful? If it is the latter, it seems like the most interesting result is a statement about user behavior rather than design. I am left wondering whether the type of equilibrium is interesting, or if a Stackelberg setup is better.

Suggestions:

  1. IRL is used without definition. Please spell out inverse reinforcement learning on first use.

  2. The notation E\mathcal{E} is not really defined in the information structure paragraph. I guess it is the space of possible user types, meaning weights and value score functions, which seems large. This should be stated explicitly.

  3. The canonical slate correspondence is mentioned in the preliminaries with no explanation in words. Later, it is assumed as a special condition in one of the results, meaning it was not assumed in some of the other results? I am confused. There is also some mention of additional slate restrictions, but it is unclear what these would be or why. The setting should be cleanly defined and concrete, and any extensions or special cases can be addressed later.

  4. There is too much forward referencing of the appendix. The body of the paper needs to stand alone, and this level of appendix referencing makes me feel I am missing key aspects of the setting. Instead of pointing to subsections throughout, a single note at the beginning or end, such as "additional details and background in Appendix B," would do. Other references introduce undefined jargon, such as "Appendix D.1 gives its continuation-value formulation." What is a continuation value? And when the paper says "Appendix D.2 bounds this gain," this seems important, so why is it deferred to an appendix?

  5. Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 are not very surprising, and it seems to me that the conclusions follow naturally from the setting and assumptions. The statements are high level, and without more details it is hard to see what is interesting or technically deep. It might help to define the algorithms precisely, for example the two learning processes being compared, or perhaps to devote less space to these results in favor of better exposition and focus on the more interesting later results.

  6. Relatedly, the framing should focus more on the implications of the results. Given someone is designing an adaptation or randomization policy for an AI assistant, what is the meaning of the existence or suboptimality of these equilibria? How do design choices change the structure of the game, and what implications should a reader take away from that? For a nice example of work which bridges ML and game theory in this way, see Hron et al., "Modeling Content Creator Incentives on Algorithm-Curated Platforms."

  7. I cannot follow the experimental results because too much is deferred to the appendix. The main text needs many more details on the experimental setting and on how the various best response algorithms are implemented.

9 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response (1/3)

Thank you for the detailed suggestions on presentation and motivation. We have revised the introduction, clarified the interaction in Section 2, and expanded the explanations of the equilibrium and learning results.

Weaknesses 1-2: presentation. The introduction now uses a coat-shopping interaction to motivate a persistent menu: the assistant shows coats over several rounds, earlier options remain available, and intermediate selections affect later recommendations. Section 3.2 explains full-history strategies and why beliefs must be specified after reports assigned probability zero, and the proof sketch of Theorem 3.1 now describes the construction, perturbing both strategies so that every report has positive probability and taking limits, instead of naming a vanishing-tremble argument. The analyses proceed from a truthful-feedback benchmark to strategic best responses and equilibrium existence, then to learning from strategic reports and the equilibrium value of that information. The latter two questions are different: a report can help infer a type without improving the assistant's equilibrium payoff.

Clarification 1: situating the model. The assistant chooses which items to reveal over several rounds, while the user makes one final choice from the accumulated menu. Intermediate selections are feedback that can influence later recommendations, not separate purchases. This models settings such as choosing a product or itinerary from an evolving shortlist; it does not attempt to model early exit or repeated consumption. Restricting a menu in order to shape another party's choice is the delegation problem of the mechanism-design literature, which our related-work section already cited and distinguished from our setting; what is new here is that the menu is built up over several rounds out of the user's own reports. Coat supplies preference data for simulated interactions, not observations of strategic reporting.

Clarification 2: features. We use the feature-value representation because it makes preference tradeoffs interpretable and lets us fit user types from item attributes and ratings in Coat and SUSHI. This is the modeling approach discussed by Keeney and Raiffa (1976), Bohanec and Rajkovic (1988), and Boutilier et al. (2004), cited at the start of "Feature-value utilities" in Section 2. For example, two Coat users may place different weights on price and material, and assign different scores to particular values of those features; the same construction applies to the item attributes used for SUSHI. Some theoretical arguments use only the resulting utility over items, so an arbitrary finite utility table would suffice for those arguments. The feature representation remains useful for interpreting heterogeneity and constructing the empirical instances.

Clarification 3: reports and menus. After a new slate SS is revealed, the user reports an item from B=A∪SB=A\cup S, the union of earlier items AA and newly revealed items SS. The report is not restricted to SS. Re-reporting an earlier item is possible, and a failure to switch can itself inform the assistant. The terminal choice is also from the accumulated menu. We now say this explicitly in Section 2.

Clarification 4: zero-probability reports. A deterministic reporting rule does not make every alternative report impossible under the assistant's current uncertainty. The predictive probability Pqσ(y∣A,B)P_q^\sigma(\mathbf y\mid A,B) is zero precisely when every type with positive posterior probability assigns zero probability to y\mathbf y. Under deterministic truthful reporting, different candidate types can prefer different items, so an item not preferred by the actual user may still have positive predictive probability. When the denominator is zero, Bayes' rule does not determine a posterior. Section 3.1 specifies the update rule for such reports when studying a fixed policy; Section 3.2 specifies beliefs after reports assigned zero probability in an equilibrium (off-path reports). We have clarified this distinction in the preliminaries.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response (2/3)

Clarification 5: what the results show. The interpretation in the question conflates a non-adaptive assistant with a non-adaptive benchmark. Theorem 5.1 does not require the assistant to be non-adaptive. It constructs an uninformative equilibrium even when the assistant can adapt to feedback: all types report alike, so adaptation cannot extract information, and the worst-equilibrium payoff equals the best non-adaptive value. This is different from assuming in advance that reports cannot affect the policy. Theorem 5.2 concerns the truthful-feedback comparison; it should not be read as asserting that every adaptive assistant makes truthful reporting optimal. The system-design implication is that offering adaptive recommendations does not ensure informative feedback when users have incentives to influence future menus. Theorem 4.1 studies the complementary phenomenon in which the assistant does try to learn, but strategic reports can move a truthful-likelihood posterior toward a false type. We do not claim a general theorem for perfectly aligned objectives. Section 5.1 now makes the babbling-versus-collapse distinction clearer.

Clarification 6: randomization and Stackelberg behavior. Theorem 5.3 does impose assumptions concerning the assistant's behavior, not only user types: its collapse conclusion requires a suitable restriction on terminal outcomes (outcome determinacy), alongside strict user preferences and reachability of the relevant menu. Deterministic assistant behavior is a sufficient case for the outcome restriction; this is important for policy design. Theorem 5.4 treats a different timing of randomization, where the assistant's seed is revealed before the user reports. It does not say that public randomization alone makes truthfulness optimal. Rather, its characterization includes a condition requiring truthful reporting to remain optimal at the relevant continuation decisions. The theorem therefore addresses both the value comparison and the user's incentives. We clarify this after Theorem 5.4.

A Stackelberg alternative lets the assistant announce a policy first and the user choose a best response to it. The new Proposition F.8 analyzes deterministic commitment: under its assumptions, the assistant gains no more than from a fixed deterministic menu. The appendix also gives a randomized-commitment example where a favorable optimal user response yields more than the randomized non-adaptive benchmark; that improvement is not established for every optimal response. Commitment to a randomized policy is different from announcing the realized seed before the report. These distinctions are now explained in Section 5.3. Our response to Suggestion 6 below addresses the design implications.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response (3/3)

Thank you for the concrete suggestions. We address them in the reviewer's numbering and distinguish definitions already present in the submission from explanations added in the revision.

Suggestion 1: IRL. We spell out inverse reinforcement learning on first use.

Suggestion 2: E\mathcal E. The set E\mathcal E is a finite hypothesis space of candidate user types, where each type is specified by feature weights and value-score functions. This was already defined in the submitted paper, in the information-structure paragraph of Section 2, immediately after the definition of a user type.

Suggestion 3: canonical slate correspondence. Section 2 now explains before the formula that the assistant may reveal any set of at most kk previously unseen items. We call this correspondence canonical because it adds no further restriction on which unrevealed items may appear together. Restrictions such as category constraints can be modeled by smaller feasible-slate sets. The separate assumption k≥∣X∣k\ge |X| is stronger and is used only in results that require it.

Suggestion 4: appendix references and DIC. We retain precise appendix references where they identify the relevant argument, but explain the essential point in the main text. After Definition 3.1, we describe the bound in Appendix D.2: it compares the user's best continuation payoff after any report with the best payoff after a currently preferred report, and bounds the benefit of a one-step deviation when the induced posteriors are close and continuation utility is not too sensitive to them. The appendix gives the assumptions and proof. This also clarifies the role of DIC without introducing an extra theorem into the main text.

Suggestion 5: Theorems 4.1 and 4.2. The question is not whether a Bayesian posterior concentrates in the abstract. The observations are generated within a sequential interaction: a report can reflect the user's attempt to influence later menus rather than a preference for the reported item. We therefore compare two updates on the same strategically generated reports. The truthful-choice likelihood can accumulate evidence favoring a false type (Theorem 4.1); even the correct strategic likelihood identifies the true type only when the reporting distributions separate the candidate types sufficiently along the menus encountered (Theorem 4.2). The two conditions concern different failures and neither follows from the mere presence of strategic reporting. Section 4 now defines the learning comparison, states the assumptions more precisely, and gives separate proof sketches. Section 5 asks whether informative feedback is actually available and valuable in equilibrium.

Suggestion 6: design implications. Three choices matter: how reports are interpreted, how the recommendation policy changes the incentive to report, and when randomization is resolved. A report need not be a truthful preference observation; an assistant that updates as though it were can be misled. Conversely, a correct likelihood does not guarantee learning if equilibrium reports do not distinguish types. Theorem 5.3 identifies conditions under which adaptation cannot improve the best equilibrium value; Theorem 5.4 concerns publicly resolved randomization and the additional incentives needed for truthful reporting. Section 5.3 now also analyzes policy commitment: a deterministic committed policy is no better than a fixed deterministic menu under the proposition's assumptions, whereas randomized commitment can do better for a favorable optimal user response. This distinction matters when a platform publishes a policy, as in the algorithmic-incentives setting discussed by Hron et al.; publication of a policy does not resolve its future random draws.

Suggestion 7: experimental methods. We added a main-text account of the experimental procedures. The 129 reporting rules are numerical fixed points found from 300 starts and closed under report relabeling, not an exhaustive equilibrium enumeration. The user's best response is computed by backward induction against a fixed policy and updating rule; an occupation-measure linear program handles the assistant's constrained optimization, and exact dynamic programming computes the benchmarks. The appendix retains the detailed recursions, numerical tolerances, and verification procedures.

Reviewer_riyeOpenReview ↗
Rating
3(+1)
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
3
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Paper summary

The paper looks at an assistant that recommends items over several rounds and learns what the user likes from the items they pick. Revealed items stay on the menu, and the user makes a final choice at the end. The assistant tries to steer that choice toward items it prefers while keeping the user’s expected welfare loss under a budget. The catch is that users may pick strategically to influence what gets shown next.

On the learning side, the authors show that reading strategic choices as honest can push the assistant’s beliefs toward the wrong type, while using the right strategic model lets it learn when different types behave differently enough. On the value side, as long as the welfare budget can be met without feedback, there is always an equilibrium in which all users report the same way, which leaves the assistant with exactly what it could get by ignoring feedback. With a deterministic assistant, and under a few technical conditions, every equilibrium ends up there. The reason is that each type can imitate the others, so the equilibrium outcomes could have been offered as one menu from the start. Randomizing after seeing the report breaks this, and then strategic feedback can even beat honest feedback. The experiments use a small hand-built instance, random synthetic instances, and preference types fitted from Coat and SUSHI, with the strategic behavior simulated.

I’m not an expert in mechanism design or game theory. I followed the main arguments but did not check every proof, and I can’t judge the novelty relative to the economics literature very well. My comments are mostly about the modeling choices and the experiments.

Critical strengths

I like the question. Many ML systems learn preferences from clicks and choices, and it’s easy to forget that people who know they’re being learned from may stop behaving honestly. The persistent menu is a nice touch: whatever the assistant shows in order to learn also changes what the user can end up with. The collapse result is the part I found most interesting. With a deterministic assistant, strategic feedback is worth no more than no feedback, and the imitation argument behind this is short and easy to follow. That is a useful message for anyone building adaptive recommenders, and it’s the main reason I see value in the paper.

I also appreciated how carefully the authors mark the limits of their results. They don’t oversell the collapse, and they give concrete counterexamples showing that it fails when the assistant randomizes after the report. The experimental appendix is unusually frank about what the numbers do not show, for instance that the finite-sample bounds are vacuous at the tested horizons and that the real datasets contain no strategic behavior.

Critical weaknesses

My main concern is how much of this would carry over to a real assistant. The users here know the assistant’s objective, policy and update rule, and they compute dynamic best responses through its posterior. The assistant, in turn, knows a finite set of possible types. The positive learning result also needs the exact strategic reporting rule behind the data, but even the four-item toy instance has 129 belief-consistent rules, and the paper doesn’t say which one would arise. So I’m not sure how an assistant would ever get the correct strategic likelihood. The welfare guarantee is also weaker than the abstract suggests, since it only holds on average over types. Example B.2 shows that a single user can end up well above the budget.

The experiments don’t help much with this. The learning experiment is one hand-built instance, and by the authors’ own description its reporting rules are not equilibria. In it, the strategic-likelihood posterior on the true type ends around 0.52, barely above the 0.5 prior. What the experiment really shows is that the naive assistant gets misled, not that the strategic one learns.

The real datasets are only used to fit five preference types, and the assumptions behind the collapse results don’t hold on those instances. The gain from honest feedback there is about 0.01 on a 0 to 1 scale. That makes me wonder whether the stakes in practice are as large as the unbounded price of truthful feedback suggests, since that result comes from a constructed example. The exact computation also already runs past the authors’ one-hour limit at 14 items.

Overall, I find the theoretical results interesting, particularly the collapse result for deterministic assistants. However, the positive learning result relies on assumptions that seem difficult to satisfy in practice, and the experiments provide limited evidence of its usefulness beyond the constructed settings. I am therefore not fully convinced by the overall contribution and lean slightly toward rejection.

My confidence is low because mechanism design is outside my primary research expertise, and I cannot fully assess the novelty of the theoretical results.

Questions for authors

A few clarifications could change my view.

Why is the assistant modeled as best-responding to a fixed user strategy rather than committing to a policy that users then respond to? Platforms usually commit to their algorithms. Under commitment, is the babbling equilibrium still the relevant worst case, and what happens to the collapse results?

How do the babbling and collapse results relate to standard ideas in mechanism design and cheap talk, such as the revelation principle and the fact that incentive-compatible outcomes can be offered as a menu? The imitation argument looks close to this, and it would help to know what is new.

3 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response (1/2)

We appreciate the detailed questions about the scope of the model and what the experiments establish. Several concerns appear to treat assumptions used for different results as though they were imposed together. We clarify those distinctions below and explain what the learning experiments do and do not show.

Modeling assumptions and practical relevance. The assumptions differ across the analyses because each addresses a complementary question. In Section 3, the common-knowledge convention lets us analyze how a user responds when the assistant's policy and update rule are known. Section 3.1 characterizes a dynamic best response to a fixed policy; Section 3.2 allows both players to choose strategies and proves full-history equilibrium existence. Neither result says that actual users solve a dynamic program. With strategic behavior in place, we ask what the assistant can learn from strategic reports (Section 4), and whether the information provided in equilibrium improves its attainable payoff (Section 5). The learning results fix a strategic reporting process, while the value results consider welfare-feasible Markov strategic assessments. Thus the common-knowledge convention of Section 3 should not be read as a common assumption behind all the learning and value results.

The finite hypothesis space is a modeling assumption introduced in Section 2; we do not claim that a deployed assistant knows every possible preference profile. Likewise, Theorem 4.2 assumes the likelihood of the reporting process is specified. This is a conditional learning guarantee, not an algorithm for discovering an unknown reporting rule. The distinction matters in practice: using the wrong observation model can lead to incorrect inference even when the true type belongs to the hypothesis space, while using the correct model permits learning when reports sufficiently distinguish types. The analysis isolates these mechanisms; it does not require the assistant to identify a unique equilibrium reporting rule in every application.

The 129129 rules in the four-item experiment are distinct belief-consistent solutions found by numerical search and report relabelling, not 129129 proven full-game equilibria. We evaluate the learning comparison across this discovered set rather than selecting one rule and claiming it is the one that would arise in deployment. This tests multiple reporting rules, without identifying which one a user would follow. Equilibrium selection is a separate question, and the learning theorems do not assume a unique selected rule.

Why the experiments matter. The experiment tests whether accounting for strategic reporting improves inference when the same reports are observed. It does: the truthful-choice update favors a false type in 67.8%67.8\% of interactions, compared with 27.4%27.4\% under the strategic likelihood. The strategic update assigns more mean posterior mass to the true type for each of the 129129 discovered reporting rules, with an average improvement of 0.1560.156. The comparison does not select one preferred rule.

The review distinguishes misleading inference from learning, but the experiment provides evidence for both a failure of the misspecified update and an improvement under the correct likelihood. At T=3T=3, the strategic-likelihood posterior assigns mean probability 0.5240.524 to the true type, compared with the 0.50.5 prior and 0.3680.368 under the truthful-choice likelihood. Thus, accounting for strategic behavior substantially improves the posterior probability assigned to the true type relative to treating the same reports as truthful. Beyond this experimental comparison, Theorem 4.2 establishes a finite-sample learning guarantee under cumulative type separation. Sections 4 and 6 now clarify the distinction between the experimental findings and the theoretical guarantee.

Welfare, real data, and computation. The welfare budget controls expected loss across types and interaction randomness, rather than guaranteeing a loss bound for each user; Example B.2 illustrates the distinction. The real-data experiments address a separate concern: whether the value comparisons are confined to hand-built preferences. Coat and SUSHI supply item ratings and attributes from which we fit preference types and construct simulated interactions; they are not datasets of strategic reports, and we do not use them to test equilibrium selection. On these fitted instances, truthful feedback exceeds the non-adaptive benchmark in 29 of 40 Coat cases and all 20 SUSHI cases. The absolute gains are modest, whereas the unbounded ratio is a worst-case construction; neither claim requires these instances to satisfy the stronger collapse theorem's assumptions. Finally, the scaling experiment measures the cost of exact computation: with 14 items, slates of three have a median runtime of about 222 seconds, while slates of 14 exceed three hours in the censored runs. We have separated these purposes in Section 6 and the appendix.

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Thank you for the two questions about commitment and the relation to mechanism design. We added a commitment analysis in Section 5.3 and the appendix, and expanded the contrast with cheap talk in Section 5.1.

Commitment and Stackelberg behavior. A fixed-policy best-response analysis is useful even when a platform can announce its algorithm: it identifies how users may change their reports in response to that algorithm, and is the user-side building block for the equilibrium analysis in Section 3.2. For example, a recommender may use a published updating rule while continuing to choose future slates based on observed choices. Knowing the rule does not make those future recommendations independent of the user's reports. The strategic-assessment formulation in Section 5 studies optimal behavior by both sides rather than assuming that the assistant first selects and irrevocably commits to a complete policy. Commitment is a distinct timing assumption, not a necessary consequence of using an algorithm. We therefore analyze it separately as a Stackelberg alternative.

In particular, Section 3.1 does not optimize the assistant's choice of the fixed policy. A Stackelberg formulation instead lets the assistant commit to a policy first, after which the user chooses an optimal reporting strategy knowing the commitment. Proposition F.8 analyzes this formulation for deterministic assistant policies. Under its strict-preference, reachability, and welfare conditions, the best deterministic commitment achieves exactly OPTnfdet(ϵ)\mathrm{OPT}^{\mathrm{det}}_{\mathrm{nf}}(\epsilon): the best expected payoff from a fixed deterministic menu that respects the welfare budget. By contrast, OPTnf(ϵ)\mathrm{OPT}_{\mathrm{nf}}(\epsilon) is the best expected payoff when the assistant may choose a lottery over fixed menus, while still respecting the welfare budget on average. Such a lottery can outperform every single feasible menu, so the best deterministic commitment can be strictly less valuable than OPTnf(ϵ)\mathrm{OPT}_{\mathrm{nf}}(\epsilon). Thus deterministic commitment cannot recover a gain from reacting to reports under the proposition's conditions.

The proof uses a reporting imitation argument: a user can send the reports that another preference type would send. Since the first user's actual choice from the final menu remains their own, optimal reporting forces the resulting choices to be compatible with offering a single menu. The reachability condition ensures that menu can actually be shown within the horizon, while preserving expected welfare loss. The appendix also considers commitment to a randomized policy, where the assistant announces its rule but does not reveal future random draws. In the example, this can outperform the randomized non-adaptive benchmark if the user chooses an optimal response favorable to the assistant; the example does not establish that improvement for every optimal response. Revealing the realized random seed before a report is a different timing model. The babbling result concerns the original strategic-assessment game, whereas this proposition addresses the Stackelberg alternative. A platform can publish a policy without committing to every future random outcome.

Mechanism design and cheap talk. The reviewer identifies a genuine connection: a menu can implement an allocation when each type prefers the item assigned to it over items assigned to other types. Here, however, the assistant does not directly ask for a type or announce a single menu. It reveals items over several rounds, and reports influence which items are offered next. The imitation argument derives the relevant incentive restrictions from this sequential interaction. It must also show that a single menu can be reached under the slate and horizon restrictions and that replacing the interaction by this menu preserves the welfare constraint. This yields a bound on equilibrium payoff, beyond the familiar observation that a particular allocation can be offered as a menu.

Unlike ordinary cheap talk, reports here are selections from a persistent menu and can change the user's future options. The babbling result shows that an uninformative equilibrium can exist even when the assistant is free to adapt. The later collapse result (Theorem 5.3) says more: under its additional conditions, even informative equilibrium reports cannot improve the assistant's best equilibrium payoff above the non-adaptive benchmark. We have expanded this distinction in Section 5.1 and the appendix.

Thanks for your explanation. It did resolve part of my concerns. Therefore, I have increased my score

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