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Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

Dynamic Incentive Design for Managing Strategic Manipulation under Continual Learning

Abstract

When algorithmic predictions affect users' outcomes, people may benefit from manipulating their inputs. How should an organization design incentives when these inputs are also used to train future models? We study a setting where a firm chooses costly incentives around a continually updated predictor, taking the training procedure as given. Incentives affect both current operating payoff and future learning. We characterize this trade-off and derive bounds on the dynamic value of departing from the myopic incentive. In a continual learning system, retained information also affects future training: organizations with the same predictor can share the same myopic optimum, yet different histories can make their optimal dynamic incentives lie on opposite sides of the myopic point. We also examine how incentive design interacts with strategy-aware learning. For small training updates, the two interventions are complementary when incentives increase the gain from the update, and substitutes when they reduce it. To examine the economic implications, we use a stylized model to connect our analysis to managerial agency problems and worker welfare. We then provide simulation evidence on the gains from dynamic incentive design. In our benchmark, an approximate history-aware oracle improves net discounted payoff by 6.53% over no intervention, compared with 1.38% for myopic control and 3.19% for current-information control. We further test whether policy learning can recover oracle gains using only observable information, and find that including retained-history information in fitted Q-iteration can achieve outcomes similar to the oracle benchmark.

Primary area:
alignment, fairness, safety, privacy, and societal considerations
Keywords:
Incentive design, human-AI interaction, sequential decision making, strategic classification, continual learning

Reviews

Among:
Shape:
1234this paper, Bottom 10%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 1.67 over 3 reviews, above 10% of the others.
Reviewer_wkuAOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
1
Soundness
3
Read review
Paper summary

The paper investigates the role of incentives on the long-term payoff of the firm in the context of strategic employees who might inflate their reports and an online learning system that learns from the data, An important observation is that the strategic employees would not only impact the current payoffs, but also the future payoffs due to their impact on the learning system. The incentives discourage the strategic inflation by imposing reporting costs. It is also shown how historical information might change the optimal long-term incentives, and how strategy-aware learning interacts with incentive design.

Critical strengths

The paper addresses a novel problem of how strategic agents can distort the results of learning by manipulating the inputs and how to address it through incentive design and history-sensitive learning. The formalization of this rather complex scenario is well executed and commendable.

The successful application of Fitted Q-learning is also interesting and worth noting.

Critical weaknesses

The paper addresses a somewhat narrow problem that is tied very closely to workforce management. It is not clear if there are any generalizable lessons here which are significant to the ICLR community. While the technical contribution here is strong, and the paper has some relationship to learning, it is not in the main stream of research on learning representations.

The formalization and the assumptions (eg, concavity) behind the theory appear very restrictive. It would be helpful if the authors provide a stronger justification behind them and address how relaxable they are.

The paper is highly mathematical and difficult to read. They should consider rewriting it in a way that the main paper is understandable to a broader audience with all the proofs moved to the appendix.

The experimental evaluation is quite narrow and based on synthetic data. The paper would be stronger if the theory is applied to more real world data.

Questions for authors

Can you provide more justification of the assumptions behind the theory, how restrictive they are, and if they can be relaxed in the future work? I am particularly concerned about the concavity assumption and the linearity of the learning model in the reported experiments. How critically do the theoretical and experimental results depend on these assumptions?

Reviewer_RsDnOpenReview ↗
Rating
1
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
1
Soundness
1
Read review
Paper summary

The paper studies how a firm should choose a costly incentive such as a reporting requirement or audit intensity, when a continually retrained predictor is subject to strategic manipulation. The incentive affects both current operating payoff and the data used for future retraining, which creates a trade-off between current payoff and future learning.

The framing of the paper is novel in that it treats the incentive design as control of a continually learned predictor, and analyzes how retained historical data shape the optimal incentive. The authors bound the gain from departing from the myopic incentive and the loss from not observing retained history. They show that two organizations with identical deployed predictors can have optimal incentives on opposite sides of the myopic choice. They also characterize when strategy-aware learning complements or substitutes for incentives, and extend the model to managerial compensation and worker welfare.

Simulations with a small neural predictor show that a history-aware policy outperforms myopic and current-information policies, and that fitted Q-iteration with retained-history features nearly matches the history-aware oracle. However the experiments are small scale and rely on restrictive assumptions that make their practical applicability unclear.

Critical strengths

None

Critical weaknesses

The notation is overloaded in ways that make the theoretical sections harder to follow than necessary:

  1. The payoff rr is used with different argument sets (r(f,u,c)r(f,u,c), r(u)r(u), r(β,u)r(\beta,u), r(L,u)r(L,u), r(w,u)r(w,u)). In its first definition in page 3, the distribution of the expectation is left implicit. It should be stated as (zi,yi)∼P(⋅∣f,u,c)(z_i,y_i) \sim P(\cdot \mid f,u,c), which also makes clear that uu affects rr through behavioral responses, not only through K(u)K(u).

  2. Several symbols carry multiple meanings: κ\kappa (curvature bounds in Prop. 1, κ0\kappa_0, κM\kappa_M, and cost multipliers in App. C), η\eta (coefficient update rate in Sec. 4 vs. strategy-aware step size in Prop. 3), and hh (reporting multiplier vs. worker characteristics).

  3. The transition F(L,u)F(L,u) is used in Sec. 3.1 without definition, and its relationship to the stochastic update Tt(L,D)\mathcal{T}_t(L,D) is explained only in the appendix.

In several instances, main-text results depend on notations defined only in the appendix, making it difficult to read on their own. A notation table and self-contained statements of the main propositions would substantially improve readability.

Questions for authors
  1. Props 1–3 assume (strong) concavity of the dynamic objective J=r+δCJ = r + \delta C, but CC has no evident reason to be concave (e.g., Π\Pi in A.5.1 is not). Can the authors give conditions under which this holds, and clarify whether it holds in the simulated environment?

  2. In Fig. 3b, the additional value of history is larger at k=0.65k = 0.65 than at k=0.1625k = 0.1625, the opposite of what the curvature intuition from Prop. 2 suggests. Is there an explanation for this? Also, Fig. 3 omits ω=0.35\omega = 0.35 from Table 2, where figure 3(a) would be non-monotone in ω\omega for k=0.65k = 0.65. Please include all computed points or qualify the claim appropriately.

Reviewer_gu8EOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
3
Read review
Paper summary

The paper studies a firm that deploys a continually retrained predictor on inputs that individuals can manipulate, and that chooses a costly organizational incentive (e.g., a reporting requirement) each period while taking the training procedure as given. The incentive affects both the current operating payoff and the data retained for future training. The authors (i) decompose the dynamic objective into current payoff plus a continuation value and give concavity-based bounds on the distance between the myopic and dynamic incentives and on the resulting payoff gain (Prop. 1); (ii) bound the loss from not observing retained history when two learning states share a predictor (Prop. 2); (iii) show, for a one-gradient-step “strategy-aware” update, that incentives and strategy-aware learning are complements or substitutes depending on the sign of a gradient-norm difference (Prop. 3); (iv) in a one-dimensional linear model with OLS retraining and replay, construct a family of retained histories with the same fitted coefficient whose optimal incentives lie on opposite sides of the myopic optimum (Prop. 4), and derive implications for a linear managerial contract under CARA risk aversion (Prop. 5) and for allocation and utility gaps between honest and strategic workers (Prop. 6); and (v) report simulations in a small synthetic environment (a 36-parameter network predictor, 289 discrete worker plans, six review dates) where a history-aware oracle gains 6.53% over no intervention versus 1.38% (myopic) and 3.19% (current-information), and where fitted Q-iteration with retained-history features recovers 6.49%.

Critical strengths

The framing is a genuine and under-studied angle on strategic classification: rather than changing the learning rule, the firm changes the cost of manipulation, and the paper is explicit that this lever has two effects, one on today’s payoff and one on the composition of the data the continual-learning system will retrain on. The observation that two organizations with identical deployed predictors but different retained data can have optimal incentives on opposite sides of the common myopic optimum (Section 3.2, Prop. 4) is a clean and somewhat surprising point, and Appendix A.5 works it out concretely, showing how the replay weight and historical reporting variance jointly determine whether retraining under- or over-predicts after workers respond.

The mathematics that I checked is correct. I re-derived the strong-concavity bounds in Props. 1 and 2, the first-order expansion in Prop. 3, and the stylized-model objects in Appendix A.5 (the history family in (35) does fit a common coefficient, the decomposition (40)–(41) holds, the replay threshold (45) sets the combined fit to beta*, and the condition k > beta_0/beta* is equivalent to (48)); the comparative statics in Prop. 6 also follow from the stated utilities. The appendix is candid about scope limitations (e.g., Prop. 1 compares a one-step deviation with optimal continuation, not dynamic versus always-myopic control; Prop. 2’s upper bound applies only when history becomes observable after one period).

The simulation appendix is unusually complete for a theory-leaning paper: worker plan grids, cost parameters, network architecture and training schedule, replay and retention weights, oracle search procedure, FQI features and tree settings, seeds, and five replications with standard errors (Table 3) are all specified, and the authors are careful to state that the FQI results are feasibility evidence, not statistical guarantees.

Critical weaknesses

The theoretical contribution is thin relative to what the paper’s framing suggests. Props. 1–3 are textbook consequences of strong concavity and the implicit function theorem applied to an abstract objective J = r + delta·C; the learning system enters only through the unexplained function C, so nothing in these results is specific to continual learning, replay, or strategic responses. The results that do engage with learning (Props. 4–6) are confined to a scalar linear model with population OLS, a specially constructed three-point family of retained histories, myopic workers, and a two-period horizon with the terminal incentive fixed at zero. Prop. 3’s “strategy-aware learning” is a single gradient step of the firm’s payoff from the ordinary-training parameters, which is both much weaker than the methods it is compared to (Levanon & Rosenfeld, 2021; Björkegren et al., 2026) and presupposes that the firm knows the response function; the complement/substitute result then reduces to comparing a squared gradient norm at two points. For an ICLR audience, the machine-learning content is limited to this one-step gradient model and a toy predictor in the simulations.

The empirical evidence is a single hand-specified environment with exactly two histories, and the headline numbers are drawn from the more favorable one. Appendix C.5 and Table 2 (k = 0.65, omega = 0.7) give the two-history averages as 4.17% (history-aware over no intervention), 2.61 pp over myopic, and 1.76 pp over current-information. Combined with the Table 1 values for the benchmark history (6.53 / 5.15 / 3.34), this implies that in the other history the history-aware oracle gains roughly 1.8% over no intervention, about 0.1 pp over myopic control, and about 0.2 pp over current-information control. In other words, in half of the simulated worlds dynamic incentive design is essentially worthless relative to myopic control, which the abstract, introduction, Table 1 and Figure 2 do not reveal. Likewise, “the value of history” in the FQI experiment is the value of distinguishing two histories: with only two training/evaluation histories, the 49 retained-data features need only act as a one-bit indicator, and the policy is evaluated in-sample on the same two histories it was trained on, so the claim that “policy learning can recover oracle gains using observable information” is not meaningfully tested. There is no variation over environment draws (worker cost multipliers are drawn once), and no code is provided.

The related-work treatment misses the closest prior lines of work, which weakens both the originality and the economic positioning. Frankel & Kartik (JEEA 2022, “Improving information from manipulable data”) already analyze how a decision-maker’s reliance on manipulable data trades off current use against the informativeness of the data, and the ratchet-effect literature (Weitzman 1980; Laffont & Tirole 1988) is precisely about dynamic incentives when today’s reports feed tomorrow’s standards; neither is cited despite the paper’s title and Section 4 being squarely in this territory. On the ML side, Zrnic et al. (NeurIPS 2021) study retraining dynamics and who leads/follows when the learner updates repeatedly against strategic agents; Harris, Heidari & Wu (NeurIPS 2021) study stateful strategic agents across rounds; Hu, Immorlica & Vaughan (FAT* 2019) study distributional effects of manipulation costs across groups, which is the content of Prop. 6; and the incentive-design strand within strategic classification (Haghtalab et al. 2020; Alon et al. 2020; Shavit, Englert & Hardt 2020, which also has the decision-maker optimize its own objective rather than accuracy) is absent. Finally, the presentation is hard to follow in places: Prop. 4 refers in the main text to objects (the history family, omega_c, the variance index v) defined only in Appendix A.5; Prop. 3 is stated before the reader is told what Gamma measures; the quantities in Prop. 5 are introduced in a single dense paragraph; and the AI-use disclosure states that generative AI helped “formulate mathematical claims” and “assist in the writing of proofs,” which makes the sparse main-text intuition more costly for the reader. The Cong & Zhao (2025) reference is a Google Drive link that I could not verify.

Questions for authors
  1. Please report the full set of Table 1 / Figure 2 quantities for history 1 as well as the benchmark history, and state explicitly in the abstract and Section 5 which history the headline numbers come from. If my back-of-envelope calculation above is wrong, please correct it.

  2. With only two histories, what prevents the history-aware FQI policy from simply learning a history indicator? Would the result survive (a) evaluation on histories not used for training, or (b) a larger family of histories (e.g., many draws of the calibration parameters in Appendix C.2)?

  3. Workers in Section 4 appear to best-respond myopically each period. How do Props. 4 and 6 change if strategic workers anticipate that inflated reports today raise the coefficient, and hence their own allocation, tomorrow (the ratchet-effect case)?

  4. In Prop. 3, why is one gradient step from the ordinary-training parameters the right model of strategy-aware learning? Does the complement/substitute conclusion survive if the firm fully optimizes the payoff-aware objective rather than taking an infinitesimal step?

  5. Prop. 1 compares a one-step deviation followed by optimal continuation. Can you state what the bound implies about dynamic versus always-myopic control, which is the comparison made in the simulations?

  6. In Table 1, the learned myopic regression (1.46%) outperforms the myopic oracle (1.38%). I assume this is because the oracle optimizes current payoff while the metric is total discounted payoff; please confirm and clarify in the text.

  7. Will code for the simulator, the oracle search, and the FQI pipeline be released?

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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