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Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

Learnable Randomization as Commitment Against Adaptive Optimizers

Abstract

A pricing page can walk the posted price up to the last amount a buyer still accepts, a recommender can hold back a better item for a barely acceptable promoted one, and a classifier can shift its boundary once applicants change their features. The system predicts the response and then picks the menu that serves its own objective, so the surplus above the user's cutoff is taken. Playing the single best action publishes that cutoff, while noise on actions the user would never take throws away payoff and teaches the platform that a worse menu is still acceptable. We study unpredictable near-optimal policies (UNOP), which mix uniformly on near-best actions that remain individually rational. The mixture is a commitment about the response. On a finite price grid, when the best sure-demand price strictly out-earns the randomized band, a seller who already knows the curve posts below the band, and the purchase that occurs is deterministic. Knowing that curve is not the same as predicting the next draw. The mixture can be learned and the optimizer can match its best response, while the user's payoff stays higher because the mixture changes which action is targeted. In pricing and in policy-aware recommendation this leaves more surplus than greedy play when the platform optimizes against the curve and more than one action is acceptable. The gain goes away under quality ranking, a singleton near-optimal set, a wrong utility estimate, or a short-horizon explorer. That is also where mixing should be turned off if the other side is trying to cooperate.

Primary area:
alignment, fairness, safety, privacy, and societal considerations
Keywords:
strategic users, adaptive pricing, recommendation, response-curve commitment, unpredictability, individual rationality

Reviews

Among:
Shape:
1234this paper, Bottom 10%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 1.67 over 3 reviews, above 10% of the others.
Reviewer_zikWOpenReview ↗
Rating
1
Confidence
3
Informativeness
1
Presentation
2
Soundness
3
Read review
Paper summary

This paper proposes UNOP, a policy that utilizes randomness over near-optimal actions to prevent excess loss in adaptive platforms. The work aims to demonstrate that even when the buyers strategy is fixed, it can at times exceed the amount a mere greedy strategy would achieve. The authors give experimental evidence for their theoretical results.

Critical strengths

None

Critical weaknesses

The Setting is not Well Motivated: The first of the three primary contributions of the work, namely their distinction between prediction accuracy, distribution learning error and welfare, seem like contrived terms and have no established connection to the strategic elements at hand. The fact the seller cannot revise their behavior throughout the course of the interaction severely limits the model. Within the paper, it is not even clear that UNOP is the optimal strategy the buyer can have. The second main contribution, the price grid, is a standard technique in optimization and beyond.

No End-To-End Learning: The characterization of UNOP against a seller who cannot change his strategy lacks technical novelty and uses standard arguments, (standard KL-decomposition, entropy maximization, concentration for multinomial distributions). Moreover, the authors do not give results that establish the convergence of the process, finite-sample bounds or give a detailed theoretical or experimental explanation of why the randomization is even necessary for increasing the surplus.

Questions for authors

Would a deterministic algorithm, like one that rejects everything in the set of near-optimal policies perform as well as UNOP?

Can the authors provide regret bounds for their algorithm?

How do the main theorems change when the adversary is also allowed to make strategic moves? This makes the setting significantly more challenging, but much more realistic.

The writing and presentation of this paper needs some improvement. The theorem statements are very confusing to read and much too long (Proposition 4 is a block of text that takes up 18 lines, Proposition 2 has a diatribe about matching pennies, when the theorem includes it as it is a zero sum game). There are also strange jumps between paragraphs (Line 51, the work was talking about randomness concealing a function and the text jumped to talking about their model).

Reviewer_effTOpenReview ↗
Rating
1
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
3
Read review
Paper summary

This paper studies a problem with potential real-world applications: Can users obtain higher utility by strategically randomizing their own behavior to influence the decisions of an adaptive AI system? The authors propose UNOP and provide theoretical analysis and experimental comparisons, showing that under certain conditions, this strategy can yield higher utility for users compared to acting greedily.

Critical strengths

This paper studied a practically relevant problem, particularly given the increasing prevalence of AI-driven dynamic pricing and personalized recommendation systems.

Critical weaknesses
  • The core idea of ​​this paper is highly related to existing research on strategic buyers and Stackelberg commitment. Previous work has already investigated how buyers can influence the pricing behavior through strategic purchasing or rejection behavior. The paper does not sufficiently clarify which theoretical or algorithmic insights are fundamentally new compared with existing work.

  • My primary concern is whether randomization is actually necessary. In the posted-pricing model, a buyer could simply adopt a deterministic threshold strategy to induce lower prices. In fact, within the static model presented in Proposition 4 (under the same constraints), such a strategy is already capable of achieving the optimal commitment payoff for the buyer. Although Figure 3 includes a comparison with a "best threshold" strategy, the paper does not adequately explain the unique advantages of UNOP’s randomization over deterministic commitment.

  • The writing can be significantly improved.

Questions for authors

Q1. Compared to existing work on strategic buyers and Stackelberg commitment, what are the core technical innovations of UNOP? Q2. Under what conditions can UNOP achieve higher returns than a deterministic threshold commitment? Could the authors provide a theoretical explanation, or include more targeted comparisons in the online learning experiments?

Reviewer_NNTWOpenReview ↗
Rating
3
Confidence
2
Informativeness
3
Presentation
2
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

This paper studies how users can preserve utility by committing to a randomized response curve against adaptive platforms that learn their responses and revise menus. UNOP mixes uniformly over actions within a chosen slack of the estimated best utility, applying an individual-rationality floor when the intersection is nonempty. Aware-UNOP reweights that support using an available platform forecast. The paper distinguishes distribution learning, next-action predictability, optimizer regret, and surplus extraction, and presents conditional results for zero-sum and common-interest games, entropy constraints, and finite-grid pricing. Experiments cover bimatrix games, posted pricing, policy-aware recommendation, strategic classification, and public-data simulations, including boundary cases involving collapsed support, utility noise, short-horizon exploration, and cooperative counterparts.

Critical strengths

1.Even when the platform knows the response distribution, a randomized commitment can change its best response. The finite-grid pricing result makes this mechanism precise as a response-curve commitment effect, rather than a failure to learn the policy. The near-optimal support and individual-rationality restriction help explain how randomization can preserve utility. This conceptual analysis is clear and informative. 2.The experiments cover both effective and boundary cases. Comparisons across extractors and baselines, together with short-horizon dynamic programming, individual-rationality ablations, utility-noise tests, public-data simulations, and common-interest games, help identify when randomization is useful and make the scope of the results transparent.

Critical weaknesses

1.The conditions for surplus preservation against an informed platform could be summarized more centrally. The paper already provides an exact best-response pricing result on a finite grid and exact small-catalog recommendation experiments. Bringing together the feasible menu spaces, platform objectives, and strict revenue condition in Proposition 4, while distinguishing approximate larger-catalog results and limits of generalization, would make the protection mechanism easier to interpret. 2.The utility-noise ablations do not establish performance when the user's utility must be estimated from limited feedback. A bounded extension in one existing simulator, with held-out calibration of utility-estimation error and a matched UNOP-versus-greedy surplus comparison, would clarify practical applicability at realistic estimation accuracy. This optional deployment extension would add evidence beyond the stated known-utility results.

Questions for authors

1.Could you give a concise summary of the conditions under which each theoretical guarantee or empirical surplus comparison holds when the platform knows UNOP, linking them to the existing oracle and exact-enumeration results? Please distinguish the feasible menu spaces, platform objectives, and pricing revenue condition, and state the limits of extrapolation to more general platforms. 2.In one existing simulator, could UNOP and greedy use the same utility estimator and feedback budget, with utility-estimation error calibrated on held-out data, and report their user-surplus difference? Simulator ground truth could be reserved for final evaluation. This limited extension would help assess finite-feedback performance.

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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