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Paper summary
PABP selects FL participants using locally perturbed bids and calibrates payments toward an expected truthful-payment target. The allocation analysis is sound under the stated model, and experiments retain high welfare. The practical incentive and privacy guarantees need quantitative support.
Critical strengths
- The formulation accounts for device resource costs and separates optimal allocation for perturbed bids from welfare evaluated at true values.
- The appendix gives a formal single-release privacy analysis and clearly distinguishes finite-sample payment audits from the worst-case error required by the theorem.
Critical weaknesses
- Approximate truthfulness and participation depend on a uniform payment-error bound that the proposed calibration does not establish. Twelve calibration profiles and twenty validation profiles cannot certify all bids and opponent profiles. Moreover, noise can select a zero-value device that incurs resource costs, while executable service payments are nonnegative. Some participation loss is therefore unavoidable; the paper needs a meaningful bound on its magnitude.
- The experiments do not connect the chosen noise scale to a specified privacy target. The flat reconstruction-error curve uses repeated copies of one noisy bid, as the appendix explains. This supports the fixed-bid experiment but leaves protection under changing bids unresolved. Accuracy comparisons with methods protecting model updates also do not isolate the bid-privacy trade-off.
Questions for authors
- Can the authors bound worst-case payment error for the executable rule, including calibration uncertainty, and express resulting deviation gains and participation losses relative to device values?
- What privacy radius and target does the experimental noise scale achieve? How do welfare and incentive errors change at stronger privacy levels and with multiple distinct releases?
3 comments
Weakness and Concerns (2/3)
Question 2:
Q: What privacy radius and target does the experimental noise scale achieve? How do welfare and incentive errors change at stronger privacy levels and with multiple distinct releases?
R: Thank you for requesting a quantitative connection between the experimental noise scale, the privacy target, and the resulting welfare and incentive errors. We have quantified the cumulative privacy budget with the experimental noise scale, and added two experiments to measure how stronger privacy and more biddings affect social welfare, payment, IC, and IR errors.
Privacy radius and target. In our paper, we use ρ-zero-concentrated differential privacy (ρ-zCDP) for privacy protection. Let be the bid interval, where is the bid upper bound. For device , consider two bid sequences for training rounds, i.e., and . Here, indexes these ordinary rounds, but refresh rounds are excluded. In our experiments, the privacy radius (per-release sensitivity) is . The sequences are neighboring if for every .
The privacy target (also called privacy budget) is the cumulative ρ-zCDP budget under the values of the noise scale and privacy radius. With independent Gaussian noise of scale σ at each round, the cumulative privacy budget is defined as
Based on the above descriptions, Table 5 illustrates the noise scale and zCDP budget under different numbers of bid submission rounds.
Table 5. Cumulative zCDP privacy budgets for 1 and 80 ordinary-round bid submissions.
| Bid submission in ordinary-round | sensitivity | Noise standard deviation | Cumulative zCDP budget |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 1 | 0.12 | 34.722 |
| 80 | 1 | 0.12 | 2777.778 |
Welfare and incentive errors. We added two controlled auction experiments with , , and five independent repetitions to evaluate stronger privacy and more perturbed-bid releases.
We evaluate the following ratio of expected true social welfare achieved by PABP to the optimum without bid perturbation. This ratio measures how much of the optimal social welfare PABP retains while protecting bids. A higher ratio indicates better welfare preservation, as defined in Appendix B.5.
PABP and the optimum are evaluated under the same devices, true valuations, and resource conditions in each round.
Stronger privacy levels. To evaluate how stronger privacy affects welfare and incentive errors, we fix the number of bid submissions at 80 and increase the noise scale from 0.06 to 0.30. This reduces the cumulative privacy budget and strengthens privacy.
Multiple distinct perturbed-bid releases. We fix and the single-release privacy budget at . The total release count up to the current round is . All groups use the same bank of 80 current-round bid scenarios, quality coefficients, CPU frequencies, upload powers, resource costs, calibration parameters, and evaluation random numbers. Only the number of prior releases changes. Each prior release uses a new bid and fresh independent noise.
Table 6. Effects of stronger privacy and more bid releases on social welfare and payment, IC, and IR errors.
| Conditions | Social welfare ratio | Payment error | IC error | IR error |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Stronger privacy: σ = 0.06 → 0.30 ( fixed) | 99.39403% → 88.39403% | 0.99644% → 6.17883% | 0.09046% → 1.24104% | 0.02440% → 0.81467% |
| More bid releases: (ρ = , fixed) | 97.62691% → 97.62753% | 2.23381% → 2.23243% | 0.32367% → 0.32367% | 0.11693% → 0.11660% |
Weakness and Concerns (3/3)
Results in Table 6 confirm lower welfare retention and higher economic errors under stronger privacy. This is reasonable, because stronger privacy means more noise to the submitted bids, which can severely break the economic properties. Moreover, under multiple training rounds of bid submission, the social welfare ratio, payment error, IC error and IR error remain nearly unchanged. The minor fluctuations are caused by random noise on perturbed bids and are expected. This demonstrates that our method works properly under multiple distinct releases.
Weakness 2:
W: The experiments do not connect the chosen noise scale to a specified privacy target. The flat reconstruction-error curve uses repeated copies of one noisy bid, as the appendix explains. This supports the fixed-bid experiment but leaves protection under changing bids unresolved. Accuracy comparisons with methods protecting model updates also do not isolate the bid-privacy trade-off.
R: We have added an experiment to evaluate whether bid privacy protection is still valid under multiple biddings.
Dynamic-bid privacy protection experiment. Each device draws a new valuation independently from a uniform distribution on [0,1] in every ordinary round, and perturbs it with fresh Gaussian noise of standard deviation 0.12. The server knows the bid distribution and perturbation mechanism, and uses the available history to reconstruct the device’s true bid.
Table 1. Current true-bid reconstruction error (RMSE) after 80 ordinary rounds: PABP versus the auction without bid privacy (Appendix C.1).
| Configuration | PABP (RMSE) | Auction without bid privacy (RMSE) |
|---|---|---|
| MNIST | 0.105268 ± 0.003040 | 0 |
| Fashion-MNIST | 0.105654 ± 0.002831 | 0 |
| CIFAR-10 | 0.104622 ± 0.003569 | 0 |
The root mean square error (RMSE) measures the discrepancy between reconstructed and original bids. A value of zero means exact bid recovery. A positive value indicates imperfect recovery and some privacy protection against the evaluated attack. PABP’s mean RMSE remains 0.1041–0.1094 across 1–80 ordinary-round releases, compared with zero for the Non-private auction, demonstrating that the proposed PABP can protect the recovery of current true bids under dynamic bidding.
Baseline settings.
We note that PrivAim [1] and RAFL [2] also perturb participants’ bids for privacy protection. Therefore, we add experiments on the ImageNet dataset to compare PABP with PrivAim-bid-adapted and RAFL-bid-adapted.
Our comparison metric is the social welfare ratio, defined as the ratio of the aggregated expected true social welfare to the full-information optimal social welfare without bid perturbation. This ratio measures how much of the optimal social welfare each method retains while protecting bids. A higher ratio indicates better welfare preservation and less social welfare loss.
Table 2. Social welfare ratios of PABP, PrivAim-bid-adapted, and RAFL-bid-adapted.
| Method | Social welfare ratio |
|---|---|
| PABP | 97.215% |
| PrivAim-bid-adapted | 88.129% |
| RAFL-bid-adapted | 87.560% |
Table 2 shows that PABP achieves a higher social welfare ratio and less social welfare loss than both adapted baselines.
Based on our analysis, we believe that PABP’s additional resource optimization contributes to this improvement. PABP jointly considers winner selection and resource allocation. It computes optimal CPU frequencies and upload powers and assigns these configurations to the selected devices, reducing their resource costs. PrivAim and RAFL do not optimize CPU frequencies or upload powers.
[1] Wang et al. (2023). PrivAim: A Dual-Privacy Preserving and Quality-Aware Incentive Mechanism for Federated Learning. IEEE Transactions on Computers, 72(7):1913–1927. DOI.
[2] Sun et al. (2026). RAFL: A Reverse Auction Federated Learning Framework with Non-Independent and Identically Distributed Data for Mobile Crowdsensing. Computer Networks, 283:112314. DOI.
Weakness and Concerns (1/3)
We thank the reviewer for the helpful comments.
Weakness 1 & Question 1:
Q: Can the authors bound worst-case payment error for the executable rule, including calibration uncertainty, and express resulting deviation gains and participation losses relative to device values? R: Thank you for this question. We fully agree that a payment-error upper bound should be provided, and the corresponding maximum expected deviation gain and expected participation loss should be analyzed. In the following, we have expanded the theoretical analysis to address the expected deviation gain and loss.
Uniform payment-error bound. Under the revised payment-calibration constraints described in Section 4.3 and details in Appendix A.5, the payment-error analysis in Appendix B.4 establishes the following bound, also stated in Section 4.4.
δi=supb∈BNEη[πi(b~;θi∗)∣b]−πiref(bi;b−i)≤2παiσi.
The bound holds for every adopted calibration output satisfying the continuous-domain constraints. Thus, although finite random samples are used for fitting, the guarantee does not depend on their coverage of the bid space.
Deviation gain and participation loss.
With the approximate expected IC/IR guarantees in Section 4.4 (Theorem 1), the maximum expected utility gain from misreporting is at most εIC,i=2δi=π2αiσi, and the expected participation loss is at most −εIR,i=−δi=−2παiσi.
We also respond to the concern in Weakness 1 regarding participation loss when noise selects a zero-valuation device. We clarify the example of a zero-valuation device winning after bid perturbation. This outcome is rare because the noise is unlikely to raise a zero bid to the selection threshold. In practice, the bid required for selection is much larger than the noise scale. Furthermore, from the individual rationality standpoint, a device, though selected due to noise, will not choose to train the model or pay for a zero-valued service. For example, a customer would not purchase an unwanted product merely because a shopkeeper offered it. Similarly, selected devices with zero valuation are unwilling to pay in this case.