- Rating
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- Confidence
- 4
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
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- Soundness
- 3
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Paper summary
There are by now a number of papers on using deep-learning techniques to design revenue-maximizing auction mechanisms. This is one of them. In this one, the authors note that item-by-item Myerson (Myerson is optimal for selling a single item) often outperforms an existing DL approach (ALGNet) in larger settings, and build on this insight. First they try to explain this in terms of "competitive" items. The authors then use item-level Myerson as a teacher, and eventually try to move beyond the teacher. With this, they (apparently) achieve state of the art results.
Critical strengths
See summary. Also: This is the best paper in my batch, though it must be said that the rest of my batch was just disappointingly bad with lots of (poor) LLM writing etc. This one is well written. So thank you to the authors for at least putting something decent into my batch and I hope in the future we can narrow down the set of submissions with desk rejections so that reviewers only get papers of at least this paper's quality to read.
Critical weaknesses
I mostly have questions so I'm putting this all in questions for authors.
Questions for authors
Regret vs revenue: clearly the more regret one allows the more revenue one can get. While the regret of the mechanisms in this paper doesn't seem all that bad, it still feels like somehow we should address the revenue-regret tradeoff. How much more revenue should I expect for an extra unit of regret?
On that note, some alternative approaches attain no regret (exact strategy-proofness), which is a nice property. I agree with the authors that we don't need to only consider such approaches, but there it feels especially uncomfortable to directly compare revenue. (There was at least one place where the authors said something like "zero regret is impossible" by which I think they meant zero regret is impossible in their framework, but it would be good to be clearer.)
... though actually it seems there are now methods to get from approximate strategy-proofness to exact strategy-proofness. Do they apply to your technique? That would be nice. See Guo et al. "Extending Myerson's optimal auctions to correlated bidders via neural network interpolation" (NeurIPS 2026)
Maybe I didn't fully understand but it wasn't clear to me to what extent the number of competitive items really explains item-wise Myerson doing better. It seems you show a correlation between these things, but there are probably lots of other things that correlate too. Should I take this as being the mechanism (in the other sense of the word mechanism) behind why it does better? Why?
One intuition is the following: when there are few bidders for lots of items, that's precisely when selling item by item does not do well -- that's where you want to bundle. Are you looking at the other extreme?
It is not clear to me whether you consider OD-VVCA to fall under the same framework or not. OD-VVCA is motivated more in automated mechanism design terms. But then it seems your paper also is an example of automated mechanism design. I don't have serious concerns about this either way, but perhaps you should give some more background on all this in the paper.
3 comments
Thank you, all your comments are in line with what I expected and so you have reinforced my positive review -- all my issues are addressed (well, some things are left open for future research but that is fine) as long as you ensure these points are clear in the final paper.
Thank you for your deeply insightful review. We truly appreciate the rigor of your comments and the constructive perspective you offered on the open directions for future work. We are grateful for your support and will make sure every point discussed is clearly reflected in the final version.
1.Revenue–regret trade-off. How much additional revenue can a seller gain by allowing more regret?
Quantifying the exact revenue gain from a given increase in regret remains an open problem for general multi-bidder, multi-item auctions. For a single additive bidder, converting an approximately strategy-proof mechanism into an exactly strategy-proof one yields a known upper bound (Rahme et al., Auction Learning as a Two-Player Game, 2021; Balcan et al., Mechanism Design via Machine Learning, 2005). Specifically, letting P0 denote the optimal expected revenue under exact strategy-proofness, allowing expected ex-post regret up to R can increase optimal expected revenue by at most 2P0R+R.
However, introducing multiple bidders fundamentally changes the strategic problem, because each bidder’s outcome depends on the others’ reports and all allocations must satisfy joint feasibility constraints. Even without a general theoretical formula, the seller can choose a mechanism based on application needs: GemNet and OD-VVCA provide exact DSIC when strict truthfulness is required, while M2L offers an effective alternative when a very small estimated regret is tolerable in pursuit of higher revenue.
Q2. What did we mean by “zero regret is impossible” ?
We acknowledge that this phrasing was imprecise. By this statement, we meant that models such as RegretNet, ALGNet, and M2L directly parameterize allocation and payment rules and penalize estimated regret during training. Consequently, this procedure cannot guarantee strictly zero regret in practice. We will revise the sentence accordingly in the revised paper.
Q3.Can the exact strategy-proofness procedure of Guo et al. be applied to M2L?
The procedure by Guo et al. cannot be directly applied to M2L. But adapting it to achieve exact strategy-proofness in our model is a promising direction for future work. We note that the preprint by Guo et al. was posted on arXiv after our submission, and we will discuss it in the final version.
Technically, their method verifies or repairs single-dimensional allocation monotonicity and then derives critical payments in a multi-unit setting where each bidder demands at most one unit and submits a single bid. In M2L, each bidder reports a value for each item and can change several bids jointly. Checking or repairing monotonicity one bid at a time cannot rule out profitable joint deviations across items. Therefore, enforcing cyclic monotonicity and recovering compatible payments in multi-item settings while preserving revenue remains a worthwhile research question.
Q4.Why does item-wise Myerson improve with more bidders, and what does the competitive-item count explain?
Feldman et al. (99% Revenue via Enhanced Competition, 2018) show that for additive bidders with independent items, running separate second-price auctions (and thus item-wise Myerson) achieves nearly all of the optimal expected revenue once the number of bidders is sufficiently large relative to the number of items.This makes item-wise Myerson a natural teacher in highly competitive markets. Palfrey (Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information, 1983) and Chakraborty (Bundling Decisions for Selling Multiple Objects, 1999) also show that bundling can earn more revenue with few bidders, while separate sales can earn more as the number of bidders grows.
Our competitive-item count quantifies the degree of competition in each valuation profile. A higher count means that more items attract at least two bids above the reserve and there are more competition. As more bidders enter, the expected count rises, and item-wise Myerson performs better.
Q5. Do OD-VVCA and M2L both fall under automated mechanism design?
Yes, both OD-VVCA and M2L fall under automated mechanism design, and the main distinction lies in what each method learns. OD-VVCA optimizes the parameters of a deterministic affine maximizer, whose structure determines allocations and payments and guarantees exact DSIC. In contrast, M2L learns both rules directly with neural networks, using item-wise Myerson as a guide and estimated regret as a training penalty. As a result, M2L offers greater expressive capacity than affine maximizers. We will clarify this distinction in the related work section.