ABSTRACT
"Procuring data for machine learning" -> explain this for what purpose; motivate the procurement of data
"vary with the quantity supplied." -> what is the quantity here?
"homogeneous goods" -> a seller also has homogeneous copies?
"payment menus " -> what are menus? What is the production level here?
What is the transition to the next sentence about "each agent" ... are agents providers here? Why is M the same for each agent? Why is the cost over K types only? I wonder how realistic this assumption is
"wishes to maximize her expected value less payments." -> minus; maximize her value by doing what? you need to state this more explicitly
"We first study the single-agent setting" -> why can't you do a reduction from a knapsack variant where the obj is value minus cost?
"We then give an exact algorithm" -> with running time?
"candidate production " > what is this?
you can just explain this in plain english
I think you should explain poly(K,M)
"an ordering condition on the types’ cost curves" -> what is the meaning of this?
"In the multi-agent setting, posting ..." -> this sentence doesn't make sense; they are not producing anything (so why over production?), high startup costs? economy of scale? It has nothing to do with economies of scale; then don't do posting one menu, then why do you have to use it to motivate the sequential model?
"an exact dynamic program over single-agent" -> what problem does it solve? Do you solve each t independently? I am not clear
"may close the market at any round," -> what does this mean? T is given as input right?
Are these like exact algorithms?
1 INTRODUCTION
"In many applications of interest," -> for these applications, can you provide specific use cases?
"The same structure appears well beyond data ..." -> what structure are you referring to?
"her" -> how is her the right word for data center? accelerators are not homogeneous
"person-hours " -> ???
"She " -> i would be gender neutral
what is the meaning of "a menu of payments"?
"Each agent then best responds" -> this sounds more like equilibrium computation
"producing the quantity that maximizes her payment less her costs" -> minus; producing doesn't mean that the principal will buy it right? this implies you have no budget constraint; so then you need to make procurement decisions
"This setting poses three distinct challenges. " -> no it doesn't; you didn't show anything challenges so this setting doesn't show any challenges to begin with; you are making the challenges here artificially yourself
"the distribution from which agents’ costs" -> why is this realistic? why is this a challenge?
"a payment sufficient to induce production" -> what is the connection of this sentence to your argument? what is the meaning of while higher payments erode her utility?
"payments offered at different quantities must be chosen jointly" -> jointly as in you offer the same prices to each agent?
"Third, the menu may depend only on the quantity an agent supplies, " -> i am confused what is the agents reporting? in general you payment computations are based on the input of bids from others which depend on the sellers
1.1 SUMMARY OF OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
there is no transition to here
"anonymous payment menu" -> you didn't define anonymous or payment menu; why does it have to be anonymous?
why a known distribution over K? how do you motivate that? Why do you cap them at M? why does it have to be discrete?
"the agent best responds by maximizing ..." -> ok so where are the purchasing decisions?
"with ties resolved in the principal’s favor" -> why? it should be in the best interest of the agent
Where is the procurement decision here? This should be explained explicitly, so the whole point of the principal is to buy something
"In Alzheimer’s data ..." -> provide citations in these examples
"We first give polynomial-time reductions ..." -> so the two problems are the same or not?
"This reduction transfers" -> transfers?
"However, as we are interested in the large " -> however as in? what is the novelty of this algorithm? it is just enumeration
what is marginal cost here?
spectacularly???? -> this doesn't sound like the right word
2 SINGLE-AGENT PROBLEM SETTING
"A principal wishes to incentivize " -> dont need to say incentivize; incentivize means something else in procurement
This organization is so strange; usually people just present the general setting together and you have two separate settings; this looks like two papers combined together
"The agent belongs to one of K types," -> you said they have one of the ci function instead of belongs to K types this needs to be consistent
so what does the agents decide?
"chooses a production level which maximizes her utility" > this doesn't mean that the items will be purchased right ?
what is the meaning of mi(\pi) in ()? it hasn't been defined yet
3 HARDNESS RESULTS AND CONNECTION TO ITEM PRICING
so Theorem 1 says both problem is the same; what is new here?
4 EXACT ALGORITHMS FOR A SINGLE AGENT
What are exact algorithms for unit-demand item pricing?
4.1 AN EXACT ALGORITHM FOR GENERAL COST CURVES
What is the connection to the Bellman equation?
5 MULTI-AGENT PROBLEM SETTING
"With concave costs, however, this fails. " => fails as in what? what don't you try other approaches instead of the squential models
On tie-breaking robustness and scalability
Reviewer gDtV:
Thank you for recognizing the technical insight behind the static algorithm, and for raising the questions about robustness and scalability.
Tie-breaking robustness: It is known in item pricing that small perturbations could lead to large losses due to buyers switching to much cheaper items (see Hartline and Koltun (2005), §2 and §5). There is a similar robustness concern in our setting. For example, if we perturb the payments to force a unique best response for each agent, then the optimal principal utility in Example 1 drops from 1.4 to at most 1. In particular, the utility of 1.4 comes from procuring two units in one round and one unit in the second. If the principal can only repeat a unique best-response production level, the best thing she can do is to collect two units for one or two rounds, both resulting in utility at most 1. She can approach this bound by changing the payment of two units to 1+ε. This gives utility 1−ε for one round and 1−2ε for two rounds. Thus, even arbitrarily small payment errors can eliminate the 0.4 utility gain in this example. We will clarify this sensitivity when discussing the static model.
However, if we remove the strategic advantage that the principal may tie-break differently at different rounds, then we might have a simpler algorithm. Say we force the principal to fix a particular production level for each type beforehand. In this case, we can discard the tree formulation in §6.2. Instead, we may enumerate all production profiles with their cheapest menus, and use a DP to compute the optimal stopping policy for each. This results in a similar (M+1)Kpoly(K,M,T) runtime as in the adaptive case. However, such an algorithm exactly fails to reconstruct the optimal utility in Example 1.
Scalability: Under general costs, the exact algorithms are best suited to instances with few cost types K and a modest range of production levels M. The adaptive algorithm enumerates (M+1)K production profiles per DP state, while the static algorithm enumerates at most (K+1)K−1(M+1)K−1 labeled trees. Increasing K raises the exponent on M+1 in both and the tree-count factor in the static case. For fixed K, the enumeration grows polynomially in M, though the degree can still make large M costly. The horizon T affects only the O(T2M) DP state count and leaves both enumeration sizes unchanged. We will clarify these tradeoffs in the paper.