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Paper summary
The paper asks how to charge advertisers so that they report their true values through an automated bidder's target-CPA interface. It adjusts payments at the end of the day using Myerson's formula, analyzes estimation error, and provides preliminary checks through simulations and an online discount experiment.
Critical strengths
- The approach changes only end-of-day payments while preserving the auction ranking. This is straightforward and potentially useful in practice. (pp. 4–5)
- The paper distinguishes the guarantees with exact allocation information from those under estimation error, and states the extra conditions needed for convergence. The proofs also handle stepwise allocation curves. (Theorems 1 and 3; Proposition 2)
Critical weaknesses
- It is unclear why the entire allocation curve needs to be learned. Under the paper's first-price setting and complete logs, the exact payment can be computed by summing the highest competing score for each won impression. What does the proposed approach add beyond this critical-price settlement? (pp. 3–6)
- The key experiments do not directly address the main concern. E2 does not test over-reporting. E3 uses the estimated allocation in both the value and payment terms, so truthful reporting is already optimal for this surrogate objective over a continuous report domain. The authors acknowledge these limitations, but evidence using actual utility is still lacking. (pp. 8–9)
Questions for authors
- Given the assumed logs, what prevents direct settlement at the critical price for each won impression? What additional problem does learning the full allocation curve solve?
- Do the deviation gains and dynamics still support the conclusions when E2 covers the full allowed report range and E3 uses the value of the actual allocation minus the estimated payment?
§3.1 corrected and Appendix H added; E2 extended to over-reports; E3 re-run under actual utility
Weakness 1 and Question 1: why learn the whole curve rather than settle at critical prices.
You are right, and we have corrected the text. In the idealized model of §2---first-price ranking, fixed rivals, a complete candidate queue per impression, and an entry threshold that does not move when the advertiser changes its own report---the information rent has a closed form: writing m−i,j=maxk=iτkqk,j and xi,j=m−i,j/qi,j, the Myerson payment is exactly ∑j:xi,j<τim−i,j, the sum of the critical scores of the impressions won. No curve need be fitted, and the settlement carries the same requirement we already impose on the rebate: applied after the auction and excluded from the pacing feedback. Nor is it limited to one realized day: sorting the thresholds once and accumulating along that order answers the payment at any report, so the exact route delivers the whole billing rule. Within the model your proposal is therefore correct and complete, and the submitted sentence "we must estimate Gi in order to compute the integral" was wrong as stated. We have replaced it (§3.1).
What the revision adds, in the new Appendix H, is why our own deployment estimates the curve regardless. The difficulty is not the arithmetic but the conditions the identity assumes, none of which our production setting supplies exactly.
Billing is per click and the factors entering qi,j are themselves predicted, so the charge at a report the advertiser never submitted is a prediction rather than a sum over observed events: the impressions it would have won at that report have no realized clicks, and replaying the log does not recover them. The replay also reproduces the logged auction rather than the serving system around it---eligibility and targeting filters, traffic routing, frequency and quality controls, campaign-level overrides---all of which interact with a changed report in ways we neither model nor have measured, so exact arithmetic on replayed inputs is exact with respect to the replay and not with respect to production. The third obstacle is cost, and again not of the summation: assembling and refreshing a per-unit counterfactual queue every day sustains a few hundred units at our throughput, against the platform's active population.
These are reasons the exact-threshold route is unavailable to us, not claims that it is infeasible in general. Estimating Gi does not make the gap disappear; it puts the gap in a form the analysis can carry, since Theorem 3 bounds the IC slack by the uniform allocation error whatever its source.
Weakness 2 and Question 2, first part: E2 does not test over-reporting.
Fair, and now fixed. E2's grid previously ran over [0.02vi,vi]; it now covers [0,Vsim] with the same markets, seeds, subsamples, estimator and integration, so only the search range changed. The measured deviation gain at n=104 rises from 1.66% to 4.45% of gross truthful value, and the p95 of market means from 5.07% to 15.88%. The original under-report statistics reproduce exactly, so the comparison is paired.
Weakness 2 and Question 2, second part: E3 optimizes a surrogate under which truth is optimal by construction.
You correctly identified that optimizing a proxy built from the same monotone estimate cannot validate best responses under the actual allocation, and you asked what happens when the objective becomes the value of the actual allocation minus the estimated payment. We re-ran the dynamics with exactly that decision rule, now Appendix J: same markets, seeds, subsample stream, grid, damping and horizon, with the value term the only difference, so the two runs are paired market by market and the proxy branch reproduces Table 8. The terminal report error among truth-active advertisers is larger under actual utility in every one of the twelve configurations, by a median factor of 2.6; since that factor is unstable where the proxy error is near zero, the absolute values are the informative ones, and at N=50 the error roughly doubles, from 0.036–0.041 to 0.069–0.090. Median shade stays within 0.98–1.00, so the gap is dispersion across advertisers rather than systematic shading. E3's near-truthful trajectory is therefore a property of its proxy objective and should not be read as evidence about behaviour under the real allocation.