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- Confidence
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- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
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Paper summary
The paper investigates the effects of communication on cooperative behaviour among LLM agents through two social dilemma games: two-player iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) and four-player Public Goods Game (PGG) . The authors use Gemma-3-12B-it for all experiments, comparing 30-round games under two conditions: open (agents can communicate) and silent (no communication). Agents take one of three personas: neutral, benevolent, or deceptive, and the authors use a trembling hand mechanism, where the agent’s action is flipped with probability 0.1.
The authors examine agent behaviour at multiple levels, including message content and reasoning traces, internal representations through residual-stream probing, and population-level outcomes through replicator dynamics.
They find that communication generally improves cooperation and helps agents recover from unintended defections in IPD, while also reducing the effectiveness of deceptive strategies. However, in PGG, communication can increase the ability of deceptive agents to exploit cooperation. The authors conclude that the effects of communication depend on whether the benefits of cooperation are excludable.
Critical strengths
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The comparison of communication across two different social dilemmas provides an interesting perspective on multi-agent cooperation. Evaluating both IPD and PGG with and without communication allows the authors to demonstrate that communication does not always have the same effect on collective outcomes. The finding that communication can support cooperation in one setting while facilitating exploitation in another is relevant to the design and evaluation of multi-agent systems.
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The paper attempts to examine communication beyond directly observed actions and payoffs. The analysis of message content, agent reasoning, internal representations, and population dynamics is a potentially useful approach to understanding multi-agent interactions.
Critical weaknesses
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The main conclusions are not sufficiently supported by the experiments, particularly the proposed causal mechanisms. The authors conclude that communication supports cooperation when benefits are excludable but facilitates exploitation when they are non-excludable. However, this conclusion is based on comparing two games that differ in several important dimensions, including the number of players and payoff structure. It is therefore unclear whether excludability is the determining factor or whether other differences between the environments explain the results. This is consequential as identifying the mechanisms through which communication affects cooperation is a central goal of the paper.
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Several experimental and analytical choices are insufficiently justified, limiting the generalisability and interpretation of the results. For instance, all experiments use Gemma-3-12B-it, and Appendix B notes that "we tested a variety of models before deciding on one for fair comparison across experiments," but no further explanation or results are provided. This makes it difficult to assess whether the findings generalise beyond the selected model. Similarly, while the trembling-hand mechanism is motivated as a way of introducing uncertainty, its effects are not isolated experimentally, making it unclear how much it contributes to the reported findings. The replicator dynamics analysis is also not sufficiently motivated in relation to the central research question, and it is unclear what additional conclusions can be drawn from this analysis beyond the behavioural results already presented.
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The novelty of the contribution is not sufficiently established. The finding that communication can both facilitate cooperation and enable exploitation has already been explored in the literature on communication and social dilemmas, including more recent work on multi-agent learning and LLM agents. The related work section does not sufficiently engage with some of this literature, making it difficult to assess what is genuinely new about the findings. While the paper attempts to provide a multi-level analysis, it is also unclear to what extent the additional analyses provide new insights into the effects of communication, rather than further characterisations of the observed behaviour. This limits the significance of the contribution, particularly given the paper's emphasis on providing a deeper understanding of communication between LLM agents.
Questions for authors
- How can the authors establish that the differing effects of communication between IPD and PGG arise specifically from benefit excludability, rather than other differences between the environments? Are there controlled comparisons or additional analyses that could help distinguish these explanations?
- What motivated the selection of Gemma-3-12B-it, and what were the results of the preliminary experiments with other models mentioned in Appendix B? Similarly, what motivated other design choices, such as the choice of social dilemmas or number of rounds?
- Are the agents aware they are taking an action due to the trembling hand mechanism?
- How do some of the design choices add to the analysis and to answering the main research question? Particularly the trembling hand mechanism or the replicator dynamics analysis.