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- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
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- Soundness
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Paper summary
The authors study the effect of higher order knowledge (I know that you know that I know...) and common knowledge (the limit version of that) on game play, specifically in a stag hunt game and the volunteer's dilemma.
Critical strengths
I think the authors have the beginnings of something interesting and important here, and the (conditional) contrast between stag hunt and volunteer's dilemma is interesting.
Critical weaknesses
I also feel that the paper was rushed out the door. The authors first of all should be clearer what we're talking about in each case -- common knowledge of WHAT? Game structure? Promises? If someone states P in a public place, this does not establish common knowledge of P; it just establishes common knowledge of "someone said P in the public place" (this is especially so because you're interested in deception as well). There is a really rich literature on common knowledge that I don't think the authors engaged with a whole lot.
Also the nature of the communication is not made clear. There are hints of this, like when it says communication helps a lot more in the volunteer's dilemma because then we can talk about who will volunteer. But generally there is very little about the nature of the messages, the mechanism by which we get to better outcomes, etc. It's mostly "we ran a bunch of experiments and we're telling you the results." I would like to learn more about what actually happened.
Questions for authors
What's the role of the precise values of the utilities? What if you vary those? This seems a pretty obvious question but I did not see that the authors addressed it.
4 comments
Thank you for the clarifications and additional study. It raises my assessment slightly though not a full point. Also I think rewriting the paper to include new results and submitting it again would be better than having so many clarifications and additions (looking also at the other reviews) reviewed here in comments.
Thank you for reading our response. To be thorough, we ran new experiments for every concern raised by the reviewers instead of only promising them for a future version. We hope that this extra work counts in the paper's favor and the results also support the paper's original conclusions without changing them.
We have now revised the paper to show exactly how these changes will be incorporated. We have added:
- A definitions paragraph in Section 3.1 clarifying that "common knowledge" refers to common knowledge of the payoff-relevant fact , while the game itself is common knowledge in all conditions.
- A new Section 9 (RQ5) analyzing what agents say in the communication experiments.
- Payoff variation results (Appendix D.4).
- The additional experiments for the other reviewers (Appendices D).
As the discussion period ends soon, we would be grateful if you could take a look and let us know if any concern remains.
Thank you again for your valuable feedback! With the rebuttal deadline approaching, we wanted to follow up and see if our responses and additional experiments have addressed your concerns. We would be happy to clarify any remaining questions and would appreciate it if you could consider these updates in your final evaluation.
Response to Reviewer's Feedback
Thank you for finding the contrast between the Stag Hunt and the Volunteer's Dilemma interesting. We ran the experiments you suggested: an analysis of what agents say in all our communication runs, and a payoff experiment. Results and the corresponding paper changes follow.
1. Common knowledge of what?
As per standard behavioral game theory, the game's rules, actions, and payoffs are shown to all agents in their contexts and are assumed to be common knowledge. Our knowledge conditions vary only in what agents know about a payoff-relevant fact, F: "The deep grounds are rich this month" in the Stag Hunt game and "A buyer's boat is passing the village today" in the Volunteer's Dilemma. Throughout the paper, "common knowledge" refers to common knowledge of F. All agents receive F in every condition; the only thing that changes is whether they know that other agents have received it. We will clarify this at the start of Section 3.1 by adding a definitions paragraph that states that the game is common knowledge in all conditions, while the knowledge conditions vary only in what agents know about F.
We will also expand the Related Work with the relevant literature on common knowledge including
2. What actually happened in communication?
We used a GPT-5.2 judge to label every message in our GPT-5.2 communication runs (9,130 messages). The table shows the percentage of messages that do each of six things, in the first and last round of communication.
The table shows communication moving through three stages: agents share the fact, then commit to an action, then confirm where the group stands.
For the Camera Ready version, we will add this analysis to the main paper as a new section, RQ5: "How does communication lead to coordination?" We believe this fully addresses the reviewer's concern.
3. What is the role of the payoff values?
We varied the payoff for coordinating (both agents going deep in a rich month) and kept everything else fixed. We ran k0 and CK at each payoff (Stag Hunt, GPT-5.2, seeds 1–15).
Changing the payoff does not change the result. Agents never coordinate at k0, even when coordinating pays five times the safe option, and always coordinate under CK, even when it pays only slightly more. This shows that knowledge level drives coordination and not the payoff values. We believe this fully addresses the reviewer's concern.