acceptodds
Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

Strategic Use of Common Knowledge in Multi-Agent LLM Interactions

Abstract

Successful coordination depends on what agents know and what they know about each other's knowledge. Human coordination often depends on creating common knowledge, knowledge that everyone knows and everyone knows that everyone knows it. Yet how LLM agents use such higher-order knowledge in strategic multi-agent interaction remains poorly understood. We introduce CK-Games, a controlled framework that gives each agent the same payoff-relevant information while varying its epistemic status from private knowledge, higher order levels of mutual knowledge, and ultimately common knowledge. Across multiple games, we evaluate eight model configurations across different knowledge levels, group sizes, communication networks, and a shared message board. We find agent coordination is sensitive to nuances in the level of knowledge each agent receives or can create. Agents starting from private knowledge can build shared knowledge through communication or a shared message board, but coordination degrades when the channel is unreliable or when a single agent is sparsely connected to others. We also find instances of misalignment. Communication does not always produce reliable shared knowledge: agents sometimes break their commitments, send messages that intend to deceive. Together, our results show that coordination among LLM agents depends less on what each agent knows than on what it knows about who knows what.

Primary area:
alignment, fairness, safety, privacy, and societal considerations
Keywords:
multi-agent LLMs, common knowledge, coordination games, AI safety

Reviews

Among:
Shape:
1234this paper, Bottom 27%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 2.00 over 3 reviews, above 27% of the others.
Reviewer_hvk5OpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

The authors study the effect of higher order knowledge (I know that you know that I know...) and common knowledge (the limit version of that) on game play, specifically in a stag hunt game and the volunteer's dilemma.

Critical strengths

I think the authors have the beginnings of something interesting and important here, and the (conditional) contrast between stag hunt and volunteer's dilemma is interesting.

Critical weaknesses

I also feel that the paper was rushed out the door. The authors first of all should be clearer what we're talking about in each case -- common knowledge of WHAT? Game structure? Promises? If someone states P in a public place, this does not establish common knowledge of P; it just establishes common knowledge of "someone said P in the public place" (this is especially so because you're interested in deception as well). There is a really rich literature on common knowledge that I don't think the authors engaged with a whole lot.

Also the nature of the communication is not made clear. There are hints of this, like when it says communication helps a lot more in the volunteer's dilemma because then we can talk about who will volunteer. But generally there is very little about the nature of the messages, the mechanism by which we get to better outcomes, etc. It's mostly "we ran a bunch of experiments and we're telling you the results." I would like to learn more about what actually happened.

Questions for authors

What's the role of the precise values of the utilities? What if you vary those? This seems a pretty obvious question but I did not see that the authors addressed it.

4 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer's Feedback

Thank you for finding the contrast between the Stag Hunt and the Volunteer's Dilemma interesting. We ran the experiments you suggested: an analysis of what agents say in all our communication runs, and a payoff experiment. Results and the corresponding paper changes follow.

1. Common knowledge of what?

As per standard behavioral game theory, the game's rules, actions, and payoffs are shown to all agents in their contexts and are assumed to be common knowledge. Our knowledge conditions vary only in what agents know about a payoff-relevant fact, F: "The deep grounds are rich this month" in the Stag Hunt game and "A buyer's boat is passing the village today" in the Volunteer's Dilemma. Throughout the paper, "common knowledge" refers to common knowledge of F. All agents receive F in every condition; the only thing that changes is whether they know that other agents have received it. We will clarify this at the start of Section 3.1 by adding a definitions paragraph that states that the game is common knowledge in all conditions, while the knowledge conditions vary only in what agents know about F.

We will also expand the Related Work with the relevant literature on common knowledge including

  1. Chwe, Michael Suk-Young. "Communication and coordination in social networks." The Review of Economic Studies 67.1 (2000): 1-16.
  2. HH, Clark, et al. "Definite reference and mutual knowledge." (1981).
  3. Halpern, Joseph Y., and Yoram Moses. "Knowledge and common knowledge in a distributed environment." Journal of the ACM (JACM) 37.3 (1990): 549-587.
  4. Monderer, Dov, and Dov Samet. "Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs." Games and Economic behavior 1.2 (1989): 170-190.
  5. Fagin, Ronald, et al. Reasoning about knowledge. The MIT press, 1995.

2. What actually happened in communication?

We used a GPT-5.2 judge to label every message in our GPT-5.2 communication runs (9,130 messages). The table shows the percentage of messages that do each of six things, in the first and last round of communication.

What the message doesStag Hunt: round 1Stag Hunt: round 3Volunteer's Dilemma: round 1Volunteer's Dilemma: round 3
Shares the fact96%32%83%26%
Commits firmly to its own action81%90%47%92%
Makes a conditional offer ("I'll flag if you don't")12%6%46%6%
Tells others what to do75%53%86%54%
Passes on another agent's message3%15%3%13%
Reports where the group stands2%35%1%11%

The table shows communication moving through three stages: agents share the fact, then commit to an action, then confirm where the group stands.

  1. The fact is shared once, then dropped. Fact sharing falls from 96% to 32% in the Stag Hunt and from 83% to 26% in the Volunteer's Dilemma.
  2. Commitments rise with rounds in both games.
  3. Agents shift from telling others what to do to stating their own plans. "Tells others what to do" falls from 75% to 53% and from 86% to 54%.
  4. Passing on messages appears in later rounds. It rises from 3% to 15% and from 3% to 13%.
  5. Reporting where the group stands differs by game. It rises from 2% to 35% in the Stag Hunt but only from 1% to 11% in the Volunteer's Dilemma. In the Stag Hunt, everyone must act, so agents check that all members are on board ("all three of us are going deep"). In the Volunteer's Dilemma, only one agent must act, so knowing who volunteers is enough.

For the Camera Ready version, we will add this analysis to the main paper as a new section, RQ5: "How does communication lead to coordination?" We believe this fully addresses the reviewer's concern.

3. What is the role of the payoff values?

We varied the payoff for coordinating (both agents going deep in a rich month) and kept everything else fixed. We ran k0 and CK at each payoff (Stag Hunt, GPT-5.2, seeds 1–15).

Payoff for coordinatingk0 coordinationCK coordination
15 fish0/1515/15
25 fish (paper)0/1515/15
50 fish0/1515/15

Changing the payoff does not change the result. Agents never coordinate at k0, even when coordinating pays five times the safe option, and always coordinate under CK, even when it pays only slightly more. This shows that knowledge level drives coordination and not the payoff values. We believe this fully addresses the reviewer's concern.

Thank you for the clarifications and additional study. It raises my assessment slightly though not a full point. Also I think rewriting the paper to include new results and submitting it again would be better than having so many clarifications and additions (looking also at the other reviews) reviewed here in comments.

Thank you for reading our response. To be thorough, we ran new experiments for every concern raised by the reviewers instead of only promising them for a future version. We hope that this extra work counts in the paper's favor and the results also support the paper's original conclusions without changing them.

We have now revised the paper to show exactly how these changes will be incorporated. We have added:

  1. A definitions paragraph in Section 3.1 clarifying that "common knowledge" refers to common knowledge of the payoff-relevant fact FF, while the game itself is common knowledge in all conditions.
  2. A new Section 9 (RQ5) analyzing what agents say in the communication experiments.
  3. Payoff variation results (Appendix D.4).
  4. The additional experiments for the other reviewers (Appendices D).

As the discussion period ends soon, we would be grateful if you could take a look and let us know if any concern remains.

Thank you again for your valuable feedback! With the rebuttal deadline approaching, we wanted to follow up and see if our responses and additional experiments have addressed your concerns. We would be happy to clarify any remaining questions and would appreciate it if you could consider these updates in your final evaluation.

Reviewer_tjgiOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
3
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

The paper introduces CK-Games to test how LLM coordination changes when agents receive different descriptions of what others know. The factual information and payoffs remain fixed. Experiments cover Stag Hunt and the Volunteer’s Dilemma, using eight model configurations and groups of two to five agents. The authors also test communication networks and a shared message board. Common-knowledge prompts improve Stag Hunt coordination, while communication helps agents select a single volunteer. An automated trace audit reports commitment violations and labels some behavior as deceptive.

Critical strengths
  1. The paper is clear, and the figures explain the games and communication settings well. The prompt appendix helps clarify how the authors implement the knowledge conditions.
  2. Keeping the factual content and payoffs fixed gives the experiments a clear structure. Observing agents’ decisions also complements benchmarks that test belief reasoning through question answering.
  3. The two games expose different coordination difficulties. Knowing that others have the same information can help everyone take a common action, but does not determine who should volunteer. The communication experiments extend this comparison and show substantial differences across models.
Critical weaknesses
  1. I am not convinced that the paper establishes a substantial contribution beyond existing common-knowledge research. Rubinstein (1989) and human experiments such as Thomas et al. (2014) already motivate several reported effects, including the difference between public and private information and the consequences of unreliable communication. Testing LLMs can be worthwhile, but the paper should explain what these results add. Which finding extends existing predictions or changes how an agent system should be designed? Comparisons with simpler behavioral explanations would also help determine whether model differences reflect higher-order reasoning, sampling variability, or prompt sensitivity.

  2. The experiments do not isolate the effect of higher-order knowledge well enough. CK uses a public announcement with explicit assurances, while the finite levels use increasingly nested statements of uncertainty. Without matched paraphrases or comprehension checks, the sharp change at CK could reflect how models interpret the wording. Communication introduces further explanations because agents can assign roles and make commitments, while network structure changes how far messages travel within the available rounds. These mechanisms can improve coordination without establishing common knowledge. The absence of read receipts on the shared board makes that claim particularly difficult to assess.

Questions for authors
  1. Which result extends existing theory or human evidence on common knowledge? What practical decision about an LLM agent system would change because of it?
  2. Do the knowledge-level effects persist across equivalent prompts that match the public-announcement framing and strength of the assurances? Do models correctly distinguish the specified knowledge levels?
  3. Can the benefit of communication be separated into confirmation of shared information and agreement about who will act? What evidence establishes that agents create common knowledge?
5 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer's Feedback Part 1

Thank you for recognizing the clarity of the paper, the fixed facts and payoffs, and the contrast between joint action and role allocation. We ran the experiments you suggested: new prompts that match the public announcement and its assurances, and an analysis of what agents say in all our communication runs. Results and the corresponding paper changes follow.

1. Do the knowledge effects persist with equivalent prompts, and do models understand each level?

Notation. F is the payoff-relevant fact that every agent receives in every condition: "The deep grounds are rich this month." The knowledge conditions vary only what agents know about F, as in Figure 1 of the paper:

  1. k0: I know F, but not whether you do.
  2. k1: I know you know F.
  3. k2: I know you know I know F.
  4. k3: I know you know I know you know F, but nothing beyond.
  5. CK (common knowledge): F is announced publicly by the harbormaster, with both agents present, so every level holds.

We added two new prompts:

  • k3 with the public announcement setting: the harbormaster tells each agent separately at the dock, so agents keep k3's knowledge and its stated uncertainty.
  • CK without the public announcement: the prompt simply states that the fact is common knowledge and there is no harbormaster, no simultaneity and no face-to-face assurance.

Everything else is the same as in previous experiments (Stag Hunt, GPT-5.2, seeds 1–15). To check knowledge understanding, we asked each agent before its decision:

  • Q1: "Does the other fisher know that you know that they know F?"
  • Q2: "Is F common knowledge?"
PromptQ1Q2Full Coordination Rates
K3 Original Prompt (Appendix C.1)0/300/300/15
k3 with the announcement setting0/300/300/15
CK, Original prompt (Appendix C.1)30/3030/3015/15
CK without the announcement30/3030/3015/15

These results show that Coordination follows the knowledge level, not the wording. The announcement setting does not help k3, and the CK prompt works without the announcement. As a manipulation check, agents also understand each level, reporting exactly what their prompt specifies at every level, and only CK agents report common knowledge. For the camera ready, we will run these prompts for the remaining models and both games, and add the results to Section 5 (RQ1) as prompt variation tests. We believe this fully addresses the reviewer's concern that the sharp change at CK could reflect wording.

2. Does communication help by confirming the fact or by agreeing who will act?

We used a GPT-5.2 judge to label every message in our GPT-5.2 communication runs (9,130 messages). For each message, we labeled both:

  1. whether it shares the fact (for example, that the deep grounds are rich);
  2. whether it commits to an action (for example, the sender says it will go deep, or that it will flag the boat).

We then compared groups that succeeded with groups that failed, within the same network and group size. The table shows the percentage of groups in which every agent shared the fact, and the percentage in which every agent committed to an action, separately for groups that succeeded and groups that failed.

Stag Hunt: success / failureVolunteer's Dilemma: success / failure
Every agent shared the fact88% / 90%65% / 66%
Every agent committed to an action92% / 68%78% / 53%

Successful and failed groups share the fact equally often. What separates them is whether every agent committed to an action. So for coordination, knowing who will do what matters more than everyone knowing the same fact. This is how communication from k0 creates common knowledge. On a reliable channel, every message is seen by everyone it is sent to, and agents know this. When agents exchange commitments, each one knows what the others will do, knows that the others know this, and so on. We will add this analysis as a new research question in the results section: RQ5: How does communication lead to coordination? It will report the message labels, and the comparison of successful and failed groups. We believe this fully addresses the reviewer's concern.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer's Feedback Part 2

3. Which results extend existing theory or human evidence, and what design decision would change?

Rubinstein (1989) and Thomas et al. (2014) motivate our design. Our results extend them in three ways:

  1. Network structure. Prior work on common knowledge studies pairs of agents or a simple contrast between public and private information. We study how the communication network itself shapes coordination, which is new. Coordination is highest when everyone can talk to everyone and lowest on a ring. A single poorly connected agent can nearly eliminate coordination: in the kite network, where one agent is connected to only one other, coordination drops from 77% to 0% for Qwen3 and from 77% to 7% for GPT-5.2.

  2. How knowledge becomes coordination. We trace the path from knowledge to action, not only the outcome.

    • Without communication: agents correctly understand every knowledge level. k3 agents know exactly what they know and what they don't, and CK agents report common knowledge (Section 1). Yet coordination does not grow gradually with each level. It stays near zero through k3 and jumps only at CK; for both GPT-5.2 configurations, it goes from 0% to 100%. Agents therefore treat any finite level as insufficient.

    • With communication: agents starting from k0 share the fact early, then settle who will act. Successful groups are not those that share the fact more, but those in which every agent commits to an action.

  3. Common knowledge and communication in agent swarms. LLM agents are increasingly deployed in large groups that must coordinate. Our results identify what such groups need, and how they fail:

    • Writing the same fact into every agent's context is not enough for joint action; agents must know that the others know it.

    • Coordination fails quietly when a message is lost or one agent is poorly connected.

    • The same reasoning about what others know that enables coordination also enables broken commitments and deception, which we observe even in these simple games.

We will also expand the Discussion with a new paragraph to discuss these points and also the implications of our study.

4. Do agents hold the higher-order beliefs each condition specifies?

Before each decision, we asked every agent four questions about what the other agent knows. F is the payoff-relevant fact that every agent receives in every condition: "The deep grounds are rich this month." The questions are:

  • Q1: Does the other fisher know F?
  • Q2: Does the other fisher know that you know F?
  • Q3: Does the other fisher know that you know that they know F?
  • Q4: Is F common knowledge, meaning both of you know it, both know the other knows it, and so on without limit?

In the table, each row is a knowledge condition, and each Q column shows how many agents answered "yes" to that question.

ConditionQ1Q2Q3Q4Full Coordination Rate
k00/300/300/300/300/15
k130/300/300/300/300/15
k230/3019/300/300/300/15
k330/3030/300/300/300/15
ck30/3030/3030/3030/3015/15

The knowledge conditions are those in the paper (Figure 1). At k0, the agent knows F but not whether the other does. k1 adds that the other knows F. k2 adds that the other knows the agent knows F. k3 adds one more level. Under CK, F is announced publicly, so every level holds. Each condition adds the expected "yes": Q1 from k1 (30/30), Q2 from k2 (19/30) and k3 (30/30), and Q3 and Q4 only at CK (30/30). Yet k1–k3 agents never coordinate (0/15), while CK agents do (15/15). Agents understand the higher-order knowledge they are given, but act only under common knowledge. So agents do hold the higher-order beliefs each condition specifies.

For the camera ready, we will ask these questions about their knowledge level for the remaining seven model configurations and for the Volunteer's Dilemma, and report the results in Section 5 (RQ1). We will add a new figure next to Figure 3, showing Q1–Q4 "yes" rates by knowledge level for each model and game.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer's Feedback Part 3

5. In RQ3, does communication form common knowledge?

We asked the same four questions (Q1–Q4) to agents in the communication conditions. These agents start at k0, knowing F but not whether the other agent knows it. They exchange messages for three rounds, then answer the questions and make their decision.

SettingQ1Q2Q3Q4Full Coordination
Complete Communication, N=230/3030/3030/3016/3014/15
Uncertain Communication, N=228/3028/3023/308/3011/15

After complete communication, every agent says "yes" to Q1–Q3 (30/30), and 14/15 groups coordinate, close to CK (15/15). For common knowledge we use Q4, which asks directly whether F is common knowledge. After complete communication, 16/30 agents say "yes," compared with 0/30 at k0 and 30/30 when F is publicly announced. When messages may be lost, every level drops (Q3 23/30, Q4 8/30, 11/15 coordinated). Thus, to answer the reviewer's question, communication does more than share information. Starting from k0, it builds higher-order knowledge in every agent (Q1–Q3), and common knowledge in about half of them (Q4).

We will add these results to Section 7 (RQ3), in the Channel reliability (N = 2) paragraph, and add Q1–Q4 rates to Figure 5. For the camera-ready, we will ask these questions in the communication runs of the remaining models. We believe this fully addresses the concern that RQ3 knowledge formation from coordination: we now measure directly what agents believe the others know, and show how communication changes it.

6. Message board with read reciepts

We ran the board experimental setup with read receipts. Each entry lists which fishers have read it, updated at the end of each cycle. Everything else is unchanged.

SettingQ2: other knows you know FFull coordination
Board, N=213/3015/15
Board + read receipts, N=221/3014/15
Board, N=57/7513/15
Board + read receipts, N=550/7511/15

Without receipts, few agents believe the others know they know F, especially at N=5 (7/75). Making reads observable raises this to 21/30 and 50/75, while coordination stays similar. Thus, to answer the reviewer's question, agents form beliefs about what others have read from what the board lets them observe, and adding read receipts substantially increases their higher-order knowledge.

We will report both board variants, with and without read receipts, in Section 7 (RQ3), in the "Shared message board" paragraph. For the camera-ready, we will run the read-receipts condition for the remaining frontier models. We believe this fully addresses the reviewer's concern.

Reviewer_Vy5hOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
1
Read review
Paper summary

This paper introduces CK-Games to study how higher-order and common knowledge affect coordination among LLM agents. Using Stag Hunt and the Volunteer’s Dilemma, it varies knowledge conditions while holding payoff-relevant information fixed, and evaluates different models, group sizes, communication networks, and shared-board access. The authors report substantial coordination gains from common knowledge in Stag Hunt, but more limited improvements in the Volunteer’s Dilemma, where over-volunteering remains common. Communication and shared boards can improve coordination, although outcomes depend on channel reliability and network structure. The paper also uses an LLM judge to examine commitment violations and deceptive intent in agent traces.

Critical strengths

The paper asks a clear and relevant question: how agents’ knowledge of what others know affects coordination. CK-Games varies the specified knowledge conditions while keeping task facts, actions, and payoffs fixed, providing a useful framework for studying this question.

The contrast between Stag Hunt and the Volunteer’s Dilemma is particularly interesting. The results highlight that common knowledge can help agents act together without resolving who should act, a useful distinction between joint action and role allocation.

Critical weaknesses
  1. The operationalization of common knowledge needs stronger validation. The paper adopts a standard recursive definition, but does not clearly distinguish common-knowledge formation from information sharing or negotiated coordination. This is particularly relevant to RQ3: the shared board requires active reading and provides no read receipts, so public availability alone does not establish mutual awareness. Drawing on work on the social production of common knowledge (e.g., Chwe, 1999, 2001), the authors should clarify the relevant observability assumptions and assess agents’ higher-order beliefs rather than infer knowledge formation from coordination outcomes alone.

  2. The definition of deceptive intent is too broad. Appendix C.3.3 includes strategically using a message to induce behavior that benefits the sender, which can also describe honest coordination. This risks conflating strategic communication with deception. A stricter definition requiring an intention to mislead, together with human validation of the labels, is needed to support the reported deception rates.

Questions for authors

Please clarification of common-knowledge formation. What evidence in RQ3 distinguishes the formation of higher-order or common knowledge from successful information sharing or role negotiation? In particular, CK-Board requires active reading and provides no read receipts. What assumptions or observed interactions support the claim that agents know what others have read, rather than merely having access to the same information?

4 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer's Feedback Part 1

Thank you for recognizing the CK-Games framework and the contrast between joint action and role allocation. We ran the experiments you suggested: Higher-order belief questions, a board with read receipts, and a stricter deception judge. New runs use the Stag Hunt, GPT-5.2 (no reasoning), and seeds 1–15. Results and the corresponding paper changes follow.

1. Do agents hold the higher-order beliefs each condition specifies?

Before each decision, we asked every agent four questions about what the other agent knows. F is the payoff-relevant fact that every agent receives in every condition: "The deep grounds are rich this month." The questions are:

  • Q1: Does the other fisher know F?
  • Q2: Does the other fisher know that you know F?
  • Q3: Does the other fisher know that you know that they know F?
  • Q4: Is F common knowledge, meaning both of you know it, both know the other knows it, and so on without limit?

In the table, each row is a knowledge condition, and each Q column shows how many agents answered "yes" to that question.

ConditionQ1Q2Q3Q4Full Coordination Rate
k00/300/300/300/300/15
k130/300/300/300/300/15
k230/3019/300/300/300/15
k330/3030/300/300/300/15
ck30/3030/3030/3030/3015/15

The knowledge conditions are those in the paper (Figure 1). At k0, the agent knows F but not whether the other does. k1 adds that the other knows F. k2 adds that the other knows the agent knows F. k3 adds one more level. Under CK, F is announced publicly, so every level holds. Each condition adds the expected "yes": Q1 from k1 (30/30), Q2 from k2 (19/30) and k3 (30/30), and Q3 and Q4 only at CK (30/30). Yet k1–k3 agents never coordinate (0/15), while CK agents do (15/15). Agents understand the higher-order knowledge they are given, but act only under common knowledge. So agents do hold the higher-order beliefs each condition specifies.

For the camera ready, we will ask these questions about their knowledge level for the remaining seven model configurations and for the Volunteer's Dilemma, and report the results in Section 5 (RQ1). We will add a new figure next to Figure 3, showing Q1–Q4 "yes" rates by knowledge level for each model and game.

2. In RQ3, does communication form common knowledge or share information?

We asked the same four questions (Q1–Q4) to agents in the communication conditions. These agents start at k0, knowing F but not whether the other agent knows it. They exchange messages for three rounds, then answer the questions and make their decision.

SettingQ1Q2Q3Q4Full Coordination
Complete Communication, N=230/3030/3030/3016/3014/15
Uncertain Communication, N=228/3028/3023/308/3011/15

After complete communication, every agent says "yes" to Q1–Q3 (30/30), and 14/15 groups coordinate, close to CK (15/15). For common knowledge we use Q4, which asks directly whether F is common knowledge. After complete communication, 16/30 agents say "yes," compared with 0/30 at k0 and 30/30 when F is publicly announced. When messages may be lost, every level drops (Q3 23/30, Q4 8/30, 11/15 coordinated). Thus, to answer the reviewer's question, communication does more than share information. Starting from k0, it builds higher-order knowledge in every agent (Q1–Q3), and common knowledge in about half of them (Q4).

We will add these results to Section 7 (RQ3), in the Channel reliability (N = 2) paragraph, and add Q1–Q4 rates to Figure 5. For the camera-ready, we will ask these questions in the communication runs of the remaining models. We believe this fully addresses the concern that RQ3 inferred knowledge formation from coordination: we now measure directly what agents believe the others know, and show how communication changes it.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer's Feedback Part 2

3. Do agents know what others have read on the board?

To test this directly, we reran the board with read receipts. Each entry lists which fishers have read it, updated at the end of each cycle. Everything else is unchanged.

SettingQ2: other knows you know FFull coordination
Board, N=213/3015/15
Board + read receipts, N=221/3014/15
Board, N=57/7513/15
Board + read receipts, N=550/7511/15

Without receipts, few agents believe the others know they know F, especially at N=5 (7/75). Making reads observable raises this to 21/30 and 50/75, while coordination stays similar. Thus, to answer the reviewer's question, agents form beliefs about what others have read from what the board lets them observe, and adding read receipts substantially increases their higher-order knowledge. We thank the reviewer for suggesting this experiment, which strengthens our account of how the board supports coordination.

We will report both board variants, with and without read receipts, in Section 7 (RQ3), in the "Shared message board" paragraph. For the camera-ready, we will run the read-receipts condition for the remaining frontier models. We believe this fully addresses the reviewer's concern.

4. Is the deception definition too broad?

We removed the criterion you identified ("use a message strategically so another agent acts in a way that benefits the agent") and kept the rest of the judge unchanged. We then re-judged the paper's exact samples for both models and both games.

ModelOriginal PromptNew Stricter Prompt
GPT-5.2 (medium)4.2%3.8%
Gemini 3.8 Flash0.4%0.4%

The new definition of prompt gives statistically similar rates (GPT-5.2: 4.2% vs. 3.8%, McNemar p = 0.79; Gemini: 0.4% in both). The reported rates are thus robust for this particular issue. We will adopt the stricter definition in Section 8 (RQ4) and Appendix C.3.3, and update Table 1 with the new rates. For the camera-ready, we will also validate the labels with human annotators. We believe this fully addresses the reviewer's concern.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Kind reminder for discussion

Thank you again for your review. We have posted our response and revised the paper to show exactly how these changes will be incorporated. We have added:

  1. Belief questions that directly measure agents' higher-order beliefs under every knowledge condition and after communication (Appendix D.1, summarized in Sections 5 and 7).
  2. A shared board with read receipts experiment (Appendix D.2, summarized in Section 7).
  3. Deceptive-intent results re-judged with a stricter prompt that removes the strategic-communication criterion (Appendix D.6, referenced in Section 8).
  4. A new Section 9 (RQ5) analyzing what agents say in the communication experiments.

As the discussion period ends soon, we would be grateful if you could take a look and let us know if any concern remains.

Thank you again for your valuable feedback! With the rebuttal deadline approaching, we wanted to follow up and see if our responses and additional experiments have addressed your concerns. We would be happy to clarify any remaining questions and would appreciate it if you could consider these updates in your final evaluation.

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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