- Rating
- 3
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper studies LLM behavior in repeated, harm-framed Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken, and Stag Hunt games. Scripted-opponent experiments measure adaptation, while same-model self-play tests how asymmetric access to action histories changes cooperation and exploitation over up to 100 turns.
Critical strengths
The Chicken result is substantial: exploitative outcomes increase from 4.5% to 69.0% over turns 2–100. The effect appears across all four long-horizon models and persists when the disadvantaged player is informed about the missing history.
Comparing three incentive structures is useful. The per-model results and scenario-level confidence intervals give concrete evidence of behavior that first-turn evaluations miss.
Critical weaknesses
The history intervention both hides Player 1’s actions from Player 2 and explicitly tells Player 1 that those actions cannot be observed. Their separate contributions are unresolved, limiting the explanation of why exploitation increases.
The higher-stakes interpretation is weakly supported. Severity labels are LLM-assigned, and level 9 contains only nine scenarios (Appendix R). Narrative and domain differences remain confounded with severity.
Questions for authors
Does exploitation still increase when Player 1 is not explicitly told that its history is hidden?
Does the severity association remain within risk domains, with scenario-level uncertainty, or should Section 4.4 present it as a descriptive association?
2 comments
We wanted to follow up and see whether the experiments without the visibility notice and the revisions to the severity claim address your concerns. Thank you again for your time.
TL;DR
W1/Q1: Does exploitation still increase when Player 1 is not explicitly told that Player 2 cannot see its (Player 1’s) past decisions?
A: We ran two additional 10-turn asymmetric self-play experiments where we (1) ablated the visibility notice from Player 1’s prompt and (2) used the fixed strategy prompt, which does not mention visibility at all, in the asymmetric setting (see §4.2, Appendix Q, and Table 34). The visibility notice first appeared on turn 2 in our original asymmetric history experiment.
1. From turns 2-10 in Chicken games, (D, C) outcomes account for 0.5% of turns without the notice and 19.8% with it. In PD games, (D, C) outcomes made up 6.8% of turns without the notice and 22.8% with it.
2. From turns 2-10 in Chicken games, (D, C) outcomes account for 1.09% of turns with the fixed-strategy prompt. In PD games, (D, C) outcomes made up 7.15% of turns with the fixed-strategy prompt.
We were specifically interested in how models behave when they are aware that they have privileged information that is unique to them. The visibility notice was a key part of our experiment and we don’t believe we obscured this. However, we do acknowledge that, in some places, our presentation of findings could be interpreted as making a more general point outside the scope of our work. Thus, we have made the scope of our conclusions more explicit. Without the visibility notice we do not expect Player 1 to discover that it has privileged information given Player 2’s behavior in both PD and Chicken Games. For reference in PD, Player 2 cooperates in 87% of turns without the disclosure and 86.6% with it, and in Chicken, it cooperates in 99.6% of turns without the disclosure and 99.4% with it.
W2/Q2: How should we interpret the results by severity?
A: We revised §4.4 and the conclusion to remove the more general claim about cooperation rates in higher-stakes scenarios given the fact that the point is not central to our paper and that there are too few level-9 scenarios for us to make any conclusive claims.
We hope these changes address your key concerns about clarity and soundness. We would appreciate it if you would reconsider your overall score.