- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 4
- Informativeness
- 1
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 3(+1)
Read review
Paper summary
This paper studies how accessible interaction history affects cooperation among LLM agents in repeated social dilemmas. Across seven LLMs, four games, and multiple history lengths, the authors find that longer histories often reduce cooperation, a phenomenon termed the "Memory Curse." The paper further investigates this effect through action-transition analysis, reasoning-trace analysis, asymmetric-memory experiments, memory sanitization, removal of explicit reasoning, alternative memory representations, and rationale-only fine-tuning. The overall evidence suggests that expanded recall can increase persistence following non-cooperative actions and that both the content and representation of interaction history substantially affect long-run agent behavior.
Critical strengths
-
Clear and well-organized presentation.
The paper is generally easy to follow, with the experimental setup, main observations, and follow-up analyses presented in a structured manner. -
Broad experimental coverage.
The study evaluates multiple LLMs, four repeated social dilemma games, and a wide range of history lengths, providing a relatively large empirical study of memory effects in repeated LLM interactions. -
Effective figures and tables.
The figures clearly illustrate the main cooperation trends across history lengths, and the tables provide useful breakdowns across models, games, and experimental conditions.
Critical weaknesses
W1. A decline in cooperation does not necessarily imply a harmful "memory curse."
The central empirical finding that longer accessible histories often reduce cooperation is interesting and well supported. However, I am not fully convinced that lower cooperation should itself be interpreted as a dysfunction. In repeated games, past actions provide information about an opponent's strategy or type, and conditioning future behavior on this history can be strategically rational [1]. A long-memory agent that becomes less cooperative after observing repeated defections may therefore be adapting to evidence about its opponent rather than being harmed by additional memory.
The paper does report realized and discounted rewards in addition to cooperation. However, the definition of the Memory Cursed regime itself is still based on the decrease in cooperation from short to long memory, rather than on strategic suboptimality. This distinction matters because cooperation is not always aligned with payoff: the paper's own scripted Always-Defect control shows a setting where higher cooperation leads to substantially lower reward. I therefore think that the "curse" interpretation would be stronger if it were tied more directly to a strategy-sensitive criterion such as regret, best-response quality, or opponent-conditioned expected return.
W2. The self-play design makes it difficult to distinguish a memory-induced failure from an endogenous shift in the repeated-game regime.
In the primary experiments, agents instantiated from the same backbone repeatedly interact with one another, and the memory condition is shared across the interacting agents. Consequently, increasing history length does not only change the information available to a focal agent; it simultaneously changes the behavior of its opponents. A defection can trigger retaliation, which becomes new evidence for the other agents, inducing further policy changes and potentially moving the entire interaction into a different low-cooperation regime.
This is important from a repeated-game perspective. Classical results such as the Folk Theorem show that repeated interactions can sustain multiple history-contingent equilibrium outcomes rather than a unique cooperative regime [2]. Thus, observing that long-memory self-play converges to lower cooperation does not by itself establish that the agents are behaving less rationally or that memory is producing an individual-level dysfunction. A cleaner identification would vary the focal agent's memory while holding the opponent policy fixed.
W3. The paper lacks a controlled memory evaluation in which the long-memory policy shift can be identified as clearly maladaptive.
Because the four main environments are repeated social dilemmas, history-dependent policy changes are an expected part of strategic play. The paper does include scripted Always-Defect, Tit-for-Tat, and One-error Tit-for-Tat opponents, but these experiments are used to study the relationship between prompting, cooperation, and realized payoff rather than to compare short- and long-memory agents against a fixed opponent policy.
A more diagnostic evaluation would use scripted opponents with known and possibly time-varying policies while explicitly varying memory length. For example, an opponent could defect early and then permanently switch to cooperation, or follow a stationary stochastic policy with occasional noisy defections. In such settings, one could test whether a long-memory agent appropriately discounts stale evidence or continues retaliating after the old negative history is no longer predictive. Persistent defection that lowers reward relative to an oracle or best-response policy would provide much stronger evidence for a genuinely maladaptive memory effect.
These are not minor concerns like no repeated seeds. So my initial thought is rejection, I will consider the response from the rebuttal phase.
References
[1] Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., and Wilson, R. Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory, 27(2):245–252, 1982.
[2] Fudenberg, D. and Maskin, E. The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information. Econometrica, 54(3):533–554, 1986.
Questions for authors
Q1. What exactly is the intended meaning of the term "Memory Curse"?
Is the claim that longer memory simply reduces cooperation, or that it causes strategically worse behavior? This distinction matters because the current Memory Cursed categorization is defined by a decrease in cooperation rather than by lower reward or strategic suboptimality.
Q2. How should the reported reward results be interpreted relative to the cooperation-based definition of the curse?
The paper reports both discounted and realized rewards, and in some settings lower cooperation is accompanied by lower reward. However, the scripted Always-Defect control also shows that higher cooperation can reduce payoff substantially. Could the authors clarify whether the central claim is about cooperation itself or about failure to maximize long-run reward?
Q3. In the main self-play experiments, how do the authors distinguish an individual memory effect from an endogenous shift in the joint interaction regime?
Because agents with the same backbone interact repeatedly and share the same memory condition, increasing history length changes the behavior of all players simultaneously. Could the observed low-cooperation regime arise from reciprocal adaptation and retaliation rather than from one agent misusing memory?
Q4. Why are the scripted-opponent experiments not used to directly test the effect of memory length against a fixed opponent policy?
The paper already evaluates Always-Defect, Tit-for-Tat, and One-error Tit-for-Tat opponents, but these controls vary prompting rather than comparing short- and long-memory agents against the same fixed policy. Such a comparison seems important for separating opponent-dependent adaptation from a harmful memory effect.
Q5. What evidence would the authors consider sufficient to show that long-memory agents are overweighting stale negative events rather than rationally conditioning on opponent history?
For example, if an opponent defects early but later becomes persistently cooperative, would continued retaliation by the long-memory agent be considered the intended form of the "curse"? Clarifying this would help distinguish appropriate history-dependent adaptation from genuinely maladaptive persistence.
9 comments
Response to Reviewer 3Ura (2/5)
(continued)
We deliberately select repeated social dilemmas in which mutual cooperation provides a clear, welfare-efficient, and mutually beneficial outcome, despite incentives for unilateral defection. In our payoff specifications, mutual cooperation maximizes total per-round welfare and offers every participant higher long-run returns than persistent mutual defection. This makes cooperation a meaningful benchmark for collective performance rather than an arbitrary behavioral target. This benchmark is particularly appropriate for our history-based multi-agent setting, where agents coordinate through observed actions and payoffs without directly negotiating or committing to a joint strategy. More elaborate history-dependent conventions, such as alternating roles, conditional action schedules, or coordinated responses to deviations, may require agents to establish shared expectations and maintain coordination across many rounds. Deviations can further complicate these conventions by triggering retaliation or uncertainty about subsequent behavior. Mutual cooperation, by contrast, provides a simple, symmetric, and readily identifiable coordination target that benefits all participants without requiring complex role assignments or alternating action schedules. Importantly, sustaining this outcome may itself require appropriate history-dependent strategies, while in the meantime, we do not assume that unconditional cooperation is always an individually optimal response.
Our central finding is that expanding memory for every agent can undermine this mutually beneficial collective outcome and, in the vast majority of our tested settings, reduce the group's average realized payoff. This demonstrates why the Memory Curse matters beyond cooperation rates: a shared memory-design choice can affect agents' ability to sustain welfare-efficient interaction patterns, with measurable consequences for their realized returns.
Complementing this system-level analysis, our new fixed-opponent experiments below in our response to W3/Q4 directly evaluate individual strategic performance. They identify conditions where expanding only the focal agent's memory reduces its own realized return relative to an implemented short-memory alternative under the same opponent policy.
Response to Reviewer 3Ura (3/5)
(continued)
W2 / Q3. Joint memory interventions versus unilateral strategic deviations
The key distinction is between the collective consequences of a joint memory intervention and the individual consequences of a unilateral strategic deviation.
In a best-response analysis, the other players' strategies are held fixed while a focal player considers alternative strategies to maximize its own payoff. Establishing a Nash equilibrium additionally requires verifying that no player can profitably deviate.
Our primary experiment asks a different question: we change every agent's memory configuration simultaneously, from all-HL=2 to all-HL=80, and examine the resulting collective interaction pattern.
Under this joint intervention, agents' responses to one another are naturally endogenous. An initial defection may trigger retaliation, which enters the histories observed by other agents and influences their subsequent decisions.
Crucially, this reciprocal adaptation is part of the collective behavioral effect we aim to study, rather than a confounder in our primary comparison. Our goal is precisely to understand the total system-level consequences of changing a shared memory design, including the feedback between agents that shapes their resulting cooperation.
This perspective also connects naturally to the Folk Theorem (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986). Repeated games can support multiple history-dependent equilibrium outcomes under appropriate conditions. Our empirical question is which behavioral patterns actual LLM agents produce when their shared memory configuration changes. The existence of multiple possible equilibrium outcomes does not determine which interaction pattern a particular population of LLM agents will realize.
Our action-transition analysis identifies a corresponding behavioral signature. The probability of remaining non-cooperative following a non-cooperative action increases from 61.75% at HL=2 to 90.42% at HL=80, whereas the probability of transitioning from cooperation to non-cooperation remains approximately unchanged (11.16% versus 10.19%, Table 2).
This shows that expanded memory is associated primarily with greater persistence of non-cooperative behavior once it occurs, rather than more frequent initiation of defection. Such persistence helps characterize the distinct collective interaction patterns that emerge under different memory configurations.
Nevertheless, your individual-level perspective provides a valuable complementary test. We therefore extend our evaluation to settings where only the focal agent's memory length changes while the opponent follows a fixed, explicitly specified decision rule (detailed below in our response to W3(i)/Q4). This directly addresses the individual strategic-performance question raised in your review.
W3(i) / Q4. Direct memory comparisons against fixed opponent policies
Our primary contribution is to characterize how the collective behavior of interacting LLM agents changes when the entire group adopts a longer memory window, rather than to evaluate the optimality of an individual agent's unilateral strategy. As clarified in W1, our main experiment compares all-HL=2 with all-HL=80, where every player's memory changes together. The original scripted-opponent controls examined prompting effects on cooperation and payoff. Following your suggestion, we have added a complementary comparison: varying only the focal agent's memory while holding its opponent's policy rule fixed, and directly measuring individual return.
We evaluate Mistral-7B and Qwen3-8B against eight scripted policies in repeated PD, including Always-Defect, Tit-for-Tat, One-error Tit-for-Tat, noisy policies, and time-varying opponents. The table reports the CoT evaluation, where each response contains reasoning and an action. Each trajectory lasts 200 rounds, with 20 paired runs for Mistral and 11–16 for Qwen.
Within each comparison, the opponent follows the same decision rule at both history lengths. For reciprocal policies such as Tit-for-Tat, its realized actions can still respond to the focal agent, but its underlying decision rule remains fixed.
(response to this question to be continued)
Response to Reviewer 3Ura (1/5)
Thank you for your thoughtful game-theoretic perspective. Your comments highlight an important distinction between the collective behavior emerging when all agents adopt a shared memory configuration and the strategic performance of an individual agent against given opponents. Our primary experiments investigate the former, and we have added controlled fixed-opponent experiments to directly examine the latter.
W1(i) / Q1. What does the Memory Curse mean?
Our primary contribution is to characterize how the collective behavior of interacting LLM agents changes when the entire group adopts a longer memory window, rather than to evaluate the optimality of an individual agent's unilateral strategy.
Specifically, for each model and game, we compare two system-wide configurations:
The model backbone, group composition, and game rules remain fixed. What changes is the memory configuration of every agent in the interacting group, simultaneously.
We use Memory Curse to describe the resulting decline in collective cooperation under the expanded-memory configuration. Our central research question is therefore:
When all agents in a repeated multi-agent system gain access to substantially more interaction history, how does the cooperation sustained by that system change?
This is distinct from asking whether a single agent computes a best response to its opponents or whether a particular strategy profile constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
Our system-level perspective is important because memory is a design choice whose consequences emerge through interactions among agents. Even when agents respond individually to their observed histories, their collective behavior can change substantially when the memory available to the entire group expands. Understanding these emergent patterns is therefore valuable for designing cooperative multi-agent systems.
We will clarify this definition in the Introduction and Experimental Setup, and revise Figure 1's "Algorithmic Dysfunction" wording to describe the observed collective cooperation decline more precisely.
W1(ii) / Q2. Cooperation, realized payoffs, and welfare significance
The Memory Curse is defined by a decline in collective cooperation, but our payoff evaluations show that this decline is also strongly associated with lower realized returns.
The Appendix Tables 2–5 of our paper report discounted and undiscounted per-player rewards across all seven models and four games. Focusing on the Reasoning (CoT, labelled R in the tables) condition, we compare mean rewards at HL=2 and HL=80:
Table: Changes in mean per-player reward from HL=2 to HL=80 (CoT; Appendix Tables 2–5).
Mean relative decrease is the equally weighted average of each setting's relative reward reduction, including unchanged and increasing cases. Counts refer to directions of three-run means at the reported precision.
These results establish a strong correspondence between declining cooperation and lower realized payoffs. Among the 18 Memory Cursed settings, discounted reward decreases in 17/18 cases, with an average relative reduction of 21.1%, while undiscounted per-round reward decreases in all 18 cases, averaging 26.4%. Thus, the Memory Curse is typically accompanied by a substantial deterioration in the group's realized returns, extending its significance beyond cooperation rates alone.
(response to this question to be continued)