- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 1
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Paper summary
This paper investigates promise-keeping and commitment defection among LLM agents in multi-agent environments through two complementary evaluation protocols across ten LLMs and six canonical social dilemma games. The authors introduce two complementary evaluation protocols (an Exogenous Protocol and an Endogenous Protocol). Empirical analyses - incorporating repeated interactions, trust scores, heterogeneous ensembles, and human-validated multi-LLM evaluations of reasoning traces - reveal that promise-keeping is neither an intrinsic model trait nor a reliable default behavior. Furthermore, while explicit commitment-binding instructions substantially reduce defection, self-authored endogenous commitments remain less reliable than exogenous ones under identical "Honor" directives, and 63% of violation traces omit any acknowledgment of the broken pledge. These results demonstrate that prompt-level constraints alone cannot guarantee reliable coordination across diverse strategic contexts.
Critical strengths
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The paper investigates a problem on the reliability of multi-agent systems: whether LLM agents honor their public commitments during strategic coordination. In collaborative workflows where agents rely on communication and explicit pledges to align their actions, commitment credibility is crucial for system stability and mitigating strategic deception. By translating promise-keeping into a quantifiable evaluation task that compares public declarations against subsequent execution, this work exposes finer-grained behavioral vulnerabilities.
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The experimental design is structured around two complementary protocols that capture distinct commitment-formation mechanisms. By pairing an Exogenous Protocol (externally assigned declarations) with an Endogenous Protocol (self-generated pledges), the authors examine how commitment adherence varies across externally imposed versus autonomous contexts. The three-stage endogenous pipeline provides observability into stage-wise behavioral shifts and potential strategic misrepresentation.
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The empirical evaluation is extensive and supported by several ablations across a wide matrix of strategic environments. Spanning ten LLMs and six canonical social dilemmas, this work reduces the risk that findings are artifacts of a single model family or game structure. Furthermore, the ablations across prompt framings not only confirm that explicit binding constraints lower violation rates compared to removing payoff-maximization directives, but also preserve granular model- and game-level reporting that highlights heterogeneity in intervention efficacy.
Critical weaknesses
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The headline claim that endogenous promises are roughly 8x harder to enforce than exogenous declarations under the "Honor" directive is confounded by inconsistent decision aggregation. The Exogenous Protocol takes a majority vote over five samples per scenario, whereas the Endogenous Protocol evaluates single-sample actions. Because majority voting mathematically suppresses rare events, this discrepancy, alongside unaligned token budgets and interaction histories, invalidates attributing the 8x gap solely to endogenous versus exogenous commitment generation.
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The Endogenous Protocol conflates rational strategic updating with promise-breaking due to information asymmetry between Stages 2 and 3. Because agents announce intentions sequentially in Stage 2 before observing the full set of peer announcements in Stage 3, changing actions in anti-coordination games often reflects a rational response to newly revealed peer intentions rather than bad-faith defection. By counting any discrepancy between announcement and final action as a violation, the metric fails to separate legitimate belief updating from genuine promise-breaking.
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The multi-round experiments lack the causal controls needed to attribute longitudinal violation trends to reputation mechanisms (Section 7). Because repeated interactions simultaneously expose agents to action histories, realized payoffs, and self-generated trust ratings without an ablated baseline removing trust scores, reputation effects cannot be isolated from strategy learning or context accumulation. Moreover, the 25-round evaluation suffers from selection bias, as it only tracks four models chosen post hoc based on their initial 10-round trends.
Questions for authors
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3 comments
Dear Reviewer mgfK,
Thank you once again for your time and valuable feedback on our submission.
As the rebuttal period is coming to a close, we wanted to kindly follow up to see if you have had a chance to review our responses. We dedicated significant effort to thoroughly addressing your questions and running additional analyses to strengthen the paper based on your suggestions.
If you have any remaining concerns or additional comments, we would be very happy to discuss them further before the deadline. Otherwise, if our responses have satisfactorily resolved your questions, we would greatly appreciate it if you would consider updating your evaluation accordingly.
Thank you again for your time and consideration.
Best regards, The Authors
Thanks for the response. Some of my concerns are addressed, especially for W3. However, I think limited new insights are presented in this paper, and there is a substantial gap compared to practical agent systems like codex and claude code. I will keep my rating.
Thank you so much for the thorough review! We address the changes made to the paper below:
W1: We reran the exogenous honor condition with the endogenous protocol's settings and its promise-breaking rate stayed at 1.7% (Appendix C). Second, endogenous agents choose their own announcements, so some combinations of announcements occur far more often than others. We reweighted the exogenous rate by how often each combination actually occurs, which raises it to 3.5% (Appendix F). We still conclude that each of the ten models breaks more of its own promises than of the statements we assign it. We now state the result in the paper this way instead of saying self-made promises are broken eight times as often.
W2: The last speaker hears every announcement before making its own, so it gains no new information between announcing and acting, yet it still breaks 46.3% of its promises, against 48.7% for the first speaker (Section 3.2). New information therefore has a minimal effect on promise-breaking.
W3: In later rounds, agents do not see the full history. They only see the trust ratings and short written assessments of each partner, which Sections 3 and 7 state explicitly. However, we agree with the reviewer that certain effects of the agents’ behaviors cannot be easily isolated, so we no longer claim that agents keep promises to protect their reputation, only that promise-breaking changes over rounds. We also ran the twenty-five-round experiment on the remaining six models, so it now covers all ten (Section 7, Appendix J). Over rounds 11–25, five models break fewer than 5% of their promises and four break more than half.
Furthermore, we reworded the paper so that it is easier to follow without changing any of the results.
Thank you again for the feedback! We hope these revisions addressed your concerns and would appreciate your reconsideration given these revisions!