- Rating
- 3(+1)
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 2
Read review
Paper summary
The paper examines how LLM behavior varies across game environments, including self-play with 15 models in ten complete-information games, analyses of four complex environments, and a simulated carbon market. It reports higher Nash-equilibrium attainment in its sequential-game group than in its simultaneous-game group, distinguishes equilibrium attainment from efficient equilibrium selection, and argues for evaluating interaction processes alongside outcomes. It also introduces Strategic Failure Detection (SFD), which checks planning, coordination, action validity, and outcomes and selects interventions based on the first detected failure.
Critical strengths
-
Useful breadth and behavioral detail: The study compares multiple model families across varied environments and distinguishes equilibrium attainment, efficiency, and interaction behavior rather than relying on a single outcome score.
-
Substantive paired intervention evidence: The authors report 120 paired records across three small games and two models, plus paired evaluation on 20 held-out carbon-market instances. These support the usefulness of the assistance package in several settings. The appendix also discusses mixed results, including the Wait–Go coordination decline.
Critical weaknesses
-
The structural explanation is not isolated by the comparison: The sequential and simultaneous groups contain different games, so timing and observability vary with payoffs, action spaces, and coordination demands. The 63.2% versus 45.4% equilibrium-attainment gap, consistent across most models, supports a descriptive finding for this suite but does not establish the explanation in Section 5.1. This limits the explanatory advance over prior game studies, including Hua et al., which already examine the same ten named games and structured workflows.
-
The distinctive benefit of SFD’s diagnosis and intervention selection remains unverified: The paired experiments establish package-level effects, but SFD also changes the prompting workflow, elicits opponent predictions, and, in the carbon market, supplies computed best responses and other diagnostic information. Without comparable fixed or generic assistance using the same tools, information, and budget, the gains cannot be attributed specifically to diagnosis-based selection. This leaves the proposed method’s main incremental contribution insufficiently supported.
Questions for authors
-
Which existing comparison distinguishes timing or observability from the other differences between the game groups? If none does, how would narrowing the structural explanation affect the claimed contribution relative to prior work?
-
What evidence establishes the benefit of diagnosis-based intervention selection beyond the added workflow and computational assistance? A fixed or generic assistance baseline with comparable resources would directly address this question; I am not assuming such an experiment can be completed during rebuttal.
-
Where are the confidence intervals and paired tests referenced by Figure 5 as appearing in Table 2? Also, how often is the neutral-prediction fallback used in each carbon-market condition, and how does this affect the comparability of Planning scores?
5 comments
Thank you for the additional experiments. The matched sequentialization study and Generic Feedback baseline substantially address my original concerns. My remaining concern is the incremental contribution over prior game studies and structured workflows. Could you clarify the most important new insight beyond the closest prior work and which revised results establish it? I currently lean toward 2 (Weak Reject) but remain open to raising my rating based on this clarification.
Further Discussion on the Incremental Contribution
Dear Reviewer W3Cw,
Thank you for acknowledging that the matched sequentialization study and the Generic Feedback baseline substantially address your original concerns. We understand your remaining concern is whether the contribution is incremental relative to prior game studies and structured workflows. We answer this directly below.
1. Insight. Beyond the closest prior work, the most important new insight is that the gain comes from diagnosis-based selection of repair feedback. In our matched comparisons, the gain is not explained by additional reasoning, generic feedback, extra tools, or larger budgets. The factor that changes is whether repair feedback is selected by the diagnosed failure. Prior behavioral game studies document LLM failures, and prior structured workflows score or guide reasoning. To our knowledge, the closest prior work we compare does not combine a four-dimension diagnosis with a closed repair loop. Our contribution is matched empirical evidence for such a loop.
2. Revised results that establish the insight. The matched Generic Feedback comparison in the carbon-market game is the result that most directly establishes the insight. It covers four models, 30 matched instances, and five runs per instance. Evidence, tools, attempt caps, and budgets are held fixed. Only the feedback selection rule changes. The mean results are:
| Method | P | C | Welfare ( CNY) | BR gap (lower is better) | TPAR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Direct LLM | 19.5% | 18.8% | 66.3 | 9.670 | 40.5% |
| CoT Prompting | 19.7% | 18.8% | 68.9 | 9.093 | 42.4% |
| Generic Feedback | 56.5% | 40.8% | 142.9 | 2.159 | 92.7% |
| SFD (ours) | 99.4% | 92.4% | 155.1 | 0.005 | 100.0% |
In this setting, CoT Prompting yields little improvement over Direct LLM. Generic Feedback helps but remains far below SFD. Relative to Generic Feedback, mean Planning rises from 56.5% to 99.4%, and mean Coordination rises from 40.8% to 92.4%. The complete information results provide generalization evidence. Across eight models, SFD raises equilibrium attainment from 46.3% to 64.8% in simultaneous games and from 59.0% to 99.5% in sequential games. We also mark a boundary openly. In the asymmetric Wait-Go game, GPT-4o falls from 0.50 to 0.30 under SFD.
3. Position relative to prior work. First, behavioral studies such as Akata et al. (2025) characterize failures and modulate behavior with fixed prompts. Within the scope of our comparison, they do not diagnose failures into dimensions or close a repair loop. Second, process benchmarks such as GAMEBoT, DSGBench, and WGSR-Bench score reasoning steps offline. They do not feed evaluation signals back to the agent. Third, PrimeNash derives equilibria analytically. It does not repair the behavior of deployed agents. Relative to these lines, the increment is matched empirical evidence that a detect, decompose, and repair loop with diagnosis-selected feedback improves deployed-agent behavior.
4. Our contribution. To state it plainly, the novelty we claim is closed-loop empirical evidence with a matched control that isolates diagnosis-based intervention selection. The paper also reports discovery-oriented findings. Strategic behavior depends critically on game structure. Equilibrium attainment does not imply Pareto-optimal equilibrium selection. Outcome metrics alone miss process failures. We hope this direct answer clarifies the increment over prior work.
Thank you again for your thoughtful feedback and helpful suggestions.
Best regards,
Authors
Response to Reviewer W3Cw (denoted as R4)
Q4-1The structural explanation is not isolated by the comparison.A4-1We thank the reviewer for questioning whether the structural comparison isolates game format.(1) Equilibrium invariant test. We converted the five simultaneous games to sequential counterparts while retaining payoff tables and action sets. Across 15 models and 10 runs per game and structure, attainment was:
Bold marks the higher rate in each row. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, both formats have the same unique equilibrium outcome, (D,D), while attainment rises from 67% to 92%. The overall 29.8 percentage point difference is descriptive because sequentialization changes strategic opportunities in some games.
(2) Scientific findings. Our contribution extends beyond SFD. We find that strategic behavior varies with structure and scale, equilibrium selection differs across Stag Hunt models, outcome metrics miss process failures in incomplete information games, and observable carbon market failures can be detected and improved.
Q4-2What establishes the benefit of diagnosis-based intervention selection?A4-2We thank the reviewer for asking what SFD adds beyond generic assistance.(1) Matched control. Generic Feedback and SFD share triggers, evidence types, tools, maximum generation slots, per-call limits, attempt caps, and negotiation. Generic gives fixed feedback, while SFD selects it by diagnosed failure. Packet values may differ as trajectories diverge.
(2) Results. P and C are Planning and Coordination rates. Lower BR gap is better. TPAR is terminal payoff achievement rate. Results are:
Bold marks the best value within each model block. Ties are also bold. SFD improves the reported metrics over Generic for three models. DeepSeek-V3 ties at ceiling.
Q4-3Where are Figure 5’s confidence intervals and paired tests?A4-3We thank the reviewer for catching this omission. The revised manuscript reports these tests in Appendix D.7.1.We compare SFD with Direct on 30 paired instances. The table reports mean paired differences, 95% bootstrap confidence intervals, and two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank and paired t-test p-values. Welfare is in 106 CNY. pW and pt denote the respective tests.
Action validity was 100% in both conditions. Only P is significant for DeepSeek-V3. For GPT-4o, all five reported metrics are significant under both tests.
Q4-4How often is neutral-prediction fallback used, and how does it affect Planning comparability?A4-4We thank the reviewer for asking us to quantify fallback use.(1) Fallback. In the revised scorer, neutral prediction fallback is disabled. Its use is therefore zero. Missing or invalid predictions are N/A, not passes.
(2) Planning coverage. The table reports the percentage of scorable Planning decisions in each condition.
No Planning score uses a fallback value. We corrected the manuscript's neutral substitution description and specify the rule in revised Appendix D.7.2.