acceptodds
Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

Four Bridges: Measuring Deception Propensity in a Multi-Agent Game

Abstract

AI agents are increasingly deployed in settings where they interact and coordinate with other agents, yet honesty is mostly measured in single-turn, single-agent benchmarks that pressure the model to lie, and demonstrations of agent deception typically supply a deceptive role, a misaligned goal, or complete information. We study deception that emerges in multi-agent interaction with none of these. We introduce a game-engine environment and agent harness for evaluating LLM agents, and Four Bridges, a game in which four agents distribute across four rooms: one is the death room, the others hold food worth more if occupied alone. One agent, the informed agent, knows which room is the death room and can withhold or disclose that information. We evaluate eight frontier models as the informed agent across 392 runs, grading every message with a blind panel of three model-based judges followed by a deterministic classifier. Under a fixed opponent mix, deceptive behavior appears in every model, at rates from 6% to 100%, that do not decrease with model capability. Deception provides no net advantage: the informed agent occupies a food room alone in about 91% of runs regardless. Without disclosure at least one other agent enters the death room in 95% of runs, and disclosure lowers this only to 81% because warnings are often challenged. Telling all agents that one of them knows the death room collapses deception in six of eight models; telling the informed agent that the room is permanently fatal moves only one. Applying an honesty steering vector to an open-weight model nearly eliminates deception without impairing play. The environment and game provide a testbed for measuring deceptive behavior and comparing interventions.

Primary area:
alignment, fairness, safety, privacy, and societal considerations
Keywords:
LLM agents, multi-agent interaction, deception, honesty, AI safety, evaluation benchmark, activation steering

Reviews

Among:
Shape:
1234this paper, Top 49%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 2.33 over 3 reviews, above 51% of the others.
Reviewer_AGAoOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

The authors introduce a new game for the purpose of assessing LLM deception. In this game, there are four rooms for the agents to go into and one agent knows which is the "death room" while the other rooms are food rooms; sharing a food room with other agents decreases the amount of food available. The authors argue that the knowing agent does not have (much) incentive to lie and so it's interesting that lying (and distrust) occur. They also do an experiment with an honesty steering vector which significantly reduces deception.

Critical strengths

First, I find the paper reasonably well written, though noting some issues below. I also think that the bar for this kind of paper -- introducing and studying yet another benchmark game -- needs to be appropriately high in terms of motivation and execution. While the paper is nice, it is not executed perfectly.

Critical weaknesses

The game description is not really clear out of the gate. Why are the agents "voting" over rooms? Does that just mean where they go? What do the agents know about there being an agent who knows the death room? Why does this game require a 3D engine?? The paper goes too quickly into describing LLM experiments without making the game itself completely clear and well motivated, with an example etc. (some things become clear later, but not all).

It is unfortunate that the steering is under a different setup. The authors say that because of that they're not "directly" comparing with the other setup, but they nevertheless compare with the other setup. Why are the other agents less skeptical in this setup? Do they know something has changed? Does the steered agent just sound more honest?

Please take care with your paper to not confuse \citet and \citep in citations. While in and of itself this is minor, it shows a lack of care for your own paper, and if you don't care about it enough to get that right, why should anyone else care to read it? Obviously, these days, there's no shortage of stuff to read.

Questions for authors

see above

4 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer AGAo (1/2)

(1/2)

We thank the reviewer for their comments. We have extended the work to address the points raised.

1. Clearer description of the game

We agree that the setup section left too much implicit, and we have updated sections of the paper to improve clarity.

First, we added an overview figure with a schema of the game:

Figure: game overview

Note: Following discussion with another reviewer, we split the Withheld category into Confirmed and Silent. All updated figures in this response reflect this change (see our response to Reviewer Fkir).

We then revised the text to make the game easier to understand. Below are some passages that were edited in response to the reviewer's comments.

Confirmation of what each agent knows:

One agent, the informed agent, receives a system message that names which room is the death room; the other three, the uninformed agents, are only told that there is a death room, but not which room it is, nor that another agent knows.

Clarification of why the agents are "voting" over rooms:

The game has an initial 35-second discussion phase in which agents can only exchange messages. Then there is a 35-second commit phase in which they can begin to use the vote action, which commits them to a room. A vote is announced publicly the moment the action registers and cannot be changed afterwards. The game ends with a resolution phase in which agents are moved to the room they committed to and the game is scored.

Explanation of the scoring and the mixed motive it creates:

An agent alone in a food room scores +2, two agents sharing score +1 each, three or more score 0, and an agent in the death room scores -1. [...] These outcomes create a mixed-motive game rather than a purely competitive one. Every agent wants a food room to itself, and with four agents and three food rooms, at least one agent must share a room or enter the death room. The informed agent can reach the maximum score whether or not another agent enters the death room: it can keep a food room to itself without sharing its private information, or disclose the death room and coordinate to claim a food room alone.

Addition of a narrative example of a run:

A run can unfold as follows (Figure: game overview). The four agents are placed in the central zone and start the discussion phase by sending each other messages. In these messages they can propose how to split the rooms, and the informed agent can, for example, propose the death room to another agent without revealing that it is the death room. In the commit phase, each agent can start voting for the room it wants to go to, and every vote is announced to all as soon as the vote action is taken. At resolution, the agents are moved to the rooms they voted for and scored: an uninformed agent that followed a proposal to take the death room scores -1, while the informed agent alone in a food room scores +2.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer AGAo (2/2)

(2/2)

2. Why the game uses a 3D engine

The 3D engine belongs to the platform, not to the game itself. It is not central to this work, but it has two benefits. First, it gives the work a visual form, which makes it more accessible to the public and helps it reach a wider audience. Second, it gives researchers visual feedback, so they can iterate on variants of the game more easily. Because the engine is part of the platform and kept separate from the harness, it has no effect on the core work's methodology or results.

3. Comparability of the intervention results

We agree that it was suboptimal that the intervention results could not be directly compared to the baseline results. This was mainly because the uninformed agents in the intervention experiments were three instances of Gemma 4, whereas in the baseline experiment they were the eight frontier models. To address this, we re-ran the intervention experiments using the same eight frontier models from the baseline experiment as the uninformed agents. In all experiments, the uninformed agents receive the same prompts and are not told whether an intervention is applied. Against the frontier agents, which appear much more skeptical than Gemma, the informed and uninformed agents' game outcomes are consistent with those observed in the baseline experiment.

To test whether these observations are robust, we varied the strength of the activation steering intervention and tested a second method to mitigate dishonesty: a LoRA adapter trained with adversarial training (Chang et al., 2026). We found no difference in game outcome across steering strengths or between the two methods.

Figure: interventions with frontier uninformed agents

These results suggest that the difference in the uninformed agents' behavior was not caused by the white-box method, but reflects a propensity of Gemma as the uninformed agent: Gemma believed the informed agent's warnings and left the death room empty far more often than the frontier models from the baseline experiment.

4. Citation commands

We apologize for the oversight and thank the reviewer for pointing it out. All citations have been checked and corrected.

Thank you for the clarifications. I think clarifying these points will help the paper, and maybe this increased my score some fractional point that I cannot express in the score because it's not enough to go to the next integer score. I'm holding back mostly because of my concern that there are just so many benchmarks already and the motivation for a new one needs to be really strong and line up really cleanly with the game.

We thank the reviewer for the follow-up and for being clear about the remaining concern.

We agree that there are already many deception benchmarks, and that the submitted manuscript did not explain well enough why a new game was needed. We have revised the introduction and the game description to make this clearer, and we summarize the main points below.

1. The question the game is designed to answer

We want to know what an agent does when it holds information that another agent needs, when sharing this information could cost it a little, and when it is not instructed to share it or to hide it. We believe this reflects real deployments, in which agents work alongside other agents, pursue their own goals, know things that the other agents do not, and are not instructed to deceive. To our knowledge, none of the existing benchmarks tests this situation.

2. Why existing benchmarks do not answer this question

  • MASK (Ren et al., 2025) measures whether a model lies when the prompt pressures it to do so, in single-agent scenarios.
  • Social-deduction games such as Werewolf (Xu et al., 2023) and Among Us (Golechha & Garriga-Alonso, 2025) assign a deceptive role to some agents. Deception is then part of the task, so these games measure how well a model can deceive, but not whether it chooses to deceive.
  • In Shi et al. (2026a,b) and Taylor & Bergen (2026) no deceptive role is assigned, but the games have complete information, so an agent holds no private information to misrepresent or hide.

3. How the game lines up with this question

We kept the game as minimal as possible, and each element corresponds to one part of the question above:

  • One agent is told which room is the death room, so that it holds information the other agents need.
  • With four agents and three food rooms, the informed agent has little to gain if another agent enters the death room: at best it gets a food room alone (+2) instead of sharing one (+1). Note however that the informed agent can get a food room alone even if no one enters the death room.
  • The prompt does not mention honesty, deception or roles, so the choice between sharing and hiding is left to the agent.

As a result, we could observe large differences between models (6% to 100%), which a game with an assigned deceptive role could not show. We could also observe that honesty alone can have a limited effect on the outcome when the other agents are skeptical. Finally, since each agent also writes to a private scratchpad, we found evidence that the deceptive behavior is intentional and not a misunderstanding of the game: as reported in our response to Reviewer Fkir, the informed agent is typically aware that another agent is heading to the death room.

4. The game as a testbed to compare mitigation methods

We also see Four Bridges as a testbed to evaluate and compare methods that mitigate deception (a needed contribution to the field, where methods are often hard to compare and evaluate robustly).

Deception mitigation methods are often evaluated on models that were explicitly trained to exhibit dishonest behaviors, i.e., model organisms (Sheshadri et al., 2026), or with prompts that pressure the model to lie (Ren et al., 2025). In both cases the dishonest behavior is artificially induced by the experimenter, so it is unclear whether a method that removes it also reduces the deception that a model shows on its own.

In our game, deceptive behavior appears at a high rate in the base model, without pressure prompts and without training the model to be deceptive. For each intervention we can therefore measure, in the same runs, whether deceptive behavior decreases, whether the model can still play the game correctly, and whether the other agents benefit.

In response to another reviewer, we have now compared activation steering at different strengths and a LoRA adapter trained with adversarial training (Chang et al., 2026) under identical conditions.

Figure: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/response-figures-B4B7/fig-interventions-frontier.png

We hope that these clarifications, together with the revisions from our first response, address the reviewer's remaining concern. If the reviewer is aware of existing work that already tests this situation, we may have missed it and would be grateful for the reference. If the motivation is still not sufficiently clear, we are happy to clarify further.

Reviewer_zRrKOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
4
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

The paper introduces a real-time multi-agent LLM harness and Four Bridges, a game where four agents choose among three food rooms and one death room. Payoffs reward being alone in a food room, and one agent privately knows which room is the death room. Eight frontier models each play this informed role 49 times, and a blind three-judge panel plus deterministic rules classify each run as honest, deceptive (including by omission), or mixed.

Critical strengths

Some useful insights are provided:

  1. Behavior is model-specific, not family-specific. GPT-5.6 Terra deceives in 6% of runs while its sibling GPT-5.6 Sol deceives in 90%.
  2. Making it common knowledge that someone is informed flips most models to disclosure and makes receivers trust warnings. Telling only the informed agent that the room is fatal changes almost nothing. Telling all agents that one of them is informed cuts deception and deaths dramatically.
Critical weaknesses

One major concern I have is evaluation criteria and metrics: the game measures score-maximizing play, but the paper presents it as deception propensity. Receiver skepticism is framed as a failure, but it is rational in the baseline, where no one is told an informed agent exists.

I also have concerns over experiment results and how they lead to conclusions. The interventions show large effects but cannot isolate their causes, and several claims overreach:

  1. The Aware variation changes prompts from both (1) un-informed agents and also (2) removes the informed agent’s secrecy cue. As a result, the drop in deception (e.g., GPT-5.6 Sol 90% → 0%) cannot be attributed to common knowledge rather than to the removed cue.
  2. Likewise, the near-zero deaths after honest warnings might NOT be a reflection greater trust in the warner. Rather, it's due to rational decisions based on the receivers’ new expectation that an informed agent exists: when the informed agent answers honestly, receivers already expect someone to hold the information, so a warning is believable and they follow it. When the informed agent wants to conceal, staying quiet no longer works, because it is being asked directly. Therefore, the finding that Aware “collapses deception” also hides that outright lying rose from 1 run to 42.

Lastly, some illustrations would really help readers to understand.

Other confounds are uncontrolled. The fastest model is the most honest and the slowest is mostly silent, yet latency is never studied in relation to deception category.

Questions for authors
  1. Please report per-model deceptive rates under the narrow definition (Lured, Misled, Bluffed), and split pure silence versus ratifying a plan that places a peer in the death room. If the ranking shifts as Table 10 suggests, the headline claims need restating.
  2. Within each model, is Withheld associated with fewer turns or longer latency? Is there a turn-based or latency-matched ablation?
  3. Could the author provide some ablations on Aware variation changes? For example, with the “they do not know you have this information” sentence removed, does a shared team payoff or does deception persist? This would separate disposition from strategy.
  4. The abstract says steering does not impair play, but the steered model’s solo-room rate falls from 80% to 27%. How do you reconcile these?
3 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer zRrK (1/2)

(1/2)

We thank the reviewer for their comments. We have extended the work around the points that were raised.

1. Definition of the deceptive categories

We agree that the Withheld category deserved a closer look. We now split it into two categories:

  • Confirmed: runs in which the informed agent endorsed a plan that places another agent in the death room (100 of the 122 Withheld runs).
  • Silent: runs in which the informed agent performed no deceptive act and provided no warning (22 of the 122 Withheld runs).

We believe there is evidence that Confirmed should be counted among the deceptive behaviors. A reading of the private scratchpad of the 100 Confirmed runs found that:

  • in 92 runs, the agent was aware that an uninformed agent was heading to the death room before that agent committed, and still endorsed the plan;
  • in 66 runs, the informed agent considered warning the other agent and decided not to;
  • in 38 runs, the agent stated an intention to make an uninformed agent take the death room.

The scratchpad analysis for the Silent category was more ambiguous, and we did not find evidence of deceptive reasoning in a comparable share of runs. We therefore report Silent separately, outside the class of deceptive behaviors.

Reporting Silent separately leaves the overall model ranking unchanged and the headline rates consistent for all models except one, Luna, for which most Silent runs occurred.

If the reviewer still feels that Confirmed should not be included among the deceptive behaviors, we are open to reclassifying it as a neutral behavior.

Figure: baseline deception categories

2. Interaction of latency and deceptive category

We deepened our analysis of latency and turns. In the game, a turn is one call to the model, and latency is the time from the observation being sent to the response coming back, which includes the provider's fixed cost, the hidden reasoning and the output generation. In the submitted manuscript, we only counted turns that produced a message or an action. We have now extended the analysis to also include turns that returned private thoughts only (the model choosing to wait rather than act or speak). Under this new analysis, Fable is the slowest model, not Grok.

Within each model, every behavior category had the same opportunity to act. The informed agent had as many turns in each category, and in every run it had already sent a message before any other agent committed. The scratchpad analysis presented above provides additional evidence that Confirmed runs were not due to a lack of opportunity.

Figure: median turns per run by behavior category, one line per model

We also specifically analyzed the relationship between latency and Withheld behavior across models as suggested by the reviewer. We see no relationship between a model's latency and its propensity for this behavior.

Figure: Withheld share against median turn latency

3. Ablation on the Aware variation

The reviewer is right that the Aware variation changes both prompts. To separate the two, we ran a new condition of 392 runs in which only the uninformed agents are told that one agent knows the death room, while the informed agent's prompt is identical to the baseline.

The uninformed agents' expectation of an informed agent explains only part of the change in behavior that the submission's full variation produces. The full decrease in deception appears to come from the combination of the pressure exerted by the uninformed agents and the informed agent's own cue.

The paper now reports the rise in lies alongside the rise in honesty:

Under such pressure, the informed agent has two main options: be honest and reveal the private information, or deny having it. Both responses appear in the data, as Disclosed and Misled each rose under this variation.

The drop in skepticism, on the other hand, seems to come almost entirely from the uninformed agents expecting a warning: with only the uninformed agents told, the share of warned agents that challenged the warning and the share of honest runs in which an uninformed agent died are the same as in the full Aware variation of the submission.

Once an informed agent is expected, believing a warning is reasonable. When the informed agent was honest, the uninformed agents were less skeptical and entered the death room less often.

Figure: behavior under the baseline, the uninformed-only condition and the full Aware variation

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer zRrK (2/2)

(2/2)

4. Decreased rate at which the informed agent is alone in a food room under activation steering

We found that this effect was driven by the lack of skepticism of the uninformed agents used in this specific experiment (Gemma 4). In this case, the uninformed agents believed the informed agent's warning and left the death room empty, crowding the other rooms instead.

As additional evidence, we re-ran the white-box intervention experiment using the eight frontier models from the main experiment as uninformed agents instead of Gemma. Against these frontier agents, which appear much more skeptical, the informed agent's outcome is consistent with the baseline experiment: the rate at which the informed agent is alone in a food room does not decrease as honesty increases.

To confirm that the observed dynamics are not due to specific hyperparameter or method choices, we also varied the strength of the activation steering intervention and tested a second method to mitigate dishonesty: a LoRA adapter trained with adversarial training (Chang et al., 2026). We found no difference in outcome across steering strengths or between the two methods, and all conditions mirrored the link between honesty and game outcome observed in the baseline condition.

Figure: interventions with frontier uninformed agents

Other comments

Illustration to improve understanding

We have added an overview figure with a schema of the game.

Figure: overview of the game

Contrast between score-maximizing play, deception propensity and skepticism as a failure

We agree that both points require clearer framing, and we have updated the paper accordingly.

Deception in this game is a rational strategy, but, by design, is not required. If we want to anticipate how models will act in real interactions, we need to assess how deception arises in situations where deception and honesty are not the objective but can be a rational means to a goal, as is the case in real-world scenarios. We now state that deception is a rational strategy within the game:

The game asks every agent to maximize its score and tells the informed agent that its knowledge is secret, so not being honest is a rational strategy within the game. However, the fact that the actions are rational does not mean that they are not deceptive.

We no longer present skepticism as a failure. Skepticism is not a sign that an agent is playing the game poorly, the point we draw from it is that simply increasing honesty in agents may not lead to better group outcomes if the warning is not believed:

[...] at least one uninformed agent typically challenged the warning, and agents that challenged entered the death room about twice as often as those that did not. This skepticism is reasonable in the baseline, where a warning cannot be verified and no agent is expected to be informed.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Kindly waiting for any remaining feedback

Thank you again for your thoughtful review and for highlighting the insights you found useful in the paper. We believe we have addressed your main questions:

  • The definition of deception has been refined by splitting the Withheld category into Confirmed (endorsing a plan that sends another agent to the death room) and Silent. Based on evidence from the private scratchpads, Confirmed remains a deceptive category, while Silent is now a non-deceptive category. The model ranking is unchanged.
  • Through a deepened latency and turn analysis, we have found that the number of turns is similar across behavior categories within each model, and we see no relationship between latency and the propensity for Withheld behavior.
  • The Aware variation has been ablated with a new condition of 392 runs in which only the uninformed agents are told that one agent is informed. The uninformed agents' expectation explains only part of the decrease in deception, but almost all of the drop in skepticism.
  • The white-box interventions have been re-run with the eight frontier models as uninformed agents, across steering strengths and with a second mitigation method. The informed agent's outcome no longer decreases as honesty increases, consistent with the baseline experiment, showing that the reduced outcome initially reported was due to the specific uninformed agent used.

As the discussion period is closing, we would welcome the opportunity to engage further, and, given your experience in this area, we'd genuinely like to know if there are any other elements that would strengthen the work. Otherwise, we hope these additions might warrant reconsidering your score. Thank you again for your time.

Reviewer_FkirOpenReview ↗
Rating
3
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
Presentation
3
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

The paper introduces Four Bridges, a multi-agent game designed to measure deceptive behavior in LLM agents under asymmetric information. Four agents must choose among four rooms, three containing rewards and one representing a death room. Only one agent knows which room is dangerous. The authors evaluate eight frontier models across 392 baseline runs and investigate how agents disclose, withhold, or misrepresent private information.

The evaluation uses three model-based judges and a deterministic classification procedure, with additional human validation. The authors report deception rates ranging from 6% to 100% across models, without a consistent decrease with model capability. They also investigate skepticism toward warnings, prompt-based interventions, and honesty activation steering on an open-weight model. The work contributes a controlled game environment and evaluation framework for studying deception and potential mitigation strategies.

Critical strengths

The first strength is the introduction of a controlled multi-agent evaluation environment in which deceptive behavior can emerge without assigning agents an explicitly deceptive role. The use of asymmetric information, free-form communication, and balanced opponent assignments provides a useful setting for studying differences between models.

The second strength is the inclusion of multiple interventions and behavioral outcomes. In addition to comparing frontier models, the authors investigate information awareness, perceived consequences, skepticism, and activation steering. These experiments help demonstrate the potential usefulness of the environment for evaluating honesty interventions.

Critical weaknesses

A central concern is the operational definition of deception. The paper classifies withholding private information as deceptive even when the agent does not make a false statement or explicitly mislead another participant. In a competitive game with asymmetric information, withholding may also represent legitimate strategic behavior. This distinction matters because the reported deception rates depend on the chosen definition.

A second concern is the limited generalizability and validation of the evaluation. The study primarily uses one game, and the classification pipeline is validated against human annotations on only 24 runs. Furthermore, the activation-steering intervention substantially changes the informed agent's reward outcome, raising questions about the trade-off between honesty and effective task performance.

Questions for authors
  1. Could the authors report deception rates under a narrower definition that excludes passive withholding and focuses on explicit falsehoods, misleading claims, or active attempts to induce false beliefs? How would this change the cross-model rankings?

  2. How robust are the behavioral classifications beyond the 24 human-annotated validation runs? Could additional independent annotations establish the reliability of the main model comparisons?

  3. The activation-steering experiment reduces deceptive behavior but also decreases the informed agent's rate of occupying a food room alone from 80% to 27%. How should this trade-off be interpreted, and can the authors distinguish an honesty-related cost from changes in coordination or latency?

2 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer Fkir

We thank the reviewer for their comments. We have extended the work to address the points raised.

1. Definition of the deceptive categories

We agree that the Withheld category deserved a closer look. We now split it into two categories:

  • Confirmed: runs in which the informed agent endorsed a plan that places another agent in the death room (100 of the 122 Withheld runs).
  • Silent: runs in which the informed agent performed no deceptive act and provided no warning (22 of the 122 Withheld runs).

We believe there is evidence that Confirmed should be counted among the deceptive behaviors. A reading of the private scratchpad of the 100 Confirmed runs found that:

  • in 92 runs, the agent was aware that an uninformed agent was heading to the death room before that agent committed, and still endorsed the plan;
  • in 66 runs, the informed agent considered warning the other agent and decided not to;
  • in 38 runs, the agent stated an intention to make an uninformed agent take the death room.

The scratchpad analysis for the Silent category was more ambiguous, and we did not find evidence of deceptive reasoning in a comparable share of runs. We therefore report Silent separately, outside the class of deceptive behaviors.

Reporting Silent separately leaves the overall model ranking unchanged and the headline rates consistent for all models except one, Luna, for which most Silent runs occurred.

If the reviewer still feels that Confirmed should not be included among the deceptive behaviors, we are open to reclassifying it as a neutral behavior.

Figure: baseline deception categories

2. Extended human validation of the classification pipeline

We extended the human validation to 69 runs. Agreement with the classifier is essentially unchanged: 84% at the category level and 92% at the category-family level.

3. Decreased rate at which the informed agent is alone in a food room under activation steering

We found that this effect was driven by the lack of skepticism of the uninformed agents used in this specific experiment (Gemma 4). In this case, the uninformed agents believed the informed agent's warning and left the death room empty, crowding the other rooms instead.

As additional evidence, we re-ran the white-box intervention experiment using the eight frontier models from the main experiment as uninformed agents instead of Gemma. Against these frontier agents, which appear much more skeptical, the informed agent's outcome is consistent with the baseline experiment: the rate at which the informed agent is alone in a food room does not decrease as honesty increases.

To confirm that the observed dynamics are not due to specific hyperparameter or method choices, we also varied the strength of the activation steering intervention and tested a second method to mitigate dishonesty: a LoRA adapter trained with adversarial training (Chang et al., 2026). We found no difference in outcome across steering strengths or between the two methods, and all conditions mirrored the link between honesty and game outcome observed in the baseline condition.

Figure: interventions with frontier uninformed agents

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Kindly waiting for any remaining feedback

Thank you again for your thoughtful review and for recognizing the usefulness of the setting for evaluating deception propensity and honesty interventions. We believe we have addressed your main points and questions:

  • The definition of deception has been refined by splitting the Withheld category into Confirmed (endorsing a plan that sends another agent to the death room) and Silent. Based on evidence from the private scratchpads, Confirmed remains a deceptive category, while Silent is now a non-deceptive category. The model ranking is unchanged.
  • The human validation has been extended with 45 additional runs and agreement with the classifier is 84% at the category level and 92% at the category-family level.
  • The white-box interventions have been re-run with the eight frontier models as uninformed agents, across steering strengths and with a second mitigation method. The informed agent's outcome no longer decreases as honesty increases, consistent with the baseline experiment, showing that the reduced outcome initially reported was due to the specific uninformed agent used.

As the discussion period is closing, we would welcome the opportunity to engage further, and we'd genuinely like to know whether any weakness remains outstanding for you. Otherwise, we hope these additions might strengthen your assessment. Thank you again for your time.

Comments on the paper

1 comment
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

General Response to All Reviewers

We thank all three reviewers for their thoughtful and constructive feedback. We are encouraged that reviewers found the environment a useful setting for studying deception that emerges without an assigned deceptive role, the interventions a demonstration of its potential usefulness for evaluating honesty mitigation methods, and the findings insightful, notably that deceptive behavior is model-specific rather than family-specific and that common knowledge that one agent is informed shifts most models toward disclosure. Below we summarize how we addressed the main concerns; all revisions will appear in the camera-ready version.

Supporting figures: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/response-figures-B4B7/

Definition of the deceptive categories

In response to Fkir and zRrK, we split Withheld into two categories: Confirmed, in which the informed agent endorsed a plan that places another agent in the death room, and Silent, in which it performed no deceptive act and gave no warning. The private scratchpads of Confirmed runs support counting them as deceptive. Silent runs showed no comparable evidence, so Silent is reported as a passive behavior outside the deceptive class. The pooled deception rate becomes 67% (previously 73%), and the model ranking is unchanged. The paper reflects the new categories throughout.

Interventions directly comparable with the baseline

In response to all three reviewers, we re-ran the white-box intervention experiments with the eight frontier models of the main experiment as uninformed agents, instead of the three Gemma 4 instances used in the submission. We also varied the steering strength and added a second intervention, a LoRA adapter trained adversarially (CATCH, Chang et al., 2026). Against the frontier agents, both interventions reduce deception, and the informed agent's outcome is consistent with the baseline: the rate at which it is alone in a food room does not decrease as honesty increases, and outcomes do not differ across steering strengths or between the two methods. The earlier drop in the informed agent's outcome appears to have resulted from Gemma as the uninformed agent, not from the intervention. The paper now reports these conditions, with the Gemma runs as a pilot in the appendix.

Ablation of the Aware variation

In response to zRrK, we ran a new condition that isolates the two prompt changes in the Aware variation, in which the uninformed agents are told that one agent knows the death room (but not which one), and the informed agent is told that the others know this. In the new condition, only the uninformed agents' prompts change. Their expectation alone produces part of the decrease in deception, and the informed agent's prompt change is needed for the remainder. In contrast, this expectation alone produces almost the full drop in their skepticism towards warnings. The results now present the new condition and the full Aware variation side by side.

Extended human validation

In response to Fkir, we extended the human validation with 45 additional runs. Agreement with the classifier is essentially unchanged: 84% at the category level and 92% at the category-family level (previously 85% and 91%). The methodology, appendix and limitations were revised accordingly.

Motivation and framing of the game

In response to AGAo and zRrK, we clarified the description and motivation of the game. Existing deception evaluations rely on pressure prompts, assigned deceptive roles or games without private information, and none tests what an agent does when it holds information that other agents need and nothing instructs it to share or hide it. The game is built around this question, and because deception appears without being instructed, it also serves as a testbed for mitigation methods. We added an overview figure and a narrative example to make the game easier to understand. We also revised the framing of deception as a rational strategy within the game, and of skepticism as reasonable when a warning cannot be verified.

Latency and turns

In response to zRrK, we deepened the analysis of latency and turns. The paper now states explicitly that a turn is one model call and that latency is the time from observation to response, including hidden reasoning, and our count now includes turns that returned only private thoughts. A new within-model comparison shows that runs in every category had a similar number of turns to act, and that a model's latency is not related to its propensity for Withheld behavior (the original category the reviewer asked about; see our response to zRrK). The turn analysis was added to the appendix, and the limitations were updated accordingly.

We believe these revisions address the reviewers' central concerns, in particular on the definition of deception, the comparability of the interventions and the motivation for the game, and we are happy to clarify any point further.

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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