- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
The authors introduce a new game for the purpose of assessing LLM deception. In this game, there are four rooms for the agents to go into and one agent knows which is the "death room" while the other rooms are food rooms; sharing a food room with other agents decreases the amount of food available. The authors argue that the knowing agent does not have (much) incentive to lie and so it's interesting that lying (and distrust) occur. They also do an experiment with an honesty steering vector which significantly reduces deception.
Critical strengths
First, I find the paper reasonably well written, though noting some issues below. I also think that the bar for this kind of paper -- introducing and studying yet another benchmark game -- needs to be appropriately high in terms of motivation and execution. While the paper is nice, it is not executed perfectly.
Critical weaknesses
The game description is not really clear out of the gate. Why are the agents "voting" over rooms? Does that just mean where they go? What do the agents know about there being an agent who knows the death room? Why does this game require a 3D engine?? The paper goes too quickly into describing LLM experiments without making the game itself completely clear and well motivated, with an example etc. (some things become clear later, but not all).
It is unfortunate that the steering is under a different setup. The authors say that because of that they're not "directly" comparing with the other setup, but they nevertheless compare with the other setup. Why are the other agents less skeptical in this setup? Do they know something has changed? Does the steered agent just sound more honest?
Please take care with your paper to not confuse \citet and \citep in citations. While in and of itself this is minor, it shows a lack of care for your own paper, and if you don't care about it enough to get that right, why should anyone else care to read it? Obviously, these days, there's no shortage of stuff to read.
Questions for authors
see above
4 comments
Response to Reviewer AGAo (2/2)
(2/2)
2. Why the game uses a 3D engine
The 3D engine belongs to the platform, not to the game itself. It is not central to this work, but it has two benefits. First, it gives the work a visual form, which makes it more accessible to the public and helps it reach a wider audience. Second, it gives researchers visual feedback, so they can iterate on variants of the game more easily. Because the engine is part of the platform and kept separate from the harness, it has no effect on the core work's methodology or results.
3. Comparability of the intervention results
We agree that it was suboptimal that the intervention results could not be directly compared to the baseline results. This was mainly because the uninformed agents in the intervention experiments were three instances of Gemma 4, whereas in the baseline experiment they were the eight frontier models. To address this, we re-ran the intervention experiments using the same eight frontier models from the baseline experiment as the uninformed agents. In all experiments, the uninformed agents receive the same prompts and are not told whether an intervention is applied. Against the frontier agents, which appear much more skeptical than Gemma, the informed and uninformed agents' game outcomes are consistent with those observed in the baseline experiment.
To test whether these observations are robust, we varied the strength of the activation steering intervention and tested a second method to mitigate dishonesty: a LoRA adapter trained with adversarial training (Chang et al., 2026). We found no difference in game outcome across steering strengths or between the two methods.
Figure: interventions with frontier uninformed agents
These results suggest that the difference in the uninformed agents' behavior was not caused by the white-box method, but reflects a propensity of Gemma as the uninformed agent: Gemma believed the informed agent's warnings and left the death room empty far more often than the frontier models from the baseline experiment.
4. Citation commands
We apologize for the oversight and thank the reviewer for pointing it out. All citations have been checked and corrected.
Thank you for the clarifications. I think clarifying these points will help the paper, and maybe this increased my score some fractional point that I cannot express in the score because it's not enough to go to the next integer score. I'm holding back mostly because of my concern that there are just so many benchmarks already and the motivation for a new one needs to be really strong and line up really cleanly with the game.
We thank the reviewer for the follow-up and for being clear about the remaining concern.
We agree that there are already many deception benchmarks, and that the submitted manuscript did not explain well enough why a new game was needed. We have revised the introduction and the game description to make this clearer, and we summarize the main points below.
1. The question the game is designed to answer
We want to know what an agent does when it holds information that another agent needs, when sharing this information could cost it a little, and when it is not instructed to share it or to hide it. We believe this reflects real deployments, in which agents work alongside other agents, pursue their own goals, know things that the other agents do not, and are not instructed to deceive. To our knowledge, none of the existing benchmarks tests this situation.
2. Why existing benchmarks do not answer this question
- MASK (Ren et al., 2025) measures whether a model lies when the prompt pressures it to do so, in single-agent scenarios.
- Social-deduction games such as Werewolf (Xu et al., 2023) and Among Us (Golechha & Garriga-Alonso, 2025) assign a deceptive role to some agents. Deception is then part of the task, so these games measure how well a model can deceive, but not whether it chooses to deceive.
- In Shi et al. (2026a,b) and Taylor & Bergen (2026) no deceptive role is assigned, but the games have complete information, so an agent holds no private information to misrepresent or hide.
3. How the game lines up with this question
We kept the game as minimal as possible, and each element corresponds to one part of the question above:
- One agent is told which room is the death room, so that it holds information the other agents need.
- With four agents and three food rooms, the informed agent has little to gain if another agent enters the death room: at best it gets a food room alone (+2) instead of sharing one (+1). Note however that the informed agent can get a food room alone even if no one enters the death room.
- The prompt does not mention honesty, deception or roles, so the choice between sharing and hiding is left to the agent.
As a result, we could observe large differences between models (6% to 100%), which a game with an assigned deceptive role could not show. We could also observe that honesty alone can have a limited effect on the outcome when the other agents are skeptical. Finally, since each agent also writes to a private scratchpad, we found evidence that the deceptive behavior is intentional and not a misunderstanding of the game: as reported in our response to Reviewer Fkir, the informed agent is typically aware that another agent is heading to the death room.
4. The game as a testbed to compare mitigation methods
We also see Four Bridges as a testbed to evaluate and compare methods that mitigate deception (a needed contribution to the field, where methods are often hard to compare and evaluate robustly).
Deception mitigation methods are often evaluated on models that were explicitly trained to exhibit dishonest behaviors, i.e., model organisms (Sheshadri et al., 2026), or with prompts that pressure the model to lie (Ren et al., 2025). In both cases the dishonest behavior is artificially induced by the experimenter, so it is unclear whether a method that removes it also reduces the deception that a model shows on its own.
In our game, deceptive behavior appears at a high rate in the base model, without pressure prompts and without training the model to be deceptive. For each intervention we can therefore measure, in the same runs, whether deceptive behavior decreases, whether the model can still play the game correctly, and whether the other agents benefit.
In response to another reviewer, we have now compared activation steering at different strengths and a LoRA adapter trained with adversarial training (Chang et al., 2026) under identical conditions.
Figure: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/response-figures-B4B7/fig-interventions-frontier.png
We hope that these clarifications, together with the revisions from our first response, address the reviewer's remaining concern. If the reviewer is aware of existing work that already tests this situation, we may have missed it and would be grateful for the reference. If the motivation is still not sufficiently clear, we are happy to clarify further.
Response to Reviewer AGAo (1/2)
(1/2)
We thank the reviewer for their comments. We have extended the work to address the points raised.
1. Clearer description of the game
We agree that the setup section left too much implicit, and we have updated sections of the paper to improve clarity.
First, we added an overview figure with a schema of the game:
Figure: game overview
Note: Following discussion with another reviewer, we split the Withheld category into Confirmed and Silent. All updated figures in this response reflect this change (see our response to Reviewer Fkir).
We then revised the text to make the game easier to understand. Below are some passages that were edited in response to the reviewer's comments.
Confirmation of what each agent knows:
Clarification of why the agents are "voting" over rooms:
Explanation of the scoring and the mixed motive it creates:
Addition of a narrative example of a run: