acceptodds
Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

Lies We Can See: Joint Verbal and Non-Verbal Deception by VLM Agents in Embodied Social Interactions

Abstract

Strategic deception by LLM and VLM agents has emerged as a central AI alignment and safety concern. Social-deduction games (where each player holds a hidden role and communicates with others to deduce identities) serve as the canonical testbed, particularly in multi-agent settings. Existing testbeds, however, are text-only and run on a single fixed agent configuration, missing the non-verbal sensorimotor channels treated as core by deception taxonomies and leaving it ambiguous whether an observed behavior reflects the underlying model or the surrounding harness. We introduce MineAmongUs, a 3D multimodal Among Us sandbox where imposter agents must deceive crewmates through joint verbal and non-verbal action. We also propose ARIA, a configurable VLM-agent harness that exposes five cognitive-component ablation axes; and an atom- and arc-level annotation scheme grounded in deception taxonomies and operationalized at scale by an LLM-as-a-Judge reaching near-human atom-labeling agreement. Empirical results show that both harness configuration and VLM backbone substantially shape agent behavior: changing either alters outcomes (win rate) as well as the verbal and non-verbal deception patterns through which imposters pursue wins. Taken together, our work opens a new path for embodied VLM-agent alignment research.

Primary area:
alignment, fairness, safety, privacy, and societal considerations
Keywords:
llm agents, vlm agents, agent evaluation, vlm, ai deception, llm-as-a-judge, social deduction game

Reviews

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1234this paper, Top 49%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 2.33 over 3 reviews, above 51% of the others.
Reviewer_oKT8OpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
2
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Paper summary

This paper introduces MineAmongUs, a 3D version of Among Us built in Minecraft, where VLM agents engage in social deduction through visual perception, navigation, and dialogue. It investigates how agents deceive other players through behaviors such as faking tasks, avoiding witnesses, and fabricating alibis.

The authors also develop ARIA, a modular agent harness with configurable components such as memory, planning, and reflection, along with a taxonomy of 23 verbal and nonverbal deceptive behaviors. Through 192 harness ablation games and 1,568 cross-model games, the paper examines how different models and agent configurations affect win rates and deception strategies.

Critical strengths
  1. Compared with text-based AmongAgents and the Minecraft multi-agent benchmark SoMi-ToM, this work combines hidden identities, spatial actions, and social interaction in a single environment. This introduces meaningful evaluation dimensions beyond simply changing the game setting.
  2. The taxonomy of 23 deceptive behaviors provides more insight than game win rates alone, distinguishing verbal deception, behavioral disguise, and strategies surrounding kills. Human and LLM annotations also show reasonably good agreement.
  3. The experiments cover 14 VLMs and 1,568 cross-model games, along with component ablations and behavioral analyses. The benchmark has value as an experimental platform for studying deception in multi-agent systems.
Critical weaknesses
  • It is difficult to separate model-driven deception from behavior built into the harness. Witness checks and scripted actions already implement some reported strategies. Although the minimal module templates remove tactical advice, the shared planner still suggests fake tasks and self-reporting. Using private action narration for annotation adds to this concern.
  • Winning does not necessarily mean deceiving others successfully. Only 7 of the 105 crewmate wins in Table 4 come from voting. The reported associations may therefore reflect general gameplay ability or killing proficiency. Direct evidence that deceptive behavior changes another player’s beliefs or decisions is missing.
  • Cross-model comparisons also depend on different inference settings and potentially different fallback rates. These factors make it hard to attribute the results to the models themselves.
  • The No RGB ablation supports a role for vision, but the main experiments still rely on privileged spatial tracking. The conclusions should be limited to this setting.
Questions for authors
  • Which behaviors come from model decisions, and which come from fixed scripts or tactical prompts?
  • Can you report fallback rates and control inference settings in key comparisons?
  • Can you show whether observing a deceptive action changes another player’s suspicion or vote?
4 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to reviewer oKT8 (1/3)

We greatly appreciate the reviewer's thoughtful feedback on our paper.

Response to Weaknesses and Questions

(Q1-oKT8) Separate model-driven deception from harness-driven deception

TL;DR. To distinguish ARIA-driven behaviors from model-driven behaviors, we conducted 6 additional games with minimal ReAct agents, removing tactical scaffolding and privileged information. Even without these components, the models exhibited 6 of 11 non-verbal deception atoms, although none of the games reached the next meeting phase. These findings demonstrate that some deceptive behaviors can arise without explicit tactical prompts, while highlighting the role of harness scaffolding in sustaining more complex gameplay.

Why we provide tactical scaffolding.

Our motivation was to enable VLM agents to participate in sustained, human-like gameplay. In our initial development, agents struggled to perform coherent gameplay and spontaneously develop deception strategies, particularly in the non-verbal channel. We therefore introduced tactical scaffolding to support these behaviors and systematically study how model capabilities (RQ2) and harness configurations (RQ1) shape deception. Accordingly, our main experiments characterize deception exhibited by harnessed VLM agents, rather than purely model-emergent deception. Besides, private action narration is primarily used to help the LLM judge identify non-verbal behaviors that are difficult to infer from gameplay logs alone, rather than as a fixed script or tactical prompt prescribing those behaviors.

Additional experiment: minimal-harness ReAct agents.

To investigate which behaviors models can exhibit without ARIA's scaffolding, we conducted an additional experiment using GPT-6-Astra and Muse-Spark-1.3, with 3 games per model (6 games total). Specifically, we removed ARIA's tactical modules and shared planner, retaining only a basic ReAct [1] loop and the original role instructions. Note that agents received egocentric visual observations without any privileged information.

Results.

Even without scaffolding, the models exhibited 6 of the 11 non-verbal deception atoms across 6 games. GPT-6-Astra exhibited 4 types (A, C, E, F), while Muse-Spark-1.3 exhibited 6 (A, B, C, E, F, G).

AtomGPT-6-AstraMuse-Spark
A. Fake-Mission Performance1354
B. Blend-In Wandering018
C. Stalking Pre-Kill722
D. Joint Motor Coordination00
E. Witness-Aware Kill37
F. Post-Kill Flee912
G. Bystander Co-flight01
H. Strategic Non-Reporting00
I. Self-Reporting Kill00
J. Weaponized Meeting00
K. Planned Teammate Sacrifice00
Total32 (4 types)114 (6 types)

(Counts are non-verbal atom instances across 3 games per model.)

The gameplay logs provide further evidence of model-directed non-verbal deceptive behaviors without explicit tactical instructions. For example, agents moved away immediately after all 18/18 kills, and explicitly considered the presence of other players in 16/18 kill-related thoughts.

However, the resulting gameplay was considerably limited. None of the 6 games reached a meeting phase, preventing meaningful evaluation of verbal deception. The models also exhibited only a subset of the non-verbal taxonomy, with no observed joint motor coordination or reporting/meeting-related strategies. Thus, while some model-driven deceptive behaviors arise, the agents still struggle to sustain the full social-deduction gameplay needed for more elaborate deception.

In summary, these findings clarify the distinction between model-driven and harness-driven deception. The full ARIA harness explicitly supports certain strategies, while the minimal-harness experiments show that some non-verbal behaviors can also emerge from model-directed gameplay.


(Q2-oKT8) Winning (general gameplay ability) vs. deceiving others successfully

Please refer to our response to ‘(Q1-general) Gameplay competence vs. Deception effectiveness’.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to reviewer oKT8 (2/3)

(Q3-oKT8) Different inference settings and fallback rates

TL;DR. We comprehensively audited fallback rates and conducted additional experiments with controlled inference (temperature) settings. The results show that fallbacks are generally infrequent and our main findings remain largely consistent across the tested inference settings.

To address this concern, we conducted (1) a comprehensive audit of recorded fallbacks across all 1,568 RQ2 games and (2) an additional 200-game experiment controlling inference settings.

(1) Fallback Rate Analysis

We examined fallback mechanisms throughout ARIA, covering 14 decision-stage fallback sites (including planning, kill-related checks, reporting, movement, mission selection, surveillance, meetings, voting, memory, and reflection) and one action-generation fallback site (e.g., MOVE/MISSION code generation). Across all 1,568 games, fallback rates were 0.66% at the decision stage and 0.50% at the code-generation stage, as follows:

CategoryFallback behaviorRate
KILLDefer the kill0.40% (52/12,927)
REPORTReport the nearest body0.48% (32/6,618)
MOVERandom movement0.55% (286/51,927)
MISSIONSelect the first remaining mission0.88% (824/93,316)
Code generationUse a predefined movement program0.50% (726/144,516)

Fallbacks were generally infrequent but varied across models. 10 of the 14 VLMs exhibited decision-stage fallback rates below 0.3% in both roles. Higher rates were concentrated in Gemma4-31B (4.1-4.2%), Qwen3.5-27B (1.6-3.1%), and Kimi-K2.5 (1.4-2.1%). These results indicate that recorded fallbacks are uncommon overall, although their model-dependent frequency remains a consideration when interpreting cross-model differences.

(2) Controlling Inference Settings

For reasoning effort, we used ’None’ where supported, or the minimum available reasoning level otherwise, since supported options differ across model APIs.

For temperature settings, some models require a fixed temperature of 1.0 (i.e., GPT-5-mini, GPT-5, and GPT-6Astra) and others evaluated at 0.1 or 0.7. To examine the sensitivity to temperature, we reran the RQ2 evaluation for the 5 models originally evaluated at temperature 0.7 (Qwen3.5-9B, Qwen3.5-27B, Qwen3.6-27B, Gemma4-26B-A4B, and Gemma4-31B), changing their temperature to 0.1. We evaluated all 5 models against one another across 4 cases and 2 repetitions, yielding 200 additional games, and compared them with the corresponding 200 games from the original RQ2 evaluation.

Game outcomes. The overall imposter WR remained similar, at 54.5% under temperature 0.1 versus 53.5% in the original experiments. Importantly, the model ranking remained highly consistent, with the top-3 models retaining the same ordering.

CaseTemperature 0.1OriginalDifference
Overall109/200 (54.5%)107/200 (53.5%)+1.0 pp
1A30/50 (60%)25/50 (50%)+10 pp
1B20/50 (40%)20/50 (40%)0 pp
2A27/50 (54%)31/50 (62%)-8 pp
2B32/50 (64%)31/50 (62%)+2 pp

Deceptive behavior patterns. We additionally applied our deception-atom judge to all 200 new games and compared the results with the original games. The average number of observed atoms per game remained similar (54.77 vs. 55.95), with a difference of −1.18 (95% CI: -5.38 to +3.02). Both verbal and non-verbal atom frequencies were also comparable. Furthermore, the distribution of the 23 deceptive atoms remained highly consistent (Pearson r = 0.998) when comparing their aggregate per-game frequencies across the two settings.

Atoms per gameTemperature 0.1OriginalDifference (95% CI)
All atoms54.7755.95-1.18 (-5.38, +3.02)
Non-verbal33.3133.97-0.66 (-3.82, +2.51)
Verbal21.4521.98-0.53 (-3.12, +2.07)

To summarize, these analyses provide additional evidence for the robustness of our cross-model findings. The fallback audit shows that recorded fallback events are relatively rare overall, while identifying a small number of models with higher rates. Furthermore, the controlled temperature experiment reproduces similar aggregate WR, model rankings, and deception-atom distributions.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to reviewer oKT8 (3/3)

(Q4-oKT8) Scope of privileged spatial tracking

We agree that our findings should be interpreted within the privileged-state setting, and we have already explicitly acknowledged this scope in both the main paper and the Limitations section.

Existing ablation evidence.

In §4.1 and Appendix G.1-G.7, we systematically investigate why privileged spatial tracking is necessary for sustained gameplay. Beyond the No-RGB ablation, we compare 4 state representations: privileged, priv36 (local persistent tracking), No-RGB, and ego. The results reveal two distinct bottlenecks: (1) removing persistent spatial tracking prevents agents from maintaining targets, while (2) removing RGB perception collapses kill execution even when full-map coordinates remain available.

Why privileged state is necessary.

As explained in Appendix G.5-G.7, privileged state provides persistent spatial localization but does not replace visual perception. RGB observations remain necessary for witness detection, target verification, dead body discovery, and crewmate surveillance. Our choice reflects current VLM limitations in egocentric spatial perception and temporal tracking (Du et al., 2024; Yang et al., 2025a,b; Ravi et al., 2025; Ahn et al., 2025; Zhang et al., 2026). Providing structured spatial information alongside visual observations is also an established practice in embodied AI research (Savva et al., 2019; Szot et al., 2021; Puig et al., 2024; Chang et al., 2025).

Scope of our conclusion.

We already state in §4.1 why the remaining experiments adopt a privileged state, discuss this choice in Appendix G.7, and explicitly acknowledge it in the Limitations section. Our conclusions therefore concern embodied deception under a spatial-tracking scaffold, not fully egocentric autonomous gameplay. We regard overcoming this limitation as an important direction for future VLM-agent research.

References

[1] Yao et al., ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Models, ICLR 2023

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Kind Reminder to reviewer oKT8

Dear Reviewer,

Thank you very much for the time and effort you have dedicated to reviewing our paper. As the discussion period is drawing to a close, we kindly remind you that there is less than one day remaining.

We have carefully addressed the concerns raised in the review, and we would greatly appreciate it if you could kindly reconsider your scores or let us know if there are any remaining points that need further clarification. We are happy to provide additional materials or experimental results if needed.

Thank you again for your time and consideration.

Best regards,

The Authors

Reviewer_FKLoOpenReview ↗
Rating
3(+1)
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

The goal of this paper is to investigate Strategic Deception in VLM Agents, an important topic in AI Safety. To this end, the authors introduce an environment called MINEAMONGUS, which implements the game Among Us within Minecraft and enables the simultaneous study of Verbal and Non-Verbal Deception by combining a 3D visual environment, physical actions, and text-based discussions. Furthermore, the paper introduces a configurable VLM-Agent Harness named ARIA to investigate the effects of different harness components on agent performance and deceptive behaviors. To evaluate deception, the authors also define 23 deceptive behaviors (Atoms) based on existing taxonomies. Finally, they first evaluate ARIA on two models and then compare 14 VLM backbone models. The results show that both the harness configuration and the VLM backbone influence win rates and deception patterns, and that successful models do not necessarily rely on a single deception strategy.

Critical strengths
  1. The introduction of a 3D, multimodal environment based on a Social Deduction Game as a benchmark for studying deception in VLM agents, incorporating visual perception, spatial and physical interactions, and text-based conversations.
  2. The introduction of a new evaluation framework based on existing deception taxonomies, such as Whiten–Byrne, Whaley, and Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT), to assess verbal and non-verbal deceptive behaviors.
Critical weaknesses
  1. Previous studies have also investigated Strategic Deception in text-based Among Us environments. However, the paper does not experimentally compare its findings on deceptive behaviors and the effects of harness configurations with those from these environments. Such a comparison could better clarify the role of visual and physical interactions in shaping deception patterns and agent performance.
  2. The frequency of deceptive behaviors depends on the opportunities for them to occur, such as the number of kills, meetings, and game length. Therefore, the correlations between these behaviors and win rates may partly reflect general gameplay competence rather than deception ability alone. Furthermore, the main validation of the LLM-as-a-Judge is conducted on a limited range of models, while the paper compares behavioral patterns across 14 models, making the validation for this broader comparison limited.
  3. The main harness experiments are conducted on only two models and two crewmate configurations. To provide stronger support for the paper's conclusions about the role of the harness, experiments with more diverse models and configurations, along with an independent evaluation of the crewmate components, would be beneficial.

I am optimistic about this paper, and if the authors adequately address my questions and concerns, I would be willing to raise my score.

Questions for authors

Same as weaknesses

5 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to reviewer FKLo (1/3)

We greatly appreciate the reviewer’s constructive feedback on our paper.

Response to Weaknesses and Questions

(Q1-FKLo) Compare findings on text-based Among Us experiments

TL;DR. We reproduced our harness ablation in a text-based Among Us environment across 96 additional games. While both environments exhibit similar verbal deception strategies, MineAmongUs shows a larger proportion of non-verbal atoms (57-60% vs. 36-39%) and more sustained spatial behaviors, highlighting the role of embodied interactions in shaping deception and gameplay.

Comparison with prior findings.

First, please refer to Appendix R, where we compare two findings from prior text-based Among Us studies.

Additional text-based Among Us experiments for RQ1.

To provide a more direct comparison, we additionally reproduced our RQ1 harness ablation in a text-based Among Us environment based on Golechha and Garriga-Alonso (2025). Using GPT-4.1-mini with our ARIA harness, we evaluated 16 imposter configurations * 2 crewmate configurations * 3 games per combination totaling 96 games with 5 crewmates and 2 imposters. We applied the same deception-atom evaluation procedure, adapting the LLM judge instructions to describe actions in the text-based environment.

(1) Harness effects on game outcomes.

Crewmate configurationText imposter WRText crew wins (mission/vote)Text verbal atoms/gameText non-verbal atoms/game
(sem, reac)70.8% (34/48)14 (13 / 1)17.111.1
(win, hier)72.9% (35/48)13 (7 / 6)18.310.3

While imposter WR nearly unchanged, changing the crewmate configuration substantially altered meeting outcomes, increasing vote-based crewmate victories from 1 to 6 and the number of ejected imposters from 15 to 22. This suggests that (1) harness configurations can shift game dynamics even when aggregate WRs stay similar. In contrast, the same configuration changes in MineAmongUs produced a much larger difference in imposter WR (60.4% vs. 25.0%), suggesting that (2) harness design effects also depend on the environment.

(2) Deception patterns across environments. We further compared the frequency of deceptive atoms under the same VLM backbone and crewmate configurations.

Deceptive atomText (sem, reac)MineAmongUs (sem, reac)Text (win, hier)MineAmongUs (win, hier)
Non-verbal
A. Fake-Mission Performance1.7714.211.7911.94
B. Blend-In Wandering1.941.211.774.88
C. Stalking Pre-Kill2.4411.732.155.75
D. Joint Motor Coordination0.193.330.002.00
E. Witness-Aware Kill2.523.882.212.50
F. Post-Kill Flee1.382.041.421.71
G. Bystander Co-flight0.041.100.000.46
H. Strategic Non-Reporting0.420.520.600.50
I. Self-Reporting Kill0.420.520.350.17
J. Weaponized Meeting0.000.520.020.00
K. Planned Teammate Sacrifice0.020.020.020.00
Non-verbal subtotal11.1439.0810.3329.91
Verbal
L. Alibi Fabrication2.813.063.212.52
M. Counter-Accusation5.449.965.736.94
N. Fake Eyewitness Testimony2.192.792.622.35
O. Mutual Reinforcement1.676.101.653.46
P. Co-opting Target's Words0.812.500.811.02
Q. Throw-Under-Bus0.420.270.350.00
R. Statistical / Pattern Fabrication1.082.041.271.19
S. Manufactured Witness Coalition0.210.250.190.38
T. Concession-as-Defense0.440.730.500.08
U. Honesty/Credibility Marker0.170.020.250.15
V. Hedged / Restraint Speech1.921.691.751.52
W. Vote/Chat Inconsistency0.000.120.000.04
Verbal subtotal17.1629.5318.3319.65
Total atoms/game28.3068.6128.6649.56
Non-verbal share39.4%57.0%36.0%60.4%

(Average occurrences of each deceptive atom per game.)

Both environments exhibit similar types of deception, reflecting their shared social-deduction mechanics. Verbal falsification (V-1) is also prominent in both environments. However, non-verbal atoms account for a larger share of observed deceptive behaviors in MineAmongUs (57-60%) than in the text-based environment (36-39%). The most notable differences arise during task phases. For example, Fake-Mission Performance (A) occurs approximately 12-14 times per game in MineAmongUs, compared with fewer than 2 times in the text-based environment. Unlike the discrete room-level actions in the text-based environment, MineAmongUs supports continuous navigation and physical interaction, allowing agents to exhibit extended behavioral patterns such as repeated fake-task performance and target pursuit/stalking.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to reviewer FKLo (2/3)

In conclusion, these results provide additional experimental evidence that the environment shapes both the effects of harness configuration and deception patterns. While both environments support similar verbal strategies, MineAmongUs enables more frequent and sustained (non-verbal) spatial deception behaviors. This distinction is important because deception in embodied environments extends beyond what agents say to how they act over time, introducing (non-verbal) behavioral dimensions that are difficult to capture in text-based environments.


(Q2-FKLo) Deception ability vs. general gameplay competence, and validation of LLM-judge

Please refer to our response to ‘(Q1-general) Gameplay competence vs. Deception effectiveness’.

In addition, we added extended human validation of the LLM-as-a-Judge as follows.

Additional LLM-as-a-Judge validation across 14 VLMs.

To address the concern about limited model coverage, we extended our human validation to 14 games, sampling one game from each of the 14 VLMs in RQ2, annotated by the same two human annotators. Human-human agreement achieved Spearman ρ\rho = 0.763 and Cohen's κ\kappa = 0.747, while human-LLM agreement achieved Spearman ρ\rho = 0.639, Cohen's κ\kappa = 0.632, and weighted F1 = 0.714 (compared with 0.708 for human-human agreement). Although human-LLM agreement remains somewhat lower than human-human agreement, both Cohen's κ\kappa values fall within the substantial agreement range (0.61-0.80). Moreover, the agreement gap remains comparable to our original validation (Δκ\Delta\kappa: 0.115 vs. 0.083; Δρ\Delta\rho: 0.124 vs. 0.090), suggesting that the LLM judge maintains a similar level of agreement relative to human annotations in the expanded evaluation. These results provide additional support for the reliability of our LLM judge across the broader set of 14 VLMs.


(Q3-FKLo) Diverse models and harness configurations for RQ1

TL;DR. We expanded RQ1 to 768 games across 4 VLM backbones and 4 crewmate harness configurations, independently evaluating the effects of memory and planning. The results reveal model-dependent harness effects, with hierarchical planning improving crewmate performance for GPT-4.1-mini but degrading it for Gemma4-31B. Moreover, the atom-level correlations with imposter wins remain largely consistent with our original findings.

Existing evaluation.

Beyond the two models in the main experiments, we already provide additional harness experiments with Gemini-3-flash and Gemma4-31B in Appendix I.3 (Table 21), covering 4 VLM backbones in total.

Extended experiments for RQ1.

To further investigate the individual effects of crewmate components, we expanded the evaluation to 4 crewmate configurations, crossing 2 memory types (“semantic” and “window”) with two planning strategies (“reactive” and “hierarchical”). Across 4 VLM backbones, 16 imposter configurations, and 3 repetitions per setting, this yields 768 games.

(1) Harness effects across models and crewmate configurations

CellVLM pairingCrew (mem, plan)Imposter WRImposter wins (kill / timeout)Crew wins (mission / vote)
1-1Qwen × Qwen(sem, reac)44%21 (18 / 3)27 (25 / 2)
1-2Qwen × Qwen(win, hier)52%25 (24 / 1)23 (18 / 5)
1-3Qwen × Qwen(sem, hier)52%25 (23 / 2)23 (18 / 5)
1-4Qwen × Qwen(win, reac)48%23 (19 / 4)25 (21 / 4)
2-1GPT-4.1-mini × GPT-4.1-mini(sem, reac)60%29 (29 / 0)19 (19 / 0)
2-2GPT-4.1-mini × GPT-4.1-mini(win, hier)25%12 (12 / 0)36 (36 / 0)
2-3GPT-4.1-mini × GPT-4.1-mini(sem, hier)27%13 (13 / 0)35 (35 / 0)
2-4GPT-4.1-mini × GPT-4.1-mini(win, reac)42%20 (20 / 0)28 (28 / 0)
3-1Gemini-3-flash × Gemini-3-flash(sem, reac)35%17 (17 / 0)31 (31 / 0)
3-2Gemini-3-flash × Gemini-3-flash(win, hier)29%14 (14 / 0)34 (34 / 0)
3-3Gemini-3-flash × Gemini-3-flash(sem, hier)35%17 (17 / 0)31 (31 / 0)
3-4Gemini-3-flash × Gemini-3-flash(win, reac)40%19 (19 / 0)29 (29 / 0)
4-1Gemma4-31B × Gemma4-31B(sem, reac)44%21 (20 / 1)27 (27 / 0)
4-2Gemma4-31B × Gemma4-31B(win, hier)67%32 (30 / 2)16 (14 / 2)
4-3Gemma4-31B × Gemma4-31B(sem, hier)81%39 (37 / 2)9 (6 / 3)
4-4Gemma4-31B × Gemma4-31B(win, reac)44%21 (21 / 0)27 (27 / 0)

The results reveal model-dependent effects of crewmate harness configurations. Qwen and Gemini-3-flash show relatively modest variations in imposter WR across the 4 configurations, whereas GPT-4.1-mini and Gemma4-31B exhibit substantially larger differences.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to reviewer FKLo (3/3)

Importantly, the expanded factorial design reveals that planning has a stronger effect than memory for GPT-4.1-mini and Gemma4-31B, but in opposite directions. Averaged across memory configurations, switching crewmate planning from “reactive” to “hierarchical” decreases imposter WR from 51.0% to 26.0% for GPT-4.1-mini, but increases them from 43.8% to 74.0% for Gemma4-31B. In contrast, changing memory types produces smaller differences for both models.

(2) Robustness of atom-level findings

RankAtomNameClusterCountr_pb
1EWitness-Aware KillNV-22,263+0.426
2FPost-Kill FleeNV-21,519+0.395
3HStrategic Non-ReportingNV-3892+0.257
4CStalking Pre-KillNV-26,710+0.206
5PCo-opting Target's WordsV-1990+0.122
6OMutual ReinforcementV-12,380+0.103
7RPattern FabricationV-1597+0.100
8GBystander Co-flightNV-2363+0.094
9BBlend-In WanderingNV-14,997+0.089
10MCounter-AccusationV-15,321+0.064
11SManufactured Witness CoalitionV-182+0.039
12JWeaponized MeetingNV-326+0.031
13ISelf-Reporting KillNV-3126+0.016
14TConcession-as-DefenseV-295+0.012
15QThrow-Under-BusV-1203-0.008
16DJoint Motor CoordinationNV-21,097-0.011
17KPlanned Teammate SacrificeNV-33-0.015
18NFake Eyewitness TestimonyV-11,077-0.043
19UHonesty/Credibility MarkerV-263-0.073
20VHedged/Restraint SpeechV-3555-0.085
21LAlibi FabricationV-12,282-0.100
22WVote/Chat InconsistencyV-354-0.114
23AFake-Mission PerformanceNV-19,221-0.162

The expanded analysis largely preserves the original correlation patterns and rankings. Among all 23 atoms, only two (D and N) change correlation signs compared with the original results, and both remain close to zero (r_pb = -0.011 and -0.043, respectively). Thus, the broader evaluation does not substantially alter our original findings about the associations between deceptive behaviors and game outcomes.

To sum it up, these additional experiments strengthen our conclusions in two ways: (1) the 4-model, 4-configuration evaluation confirms that agent harness design affects game dynamics, while revealing that individual component effects are highly model-dependent, (2) the atom-level correlation patterns remain broadly consistent as the evaluation expands from 192 to 768 games.

Reviewer_91xgOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
4
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

This paper introduces MineAmongUs, a 3D environment for studying verbal and non-verbal deception by VLM agents, and ARIA, a configurable agent framework. The authors develop a taxonomy of 23 deceptive behaviors and evaluate 14 VLMs across different agent configurations. The results show that both model choice and agent design influence deception patterns and game outcomes.

Critical strengths
  1. A well-motivated research problem. The paper addresses important limitations of existing text-based deception benchmarks by introducing an embodied environment that supports both verbal and non-verbal interactions. The configurable agent framework also enables a more systematic analysis of deception across different agent designs.

  2. Fine-grained behavioral analysis. Rather than relying solely on win rates, the paper identifies 23 deceptive behaviors and analyzes their relationships with game outcomes. This provides useful insights into the different strategies employed by VLM agents.

Critical weaknesses
  1. Insufficient distinction between deception effectiveness and general gameplay competence. A major concern is that the evaluation does not clearly separate deception effectiveness from general gameplay competence. Several behaviors most strongly correlated with imposter wins, such as witness-aware kills and post-kill fleeing, may primarily reflect effective gameplay rather than successful deception. Without measuring whether these behaviors actually mislead other agents or influence their decisions, the reported correlations provide limited evidence of deception effectiveness. This weakens the interpretation of the paper's central experimental findings.

  2. Limited evaluation of the individual contributions of verbal and non-verbal deception. Although the paper emphasizes joint verbal and non-verbal deception, it lacks controlled experiments that isolate their respective contributions. The current behavioral analysis does not establish how much each channel contributes to successful deception, leaving the benefits of combining them insufficiently validated.

Questions for authors
  1. How can the authors distinguish successful deception from general gameplay competence? Could they evaluate whether deceptive behaviors actually change other agents' suspicion or voting decisions?

  2. Could the authors provide controlled experiments to quantify the separate contributions of verbal and non-verbal deception to game outcomes?

1 comment
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to reviewer 91xg

We greatly appreciate the reviewer’s detailed feedback on our paper.

Response to Weaknesses and Questions

(Q1-91xg) Deception effectiveness vs. general gameplay competence

Please refer to our response to ‘(Q1-general) Gameplay competence vs. Deception effectiveness’.


(Q2-91xg) Individual contributions of verbal vs. non-verbal deception

TL;DR. Verbal and non-verbal deception are inherently intertwined across successive task and meeting phases, making their individual contributions difficult to isolate without disrupting their interactions. Nevertheless, we provide a quantitative breakdown across 1,568 (RQ2) games: 78.8% of crewmate eliminations occurred through task-phase kills, while 83.5% of atoms linked to deceived judgments were verbal. These complementary analyses reinforce our view that both channels contribute jointly to extended deception strategies, rather than independently.

We agree that quantifying the individual contributions of verbal and non-verbal deception would strengthen our evaluation. However, the two channels are inherently intertwined across alternating task and meeting phases, making it difficult to isolate their contributions without disrupting the interactions.

Nevertheless, we conducted two additional analyses to provide a quantitative breakdown across all 1,568 RQ2 games.

  1. Gameplay outcomes. We first measured how crewmates were eliminated during task (non-verbal) and meeting (verbal) phases. Overall, 78.8% of crewmate eliminations occurred through kills during task phases, while 21.2% resulted from wrongful ejections during meetings. On average, imposters achieved 2.28 kills per game (1.14 per imposter), while meetings resulted in 0.61 wrongful ejections per game. But at the same time, among 756 imposter wins achieved through numerical parity (# imposters >= # crewmates), “kills alone” fell short of the required crewmate eliminations (which means that “wrongful ejections” during meeting phases were also necessary) in 536 games (70.9%), highlighting the contribution of meeting-phase outcomes to imposter victories.
  2. Deception effectiveness. As explained in our response to ‘(Q1-general) Gameplay competence vs. Deception effectiveness’, we identified 6,439 atoms which contributed to successful deception, of which 5,377 (83.5%) were verbal and 1,062 (16.5%) were non-verbal. This provides a complementary perspective to gameplay outcomes, showing that verbal atoms account for a larger share of the deception-linked judgments.

Taken together, these analyses distinguish phase-specific gameplay outcomes from judgment-level deception effectiveness. While task-phase kills account for most crewmate eliminations, verbal atoms account for most of the identified links to deceived judgments. Still, (1) as discussed above, (2) discussed in our response to ‘(Q1-general)’, and (3) illustrated in Figures 9 and 10, verbal and non-verbal behaviors form continuous deception arcs across successive phases. We therefore view the two channels as complementary and jointly contributing to deception, rather than as isolated strategies whose effects can be directly separated.

Comments on the paper

3 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

General Response (1/3)

We thank the reviewers for their helpful feedback. We appreciate their recognition of the core strengths of our work:

  • Embodied multimodal deception (91xg, FKLo, oKT8): Introducing MineAmongUs, which extends text-based social deduction into a 3D environment combining visual perception, spatial actions, and verbal communication.
  • Configurable agent framework (91xg, oKT8): Developing ARIA, a modular agent harness that enables systematic investigation of how agent design influences deception strategies and game outcomes.
  • Fine-grained deception analysis (91xg, FKLo, oKT8): Establishing a taxonomy-grounded framework of 23 verbal and non-verbal deceptive atoms, revealing behavioral patterns beyond outcome-based win rates.
  • Extensive empirical evaluation (oKT8): Evaluating 14 VLMs across 1,568 cross-model games, complemented by component ablations and deception analyses.

Below, we address the common concern regarding distinction between general gameplay competence and deception effectiveness.

(Q1-general) Gameplay competence vs. Deception effectiveness [91xg, FKLo, oKT8]

TL;DR. We conducted an additional judgment-level analysis across all 1,568 RQ2 games to evaluate whether and how crewmates were actually deceived by imposters, identifying 5,119 deceived crewmate judgments linked to 6,439 verbal and non-verbal atoms. Our findings show that (1) the experimental results provide direct evidence of how deceptive behaviors relate to crewmates’ beliefs and voting decisions, and (2) deception-linked crewmates’ judgments remain positively associated with imposter wins even after controlling for kill counts and other gameplay factors. Overall, they provide evidence of deception effectiveness beyond correlations between deceptive behaviors and imposter win rates (WR).

Experimental Design

We analyzed the complete gameplay logs of all 1,568 games in RQ2, using Claude Sonnet 5.5 as an LLM-judge to identify (1) “deceived crewmate judgments” and (2) the verbal and non-verbal atoms contributing to each judgment.

We consider 5 types of crewmate judgments: (i) voting for an innocent crewmate, (ii) skipping a vote, (iii) incorrectly suspecting an innocent crewmate, (iv) trusting or defending an imposter, and (v) withdrawing suspicion from an imposter.

Importantly, an incorrect judgment alone does not constitute successful deception. We classify a judgment as deceived only when the crewmate's own reasoning (e.g., memory, reflections, plans, private action narration, public speech during meeting phase) can be traced to an imposter's words or actions. Each contributing atom must satisfy four criteria:

  1. Temporal precedence: The atom occurred before the crewmate's judgment.
  2. Exposure: The crewmate could have observed the behavior or heard the statement.
  3. Semantic consistency: The crewmate's reasoning reflects the specific deceptive behavior/atoms.
  4. Source attribution: The reasoning explicitly references the imposter or adopts a specific claim originating from the imposter.

This procedure distinguishes crewmates’ judgments attributable to imposter deception from incorrect judgments arising from independent reasoning, insufficient evidence, or unrelated gameplay events. We also conducted human validation of 50 identified deceived judgments sampled across 47 games, of which 88.0% (44/50) were confirmed by a human annotator.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

General Response (2/3)

Experimental Results

Across all 1,568 games in RQ2, we identified 5,119 deceived judgments across 1,007 games, linked to 6,439 contributing atoms. These judgments include 1,625 votes for innocent crewmates, 264 skipped votes, 1,393 suspicions of innocent crewmates, 1,783 judgments involving trust in or defense of imposters, and 54 judgments involving reduced suspicion toward imposters. Of the 6,439 contributing atoms, 5,377 (83.5%) were verbal and 1,062 (16.5%) were non-verbal. The distribution of contributing atoms is shown below.

AtomInnocent voteSkipSuspect innocentTrust imposterReduced suspicionTotal linksShare
Non-verbal198111,010141,06216.5%
A. Fake-Mission Performance120140111542.4%
B. Blend-In Wandering000754075411.7%
C. Stalking Pre-Kill000200200.3%
D. Joint Motor Coordination000501510.8%
E. Witness-Aware Kill0000000%
F. Post-Kill Flee0002020.03%
G. Bystander Co-flight0000000%
H. Strategic Non-Reporting0000000%
I. Self-Reporting Kill18611442811.3%
J. Weaponized Meeting0000000%
K. Planned Teammate Sacrifice0000000%
Verbal2,1882981,888952515,37783.5%
L. Alibi Fabrication574128379559251,66525.9%
M. Counter-Accusation750588232271,66025.8%
N. Fake Eyewitness Testimony5143542016471,14017.7%
O. Mutual Reinforcement151285615483976.2%
P. Co-opting Target's Words59780701532.4%
Q. Throw-Under-Bus000230230.4%
R. Statistical / Pattern Fabrication1133117712413.7%
S. Manufactured Witness Coalition2301200350.5%
T. Concession-as-Defense111043190.3%
U. Honesty/Credibility Marker3311080.1%
V. Hedged / Restraint Speech0250110360.6%
W. Vote/Chat Inconsistency0000000%
Total2,2073061,8991,962656,439100.0%

Verbal atoms were frequently associated with incorrect votes and suspicions, particularly through Alibi Fabrication (L), Counter-Accusation (M), and Fake Eyewitness Testimony (N) (i.e., V-1 Falsification cluster). Non-verbal links were primarily associated with trusting/defending imposters, particularly through Blend-In Wandering (B) and Fake-Mission Performance (A), indicating that crewmates sometimes interpreted an imposter's ordinary movement or fake-mission performance as evidence of innocence.

Deception effectiveness and game outcomes

We further examined whether deceived crewmate judgments are associated with imposter wins. Across 1,568 games, deceived crewmate judgments were identified in 73% of imposter wins, compared with 54% of losses. Moreover, among 1,275 games with at least one meeting, a higher number of deceived crewmate judgments per meeting was associated with greater odds of imposter wins (odds ratio = 1.18, 95% CI: 1.12 to 1.24), even after controlling for game length, meeting count, and kill counts. These results suggest that deception effectiveness is positively associated with imposter wins beyond general killing proficiency, although the analysis doesn’t establish causality.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

General Response (3/3)

Interpretation and Discussion

These findings support the reviewers' distinction between gameplay competence and deception effectiveness. While our original analysis examined correlations between deceptive behaviors and game outcomes, the additional analysis identifies mistaken crewmate judgments that can be traced to specific imposter behaviors. Importantly, these deception-linked crewmates’ judgments remain positively associated with imposter wins even after controlling for kill counts and other gameplay factors. Together, this provides more direct evidence of deception effectiveness beyond correlations between deceptive atoms/behaviors and imposter win rates (WR).

Verbal vs. non-verbal deception.

The larger share of verbal atoms (83.5%) does not necessarily imply that verbal deception is more effective than non-verbal deception. The two channels operate under different gameplay conditions. During meetings, all surviving agents can hear the same statements, allowing a single verbal deception to influence multiple crewmates. In contrast, task phases involve spatially distributed agents, so non-verbal deception typically reaches only a subset of crewmates. Our results therefore characterize the distribution of observed deception-linked judgments rather than the relative effectiveness of the two channels, which would require accounting for differences in exposure and opportunities to deceive.

Furthermore, verbal and non-verbal deception interact across successive task and meeting phases. An imposter's actions during a task phase may establish an apparent alibi that is subsequently reinforced through verbal claims during a meeting phase. Conversely, meeting outcomes may shape subsequent non-verbal strategies. As illustrated by the deception arcs in Figures 9 and 10, these behaviors often contribute jointly rather than independently. Therefore, both channels play complementary roles in extended deception strategies.

We will add this additional analysis and discussion to the revised paper.

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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