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- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
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- Soundness
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Paper summary
This paper studies the voluntary collusion problem between LLM agents via secret tool interactions. The paper proposes a framework implementation to benchmark the voluntary adoption of a collusive capability through its subsequent use in two multi-agent environments. These LLM agents can use a private communication channel or exclusive strategic hints as secret tools in Liar's Bar and Cleanup games. Moreover, the paper considers variants of LLMs, different prompt framings to study these agents' behaviors and the consequences of the collusion. Experimental results suggest that agents behave differently to the different prompt descriptions and their collusion alters their actions.
Critical strengths
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The paper proposes A useful framework to study and separate agents' decisions on voluntary collusion. Distinguishing willingness to acquire a capability from activation and use is valuable.
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The paper provides a comprehensive interpretation under different scenarios. The proposed frameworks offer fair alternative prompts with varied framing to test agents' behaviors beyond a single provocative prompt. Moreover, the paper includes strategic games to show the impact of voluntary collusion.
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A wide range of open-source LLMs and frontier LLMs are evaluated and compared. In addition to collusion acceptance, the paper also studies their detailed responses, gameplay outcomes, and no-tool baselines for fair ablations.
Critical weaknesses
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The paper looks too fancy to read and follow. So many icons, colored fonts, highlighted text, and compact figures are shown. It is hard for me to follow and focus on the paper's writing.
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The paper lacks a detailed definition of collusion in the main pages. Though C.1 gives the definition in the Appendix, it is hard to understand what collusion refers to in the main paper.
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The frontier models are not compared or evaluated in the main paper's experiments. I would like to see their performance with the framing used in Table 5. Currently, their evaluations and comparisons seem separated.
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Some experimental details are missing. In Figure 5, the evaluated models are not clear. Also, the exact prompts, logs or a few illustrative cases are helpful to understand and compare the framing differences.
Questions for authors
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Why are frontier models not being put together with the framing used in Table 5? What is the difference between V0-V5 and (No cue, Can observe, Cannot observe)?
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What could be the malicious consequences of voluntary collusion in your proposed two games?
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Can you elaborate in more detail about the game implementations?
Summary of Revisions and Request for Reviewer Engagement
Dear Area Chair, Senior Area Chair, and Program Chair,
Thank you for overseeing the review and discussion of our submission. As the discussion period closes in about three days, we would like to summarize our responses and kindly ask for your help in encouraging the reviewers to engage with them.
We posted detailed responses to all three reviewers on November 10, together with an updated PDF in which all revisions are marked in red, but we have not yet received any replies. We understand how busy this period is, and we would be very grateful if you could remind the reviewers of our responses, so that they can consider the new results and update their assessments if appropriate.
We were glad that the reviewers found our question "clear and under-examined" (Reviewer BDk1), our empirical investigation "thorough and rigorous", our results "convincing" (Reviewer gs4e), and our framework "useful" for studying and separating agents' decisions on voluntary collusion (Reviewer pJ15). In response to their comments, we made the following main additions:
Crucially, these additions consolidate and extend our original findings. Agents still adopt a collusive channel described without any alliance language and use it to share private information. The harm to the other agents in Cleanup holds on the steps where they can act and in longer games, in every seed. The current frontier models show the same cue-dependent refusal as the models in the original submission.
We would be happy to answer any further questions from you or the reviewers before the discussion closes. Thank you again for your time and for facilitating this process.
Sincerely,
The Authors