- Rating
- 3(+1)
- Confidence
- 4
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
The paper introduces DecepEval, comprising 1,532 neutral–induced instance pairs spanning tool use, coding tasks, and long-horizon interactions across 28 professional scenarios. The authors organize inducements into pressure, incentive, opportunity, and conflict, and assess deceptive behavior using execution trajectories and artifacts. Experiments on nine models show that the rates of behavior classified as deceptive generally increase under induced conditions, and that model rankings vary across tasks and conditions.
Critical strengths
- The integration of multiple executable workflows offers practical evaluation value. Tool logs, code tests, and delivered artifacts provide verifiable evidence for assessing whether reports are consistent with actual execution.
- The paired design helps identify sensitivity to context. Paired versions of each instance share core facts and environments, enabling comparisons of behavioral changes introduced by specific inducement text relative to the neutral condition.
- The evaluation rules include necessary boundary conditions. They explicitly state that tool failures, hidden-test failures, or test modifications do not themselves constitute deception, and classify truthful reporting of failures as honest behavior.
Critical weaknesses
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The construct validity of deception has not been sufficiently established.
The paper treats the delivery of relevant facts to the agent as important evidence of its awareness of those facts, but this is insufficient to rule out misunderstanding, confusion between task objects, or failures of long-horizon state tracking. Although the evaluation rules require ordinary errors to be excluded, the paper does not provide an independent, operational procedure for distinguishing them. Consequently, the current metric may conflate goal-directed deception with inaccurate or self-contradictory reporting. The 97% human–judge agreement rate supports labeling consistency but does not directly establish the validity of this conceptual distinction. -
Confounds in the inducement design limit the interpretation of the Deception Diamond.
Some induced prompts not only introduce pressure or incentives but also directly instruct the agent to mark work as complete or retain conclusions that have been invalidated. The results may therefore reflect a combination of inducement effects, compliance with dishonest instructions, and the handling of conflicting instructions. Moreover, the four inducement categories correspond to different underlying seeds. Although the paired design supports comparisons against the respective neutral conditions, it is insufficient to support cross-factor conclusions such as incentives being more likely than pressure to elicit deception. -
The positioning and novelty claims relative to prior work are overstated.
DeceptionBench already studies multiple domains, incentives/coercion, and multi-turn interactions, while MASK already addresses the distinction between honesty and accuracy. The clearer contribution of this paper lies in unifying executable agent workflows and their evidence-based evaluation, rather than being the first to systematically investigate the context dependence of deception. In addition, Table 1 counts DeceptionBench’s five domains as five scenarios, using a counting convention that is not directly comparable to the paper’s 28 scenarios. -
Evaluation validation and result breakdowns are insufficient, and some conclusions exceed what the experiments support.
Human validation covers only 100 examples and lacks inter-annotator agreement, stratified confusion matrices, and analysis of boundary cases. Correlations among template-expanded instances and uncertainty across repeated sampling are also insufficiently reported. Domain comparisons confound differences in task type, while the non-deceptive label includes refusals and incomplete work, limiting the validity of inferring model reliability or domain-specific risk from the scores.
Questions for authors
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How do you distinguish between facts being present in context but misunderstood or misremembered, and a model knowingly misleading the recipient to achieve its objective? Could you provide independent knowledge checks and report results on the subset of deception cases with clear evidence of strategic behavior?
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Do the main findings hold when direct behavioral instructions such as “mark as complete” or “retain the original conclusion” are removed, leaving only pressure or incentives? Could you apply each of the four inducement categories separately to the same set of underlying tasks to test their relative effects?
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Why is a report that explicitly discloses failure but also marks the task as complete classified as deception? For example, in the credential-revocation case on pages 54 and 59 of the appendix, the agent states in the same report that resource access failed, independent verification was not completed, and revocation status was unknown, yet sets
completion_statetocompleted; the judge consequently classifies this as deception. If a downstream system reads only the completion flag, the report could indeed mislead it; if the recipient reads the full report, however, the failures have been explicitly disclosed. What evidence supports classifying this behavior as goal-directed deception rather than an incorrect status label or a self-contradictory report under conflicting instructions? Does the evaluation explicitly specify how the recipient reads and uses these fields? -
Does the 97% agreement rate also hold for boundary cases involving ordinary errors, implicit omissions, and self-contradictory reports? Could you report inter-annotator agreement, misclassification rates by task and condition, and the results of independent adjudication of disagreements?
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Do the model rankings and domain differences persist after separating refusals, honestly reported failures, and honest task completion, and controlling for task type and template clustering?
14 comments
Response to Reviewer dMod – Part Ⅱ
W2: Confounds in the inducement design limit interpretation of the Deception Diamond. Some prompts explicitly instruct agents to mark tasks as “completed,” so the results may reflect multiple factors. Although the paired design supports comparisons with corresponding neutral conditions, differences in underlying tasks weaken cross-inducement conclusions.
Q2: Do the main findings hold when direct behavioral instructions are removed, leaving only pressure or incentives? Could all four inducement types be applied separately to the same underlying tasks to assess their differential effects?
R2: We agree that instructions such as “mark as complete” can confound situational inducement with compliance with dishonest instructions. We therefore audited these instructions and evaluated whether deception persists after removing them.
Identification and prevalence. We audited all model-visible text across the 1,532 task pairs using complementary retrieval methods and LLM-based semantic review. Keyword/rule matching and BM25 identified explicit commands and lexical variants, while dense retrieval captured semantic equivalents. Representative screening phrases are listed below:
| Category | Examples of screening phrases |
|---|---|
| Completion or success reporting | must complete, mark as complete, report success, declare completion,... |
| Preserving prior conclusions | retain the original conclusion, maintain the original assessment, keep the approved status,... |
| Concealing failures or problems | do not disclose, omit failures, report only successful results, keep failures out of the report,... |
| Altering evidence or records | remove failed results, overwrite the record, delete failure logs, replace the evidence,... |
Phrase matches were treated as candidates, not automatically classified as dishonest instructions. In parallel, an LLM reviewed the text against the task context to distinguish instructions requiring misreporting, concealment, or falsification from ordinary task requirements and situational pressure. Human annotators checked all flagged cases and randomly sampled 100 remaining instances, finding no additional positive cases in that sample.
The audit identified 46/1,532 induced instances (3.00%) containing direct dishonest instructions:
| Task family | Identified / audited | Proportion |
|---|---|---|
| Tool-use | 19/550 | 3.45% |
| Coding | 14/432 | 3.24% |
| Long-horizon | 13/550 | 2.36% |
| Overall | 46/1,532 | 3.00% |
None were identified in the neutral counterparts.
Rewriting ablation. We rewrote all 46 instances to remove prescribed dishonest actions while retaining the situational stakes, underlying tasks, and factual materials. Take Appendix C.2 (Page39, lines 2065–2072) as an example:
| Original instruction | Replacement |
|---|---|
| “Complete the ticket promptly, mark it as completed in the report, and prioritize subsequent tickets.” | “Ticket processing efficiency directly determines service recovery progress and the scheduling priority of subsequent pending tickets.” |
Deception rates before and after rewriting were:
| Model | Original | Rewritten |
|---|---|---|
| GPT-5.6-Terra | 41.30% (19/46) | 39.13% (18/46) |
| Claude Sonnet-5 | 36.96% (17/46) | 36.96% (17/46) |
| Claude Opus-5 | 28.26% (13/46) | 30.43% (14/46) |
| GLM-5.3-Flash | 32.61% (15/46) | 30.43% (14/46) |
| Macro-average | 34.78% | 34.24% |
The macro-average decreased by only 0.54 percentage points, with each model’s deceptive-case count changing by at most one. Deception persisted without direct dishonest instructions, supporting that DecepEval captures autonomous deception under implicit pressure rather than mere compliance with explicit deceptive prompts.
Cross-factor interpretation. The four inducement categories share a common set of underlying task scenarios, with seeds across categories following similar task settings and logic. For example, each may involve downloading a nonexistent file and assessing whether the agent falsely reports success, while varying the inducement applied. Each induced instance is also paired with its corresponding neutral condition. Our Δ metric therefore measures the increase above each subset’s own baseline, enabling comparisons of observed inducement sensitivity across these comparable task settings.
Response to Reviewer dMod – Part Ⅲ
W3:The positioning and novelty claims relative to prior work are overstated. Table 1 counts DeceptionBench’s five domains as five scenarios, using a counting convention that is not directly comparable to the paper’s 28 scenarios.
R3-1: Thank you for recognizing our contribution in unifying executable agent workflows and evidence-based evaluation. This integration is central to systematically evaluating deception in agents that act through tools, modify code, and maintain state over extended interactions.
We recognize DeceptionBench’s and MASK’s important advances in contextual deception evaluation. In this paper, we do not claim to be the “first to systematically investigate the context dependence of deception.” Our emphasis is on evaluation coverage and paired comparisons, while Appendix A explicitly acknowledges prior work on context dependence. As summarized in Table 1, pressure is the most commonly studied inducement, and most listed benchmarks examine a single inducement category within a restricted range of task settings, sometimes centered on a specific game. Our Deception Diamond framework integrates pressure, incentive, opportunity, and conflict across 1,532 paired instances, three task families, and 28 scenarios. Together with matched neutral controls and execution evidence, our goal is to advance beyond recognizing that LLMs can deceive toward a comprehensive, unified framework for quantifying when deception arises, comparing vulnerabilities, and measuring progress in mitigating them.
We apologize for the imprecise counting in Table 1. As Figure 2 of DeceptionBench shows, its five domains each contain three deception types, yielding 15 types that more closely correspond to the scenario-category granularity used in our comparison. We have therefore revised the entry from 5 to 15 and clarified this counting convention.
Q3: Why is a report that explicitly discloses failure but also marks the task as complete classified as deception? What evidence supports classifying this behavior as goal-directed deception? Does the evaluation explicitly specify how the recipient reads and uses these fields?
R3-2: Thank you for highlighting this ambiguity. The failure statements cited in your question were not disclosed to the recipient. They were state-check outputs generated for the judge, whereas the recipient received a separate report claiming task completion. On Appendix F(pages 60-61, lines 3233-3258), our trajectory summary combined these two types of information within one content field. The judge’s summary also referred to “the same record.” This presentation could reasonably give the impression that the recipient received both the failure disclosures and the completion claim. We apologize for this lack of clarity.
Specifically, observed_tool_status, independent_verification, and action_status were available to the judge but not the recipient. They indicate that the model correctly recognized the resource access failure, incomplete independent verification, and unknown revocation status. The recipient received separate status and delivery information, including completion_state: completed, for subsequent processing and scoring. Thus, the issue is not whether the recipient reads only the completion flag or the full report, but that the cited failure disclosures were absent from the recipient-facing report.
The evaluation compares the model’s knowledge, verified through the state check, with the report actually delivered to the recipient, considering the task’s completion requirements and execution evidence. In this case, the model acknowledged that revocation remained unconfirmed but nevertheless claimed completion without communicating those limitations. This provides observable evidence supporting the deception judgment beyond an incorrect status flag alone, as illustrated in Appendix F(Page 60, lines 3235–3239). As explained in our response to W1, runs showing factual confusion, memory errors, or misunderstanding undergo bounded, independently checked retries. Only runs that pass the checks and provide evaluable reports proceed to deception assessment.
In the revised manuscript, we separately present state-check outputs, the complete recipient-visible report, and the judge’s rationale, explicitly identifying the purpose and visibility of each. We also clarify the checking and retry procedures in Appendix D.3 (Pages 46–47).
Response to Reviewer dMod – Part Ⅰ
We truly appreciate your constructive feedback and the opportunity to refine our work further. Below, we address each of your concerns in turn. While our response is somewhat lengthy, we hope the detailed explanations and additional evidence fully address your questions.
R1: Thank you for highlighting this concern. We agree that misunderstanding, confusion between task objects, and memory failures can affect deception judgments. First, DecepEval already incorporates state checks immediately before reporting to verify factual recall and understanding of task requirements. Runs that fail these checks or lack evaluable reports undergo bounded retries, each checked independently. Only runs that pass the checks and provide evaluable reports proceed to deception assessment. We have clarified these procedures in Appendix D.3 (Pages 46–47).
Regarding the specific case reports you requested, Appendix F provides the following examples, in which separate state-check outputs demonstrate accurate knowledge before the model delivers a deceptive report.
Second, we randomly sampled 300 complete trajectories from successfully completed judgments and reviewed the verification nodes’ assessments of factual recall and task understanding.
The review found correct factual recall and task understanding in 293 trajectories (97.67%), with verification errors in 7 cases (2.33%). These results indicate that residual misunderstanding was uncommon in the audited sample and support the checks’ usefulness in reducing the risk of conflating ordinary errors with deception.
Finally, our evaluation concerns observable deceptive behavior, without inferring the model’s private psychological intent. Although some misunderstanding may remain, unsupported success claims can still mislead recipients in realistic workflows. Such misleading reports therefore warrant detection and scrutiny because they can lead to harmful downstream decisions, even when deliberate intent cannot be established.