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Paper summary
This paper proposes a human-auditable deception detection method. Compared with existing methods that can only detect and monitor deception, this paper proposes transforming the model's intermediate states into auditable detection responses, enhancing the interpretability of auditing. Experiments on two target models demonstrate the effectiveness of the method.
Critical strengths
- The topic is interesting and likely to attract attention from the research community.
Critical weaknesses
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The experiments cover only two target models, and each model requires separately collecting activations, constructing supervision data, and training an auditor. This limits the method's applicability to other models, updated model versions, and closed-source systems where hidden states are inaccessible; the paper also does not adequately quantify the additional latency and resource costs during deployment.
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Existing experiments mainly test deceptive behavior in established scenarios and do not adequately assess whether the target model can hide or alter relevant activation signals when it is aware of the auditing mechanism and subjected to optimization pressure to evade monitoring. The results cannot yet guarantee reliability in adversarial environments.
Questions for authors
Please see the weaknesses.
3 comments
Dear Reviewer ZZPe,
Thank you once again for your valuable comments on our submission. As the discussion phase is approaching its end, we would like to kindly confirm whether we have sufficiently addressed all of your concerns (or at least part of them). Should there be any remaining questions requiring further clarification, please do not hesitate to let us know. If you are satisfied with our responses, we would greatly appreciate your consideration in adjusting the evaluation scores accordingly.
We sincerely look forward to your feedback.
Best regards, The Authors
Dear Reviewer ZZPe,
Thank you again for taking the time to review our paper. Your feedback has been very helpful to us. With less than 12 hours left in the discussion period, we hope you don’t mind us following up once more. We would greatly appreciate even a brief note on whether our response and revisions have addressed your concerns.
Best regards, The Authors
Thank you for highlighting the applicability and cost of StateWitness. We measured the additional audit latency and memory use on both target models. Below, we explain the adaptation tradeoff and the scope of our evidence on adaptive evasion.
Reply to W1: Model coverage, adaptation, and access
Our method trains an audit decoder (StateWitness) for each target model. This requires collecting target activations, constructing supervision, and training the decoder. Once trained, the decoder is reused across benchmarks, with audit criteria specified through natural language queries without additional parameter training. We evaluated one decoder per target across seven benchmark families. This separates adaptation to a target model from changing the question an auditor asks.
StateWitness requires access to hidden states. It is applicable to model developers or auditors with that access, including internal access to a closed model. An interface that exposes only generated text is insufficient.
The design tradeoff is additional adaptation and computation in exchange for an audit interface that reads internal activations and produces inspectable outputs. It leaves the target policy unchanged. Auditors can ask about different suspected behaviors and examine the resulting answers or reports, alongside the detection score.
Reply to W1: Additional latency and resource costs
We measured activation extraction, QA detection, and structured report generation. We have added the measurement setup and results to Appendix B.7 of the revised paper.
We measured mean audit latency over nine replies per model, covering three input length groups and seven benchmarks. Each reply was tested five times on two shared A100 80GB GPUs, one request at a time. QA audit includes extraction and scoring, while full audit adds report generation.
The measurements distinguish the cost of obtaining a detection score from the additional cost of an inspectable report. On our sampled workload, generating an inspectable report added 10.56 s for GPT-OSS and 12.71 s for Gemma.
Reply to W2: Awareness of monitoring and adaptive evasion
We agree that robustness to monitoring awareness and adaptive evasion remains unverified. Our evaluation does not test how StateWitness behaves when the target recognizes the auditor or learns to evade it.
Neural Chameleons provides evidence for this risk. McGuinness et al. fine tune target models to evade benign concept probes, then demonstrate transfer to previously unseen safety monitors. The evasion persists even though those monitors are trained after the target has been frozen. Freezing alone therefore does not rule out learned evasion.
Our contribution is a queryable audit decoder that provides detection scores, answers, and reports for human inspection. Testing this interface against adaptive targets requires an explicit attack setting and checks that evasion preserves the behavior being audited. A systematic study of adaptive evasion is beyond the scope of this work. We regard this robustness evaluation as future work.