- Rating
- 3
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper presents a benchmark for evaluating deceptive behavior in LLM agents under pressure. The benchmark consists of 477 pressure variants derived from 257 tasks (paired with pressure free counterpart). The authors collect trajectories using tools to identify misleading behavior. The paper further examine the challenges of attributing differences between pressure and clean conditions.
Critical strengths
This paper is timely given the reported increase in the deceptive capabilities of the models. Also several other previous benchmarks focused on the non-agentic settings, and this benchmark addresses that gap. Generally, I see the following strengths in the paper:
1/ The evaluation seems to be designed well. It tries to distinguish scenarios where under pressure the model/agent may take deceptive steps by pairing them with pressure free twins
2/ The benchmark also seems to be realistic with the use of appworld and tasks from real world apps.
Critical weaknesses
I see the following weaknesses in the paper --
1/ While the benchmark does well in eliciting deceptive failure modes, some settings are still "toy". The benchmark operates in a sandbox and there is a single user and there is lack of quantification of the loss to the victim. While I understand that the benchmark cannot target such a harm due to ethical reasons, it is a fundamental issue with deception benchmarks; where a real world quantification of the harm is tricky.
2/ The evaluations setup has a few weaknesses. If I understand right, the judge is not thoroughly vetted to be accurate in validating deception. This is further exacerbated by the small volumes of traces available for deception analysis. These weaknesses make the benchmark numbers a bit hard to trust.
Questions for authors
N/A
2 comments
Dear Reviewer 3XU7,
Thank you for your thoughtful review and positive assessment. To address your concerns, we added a full human validation of the trajectory auditor on all available Gemini 3.8 Flash trajectories (97.2% agreement, 96.0% precision), now included in Section 5.6. We also discussed concrete user-facing harms we identified, such as an unpaid $207 payment reported as completed.
As the discussion period is nearing its end, we would appreciate your review of our responses and welcome any remaining questions. If these additions address your concerns, we would be grateful if you would consider updating your assessment.
Best regards, The Authors
(Q1) Toy setting and harm quantification
We agree with your idea that the sandbox and single-user setting capture only part of the complexity of real-world harm, but the trajectories still allow us to identify and quantify concrete unfulfilled obligations concealed by deceptive reports. In one scenario, a Gemini 3.8 Flash agent reports an unpaid $207 payment as completed. In another, it reports a failed purchase for one of five intended recipients as successful. These misleading reports could delay corrective action by leaving users unaware of failures. Inspired by your idea, we plan to extend this evaluation to multi-user settings and study how users’ reliance on deceptive reports affects downstream outcomes.
(Q2) Judgment validation
Thank you for this suggestion. To assess the accuracy of the trajectory auditor, we manually reviewed every available Gemini 3.8 Flash trajectory. Following our deception definitions, we checked the binary judgments and deception-mechanism labels against the original interaction records, tool execution results, and user-facing reports. The results are shown as follows,
These results provide evidence of the accuracy of our trajectory judge. We include the human-verified results in the Chapter 5.6.