- Rating
- 3
- Confidence
- 4
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper focuses on the vulnerability of neural image watermarking systems to residual-based forgery attacks. The authors first introduce a metric called Residual Transferability (RT). Through empirical analysis, the paper reveals that models with high RT learn a cover-agnostic shortcut, while certain architectural designs (specifically Broadcast-GAP and Content-adaptive attention) enforce cover-dependent pathways that naturally resist residual transfer. To protect existing vulnerable systems, the authors propose CoverLock, a plug-and-play wrapper that XORs the watermark payload with a robust, image-conditioned binary hash generated by a frozen DINOv2 model and a lightweight projection head trained via contrastive learning.
Critical strengths
- The focused problem is interesting and important. I have seen several papers report the discussed phenomenon.
- The ablation studies in Section 3 and Appendix E are sufficient, providing a valuable guideline for future watermark model designs.
Critical weaknesses
- The core defensive mechanism of CoverLock is not innovative. As the authors acknowledge, traditional methods like MHDW (Lu et al., 2006) utilized this exact pipeline. While updating the hash extractor to a modern DINOv2 backbone and training it with contrastive learning improves robustness, the system-level workflow lacks conceptual novelty. It feels more like a modern engineering patch on an old idea.
- The authors motivate CoverLock as a deployment-friendly alternative that avoids the cost of redesigning and retraining the watermarking architecture. However, based on my training experience, in the context of deep image watermarking, training a separate lightweight projection head does not incur a significantly lower absolute cost than training a lightweight, semantic-bound watermark encoder.
- While Section 6 briefly acknowledges in-generation/latent diffusion watermarking methods, the paper uses overly broad terminology (such as Neural Image Watermarking) throughout the title, abstract, and introduction. The authors should either: (1) Explicitly scope their claims, title, and abstract to "Post-Processing Neural Image Watermarking" to avoid overclaiming; or (2) Provide a discussion (and empirical verification) on whether residual transferability poses a practical vulnerability to in-generation watermarking.
- The related work discussion overlooks recent studies on additive watermark residuals and their cross-image behavior, such as Removing Box-Free Watermarks for Image-to-Image Models via Query-Based Reverse Engineering (AAAI 2026). While the attack objectives differ, its analysis of additive watermark residuals is relevant to the motivation and interpretation of residual transferability in this paper.
- There is a slight structural disconnect in the paper. The first half brilliantly identifies that architectural flaws (lack of cover-dependency) cause high RT and proves that architectural interventions (Broadcast-GAP) fix it. However, the proposed solution abandons this architectural insight in favor of a post-hoc wrapper. It leads to the question: why not propose a new, robust watermark architecture based directly on the insights from Section 3? Furthermore, what is the vulnerability of CoverLock to adaptive attacks? (e.g., an attacker who knows CoverLock is deployed and attempts to find a collision in the lightweight hash head).
- Although the architectural ablations in Section 3 and Appendix E demonstrate substantial reductions in RT, these improvements come at a considerable cost to image fidelity. For instance, introducing Broadcast–GAP reduces the PSNR of MBRS from 42.32 dB to 27.07 dB and that of CIN from 41.55 dB to 21.71 dB. Moreover, the modified VINE fails to converge. These results raise concerns about the practical applicability of the identified architectural design. The authors should investigate whether the reduction in RT can be maintained under comparable image-fidelity and watermark-robustness constraints.
- The quality of Figure 3 is not good. For example, some lines are overlapped with text.
Questions for authors
See weaknesses. I may adjust my rating according to the authors' rebuttal.
4 comments
Rebuttal to Reviewer ps3b(Part 2)
W5: Robustness Against Adaptive Attacks
A5:
We sincerely thank the reviewer for raising this important concern. To further evaluate CoverLock against adaptive attacks, we conducted additional experiments using white-box PGD and black-box NES. The results show that both the no-box residual-transfer attack and the black-box adaptive attack achieve 0% forgery ASR. While the white-box attack reaches 100% ASR, it requires full access to the private hash model and its gradients, which is generally unrealistic in practical watermarking deployments, and substantially degrades image quality (PSNR: 27.68 dB). These findings support CoverLock's effectiveness under practical no-box and black-box threat models while acknowledging its limitations under full white-box access. For detailed experimental settings and results, please refer to W3 in our rebuttal to Reviewer wSNK (Part 2).
W6: Practicality of BG and Comparisons at Matched PSNR
A6:
We thank the reviewer for raising this important concern. We would like to clarify that Broadcast-GAP (BG) is not a defense proposed by our work, but an existing architectural design investigated to understand the factors governing residual transferability. As shown in our experiments, directly introducing BG into MBRS and CIN substantially reduces their PSNR, while the modified VINE fails to train successfully. Despite our training efforts, the BG-modified models could not achieve PSNR comparable to their original counterparts, making a matched-PSNR comparison infeasible under these architectural modifications. This further highlights that low-RT architectural designs cannot be directly transferred across watermarking systems without case-by-case redesign and optimization.
Importantly, low RT is not necessarily associated with lower image fidelity. In our RivaGAN ablation, fixing the attention maps increases RT@100 from 0.077 to 0.944, while PSNR remains nearly unchanged (42.12 vs. 42.11 dB). Moreover, the original HiDDeN incorporates BG and achieves 28.23 dB PSNR. Together, these findings suggest that residual transferability is governed by architectural design rather than image fidelity alone.
W7: Presentation Quality of Figure 3
A7:
We thank the reviewer for pointing this out. This was an oversight on our part, and we will correct the overlapping text and improve the presentation quality of Figure 3 in the revised manuscript.
Dear Authors,
Thank you for the detailed rebuttal and the additional experiments.
I appreciate that the authors have addressed my concerns regarding the scope of the paper, the missing related work, and the adaptive attack evaluation against CoverLock.
However, I have decided to maintain my initial rating for the following reasons:
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No revised manuscript has been uploaded for now, so the promised revisions cannot yet be verified in the manuscript.
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Remaining conceptual and practical limitations: In A2 and A6, the authors clarify that the identified architectural mechanism (Broadcast–GAP) cannot be readily transferred across watermarking schemes without severe image quality degradation or optimization failure, and thus position CoverLock as a post-hoc workaround. While practically motivated, this leaves the architectural insight largely unexploited for designing high-fidelity, low-RT watermarking encoders, and CoverLock itself remains an engineering modernization of the established content-binding paradigm. Furthermore, as shown in A5, CoverLock's security under adaptive threats still relies on keeping the hash model itself confidential rather than relying purely on a secret key, which runs counter to Kerckhoffs's principle.
Overall, the systematic analysis of residual transferability in post-processing watermarking is interesting, and I remain slightly positive on the submission.
We sincerely thank you once again for your positive assessment of our work and your valuable feedback!
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Revised Manuscript. We have now uploaded an updated version of the revised manuscript, incorporating the additional experiments and clarifications discussed in our rebuttal. Please refer to the light purple highlights for revisions addressing your concerns and the light orange highlights for shared concerns.
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Remaining Limitations. We sincerely appreciate the reviewer's suggestion regarding broader architectural exploration. We believe this is a valuable direction for future research and have explicitly discussed it in the revised Limitations section.
Regarding white-box security and Kerckhoffs's principle, CoverLock is intended as a content-binding mechanism, not as a cryptographic secret key. Its purpose is to strengthen the dependence between watermark evidence and image content, consistent with the motivation behind content-dependent watermarking designs. We therefore recommend treating CoverLock as an integral part of the watermarking system rather than a separate, publicly accessible component.
This assumption is consistent with practical deployments such as Google SynthID and Amazon Titan, where watermark embedding is controlled by the provider, while users can access watermarked content or verification services without obtaining arbitrary embedding capabilities. Keeping security-critical model parameters confidential is a reasonable assumption in such provider-controlled settings. Furthermore, CoverLock and the underlying watermarking model can be viewed as a unified system that could also incorporate cryptographic secret-key mechanisms for stronger security guarantees.
Rebuttal to Reviewer ps3b (Part 1)
We greatly appreciate the reviewers' recognition of our work and their thoughtful suggestions, which have helped us further improve the manuscript. We provide detailed responses to each comment below.
W1: Clarification of CoverLock's Novelty
A1:
We thank the reviewer for raising this important point. We acknowledge that content-dependent watermarking has been explored in earlier work, including MHDW (Lu et al., 2006). However, the novelty of our work does not rest solely on introducing a new content-binding mechanism. Our primary contribution is a systematic investigation of residual transferability in modern neural image watermarking, where the encoder–decoder architectures, learned representations, and training objectives introduce complexities that are not captured by traditional watermarking methods. Through controlled experiments and architectural interventions, we identify key factors governing residual transferability and derive practical guidance for designing more secure watermarking systems.
CoverLock builds on these findings as a practical, post-hoc defense against residual-transfer attacks. Its contribution lies in adapting content binding to existing neural watermarking systems without modifying or retraining their original architectures, while maintaining robustness under common image distortions. We will further clarify the distinction between the established principle of content binding and the specific contributions of CoverLock in the revised paper.
W2: Why Not Propose a New Watermarking Architecture?
A2:
We thank the reviewer for this question. We would like to clarify the motivation and contributions of our work. Our architectural analysis aims to answer our original research question: what are the key factors governing residual transferability in neural image watermarking? Through systematic experiments, we examine and rule out several potential factors, ultimately identifying network architecture as the dominant factor affecting RT. We further pinpoint two architectural designs, Broadcast-GAP (BG) and RivaGAN-style attention, that contribute to low RT. However, our experiments also show that these designs cannot be directly transferred to other watermarking architectures without substantial modifications. For example, introducing BG significantly reduces the PSNR of MBRS and CIN, while the modified VINE fails to converge. These findings indicate that achieving low RT through architectural changes requires case-by-case redesign and optimization of the watermarking system, which is far from straightforward. This is precisely why we propose CoverLock as a complementary post-hoc defense: it provides protection against residual-transfer attacks without requiring the redesign or retraining of existing watermarking architectures. We will clarify this connection between our systematic findings and the motivation for CoverLock in the revised paper.
W3: Scope of Neural Image Watermarking
A3:
We thank the reviewer for pointing this out. We acknowledge that our previous terminology may have led to overly broad claims. Following your suggestion, we have revised the title, abstract, and introduction to explicitly scope our study to post-processing neural image watermarking. These changes will be incorporated into the revised manuscript.
W4: Additional Related Work on Watermark Residuals
A4:
We thank the reviewer for highlighting this valuable work. An et al. (AAAI 2026) provide an insightful study of watermark removal by exploiting the additive properties of watermark residuals through query-based reverse engineering. While their work focuses on watermark removal, ours investigates cross-image residual transferability for watermark forgery and its underlying factors. We have cited this work and added the following sentence to the Related Work section of the revised manuscript:
"Relatedly, An et al. (2026) exploit the additive properties of watermark residuals through query-based reverse engineering to remove watermarks from image-to-image models, whereas our work investigates residual transferability for cross-image watermark forgery."