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Paper summary
This paper investigates stateful, cross-session backdoor attacks against LLM agents, where malicious objectives require multiple operations performed under different environmental conditions. The authors model these attacks as Mealy machines and propose a transition-level construction method: individual sub-backdoors are trained using single-session trajectories, while persistent agent memory connects their execution across sessions after a single initial trigger.
The approach is evaluated on four attack structures—sequential execution with conditional waiting, branching and merging, looping, and condition accumulation—across four LLMs in LangChain, with additional validation in OpenClaw. The primary attack achieves 71.7%–94.7% program success rates in LangChain and 85% for both evaluated models in OpenClaw. Transition-level ablations further examine whether the learned behaviors can function independently.
Critical strengths
1. A concrete and compositional formulation of cross-session attacks.
The most valuable contribution is treating cross-session malicious behavior as a state-transition problem rather than a sequence of independently triggered actions. The Mealy-machine formulation provides an explicit correspondence between persistent state, environmental conditions, and malicious tool behavior. Importantly, the primary experiment separates file access from network access across sessions, making successful exfiltration dependent on retaining intermediate information. Since the training trajectories cover individual transitions rather than complete cross-session executions, the end-to-end results provide meaningful evidence that locally learned behaviors can compose through persistent memory.
2. Relatively rigorous verification of attack execution.
The evaluation distinguishes achieving the final malicious objective from correctly executing the prescribed attack program. The Program ASR metric additionally checks state continuity, operation ordering, and prohibited intermediate actions, which is more informative than measuring successful exfiltration alone. The transition ablations and controlled OpenClaw experiments further strengthen the feasibility claim by showing that the behavior is not confined to one agent implementation or dependent on evaluator-supplied intermediate states.
Critical weaknesses
1. The experiments do not establish the methodological advantage of transition-level decomposition.
Although the paper demonstrates that independently trained transitions can compose successfully, it does not compare this construction against simpler alternatives under matched training budgets. For example, a baseline trained on complete multi-session traces, or an agent instructed to execute an explicit attack policy through persistent memory, would help establish whether the proposed decomposition contributes anything beyond encoding a predefined finite-state procedure.
The ablations in Table 3 do not resolve this issue: replacing supervision for a transition with benign trajectories predictably removes the corresponding behavior, but does not demonstrate that transition-wise factorization is preferable to other ways of learning the same attack. This distinction matters because the decomposition is presented as the central methodological contribution rather than merely an implementation choice.
2. The evaluation protocols are too constrained to establish robustness beyond the constructed execution paths.
The reported success rates are obtained under tightly prescribed session schedules. The primary experiment follows a fixed five-session progression, while the loop experiment contains exactly one version mismatch followed by one successful match. The condition-accumulation experiment covers different observation orders but does not test repeated or contradictory observations. Consequently, the experiments establish execution of trained transitions under known conditions, but provide limited evidence about behavior under unseen schedules, repeated loops, or interruptions to the stored state.
This limitation also applies to the OpenClaw validation, which retains automatically injected memory and simulated experimental tools. The initial trigger is inserted directly into the first user request rather than evaluated through a realistic lower-trust entry point. Moreover, the 10% any-action false activation rate for Qwen2.5-7B in OpenClaw, together with the substantial WebShop degradation for Llama-3.1-8B, suggests that the reliability and behavioral isolation of these backdoors deserve closer examination.
Questions for authors
1. Can the authors provide a budget-matched baseline that isolates the benefit of transition-level construction?
In particular, how would an attack trained on complete cross-session trajectories compare in Program ASR, false activation, and training efficiency? This comparison would substantially clarify whether the contribution lies in the proposed decomposition or primarily in learning a malicious state-conditioned policy.
2. How sensitive is the attack to execution schedules not encountered during training?
For example, can the same trained backdoor reliably handle a variable number of waiting sessions, multiple consecutive version mismatches, or unrelated modifications to persistent memory? These experiments would help distinguish genuine state-dependent execution from reproducing a small collection of anticipated transition sequences.
Thank you for recognizing our formulation. All rates are percentages. ASR pairs denote Outcome/Program ASR, and FAR pairs denote any-action/final-operation FAR.
W1. Construction and alternatives
1. Full-trajectory baseline (Q1)
Constructing training data from complete cross-session trajectories introduces additional issues:
It requires selecting complete execution paths, which constrains the allocation of training examples.
Earlier sessions are unavailable during evaluation, so supervision on complete trajectories introduces a mismatch between training and inference contexts.
It may make attack action selection dependent on the execution schedules chosen for training.
We trained a full-trajectory baseline for the primary LangChain (LC) instantiation on Ministral, matching the total training sessions and optimization settings. FAR is 0-1 across all four settings.
On the original evaluation, all episodes fail at scollect. The baseline is unusable under the original session-isolation protocol. As an additional test, we supply earlier sessions. ASR recovers to 96/94.
On the 3-10-session subset of W2's random evaluation, all episodes again fail without earlier sessions. Even with this extra context, ASR is only 45/9, versus the original adapter's 100/94 on the full random evaluation. This further indicates dependence on the training schedule.
2. Explicit plans
Decomposed construction, explicit plans, and prompt injection/backdoors (PI/BD) concern different methodological dimensions, rather than mutually exclusive alternatives:
Storing a plan does not itself make the model execute it. PI or BD is still needed to induce the required behavior.
An explicit plan is not necessary for BD. In a natural PI baseline, the model needs to execute the stored plan. Designing how to induce this execution requires further study.
Decomposed construction describes general attack programs without restricting the execution mechanism (PI/BD) or whether a plan is stored.
W2. Execution robustness
1. Evaluation schedules (Q2)
We added three experiments. The first two use the original Ministral adapters.
Random schedules. We randomly sample each session's task, tracking the expected program state until the expected completion condition occurs. The 50 episodes contain 3-24 sessions (mean 9.5), with variable waiting durations. ASR 100/94, FAR 16/4.
Repeated loops. We extend 20/20/10 episodes from the original loop evaluation to 2/5/10 iterations, respectively. Overall ASR 96/90.
Repeated observations. For condition accumulation, we constructed a single-transition evaluation set with 20 examples for each of nine self-loop types. Pass rates across the four original models are 0.6-36.7. After adding 225 self-loop examples to the original training set and retraining, all four reach 100, while Program ASR on the original three-session protocol remains 99-100.
These results extend the execution evidence beyond fixed schedules. Contradictory observations are not part of the condition-accumulation instantiation.
2. Memory interference
We added a memory interference experiment. We pool 50 entries each from PersonaMem-v2 and LoCoMo, randomly add 1-10 entries to memory, and shuffle them with the attack entries. We directly evaluate the original adapters on the primary LC instantiation. Ministral retains ASR of 96/95, while the other models degrade sharply. Program ASR is 9 for Llama, 1 for Qwen7B, and 23 for Qwen14B. Training used fixed memory contents, so this directly tests generalization. Further evaluation and improvement of real-world robustness remain future work.
3. Other robustness concerns
Automatic memory loading uses OpenClaw's native mechanism. Inserting the initial trigger directly is a simplification. Activation through tool responses remains future work. We show that complex attacks can be learned while reporting false activations and capability costs. Systematic evaluation and mitigation of these effects remain future work.
Finally, we ask the reviewer to reconsider our contribution in light of the additional evidence:
We identify and model a new form of attack. The contribution of identifying an appropriate model lies more in conceptual understanding and its ability to unify methods and generate research questions than in direct numerical improvements. We hope this aspect of the contribution will also receive full consideration.
We view long-horizon, programmatic attacks as a natural, and therefore important, direction as agent capabilities develop. Studying them systematically at an early stage and establishing a shared framework for discussion has research value.
We welcome further discussion.