- Rating
- 3(+1)
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper studies sleeper attacks on LLM agents, where malicious content is saved during one interaction and causes harmful behavior during a later, benign request. The authors compare three attack strategies across session context, memory, and reusable skills, using a 1,896-instance benchmark and seven models. They also examine longer-term persistence, test defenses, and reproduce the attacks in OpenCode. The results show that resistance to immediate attacks does not necessarily carry over to later interactions, and that an initially unsuccessful attack can still leave harmful content in the agent’s state.
Critical strengths
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The framework is simple and coherent. The planting–triggering formulation brings memory and skill attacks into a common setting. The distinction between malicious instructions and corrupted facts is useful, since an agent can follow the user’s request yet act on poisoned information.
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The experiments provide useful evidence of persistent risk. Fresh-session replay shows that an initially unsuccessful attack can still cause harm later. The OpenCode evaluation also supports the findings beyond simulated tool outputs.
Critical weaknesses
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The cross-state results are difficult to interpret. Memory agents retrieve all saved notes, while skill agents must read the relevant skills before acting. The attack templates also differ across settings. These differences make it unclear how much of the ASR gap comes from the state type itself.
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The evaluation rules need further validation. In Table 17(b), both annotators marked 9 of 100 evaluation configurations as incorrect. The paper does not explain whether these errors were corrected or whether correcting them changes the main results. The reported 97% annotation agreement does not address this issue.
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The defense evaluation does not report its impact on normal tasks. Table 4 reports ASR but not benign-task success under each defense. Since Runtime Defense blocks memory and skill updates, it may also interfere with legitimate tasks. Without these results, it is difficult to assess whether the reduction in ASR comes at an acceptable cost.
Questions for authors
Q1. Both annotators marked nine configurations as incorrect in Table 17(b). Were these corrected before computing the reported results? What impact do these errors have on the ASR?
Q2. An update call alone does not confirm that the malicious content was saved. Please explain how retention is checked and how attacks that already succeed during planting are excluded.
Q3. Runtime Defense substantially reduces ASR. Please also report benign-task success under each defense, including tasks that require legitimate memory or skill updates.
4 comments
Looking forward to hearing from you
Dear Reviewer AxKm,
We sincerely appreciate your time and thoughtful feedback on our work.
We would greatly appreciate any further feedback on our responses and would be happy to address any remaining questions or concerns. If you feel that our responses have adequately addressed your concerns, we would sincerely appreciate it if you would consider revisiting your evaluation.
Thank you again for your time and consideration.
Best regards,
The Authors
I thank the authors for the clarifications and additional experiments. Most of my concerns have been addressed. Overall, I will raise my score from 2 to 3.
We thank the reviewer again for their valuable suggestions and positive assessment of our work.
Response to Reviewer AxKm — Part 1
R1. Controls and implementation differences in cross-state comparisons (W1).
We thank the reviewer for pointing out the implementation differences that need further clarification in the cross-state comparison.
Our comparison uses a paired design: for the same base case, the user task, attack objective, evaluated model, and evaluation criteria remain consistent across state settings. Memory and Skill reads and writes are also implemented through a unified tool-calling framework.
These controls allow us to compare the risks of the same attack task across different state settings.
Memory provides saved information through retrieval, while Skill provides reusable procedures. These reading, writing, and usage patterns reflect how the different states operate. Attack templates are adapted to the different state interfaces and differ only in the instructions that induce Memory and Skill tool calls. Within each strategy × state setting, all models use a fixed template. We will clarify this in the paper.
R2. Corrections to the nine evaluation configurations and their impact (W2 and Q1).
We thank the reviewer for raising this issue.
Given the scale of the benchmark, we use an LLM to generate evaluation configurations and assess their quality through independent human auditing of a sample.
Manuscript Table 17(b) presents the independent audit results before correction. We corrected the nine configurations that both annotators judged incorrect before computing the final results. The ASR reported in the paper uses the corrected configurations.
We further analyzed the impact of retaining these problematic configurations. Without correcting the nine configurations and using their original judgments, the overall ASR is 31.864%, only 0.045 percentage points higher than the corrected result of 31.819%. The largest change in any model’s ASR is 0.106 percentage points, and the model ranking remains unchanged.
R3. Checking retention and excluding attacks completed during planting (Q2).
We thank the reviewer for raising this issue. We determine whether malicious content has been successfully saved using the execution status of the update operation and the write acknowledgment returned by the tool, and verify content retention through code-based checks.
We also check whether the attack objective is achieved at each interaction stage. If the final attack objective defined for a case has already been achieved during the planting stage, that trajectory is not counted as a successful Sleeper Attack.
R4. Benign task success under different defenses (W3 and Q3).
Table 6. BSR-under-attack (%) under different defenses.
Average task performance changes relatively little across defenses. The average BSR is 54.9% without defense and 51.9%, 53.9%, and 52.3% under the three defenses, respectively.
Defenses can both block normal operations and reduce attack interference. For both Qwen models and Llama, the scores remain stable or improve after adding defenses. Together with the reduction in ASR, this indicates that these models can maintain normal task performance while reducing attack risk. One possible explanation is that defenses reduce attack interference with the original task, partially offsetting the impact of additional checks.
DeepSeek-R1 shows a more pronounced decline. Its score decreases from 54.4% without defense to 29.3%–36.0%. The trajectories show additional confirmation requests, paused execution, and failures to continue and complete the task, suggesting that the defenses may lead it to adopt a more conservative execution strategy.