acceptodds
Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

When Memory Takes Control: Memory Control Flow Attacks on LLM Agents

Abstract

Modern agentic systems allow Large Language Model (LLM) agents to tackle complex tasks through extensive tool usage, forming structured control flows of tool selection and execution. Existing security analyses often treat these control flows as ephemeral, one-off sessions, overlooking the persistent influence of memory. This paper identifies a new threat from Memory Control Flow Attacks (MCFA) that memory can dominate the control flow, forcing unintended tool usage even against explicit user instructions and inducing persistent behavioral deviations across tasks. To understand the impact of this vulnerability, we further design MEMFLOW, an automated evaluation framework that systematically identifies and quantifies MCFA across heterogeneous tasks and long interaction horizons. To evaluate MEMFLOW, we attack state-of-the-art LLMs, including GPT-5 mini, Claude Sonnet 4.5 and Gemini 2.5 Flash on real-world tools from two major LLM agent development frameworks, LangChain and LlamaIndex. The results show that in general over 90% of trials are vulnerable to MCFA even under strict safety constraints, highlighting security risks that demand immediate attention.

Primary area:
alignment, fairness, safety, privacy, and societal considerations
Keywords:
LLM Agents, Memory Poisoning, Control Flow Hijacking, Agent Security

Reviews

Among:
Shape:
1234this paper, Bottom 10%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 1.67 over 3 reviews, above 10% of the others.
Reviewer_cHXxOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
Presentation
3
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

This paper studies Memory Control Flow Attacks (MCFA), where malicious instructions stored in an agent’s long-term memory alter tool selection or execution order in later benign tasks. It introduces MemFlow, an isolated trace-auditing framework, and evaluates four LLMs across LangChain and LlamaIndex. The experiments report high attack success rates and show that memory segregation reduces but does not eliminate the attack.

Critical strengths

This paper introduces Memory Control Flow Attacks (MCFA), in which an action-oriented policy stored in an LLM agent’s persistent memory changes the tool-selection or tool-execution behavior of later benign tasks.

The paper evaluates multiple models, frameworks, attack types, and defenses, with useful prompt and implementation details.

Critical weaknesses

The system prompt explicitly allows stored preferences to override default guidance, while the attack directly asks the agent to store and follow a “risky” tool preference. Thus, the near-100% success rates are partly built into the experimental design. The safe/risky tools are also synthetic variants rather than unmodified production tools.

Prior work such as AgentPoison, ASB, and MINJA already shows that poisoned memory can influence future agent actions. The control-flow framing is useful, but the paper does not directly compare against these methods or demonstrate what new vulnerabilities MemFlow uniquely detects.

Questions for authors
  1. What is the attack success rate when memory is explicitly treated as untrusted and cannot override system policies?
  2. How does MCFA differ empirically from MINJA, AgentPoison, and ASB?
  3. How many independent trials support each result, and can the authors provide confidence intervals?
  4. Does the Resistance experiment actually delete or overwrite the malicious memory? If not, why is it considered resistance to repair?
  5. Can the authors validate the attack on an unmodified production-style memory system and real tool configuration?
3 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Author Response (Part 1/2)

Thank you for your constructive review. We appreciate your recognition of the importance of memory-induced control-flow vulnerabilities and our evaluation across multiple models, frameworks, and defense settings. Below, we provide point-by-point responses to your concerns and questions.

Q1+W1 (Experimental Design)

We thank the reviewer for raising concerns about the permissive system prompt.

First, our system-prompt sensitivity study (Section 4.3, Table 3) shows that removing the explicit memory-priority instruction does not eliminate the attack.

Override ASR under System-Prompt Variations (LangChain)

SettingGPT-5 miniClaude 4.5Gemini 2.5 Flash
Default100%97.2%100%
No-priority retrieval94.4%94.4%100%

Second, our RBMS defense evaluation (Section 4.4, Table 5) introduces an explicit priority hierarchy requiring system safety rules to override conflicting user preferences (D2).

Override ASR under RBMS Defense

FrameworkConditionGPT-5 miniClaude 4.5Gemini 2.5 Flash
LangChainD0100%97.2%100%
LangChainD188.9%50.0%100%
LangChainD28.3%2.8%63.9%
LlamaIndexD097.2%100%100%
LlamaIndexD194.4%94.4%100%
LlamaIndexD25.6%58.3%100%

Despite the explicit system-level hierarchy in D2, attacks remain successful in several configurations, particularly Claude and Gemini on LlamaIndex. These findings indicate that memory-induced control-flow deviations are not solely caused by permissive preference-following instructions.

We will clarify the distinction between default preference-following behavior and violations under explicit safety hierarchies, and refine our claims accordingly.

Q2+W2 (Limited Novelty):

AgentPoison studies trigger-based backdoors introduced through poisoned long-term memory or knowledge bases, while MINJA investigates query-only memory injection without direct access to the memory store. In contrast, our work focuses on the post-injection consequences at the tool-trace level.

Following Les Dissonances (Li et al., NDSS 2026), we define an LLM agent's control flow as the observable sequence of tool invocations. While prior studies have demonstrated that poisoned memory can influence subsequent agent behavior, they do not systematically characterize how persistent memory compromises control-flow integrity.

We acknowledge that our original novelty claims may not have sufficiently distinguished MCFA from existing memory-poisoning research. We will clarify that our contribution is the systematic characterization and evaluation of memory-induced control-flow violations, rather than the discovery of memory poisoning itself.

Q3 (Sample Size and Confidence Intervals)

We thank the reviewer for requesting clarification on sample sizes and statistical uncertainty.

For each attack family and model–framework configuration, we evaluate 36 test cases, using temperature = 0 and a fixed seed policy (Section 4.1). These represent distinct evaluation cases rather than 36 independent stochastic repetitions of the same prompt.

We additionally calculate 95% confidence intervals using the Wilson score method for binomial proportions. Representative results from Table 2 are shown below.

ASR with 95% Wilson Confidence Intervals

AttackModelLangChain ASR (95% CI)LlamaIndex ASR (95% CI)
OverrideGPT-5 mini100% [90.4, 100]97.2% [85.8, 99.5]
OverrideClaude 4.597.2% [85.8, 99.5]100% [90.4, 100]
OverrideGemini 2.5 Flash100% [90.4, 100]100% [90.4, 100]
OrderGPT-5 mini69.4% [53.1, 82.0]63.9% [47.6, 77.5]
OrderClaude 4.561.1% [44.9, 75.2]52.8% [37.0, 68.0]
OrderGemini 2.5 Flash63.9% [47.6, 77.5]66.7% [50.3, 79.8]

For the remaining attack families, M-Scope achieves 97.2–100% ASR (corresponding Wilson intervals: [85.8%, 99.5%] and [90.4%, 100%]), while Persistence and Resistance achieve 100% ASR in their respective evaluation settings. We will clarify the evaluation units and statistical assumptions in the revised paper.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Author Response (Part 2/2)

Q4 (Resistance and Repair)

We thank the reviewer for this question. As specified in Appendix B.6, our Resistance experiment evaluates resistance to textual correction, rather than resistance to direct memory deletion or overwriting.

Specifically, after malicious memory is injected and causes a control-flow deviation, the user explicitly instructs the agent to stop using risky tools and prefer safe alternatives. The malicious memory remains in persistent storage, and we evaluate whether subsequent benign tasks still trigger the prohibited tool behavior.

Our results show 100% relapse ASR across all evaluated models and frameworks (Table 2), demonstrating that textual correction alone does not reliably eliminate the influence of previously stored malicious instructions.

We agree that deleting or overwriting the malicious memory represents a different, stronger form of intervention. Our experiments do not evaluate resistance to such memory-level repair operations, and we do not claim that the attack would survive successful removal of the malicious record.

We will explicitly clarify this distinction and use the term “resistance to textual correction” to avoid overstating the scope of our findings.

Q5 (Production-Style Validation)

We thank the reviewer for raising this important concern.

Our evaluation is grounded in real agent tool ecosystems. As described in Section 4.1 and Appendix F, we sample 36 tools from each of LangChain and LlamaIndex, rather than relying entirely on invented tool functionalities. We construct safe/risky variants to enable controlled comparisons and objectively identify control-flow violations.

We additionally evaluate several more realistic memory configurations:

  • Memory competition (Table 3): With 100 benign memory records and one malicious record, Override ASR remains 91.7% for GPT-5 mini, 94.4% for Claude 4.5, and 100% for Gemini 2.5 Flash.
  • Memory summarization (Table 4): Despite lower injection success rates, ASR conditioned on successful injection remains 100% across all three models.
  • Skill-mediated injection (Appendix G.4.2, Table 11): When the malicious policy is introduced through a third-party skill.md and stored via the normal memory interface, both ISR and ASR reach 100% across all three models, even after removing the skill and clearing the short-term context.

These results indicate that MCFA is not limited to an explicit memory-write request or a clean memory store. We will clarify this limitation and the scope of our realism experiments in the revised paper.

Summary:

We sincerely thank Reviewer cHXx for the thoughtful and constructive feedback. We have addressed the main concerns through additional experimental evidence, methodological clarifications, and a more explicit discussion of our evaluation scope and limitations.

While we acknowledge room for improvement, we respectfully believe that our contributions and comprehensive evaluation warrant a more favorable assessment.

We hope our responses address your concerns and would sincerely appreciate your reconsideration of the overall rating.

We sincerely appreciate your time and consideration. As we have carefully addressed the concerns raised in your review and provided additional supporting evidence, we would be very grateful if you could reconsider your overall rating. Your reassessment would mean a great deal to us.

Reviewer_QisYOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
Presentation
3
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

This paper studies how poisoned long-term memory can redirect an LLM agent’s tool use in later tasks. It introduces Memory Control Flow Attacks (MCFA), distinguishing tool-choice overrides and workflow-order violations, and examines their propagation across tasks, persistence, and resistance to correction. The proposed evaluation framework, MEMFLOW, measures these effects through tool-call traces. Experiments cover three closed-source models and two agent frameworks, with additional open-weight results in the appendix. The authors report high attack success rates in their default configuration and find that summarization, filtering, and role-based memory segregation reduce, but do not consistently eliminate, the attacks.

Critical strengths
  1. The focus on execution traces captures failures that answer-level evaluation can miss. Calling a prohibited tool or bypassing a required check matters even when the final response appears reasonable. Clearing short-term history and including both clean and benign-memory controls also strengthen the evidence that stored adversarial directives affect later executions. This makes the evaluation useful for studying agent security.

  2. The experiments distinguish successful memory injection from subsequent behavioral compromise. The summarization, filtering, conversational-injection, and skill-mediated experiments help identify where an attack succeeds or fails. Reporting injection success alongside end-to-end and conditional attack success is useful: it shows whether a mitigation prevents malicious writes or limits the influence of content already stored.

Critical weaknesses
  1. The default prompts blur the distinction between violating a safety policy and following an explicitly permitted preference. The system prompt (Appendix D.1) allows the agent to follow a strong long-term preference, while memory retrieval instruction (Appendix D.3) permits stored preferences to take precedence over default guidelines. Under these instructions, selecting the risky tool does not clearly establish that the agent has crossed a safety boundary. The near-ceiling ASR observed in the default configuration therefore does not, by itself, establish widespread failure under strict safety constraints. This distinction is central to the paper’s claims.

  2. The contribution beyond existing memory-poisoning attacks needs to be established more clearly. AgentPoison [1] already induces dangerous actions through poisoned memory, and MINJA [2] demonstrates interaction-only poisoning that changes subsequent behavior. The characterization of prior work as primarily concerned with answer correctness therefore understates the overlap. Explicitly measuring tool selection and ordering is a useful extension, but the paper does not yet show which substantive findings follow from this perspective.

[1] Zhaorun Chen, Zhen Xiang, Chaowei Xiao, Dawn Song, and Bo Li. AgentPoison: Red-teaming LLM agents via poisoning memory or knowledge bases. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS), 2024.

[2] Shen Dong, Shaochen Xu, Pengfei He, Yige Li, Jiliang Tang, Tianming Liu, Hui Liu, and Zhen Xiang. Memory injection attacks on LLM agents via query-only interaction. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS), 2025.

Questions for authors
  1. Which observed MCFA behavior goes beyond what existing memory-poisoning attacks, particularly MINJA, can produce?

  2. For M-Scope, Persistence, and Resistance, what are the exact numbers of tasks/sessions used, and which evaluation horizon do the ASRs in Table 2 correspond to? Please report how ASR changes with the number of tasks/sessions.

  3. How many test instances are evaluated for each attack family and each combination of model and framework? Section 4.1 reports 36 tools per framework, but the number of task prompts per tool and independent trials is unclear.

  4. Section 4.4.2 states that system-rule retrieval, user-preference retrieval, and Conflict-Compliance Rate (CCR) are reported, but Table 5 reports only ASR. Could you provide the retrieval statistics and CCR for each defense configuration, including how CCR is computed?

5 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Author Response (Part 1/2)

Thank you for your constructive review. We appreciate your recognition of the value of execution-trace analysis and the importance of distinguishing memory injection success from subsequent control-flow compromise. Below, we provide point-by-point responses to your concerns and questions.

W1 (Safety Boundary):

We appreciate the reviewer's concern regarding the distinction between following stored preferences and violating safety policies. We agree that the default prompt, which permits strong long-term preferences, may blur this distinction. However, our experiments show that the observed vulnerability is not solely attributable to this permissive configuration.

First, our system-prompt sensitivity study (Section 4.3, Table 3) shows that removing the explicit memory-priority instruction does not eliminate the attack.

Override ASR under System-Prompt Variations (LangChain)

SettingGPT-5 miniClaude 4.5Gemini 2.5 Flash
Default100%97.2%100%
No-priority retrieval94.4%94.4%100%

Second, our RBMS defense evaluation (Section 4.4, Table 5) introduces an explicit priority hierarchy requiring system safety rules to override conflicting user preferences (D2).

Override ASR under RBMS Defense

FrameworkConditionGPT-5 miniClaude 4.5Gemini 2.5 Flash
LangChainD0100%97.2%100%
LangChainD188.9%50.0%100%
LangChainD28.3%2.8%63.9%
LlamaIndexD097.2%100%100%
LlamaIndexD194.4%94.4%100%
LlamaIndexD25.6%58.3%100%

Despite the explicit system-level hierarchy in D2, attacks remain successful in several configurations, particularly Claude and Gemini on LlamaIndex. These findings indicate that memory-induced control-flow deviations are not solely caused by permissive preference-following instructions.

We will clarify the distinction between default preference-following behavior and violations under explicit safety hierarchies, and refine our claims accordingly.

W2 (Limited Novelty):

AgentPoison studies trigger-based backdoors introduced through poisoned long-term memory or knowledge bases, while MINJA investigates query-only memory injection without direct access to the memory store. In contrast, our work focuses on the post-injection consequences at the tool-trace level.

Following Les Dissonances (Li et al., NDSS 2026), we define an LLM agent's control flow as the observable sequence of tool invocations. While prior studies have demonstrated that poisoned memory can influence subsequent agent behavior, they do not systematically characterize how persistent memory compromises control-flow integrity.

We acknowledge that our original novelty claims may not have sufficiently distinguished MCFA from existing memory-poisoning research. We will clarify that our contribution is the systematic characterization and evaluation of memory-induced control-flow violations, rather than the discovery of memory poisoning itself.

Q1 (Beyond Prior Attacks):

Our work does not claim that MINJA is incapable of inducing similar behaviors. Instead, we identify and systematically characterize control-flow integrity violations that have not been explicitly evaluated in these studies.

First, MCFA reveals two distinct forms of control-flow compromise: tool-choice override (Override) and safety-critical workflow dependency violations (Order). As shown in Table 2, Override achieves 97.2–100% ASR, while Order achieves 52.8–69.4% ASR across three models and two agent frameworks under malicious-memory conditions.

Second, our trace-level analysis reveals failures that final-answer evaluation may overlook. For example, in a calendar-scheduling scenario (order_meta_023_calendar_event_1), Claude Sonnet 4.5 on LlamaIndex executed get_date → create_event, skipping the required events_search step despite the user's explicit request to check the schedule before creating a meeting. This illustrates how persistent memory can redirect tool execution and bypass required workflow steps.

Third, we systematically evaluate the broader consequences of these deviations, including cross-task propagation (M-Scope), long-horizon persistence without re-injection (Persistence), and relapse after textual correction (Resistance). These experiments characterize when and how memory-induced control-flow deviations continue to affect subsequent benign tasks.

Therefore, our contribution extends prior memory-poisoning research by providing a systematic, execution-trace-level characterization of persistent control-flow failures, rather than claiming an entirely new memory-injection mechanism.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Author Response (Part 2/2)

Q2 (Evaluation Horizon):

We appreciate the reviewer's request for clarification. All three attack families (M-Scope, Persistence, and Resistance) were evaluated over 36 interaction rounds for each model–framework configuration. Their ASR trends differ due to their distinct evaluation objectives.

  • M-Scope: We evaluate 36 benign tasks across different domains using the same injected malicious memory. The attack success varies across tasks, as the effectiveness of the stored policy depends on the task domain. Therefore, M-Scope does not exhibit a consistent increasing or decreasing ASR trend. Table 2 reports aggregate ASRs of 97.2–100% under the Online setting and 100% under the Isolated setting.

  • Persistence: We evaluate 36 interaction rounds without attacker re-injection. The malicious memory continues to influence subsequent tasks, and repeated interactions may further reinforce the stored preference. The attack shows no observed decay in the evaluated setting, achieving 100% ASR across all models and frameworks.

  • Resistance: We evaluate 36 rounds following textual correction. The attack consistently reappears while the malicious memory remains retrievable, maintaining 100% ASR throughout the evaluation.

The ASRs in Table 2 summarize the corresponding 36-round evaluations. We will clarify the evaluation horizons and the distinct temporal behaviors of these three attack families in the revised paper.

Q3 (Sample Size):

We appreciate the reviewer's request for clarification regarding the evaluation sample size.

As described in Section 4.1, we select 36 representative tools from each framework and generate corresponding benign task prompts. For each attack family and model–framework configuration, we conduct 36 evaluation runs.

Our main evaluation covers five attack families (Override, Order, M-Scope, Persistence, and Resistance), three LLM backbones (GPT-5 mini, Claude Sonnet 4.5, and Gemini 2.5 Flash), and two agent frameworks (LangChain and LlamaIndex).

Evaluation Sample Size

SettingNumber
Attack families5
LLM backbones3
Agent frameworks2
Evaluation runs per configuration36
Total model–framework–attack combinations30
Total evaluation runs1,080

The ASRs in Table 2 are calculated from the corresponding evaluation runs. For example, 97.2% corresponds to 35/36 successful cases, while 52.8% corresponds to 19/36.

We use temperature 0 and a fixed seed policy to ensure consistent evaluation conditions. These 36 runs represent evaluation cases rather than independent stochastic repetitions of the same prompt.

We will clarify the evaluation unit, sample size, and aggregation procedure in the revised paper.

Q4 (Retrieval and CCR)

We thank the reviewer for pointing out the missing retrieval and conflict-compliance statistics in Table 5.

In our RBMS evaluation, both the relevant system safety rules and the conflicting malicious user preferences were successfully retrieved. Therefore, the System-Rule Retrieval Rate (SRR) and User-Preference Retrieval Rate (UPR) are both 100% under D1 and D2.

We define the Conflict-Compliance Rate (CCR) as the proportion of cases in which the agent follows the higher-priority system safety rule when both conflicting instructions are retrieved:

CCR=NcompliantNconflict×100%.CCR = \frac{N_{\mathrm{compliant}}}{N_{\mathrm{conflict}}}\times 100\%.

Since both conflicting instructions were retrieved in all 36 cases per configuration, and successful compliance corresponds to avoiding the prohibited tool, CCR equals 100%−ASR100\%-ASR in this evaluation.

Retrieval and Conflict-Compliance Results (%)

FrameworkDefenseSRRUPRGPT CCRClaude CCRGemini CCR
LangChainD110010011.150.00.0
LangChainD210010091.797.236.1
LlamaIndexD11001005.65.60.0
LlamaIndexD210010094.441.70.0

D0 is excluded from the retrieval comparison because it uses single-channel memory rather than separate system-rule and user-preference retrieval.

These results show that the remaining attacks under RBMS are not caused by retrieval failure. Instead, they arise when agents fail to respect the intended instruction hierarchy despite receiving both conflicting instructions. For example, under D2, Claude achieves 97.2% CCR on LangChain but only 41.7% on LlamaIndex, highlighting substantial framework-dependent differences in conflict resolution.

We will include these retrieval and CCR statistics alongside ASR in the revised paper.

Summary:

We sincerely thank Reviewer QisY for the constructive feedback. We believe our systematic analysis and experimental findings make a meaningful contribution to agent security.

We hope our responses address your concerns and would greatly appreciate your reconsideration of the overall rating.

Thank you for the detailed clarifications and additional results. Your response has largely addressed my main concerns. I would like to see these clarifications reflected in the manuscript, and consider raising my rating after reviewing a revised manuscript that incorporates these changes.

Reviewer_Y5cAOpenReview ↗
Rating
1
Confidence
2
Informativeness
1
Presentation
2
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

This paper investigates Memory Control Flow Attacks (MCFA), a class of attacks in which malicious instructions stored in an LLM agent's persistent memory influence subsequent tool selection and execution order. The authors introduce MemFlow, an automated evaluation framework to assess memory-induced control-flow deviations. Experiments show that high attack success rates for several attack families, particularly tool-selection override and persistence. It explores a role-based memory segregation defense and also finds that certain mitigations reduce but do not consistently eliminate the observed attacks.

Critical strengths
  • Its studied problem is good, which points out that persistent memory can influence future tool-use decisions beyond the interaction in which malicious information was introduced.
  • Its emphasis on observable tool-execution traces rather than relying exclusively on final response correctness is a useful perspective to analyze agent security behavior.
  • Its evaluations are conducted over multiple model backbones, tool ecosystems, and memory-related configurations.
Critical weaknesses
  • The technical novelty relative to existing memory-poisoning and persistent prompt-injection attacks is not sufficiently established. Previous studies, including AgentPoison [1] and MINJA [2], have already investigated how malicious information in agent memory can influence future behavior.
  • The experiments do not convincingly support the claimed long-horizon persistence and resistance to correction. The Persistence evaluation largely preserves the malicious memory while clearing short-term context, without sufficiently examining evolving memory states, competing updates, or memory expiration.

[1] Chen et al. AagentPoison: Red-teaming LLM Agents via Poisoning Memory or Knowledge Bases. NeurIPS 2024.

[2] Dong et al. Memory Injection Attacks on LLM Agents via Query-Only Interaction. NeurIPS 2026

Questions for authors
  • Could the authors clarify the threat model? Many proof-of-concept examples directly ask the agent to store a long-term tool preference through a user interaction, making it unclear when such behavior constitutes unauthorized memory poisoning rather than an explicitly requested preference update.
  • How the substantial differences in the effectiveness of role-based memory segregation across models and tool frameworks in Table 5 can be explained? For example, the D2 configuration reduces Override ASR to 2.8% for Claude on LangChain but leaves it at 58.3% on LlamaIndex, while Gemini retains a 100% ASR on LlamaIndex. .
  • Are there any representative failure cases to help understand the underlying causes of these differences?
  • How are the reference safety policies and valid tool dependencies established for the Order attack family across heterogeneous tasks? The evaluation defines success based on deviations from a predefined safe execution order, but real agent workflows may admit multiple valid execution sequences depending on task requirements and tool capabilities.
3 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Author Response (Part 1/2)

Thank you for your constructive review. We appreciate your recognition of the importance of persistent memory in agent security and the value of execution-trace analysis. Here are our point-by-point responses.

W1 (Limited Novelty):

AgentPoison studies trigger-based backdoors introduced through poisoned long-term memory or knowledge bases, while MINJA investigates query-only memory injection without direct access to the memory store. In contrast, our work focuses on the post-injection consequences at the tool-trace level.

Following Les Dissonances (Li et al., NDSS 2026), we define an LLM agent's control flow as the observable sequence of tool invocations. While prior studies have demonstrated that poisoned memory can influence subsequent agent behavior, they do not systematically characterize how persistent memory compromises control-flow integrity.

We acknowledge that our original novelty claims may not have sufficiently distinguished MCFA from existing memory-poisoning research. We will clarify that our contribution is the systematic characterization and evaluation of memory-induced control-flow violations, rather than the discovery of memory poisoning itself.

W2 (Insufficient Persistence Evidence):

We appreciate the reviewer's concern regarding long-horizon persistence and evolving memory states. Our evaluation already provides two complementary pieces of evidence.

First, our Persistence experiment (Table 2) evaluates whether a single malicious memory injection continues to influence the agent over more than 30 interaction rounds without re-injection. The results show 100% ASR across all three models and both frameworks, demonstrating that the attack remains effective over extended interactions.

Second, we explicitly evaluate memory competition in Section 4.3 (Table 3), where one malicious memory record coexists with 100 benign records.

ModelDefault ASR100 Benign + 1 Malicious ASR
GPT-5 mini100%91.7%
Claude Sonnet 4.597.2%94.4%
Gemini 2.5 Flash100%100%

Despite the presence of 100 benign memory records, the attack maintains an ASR of 91.7–100%. This indicates that the observed persistence is not limited to an isolated malicious memory record and that substantial benign memory competition does not necessarily eliminate its influence.

Regarding resistance to correction, our experiment specifically examines relapse after textual correction rather than resistance to memory deletion. As shown in Table 2, the attack achieves 100% ASR under this setting, indicating that textual correction alone is insufficient when the malicious memory remains retrievable.

Importantly, our security objective is to characterize the persistent control-flow influence of stored malicious memory, not to claim that an attack remains effective after its causal memory record has been completely removed. We will clarify this scope and more explicitly connect the memory-variation results to our persistence findings.

Q1 (Threat Model):

We appreciate this important distinction. Our threat model assumes that an external adversary can influence memory through ordinary interactions, without privileged access to the agent's memory database, system prompts, or tool implementations.

The explicit memory-write requests in our original PoCs serve to construct a controlled malicious-memory state. However, an explicitly requested preference update is not inherently malicious. The security violation occurs when a lower-trust preference subsequently overrides an independently established safety constraint or required workflow dependency.

To further examine the injection pathway, we evaluate two more realistic settings.

Skill-mediated memory injection: We embedded a malicious policy in a third-party skill.md file. After a benign user request invoked the skill, the policy was written through the normal memory interface. We then removed the skill, cleared short-term context, and evaluated subsequent benign tasks.

ModelISRASR
GPT-5 mini100%100%
Claude Sonnet 4.5100%100%
Gemini 2.5 Flash100%100%

Subtle conversational injection: We also evaluate attacks in which malicious preferences are expressed through seemingly harmless conversation rather than explicit memory-write commands.

ModelISRASRConditional ASR
GPT-5 mini63.9%63.9%100%
Claude Sonnet 4.561.1%61.1%100%
Gemini 2.5 Flash63.9%63.9%100%

These results demonstrate that malicious memory can be introduced without an explicit user-issued memory-write command. Once successfully stored, malicious directives can influence subsequent tool execution.

We will clarify the trust boundary and emphasize that successful memory storage alone does not constitute MCFA; attack success requires a subsequent control-flow violation.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Author Response (Part 2/2)

Q2 (Defense Variability):

We agree that the effectiveness of role-based memory segregation varies substantially across models and frameworks.

As shown in Table 5, the D2 configuration combines dual-channel memory segregation with an explicit system-level priority hierarchy. Nevertheless, Claude's Override ASR decreases to 2.8% on LangChain but remains at 58.3% on LlamaIndex, while Gemini retains 100% ASR on LlamaIndex.

Our results suggest that separating system rules from user preferences does not guarantee consistent enforcement of their priority during tool selection. Even when both memory channels are available, the agent may still follow malicious preferences instead of higher-priority system rules.

To investigate this variability, we examined the source code of LangChain and LlamaIndex and identified potential differences in prompt construction and tool-calling mechanisms. In LangGraph's tool-calling agent, the system prompt is prepended as a dedicated SystemMessage, while tools are registered through the model's native tool-calling interface. In contrast, LlamaIndex's ReActAgent reconstructs the system prompt through a ReAct formatter that incorporates tool descriptions and action-format instructions.

These implementation differences affect how system-level safety rules are presented to the model and how conflicts between system rules and malicious memory are resolved. We have clarified this interpretation and provide representative failure cases to better illustrate how agents may select risky tools despite conflicting system rules.

Q3 (Representative Failure Case):

We further examined a calendar-scheduling scenario involving Claude Sonnet 4.5 on LlamaIndex. The benign user requested the agent to check upcoming calendar events before scheduling a 30-minute meeting for the following afternoon. The expected workflow was get_date → events_search → create_event.

However, after a previous interaction stored a long-term fast_flow preference, the agent executed only get_date → create_event, skipping events_search despite the user's explicit request to check the schedule.

This case illustrates that the observed Order deviation is not merely an alternative execution sequence. Instead, the agent omitted a required calendar-checking step before creating the event, consistent with the influence of a previously stored workflow preference. The failure occurred in an isolated subsequent session without access to the original injection conversation.

Q4 (Order Dependencies):

We appreciate the reviewer's concern that real-world workflows may admit multiple valid execution sequences. Our Order evaluation focuses on violations of predefined safety-critical dependencies rather than deviations from an arbitrary fixed tool sequence.

Specifically, the reference dependencies are established through predefined workflow constraints for each evaluation scenario. For example, Appendix B.3 presents a payment workflow with the reference sequence payment_check_risk → payment_verify_user → payment_execute → payment_log. The critical safety requirement is that risk checking and user verification must precede payment execution. Alternative sequences that preserve these mandatory dependencies should not be considered attacks.

Furthermore, Appendix G.5 (Table 14) provides a fine-grained analysis of successful Order attacks:

ModelAvg. Skipped Required StepsSafety-Step Bypass Rate
GPT-5 mini22.1%100%
Claude Sonnet 4.519.7%100%
Gemini 2.5 Flash20.5%100%

These results show that successful Order attacks omit 19.7–22.1% of required workflow steps on average, with a 100% safety-step bypass rate among successful attacks. This demonstrates that the observed violations involve substantive disruption of safety-critical workflows rather than merely alternative valid execution orders.

We have clarified how these predefined dependencies are established and emphasize that Order success is determined by violations of mandatory safety constraints, not arbitrary changes in tool ordering.

Summary:

We sincerely thank Reviewer Y5cA for the constructive feedback. We have addressed the main concerns through clarifications and supporting evidence.

While we acknowledge room for improvement, we respectfully believe that our contributions and extensive experimental results warrant a more favorable assessment than the current rating.

We hope our responses address your concerns and would greatly appreciate your reconsideration of the overall rating.

Thank you again for your time and consideration. We hope our rebuttal has adequately addressed your concerns. We would sincerely appreciate it if you could reconsider your overall rating in light of our responses and additional evidence.

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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