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- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
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Paper summary
This paper studies Memory Control Flow Attacks (MCFA), where malicious instructions stored in an agent’s long-term memory alter tool selection or execution order in later benign tasks. It introduces MemFlow, an isolated trace-auditing framework, and evaluates four LLMs across LangChain and LlamaIndex. The experiments report high attack success rates and show that memory segregation reduces but does not eliminate the attack.
Critical strengths
This paper introduces Memory Control Flow Attacks (MCFA), in which an action-oriented policy stored in an LLM agent’s persistent memory changes the tool-selection or tool-execution behavior of later benign tasks.
The paper evaluates multiple models, frameworks, attack types, and defenses, with useful prompt and implementation details.
Critical weaknesses
The system prompt explicitly allows stored preferences to override default guidance, while the attack directly asks the agent to store and follow a “risky” tool preference. Thus, the near-100% success rates are partly built into the experimental design. The safe/risky tools are also synthetic variants rather than unmodified production tools.
Prior work such as AgentPoison, ASB, and MINJA already shows that poisoned memory can influence future agent actions. The control-flow framing is useful, but the paper does not directly compare against these methods or demonstrate what new vulnerabilities MemFlow uniquely detects.
Questions for authors
- What is the attack success rate when memory is explicitly treated as untrusted and cannot override system policies?
- How does MCFA differ empirically from MINJA, AgentPoison, and ASB?
- How many independent trials support each result, and can the authors provide confidence intervals?
- Does the Resistance experiment actually delete or overwrite the malicious memory? If not, why is it considered resistance to repair?
- Can the authors validate the attack on an unmodified production-style memory system and real tool configuration?
3 comments
Author Response (Part 2/2)
Q4 (Resistance and Repair)
We thank the reviewer for this question. As specified in Appendix B.6, our Resistance experiment evaluates resistance to textual correction, rather than resistance to direct memory deletion or overwriting.
Specifically, after malicious memory is injected and causes a control-flow deviation, the user explicitly instructs the agent to stop using risky tools and prefer safe alternatives. The malicious memory remains in persistent storage, and we evaluate whether subsequent benign tasks still trigger the prohibited tool behavior.
Our results show 100% relapse ASR across all evaluated models and frameworks (Table 2), demonstrating that textual correction alone does not reliably eliminate the influence of previously stored malicious instructions.
We agree that deleting or overwriting the malicious memory represents a different, stronger form of intervention. Our experiments do not evaluate resistance to such memory-level repair operations, and we do not claim that the attack would survive successful removal of the malicious record.
We will explicitly clarify this distinction and use the term “resistance to textual correction” to avoid overstating the scope of our findings.
Q5 (Production-Style Validation)
We thank the reviewer for raising this important concern.
Our evaluation is grounded in real agent tool ecosystems. As described in Section 4.1 and Appendix F, we sample 36 tools from each of LangChain and LlamaIndex, rather than relying entirely on invented tool functionalities. We construct safe/risky variants to enable controlled comparisons and objectively identify control-flow violations.
We additionally evaluate several more realistic memory configurations:
- Memory competition (Table 3): With 100 benign memory records and one malicious record, Override ASR remains 91.7% for GPT-5 mini, 94.4% for Claude 4.5, and 100% for Gemini 2.5 Flash.
- Memory summarization (Table 4): Despite lower injection success rates, ASR conditioned on successful injection remains 100% across all three models.
- Skill-mediated injection (Appendix G.4.2, Table 11): When the malicious policy is introduced through a third-party
skill.mdand stored via the normal memory interface, both ISR and ASR reach 100% across all three models, even after removing the skill and clearing the short-term context.
These results indicate that MCFA is not limited to an explicit memory-write request or a clean memory store. We will clarify this limitation and the scope of our realism experiments in the revised paper.
Summary:
We sincerely thank Reviewer cHXx for the thoughtful and constructive feedback. We have addressed the main concerns through additional experimental evidence, methodological clarifications, and a more explicit discussion of our evaluation scope and limitations.
While we acknowledge room for improvement, we respectfully believe that our contributions and comprehensive evaluation warrant a more favorable assessment.
We hope our responses address your concerns and would sincerely appreciate your reconsideration of the overall rating.
We sincerely appreciate your time and consideration. As we have carefully addressed the concerns raised in your review and provided additional supporting evidence, we would be very grateful if you could reconsider your overall rating. Your reassessment would mean a great deal to us.
Author Response (Part 1/2)
Thank you for your constructive review. We appreciate your recognition of the importance of memory-induced control-flow vulnerabilities and our evaluation across multiple models, frameworks, and defense settings. Below, we provide point-by-point responses to your concerns and questions.
Q1+W1 (Experimental Design)
We thank the reviewer for raising concerns about the permissive system prompt.
First, our system-prompt sensitivity study (Section 4.3, Table 3) shows that removing the explicit memory-priority instruction does not eliminate the attack.
Override ASR under System-Prompt Variations (LangChain)
Second, our RBMS defense evaluation (Section 4.4, Table 5) introduces an explicit priority hierarchy requiring system safety rules to override conflicting user preferences (D2).
Override ASR under RBMS Defense
Despite the explicit system-level hierarchy in D2, attacks remain successful in several configurations, particularly Claude and Gemini on LlamaIndex. These findings indicate that memory-induced control-flow deviations are not solely caused by permissive preference-following instructions.
We will clarify the distinction between default preference-following behavior and violations under explicit safety hierarchies, and refine our claims accordingly.
Q2+W2 (Limited Novelty):
AgentPoison studies trigger-based backdoors introduced through poisoned long-term memory or knowledge bases, while MINJA investigates query-only memory injection without direct access to the memory store. In contrast, our work focuses on the post-injection consequences at the tool-trace level.
Following Les Dissonances (Li et al., NDSS 2026), we define an LLM agent's control flow as the observable sequence of tool invocations. While prior studies have demonstrated that poisoned memory can influence subsequent agent behavior, they do not systematically characterize how persistent memory compromises control-flow integrity.
We acknowledge that our original novelty claims may not have sufficiently distinguished MCFA from existing memory-poisoning research. We will clarify that our contribution is the systematic characterization and evaluation of memory-induced control-flow violations, rather than the discovery of memory poisoning itself.
Q3 (Sample Size and Confidence Intervals)
We thank the reviewer for requesting clarification on sample sizes and statistical uncertainty.
For each attack family and model–framework configuration, we evaluate 36 test cases, using temperature = 0 and a fixed seed policy (Section 4.1). These represent distinct evaluation cases rather than 36 independent stochastic repetitions of the same prompt.
We additionally calculate 95% confidence intervals using the Wilson score method for binomial proportions. Representative results from Table 2 are shown below.
ASR with 95% Wilson Confidence Intervals
For the remaining attack families, M-Scope achieves 97.2–100% ASR (corresponding Wilson intervals: [85.8%, 99.5%] and [90.4%, 100%]), while Persistence and Resistance achieve 100% ASR in their respective evaluation settings. We will clarify the evaluation units and statistical assumptions in the revised paper.