- Rating
- 3
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 3
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper introduces SynChain, a self-synthesized attack framework targeting persistent computer-use agents (CUAs). By applying persistence-aware supervised fine-tuning, the approach induces agents to generate malicious yet benign-looking artifacts that can be stored and reactivated across subsequent tasks. The authors also introduce CUAChain, comprising 30 task chains and three attack objectives. Experiments across OpenClaw, Codex, and Claude Code demonstrate strong attack effectiveness under multiple defenses, while revealing limitations in long-horizon attack propagation.
Critical strengths
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The paper identifies an important security vulnerability in self-generated persistent artifacts, extending existing agent attack research beyond externally injected malicious content.
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The experiments cover multiple agent frameworks, attack objectives, and defense mechanisms. The cross-task propagation analysis provides useful insights into persistent agent security.
Critical weaknesses
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The threat model assumes a pre-compromised model, which may limit the practical applicability of the attack. Comparisons with alternative model-compromise strategies would further strengthen the contribution.
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Attack effectiveness decreases substantially as the task chain grows longer, suggesting limitations in long-horizon persistence.
Questions for authors
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Could the authors further clarify how SynChain compares with alternative model-poisoning approaches under comparable attacker capabilities and training budgets?
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What are the primary factors contributing to the sharp performance degradation in longer task chains? Could the impact of memory summarization and artifact retrieval be quantified separately?
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The preliminary provenance-aware defense shows promising results. Could the authors discuss whether its effectiveness generalizes to other attack objectives and CUA frameworks?
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The related work discussion could more clearly position this study alongside existing research on persistent memory vulnerabilities and agent reliability, including AgentPoison, MemoryGraft, MemPoison, Sponge Tool Attack, and a survey titled Efficiency in LLM Multi-Agent Systems: A Survey. These connections would help clarify the distinct contributions of the proposed approach and its implications for agent safety and reliability.
4 comments
Responses to Reviewer rhbp (2/2)
For Question 3: Does the provenance-aware defense generalize to other objectives and frameworks?
Yes. We extended the pipeline of Appendix B.5 from one cell to all three objectives and all three frameworks at Chain-2.
| Framework | O1 | O2 | O3 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Claude Code | 86.7 → 16.7 | 76.7 → 20.0 | 83.3 → 23.3 |
| Codex | 86.7 → 20.0 | 83.3 → 23.3 | 86.7 → 26.7 |
| OpenClaw | 76.7 → 16.7 | 73.3 → 20.0 | 73.3 → 23.3 |
Each cell is Chain-2 ASR without the pipeline and with it. Reductions range from 50.0 to 70.0 points, and the pattern holds across the objectives and frameworks the original experiment did not cover.
Validating an artifact against the task that caused its creation holds up across all three objectives and frameworks we test.
We expanded Appendix B.5 to report the full three-framework, three-objective grid.
For Question 4: How does this work relate to the suggested papers?
We added all five works to the discussion. AgentPoison [1] poisons an agent's long-term memory or RAG knowledge base with records retrieved at inference. MemoryGraft [2] plants poisoned successful experiences through content the agent ingests and later imitates. MemPoison [3] studies persistent memory threats across ten model families and measures how poisoned memory shifts their responses, with and without defenses.
In all three the malicious content enters from outside the model and is then stored. In SynChain the carrier is produced by the agent's own model during a benign workflow. No attacker-supplied record and no external trigger are involved at runtime. We also cite Sponge Tool Attack [4] and the survey on efficiency in LLM multi-agent systems [5] next to our efficiency analysis in Section 4.5. Both concern the cost of agentic execution, which is separate from cross-task compromise.
We added the memory-security comparisons to Sec. 2 and the efficiency references to Sec. 4.5.
Thank you for your constructive feedback; we remain open to further discussion and suggestions to improve the presentation and defensive implications of the work.
References
[1] Z. Chen, Z. Xiang, C. Xiao, D. Song, B. Li. AgentPoison: Red-teaming LLM Agents via Poisoning Memory or Knowledge Bases. NeurIPS 2024.
[2] S. S. Srivastava, H. He. MemoryGraft: Persistent Compromise of LLM Agents via Poisoned Experience Retrieval. 2025.
[3] J. Gao, K. Xia, Y. Zhang, X. Hong, M. Lin, X. Wei, W. Li, S. Lu. MemPoison: Uncovering Persistent Memory Threats and Structural Blind Spots in LLM Agents. 2026.
[4] Q. Li, X. Wang. Sponge Tool Attack: Stealthy Denial-of-Efficiency against Tool-Augmented Agentic Reasoning. ICML 2026.
[5] Q. Li, L. Xiong, H. Lu, W. Qu, X. Yang, J. Zhang, X. Wang. Efficiency in LLM Multi-Agent Systems: A Survey. 2026.
I thank the authors for their rebuttal, which has addressed most of my concerns. I therefore maintain my positive rating and continue to support acceptance.
Thank you for confirming that our rebuttal addressed your concerns and for your continued support of acceptance; your suggestions have substantially strengthened the paper.
Responses to Reviewer rhbp (1/2)
Dear Reviewer rhbp,
Thank you for your thoughtful review; we address the model-compromise comparisons, propagation failures, and defense generalization below, with the corresponding manuscript revisions highlighted in purple.
For Weakness 1 and Question 1: How realistic is the pre-compromised model, and how does SynChain compare with other model-compromise approaches?
The adversary only releases a compromised checkpoint or model endpoint. It cannot control future tasks, modify the agent framework, access the workspace, or install skills (Section 3.1). This matches how open-weight checkpoints and third-party endpoints are adopted in practice. It is a different capability from prompt or skill injection: the malicious content originates in the supplied model rather than a live external-content channel.
DemonAgent is the closest model-compromise family, a trigger-conditioned backdoor in the model, and SkillJect represents skill-layer injection. Both are adapted to the same Chain-N protocol with their original attack primitives unchanged (Appendix D). Both stay near 100% in Chain-1 without defense, which confirms the adaptation preserves their capability. Three comparisons follow.
The comparison isolates the training-target type at the same reported budget and distinguishes immediate model behavior from artifact-mediated persistence.
We clarified the threat model in Sec. 3.1 and added the matched direct-action control to Appendix J.
For Weakness 2 and Question 2: What drives the degradation in longer chains, and can summarization and retrieval be separated?
Yes. We audited saved failed Chain-2 to Chain-5 traces by their earliest observed failing stage. Each column reports shares among annotated failures at that depth.
Summarization and retrieval appear as separate rows, as you asked. Together they account for 30, 50, 65, and 75 percent of failures from Chain-2 to Chain-5. Memory summarization grows fastest, from 10 to 42 percent.
At Chain-2 the largest single category is a carrier that survives but is not enacted, at 30 percent. The conditional enactment rate after propagation therefore need not equal that of a freshly generated artifact.
The baselines decay faster under the same protocol. In Chain-3, SkillJect and DemonAgent average 16.48% and 4.35% ASR, against 26.57% for SynChain (Table 2).
We added failure attribution to Sec. 4.4 and Appendix H.3, and qualified the survival model in Appendix H.2.