- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 1
- Soundness
- 2
Read review
Paper summary
This paper addresses the safety monitoring challenge for long-horizon, tool-using AI agents, where safety failures often stem from evidence distributed across multiple individually innocuous steps. The authors propose CROSS, a runtime monitoring framework that combines a recurrent neural state with an extended Finite-State Machine. The primary contribution is a novel neuro-symbolic recurrent architecture that bidirectionally couples continuous memory with discrete policy states under a bounded neural observation window.
Critical strengths
-
CROSS effectively addresses the long-horizon context tradeoff in agent monitoring by introducing a bidirectional, coupled recurrence mechanism. Pairing continuous neural memory with deterministic FSM states allows the framework to operate within a fixed neural observation window.
-
Despite utilizing a significantly smaller backbone, CROSS achieves state-of-the-art F1 performance across synthetic tasks and three diverse public benchmarks, outperforming stronger 4B–7B guardrail baselines.
Critical weaknesses
-
The execution of CROSS heavily relies on predefined security predicates and hand-crafted FSM rules.
-
It remains unverified how CROSS behaves in closed-loop settings where its blocking interventions actively alter the agent's multi-turn generation trajectory.
Questions for authors
-
In the Introduction, the author's innovation seems to be incremental, combining two methods.
-
The description in the introduction section is obscure and difficult to understand, making it not very user-friendly for readers in non-professional fields.
3.In the introduction, the author should further clarify the key challenges or difficulties of the research question.
-
The model architecture adopts traditional RNNs, which may lead to problems in capturing long-term dependencies. Meanwhile, this has resulted in very limited innovation in the model.
-
The author used four indicators for evaluation. However, in areas of anomalies or safety, due to the scarcity of samples, AUROC and AUPRC are usually used to evaluate model performance more accurately.
2 comments
Response to Reviewer XpAo - Part 2
Q3. Clarifying the key research challenges
We will organize the motivation around three concrete challenges: retaining distant security evidence without repeatedly processing an expanding history; connecting ambiguous semantic evidence to exact object bindings and permissions; and producing auditable action decisions from these two forms of information. A short observation window can lose earlier evidence, latent compression does not by itself provide explicit authorization semantics, and symbolic rules require context-sensitive predicates. CROSS addresses these challenges through recurrent neural memory, persistent symbolic records, and the predicate-and-feedback interface between them. The revision will connect each challenge directly to its corresponding design choice.
Q4. Use of traditional RNNs and long-term dependencies
CROSS uses a Transformer-based event encoder with recurrence across agent events. The Transformer receives the current event, learned memory tokens carrying earlier evidence, and an embedding of the symbolic state. Learned query outputs and a fast–slow gated projector then update the memory for the next event. Thus, the architecture does not replace contextual encoding with a vanilla RNN; its recurrent state carries information between successive Transformer computations.
The fast–slow update is designed to balance retention and adaptation, while symbolic records preserve explicit facts and authorizations. We agree that compressed neural memory can still lose long-range evidence. The history and sequence-order analyses examine this issue in the evaluated settings, but do not establish lossless retention over arbitrary trajectory lengths or prove that the projector prevents forgetting. The novelty claim concerns the coupled security-state architecture, rather than recurrence or gating in isolation.
Q5. Why report decision metrics rather than AUROC and AUPRC?
We agree that AUROC and especially AUPRC would provide useful complementary evidence under class imbalance. Their relevance applies to safety detection as well as anomaly detection. Our evaluation reports ACC, precision, recall, and F1, with FPR in the ablations, because an action-level monitor must ultimately make an intervention decision. Recall measures missed unsafe cases; precision measures the fraction of alerts that are correct; and FPR measures the fraction of benign cases incorrectly flagged. These metrics characterize the evaluated operating point.
They do not replace threshold-swept evaluation. Even an exact confusion matrix cannot recover the score ordering needed for ROC or precision–recall curves, and rounded summary metrics generally do not uniquely determine integer confusion counts. We will revise the evaluation discussion to make this scope explicit. AUROC/AUPRC and recall at a specified low FPR are valuable extensions, but require suitable continuous scores or a clearly defined threshold-varying policy. For CROSS, evaluating its auxiliary neural risk score alone would not evaluate the complete FSM-based intervention policy. The current results support performance at the reported operating points.
We thank the reviewer again for recognizing the importance and promise of the work and for the constructive, detailed feedback. We will incorporate these explanations, the additional baseline results, and the identified reporting improvements into a future version.
Response to Reviewer XpAo - Part 1
We thank the reviewer for recognizing CROSS's approach to the long-horizon context trade-off and its reported F1 performance against the evaluated 4B–7B guardrails. We appreciate the questions about the architecture, evaluation, and presentation, and address each below.
W1. Dependence on predefined predicates and hand-crafted FSM rules
We agree that the predicate vocabulary and FSM rules define the scope of the monitor's policy coverage. Their roles, however, differ from those of the learned component. Predicate meanings are predefined, but their values are inferred from the evolving trajectory by the neural model; they are not supplied as oracle facts during evaluation. The FSM then combines these predictions with persistent records of object bindings, provenance, and explicit authorizations to determine an intervention.
This separation allows contextual interpretation to remain learned while making policy decisions reproducible and inspectable. For example, a neural prediction cannot itself create an authorization: the FSM requires a matching explicit grant. Defining this interface also does not require enumerating every possible attack sequence. Nevertheless, missing predicates, incorrect predictions, or incomplete rules can limit coverage. We will clarify these assumptions and the engineering required to adapt the predicate vocabulary and rule set to a new policy domain. The component ablations support the value of complementary states; they do not establish robustness to arbitrary predicate or rule errors.
W2. Behavior under closed-loop interventions
We agree that closed-loop behavior remains unverified. Our experiments evaluate recorded trajectories without regenerating the agent's subsequent actions after a block. The synthetic timely-blocking analysis reports 74.30% for CROSS versus 67.97% for StepGuard, the strongest baseline on this metric. Success requires blocking at the first unsafe action, with all unsafe trajectories as the denominator. This provides evidence about intervention timing during replay.
A live intervention can change later observations, trigger retries, or cause the agent to seek approval or abandon the task. The existing results do not measure these consequences. We will state this distinction explicitly. A direct evaluation would use paired interactive rollouts on the same tasks and agent seeds, measuring safety violations, legitimate task completion, unnecessary blocks, and recovery after intervention.
Q1. Is the contribution an incremental combination of two existing methods?
The contribution is the specific coupling of two persistent security states at the action boundary. At each event, the symbolic state conditions the neural update; a predicate head maps the updated latent representation to security predicates; and these predicates update the symbolic records that govern both the current intervention and subsequent neural updates. This recurrent information flow connects ambiguous contextual evidence with explicit permissions and object bindings while keeping the neural observation window bounded.
The component results reported in Section 5.4 support this design: synthetic F1 is 91.51% for CROSS, compared with 77.26% for Symbolic-Only, 66.59% for Neural-Only, and 60.48% for Stateless. These controls retain current-event computation while changing cross-event persistence. They therefore support complementary contributions from the two persistent states, although they do not isolate bidirectional coupling against every alternative fusion design. We will sharpen the Introduction around this contribution and distinguish it from the established ideas of neural recurrence and finite-state monitoring.
Q2. Accessibility of the Introduction
We appreciate this feedback and will revise the Introduction to explain the monitoring problem through a concrete example before introducing the architecture. An agent may read sensitive information early in a task, perform several benign actions, and later propose an external write. The write's safety depends on its relationship to the earlier information and the applicable authorization. This example will make the roles of contextual memory and explicit security records clear to readers outside agent-safety research. We will also define the main terms at first use and introduce the mechanism in plain language before presenting its formalization.