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- Informativeness
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- Presentation
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Paper summary
The paper proposes TS-Edit, a framework for repairing adversarially corrupted forecasts in time-series foundation models. It adapts causal tracing to identify influential feed-forward layers and applies ROME, Sequential ROME, or MEMIT to restore the model’s clean-input forecast. Its main contribution is extending existing localization and model-editing techniques to continuous time-series forecasting.
Validation covers TimesFM 2.5 and Toto 2.0 on Electricity, ETTh1, and Traffic under segment-restricted FGSM, BIM, and PGD attacks. Experiments assess forecast restoration, clean-input prediction drift, attack budgets, and transfer to fresh attack initializations and other attack families. The authors report substantial restoration in several settings, although effectiveness and specificity vary across datasets and editing methods.
However, the results primarily demonstrate repair with access to clean reference inputs and forecasts, rather than a practical defense when those references are unavailable. The supplied manuscript also lacks comparisons with established defenses and sufficient evidence of generalization to unrelated inputs or robustness against adaptive attacks targeting the edited model. These limitations, together with the largely incremental methodological contribution, motivate my recommendation to reject.
Critical strengths
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A meaningful extension of model editing to time-series forecasting. The paper adapts causal tracing and localized weight editing to investigate adversarial forecast corruption. This provides a useful experimental direction for studying whether editing techniques developed for language models can apply to continuous numerical predictions.
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Evidence of forecast restoration across multiple settings. Experiments cover two model families, three datasets, and three attack methods, including limited transfer tests with frozen edits. These results support the feasibility of localized repair beyond a single illustrative example.
However, these strengths do not outweigh the reliance on clean reference inputs and forecasts, the lack of established defense baselines, and the limited evidence of broader robustness. My overall recommendation remains rejection.
Critical weaknesses
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The defense relies on clean reference information whose availability is not justified. Causal tracing uses clean-input activations, and editing explicitly targets the model’s clean-input forecast. In deployment, the corresponding uncorrupted context may be unavailable. The experiments therefore establish repair under privileged access to clean references, but do not adequately demonstrate a usable defense under realistic conditions. This gap substantially limits the practical significance of the central claim.
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The evaluation is too narrow to establish general robustness. Although three benchmark datasets are included, the experiments emphasize selected univariate channels and a limited window-level evaluation. This provides useful preliminary evidence, but is insufficient to support broad claims about foundation-model robustness across diverse series, temporal regimes, and multivariate dependencies. Moreover, the absence of established defense baselines and adaptive attacks against the edited model leaves both comparative effectiveness and robustness unresolved. A substantially broader evaluation is needed to justify acceptance.
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The contribution of causal localization is insufficiently isolated. The paper combines existing tracing and editing methods, but the supplied manuscript does not establish whether selecting layers through causal tracing improves repair over random or fixed-layer selection under comparable editing budgets. Without this ablation, it is difficult to determine whether the central “localize-then-edit” design is necessary or whether similar improvements follow from ordinary localized optimization.
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The backdoor motivation is not matched by the evaluated threat model. The abstract motivates the framework through malicious backdoor injections, whereas the experiments evaluate inference-time input perturbations using FGSM, BIM, and PGD. These experiments do not establish removal of a learned backdoor or suppression of trigger-induced behavior. This mismatch leaves an important part of the security motivation unsupported and weakens the claimed scope of the contribution.
Questions for authors
Clarification: Could the authors clarify whether TS-Edit requires access to the uncorrupted counterpart of each attacked context and its clean forecast at repair time? This distinction is central to assessing its practical validity as a defense.
We thank the reviewer for the detailed assessment and for recognizing the relevance of extending model editing to time-series forecasting. We address the main concerns below.
Clarification question / W1: Does TS-Edit require the uncorrupted context and its clean forecast at repair time?
Yes, the clean reference is required to construct the edit. Our intended setting is offline repair using trusted historical data, followed by evaluation of the frozen edited model on new attacked inputs. The clean counterpart is not provided at that later inference step. We will make the distinction explicit and avoid presenting this as an online repair method that works without a clean reference.
Our frozen-edit experiments evaluate exactly this setting: each edit is fitted once on a single attacked window and then applied, without refitting or a clean reference, to new attacked inputs. The edit transfers well to new attacks on the fitted window, removing over 90% of the forecast error for unseen PGD seeds, BIM, and other PGD budgets. Transfer to new inputs is more limited. On 10 other windows of the same client and 11 other clients, ROME and SeqROME remove 48–66% of the error at the median, with some cases below 20%, and MEMIT removes only 16–23%. MEMIT also fails to transfer when a different segment of the fitted window is attacked. The full table is in our response to Reviewer 1 (W1/Q1), and per-case results are in Appendix D.5.
W3: Is causal localization necessary compared with random or fixed-layer selection?
Across the six model and dataset settings, edits in the final layers lose effectiveness in every case, and on Toto they leave the forecast worse than the attack. Layer choice therefore matters. The traced layer always falls in the early and middle region where editing works, repairs more than the average alternative layer in all six settings, and in four of the six it is either the best layer or within one seed standard deviation of it. Because tracing selects L0 in five of six settings, these results do not separate tracing from a fixed early-layer rule, and we present tracing as a practical heuristic for finding the editable region rather than as a necessary step. The full results are in our response to Reviewer 1 (W1).
W2: Narrow evaluation, multivariate dependencies, limited windows, missing baselines, and adaptive attacks.
The goal of the present study is to establish and characterize the behavior of localized model editing in time-series forecasting. A broader evaluation, including multivariate dependencies, adaptive attacks, and competing defense methods, is an important next step.
To address unseen windows and series directly, we added frozen-edit experiments in which a single edit, fitted on one window, is evaluated without refitting on 10 other windows of the same client and on 11 other clients over the same period. Transfer to these inputs is partial and varies across cases; see our response to Reviewer 1 (W1/Q1) and Appendix [D.5]. This analysis is separate from the population study, where an edit is fitted for each window individually.
W4: The backdoor motivation does not match the evaluated threat model.
We agree. The backdoor reference was meant as broader security context, but the abstract wording suggested that TS-Edit addresses backdoor attacks, which we do not evaluate. Our experiments study inference-time evasion attacks (FGSM, BIM, and PGD perturbations of the input context), and we have revised the abstract and related work to reflect this threat model. Please see our response to Reviewer 2 (Q4) for details.