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Paper summary
This work presents a new backdoor-mitigation approach called DISPEL, which uses the checkpoint of the clean base model and a set of backdoor-eliciting prompts to localize a backdoor in a poisoned model variant and ultimately intervene at inference-time through a learned patching of activations. The localization apparently works by comparing the weight values of the poisoned and clean model checkpoints, after which the backdoor mitigation works by partially patching model activations with the ones from the clean model at inference-time. In order to intervene only when necessary, they seem to rely on a set of prompts that activate the backdoor to learn to detect whenever it is getting fired up so that in these cases the activations can be patched. The method is evaluated on three models and three backdoor attack approaches but only on one particular backdoor link.
Critical strengths
- The writing is clear and easy to follow without any unnecessary overformalization, which makes it a pleasant read.
Critical weaknesses
- The assumption of having access to (1) a clean base model AND (2) a set of prompts that elicit the backdoor behavior are unrealistic. When we know that a model is backdoored, we can also simply not use it. The interesting case is when we do think the model itself is safe and clean and thus have no access to a set of backdoor-activating inputs. Additionally, it relies on (3) inference-time interventions, which makes DISPEL unusable for the open-source deployment of purified models, because it requires a controlled harness around the model itself.
- The entire evaluation seems to fundamentally restricted to only a single (arguably artificial and not of practical relevance) backdoor with a textual trigger "Einstein"+"writing" and a target concept "hat". Removal behavior and localization can severely differ between different backdoors, which is why more than a single backdoor link should be studied. For example, more realistic use cases would involve explicit content or other forms of generation misuse.
Questions for authors
Clarifications
- Can you please respond to my concerns regarding the assumptions that your backdoor defense method makes. The paper mentions that the defender never requires to name the trigger, but that goes against the required pairing of a triggered and clean prompt mentioned in lines 256 onwards.
- How were ESD and UCE specifically applied as parameter-level removal approaches? The "failure" finding of the paper currently needs more information in the main paper and a comparison to Braun et al.'s work on how backdoors affect subsequent concept erasure. Also the finding of that the defense has to match the backdoor attack sounds related to this work.
- Is DISPEL also applicable and functional for more recent state-of-the-art models like FLUX.1 or FLUX.2?
- Why is the evaluation restricted to backdoor methods that attack the U-Net part of the model? What about Struppek et al.'s Rickrolling attack as a text-encoder variant?
- The "synonym substitution"-training of the probe mentioned in the paragraph on "Recovery of the block is possible without the clean model" needs more details. Can the authors please provide more background on that (side) experiment?
- Is the backdoor patching of DISPEL now additive or multiplicative? In Section 5, for SDXL-Turbo it is mentioned that the backdoor requires multiplicative rescaling, while the methodology in Section 4 describes an additive patching.
- DISPEL seems to require two forward passes for the patching: one from the poisoned model and one from the clean base. Is that correct?
Future work
- The main experiments should be extended to more than a single backdoor and the current selection of this particular Einstein->hat link should be explained.
- There are also no baselines; ESD/UCE are simply denoted as "failing" without showing qualitative or quantitative evidence for that. The findings there might also be connected to the study of Braun et al. on the survival of backdoors under erasure [1], and should thus be compared. [1] Braun et al., "Erased but not forgotten: How backdoors compromise concept erasure." (ICML 2026)