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- Confidence
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- Informativeness
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- Presentation
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Paper summary
The paper proposes STDSA, a transfer-based adversarial attack on parameter-efficient time-series forecasting models that requires no queries to the target model and aims to disrupt both local temporal structures and dominant periodic patterns. Its main contributions are complementary temporal and frequency-domain surrogate pathways, segment-wise spectral gradient filtering, scale-preserving gradient blending, and theoretical analysis of forecasting perturbations and filtering defenses. Validation covers five forecasting models on ETTh1, Weather, and Exchange under six defense configurations.
Critical strengths
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The paper studies attacks that require no queries to the target forecaster and combines temporal and spectral surrogate pathways. This provides a meaningful approach to investigating transferable vulnerabilities when direct model access is unavailable.
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The paper provides bounds on forecasting perturbations and an analysis of how low-frequency perturbations can survive frequency filtering. This offers an analytical motivation for the spectral design beyond empirical performance, although its applicability to the evaluated architectures requires stronger validation and does not change my rejection recommendation.
Critical weaknesses
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The connection between parameter efficiency and vulnerability is not convincingly established. The paper attributes susceptibility to restricted parameter spaces and structural sparsity, but attacking five selected models does not isolate these factors as the cause. Controlled comparisons across model sizes or sparsity levels, with forecasting accuracy and attack budgets accounted for, are needed to support this central claim.
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The attack comparisons are too limited to establish a substantial methodological advance. The experimental section identifies VMI-FGSM with the proposed surrogate loss and random perturbations as comparisons. This leaves uncertainty about whether the gains arise from the surrogate design, the optimization procedure, or spectral filtering. Stronger transfer-attack baselines and simple low-frequency perturbations under matched computational budgets would provide a more convincing assessment.
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The defense results do not fully substantiate the proposed explanation. The paper motivates its spectral design partly through resistance to frequency filtering, whereas the six listed experimental defenses primarily involve smoothing, training, and regularization. Direct evaluation of explicit frequency-filtering defenses across cutoff settings, while measuring their clean-accuracy cost, would better connect the theoretical argument to the empirical findings.
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The claims of imperceptibility and stealth exceed the evidence provided. An ℓ∞ budget of 0.1 and an average SNR of 21.52 dB quantify perturbation magnitude, but do not establish that changes are operationally plausible or difficult to detect. In particular, smooth low-frequency shifts can still violate sensor constraints or be identified by temporal anomaly detectors. Without such validation, the practical stealth claim remains insufficiently supported.
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The evaluation does not adequately support the breadth of the deployment claims. Experiments on ETTh1, Weather, and Exchange provide useful benchmark evidence, but do not demonstrate attacks on remote edge devices or realistic critical-infrastructure workflows. Constraints such as access to only a subset of sensors, causal modification of streaming observations, and downstream decision impact are not established by the reported benchmark results. The practical conclusions should therefore be narrowed or supported by more representative experiments.
Together, these concerns leave the claimed structural insight and practical advantage insufficiently established for acceptance.
Questions for authors
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Could the authors clarify what evidence isolates parameter efficiency or structural sparsity as the cause of increased vulnerability, rather than general sensitivity to temporal and low-frequency perturbations? Controlled comparisons across model sizes or sparsity levels would materially affect my assessment of the central claim.
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Under identical surrogate models, perturbation budgets, and optimization budgets, how does STDSA compare with standard transfer attacks and simple low-frequency perturbations? Please clarify whether the reported ablations establish the additional benefit of spectral-temporal decoupling and adaptive gradient blending.
4 comments
Reply to Reviewer [2/2]
3. Explicit frequency-filtering defenses and clean-accuracy cost (Weakness 3)
Appendix A.10 directly evaluates full-window FFT low-pass defenses at six cutoffs. Each filter is applied to both clean inputs and fixed transferred adversarial inputs. The attack effect for each defended target is normalized by that target's own defended clean MSE:
=100\left(\frac{\mathrm{MSE}_{\mathrm{adv,def},m}} {\mathrm{MSE}_{\mathrm{clean,def},m}}-1\right).$$ Table A11 reports the mean of these five target-wise percentages. Across $K\in\\{12,24,48,96,192,360\\}$, defended RMI remains **29.09%–31.86%**. At $K=12$, the attack retains **30.95% RMI** while clean MSE increases by **36.23%**. At $K=24$, the corresponding figures are **29.09%** and **22.08%**. The aggressive filters therefore impose substantial clean forecasting costs while retaining substantial attack effects. Median/IQR preprocessing produces essentially the same mean RMI, changing 31.8576% to 31.8531%. These are direct measurements on the final adversarial inputs. The input filter uses full-lookback frequency coordinates. the attack's gradient processing uses folded-segment coordinates, as explicitly distinguished in Appendix A.10. # 4. Measured perturbation structure and the meaning of stealth (Weakness 4) **The revised evidence characterizes the actual attack output in both time and frequency.** Figure A2 presents a preselected Weather example's clean and adversarial inputs, their additive difference, and the final perturbation spectrum. The lowest twelve full-lookback rFFT bins contain **70.99%** of the Parseval-weighted perturbation energy in the displayed example. The all-window Weather evaluation gives approximately **70.05%** in the same bins (Appendix A.11). This measurement verifies low-frequency concentration after sign updates and clipping. The final perturbation is dense in time and retains energy outside those bins. The $\ell_\infty$ bound and SNR quantify amplitude, while the spectrum quantifies concentration. These are the properties demonstrated by the evaluation. Operational detection performance additionally depends on the sensor constraints, anomaly detector, and application-specific acceptance thresholds. Those quantities are distinct from amplitude and spectral concentration. # 5. Restricted sensor access and information available at attack time (Weakness 5) **The new evaluation explicitly imposes restricted channel access during attack generation.** Table A10 applies channel masks inside every iterative update and evaluates the resulting attacks on the complete test sets. With access to one versus three channels, the five-target mean RMIs are 0.2682%/0.9188% on ETTh1, 3.3568%/10.4291% on Exchange, and 0.9356%/2.7035% on Weather. Thus average transfer remains positive under partial access and increases with the number of controllable channels. Table A8 also evaluates attack objectives using only information available before the prediction horizon. Replacing the future trajectory with the last observed value gives mean RMIs of **2.47%, 21.51%, and 14.25%** on ETTh1, Exchange, and Weather. Using a detached clean-surrogate forecast gives **1.64%, 6.74%, and 7.78%**, respectively. Weather and Exchange use reconstructed MixLinear + Linear sources. ETTh1 uses MixLinear only. In these experiments, future ground truth is used exclusively for evaluation, and generation uses neither target queries nor target gradients. The experiments therefore establish forecast-level transfer under partial channel control and future-label-free objectives. Remote-device deployment and downstream critical-infrastructure decisions introduce separate system-level conditions. The presented evidence supports using STDSA to stress-test the forecasting component under these explicitly defined access conditions.Your Comments are Highly Valuable to Us [Deadline in One Day]
Dear reviewer xpds,
We have carefully considered all the valuable points and concerns you raised in your initial review through the initial rebuttal. As the deadline for discussion is approaching in only one day, we respectfully ask whether our response has addressed your concerns, or you still have questions to raise. Your comments are highly valuable to us. Thank you once again for your professional time and insightful effort in reviewing our submission.
Best regards,
Authors
Your Comments are Highly Valuable to Us [Deadline in 12 hours]
Dear reviewer xpds,
We have carefully considered all the valuable points and concerns you raised in your initial review through the initial rebuttal. As the deadline for discussion is approaching in only 12 hours, we respectfully ask whether our response has addressed your concerns, or you still have questions to raise. Your comments are highly valuable to us. Thank you once again for your professional time and insightful effort in reviewing our submission.
Best regards,
Authors
Reply to Reviewer [1/2]
Thank you for recognizing the importance of target-query-free attacks and the motivation for spectral-temporal surrogates. The revised manuscript adds experiments that directly examine the mechanisms underlying transfer, trained-surrogate attack comparisons, explicit frequency-filtering defenses, and restrictions on the information and channels available to the attacker. The resulting evidence supports a concrete finding: structured perturbations generated without target-model access transfer across forecasting architectures, remain effective across model capacities, and survive the evaluated input defenses.
1. Structural vulnerability and model capacity (Weakness 1; Question 1)
The capacity experiment identifies a vulnerability shared across scales of the same forecasting architecture. The revised Appendix A.10 evaluates three iTransformer widths containing 501,472, 1,789,280, and 6,724,192 parameters. Their Weather RMIs are 31.40%, 32.51%, and 29.78%, respectively. The attack therefore produces approximately 30% forecasting-error increases over a 13.4-fold parameter-count range. This result establishes persistence across capacity. The three values do not imply a monotonic relationship between parameter count and vulnerability.
The structural interpretation is further supported by the perturbation controls in Table A9. On the same supplementary Weather evaluation suite, random low-frequency perturbations give 0.12% mean RMI, random channel-constant offsets give 6.24%, informed channel-constant offsets give 24.36%, and the full attack gives 31.86%. Thus only concentrating energy at low frequencies does not reproduce the attack effect, and an informed mean shift leaves a further 7.50 percentage-point improvement available to the full construction. Parameter efficiency defines the studied forecasting family. The experiments identify its transferable sensitivity to particular structured directions. The capacity sweep, control experiments, and architecture-level propagation analysis together substantiate that mechanism-oriented finding.
2. Stronger transfer comparisons and the contribution of the construction (Weakness 2; Question 2)
The revised comparison includes trained-surrogate transfer, an optimizer comparison using the TSP loss, and explicit low-frequency and constant-offset controls. Tables A5 and A7 compare STDSA with Transfer-PGD from a trained DLinear surrogate. STDSA achieves the higher RMI in 14 of the 15 dataset–target pairs, including all five targets on ETTh1 and Weather. The five-target mean RMIs are:
Table A6 additionally reports STDSA/VMI-FGSM mean RMIs of 17.10%/13.18% on ETTh1, 62.43%/56.16% on Exchange, and 30.02%/23.71% on Weather. These results establish a transfer advantage across three datasets and multiple target architectures.
The supplementary Weather control suite uses 10444 windows and an ℓ∞ budget of ϵ=0.1. Table A9 isolates perturbation mechanisms: its 31.86% full-attack result exceeds both random low-frequency perturbations and the 24.36% informed-offset control, with improvements over the latter on four of five targets. Table A12 separately examines source construction: the fixed uniform Direct source obtains 21.15%, fixed Direct + MixLinear obtains 30.33%, the full trained dual source obtains 31.86%, and the adapted dense control of Liu et al. (2023) obtains 9.59%. These source comparisons and the original ETTh1 component ablations answer different aspects of the mechanism and are reported under their respective configurations. In Table A4, Full STDSA and Direct Pathway Only have similar ETTh1 means (17.09% and 17.07%), while their cross-target standard deviations are 1.42 and 4.70. Removing LPF gives 16.99%. The pathway combination therefore improves cross-target consistency in that experiment, and the isolated LPF contribution to its mean is 0.10 percentage points.
Appendix A.13 also directly measures the effect of raw/projected gradient blending: changing its coefficient from 0 to 0.75 changes 14.64% of gradient signs in the 16-window first-step diagnostic. This records a directional change in that raw/projected diagnostic. Together, the new controls show that the observed transfer effect depends on the constructed directions and source, beyond perturbation magnitude or random low-frequency energy alone.