- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 1
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Paper summary
The manuscript proposes a blind watermarking method for vector databases. The approach leverages local geometric fingerprints to locate carriers and modifies their relative angles for bit encoding. To prevent carriers from being placed in easily detectable regions, the method selects half of the domain region. Fingerprints are constructed by quantizing distance ratios and angles, which are subsequently hashed using a secret key. During embedding, a neighboring element is perturbed to align the corresponding angle with a predefined bit grid. The detection process operates blindly by recomputing the fingerprints and extracting the embedded bits via a majority vote at each bit position.
Critical strengths
- The proposed method successfully integrates invariant identification, keyed addressing, angular encoding, and blind detection into a single cohesive pipeline. A notable benefit of this approach is that it eliminates the need for original-copy alignment during the extraction phase.
Critical weaknesses
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A major concern is that the geometric information itself may be altered by the watermark insertion process. The methodology appears to rely heavily on quantization tolerances and data redundancy to withstand this self-induced disruption.
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The mathematical foundation is sound. However, the hard question is end-to-end stability, and the provided theory stops before this question.
Questions for authors
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How can it be verified whether the observed robustness depends primarily on redundancy or on the proposed invariance? Specifically, how much of the performance gain originates from the invariant carrier identification versus the angular encoding?
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Since the fingerprint controls essentially every decoding decision, and the embedding process alters these features, how does the system handle boundary effects? Can a small feature change crossing a quantization boundary cause a large, discontinuous change in the keyed assignments?
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While the manuscript proves that all message positions are assigned at least one carrier before writing, a core question remains: after the writing process and subsequent attacks, are enough correctly recognized carriers left to successfully recover each bit?
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While the experiments are a strength in terms of breadth and transparency, the results appear weaker than what is discussed. How strong is the protection when success is strictly defined by detection at the intended false-positive rate?
2 comments
Response to weakness/question 4
Q4 (Detection at the intended FPR).
The reviewer asks how strong the protection is when success is defined strictly as detection at the intended FPR. The paper reports both TPR at a specified FPR and AUC. Under rotation, our method achieves 100% TPR on all four datasets at both 1% and 0.1% FPR, with AUC , whereas TVP's TPR after rotation is 0% on SIFT (Table 10). The table below evaluates frozen thresholds on separate held-out negatives across geometric and classical attacks, including the stronger conditions where detection degrades:
| Condition | SIFT | DEEP | nomic | GIST |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| No attack | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Rotation | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Random insertion 30% | 100 | 100 | 100 | 98 |
| Gaussian noise, relative scale 0.064% | 100 | 100 | 100 | 96 |
| Random deletion 10% | 100 | 100 | 100 | 94 |
| Random deletion 20% | 84 | 84 | 72 | 74 |
| 8-bit quantization | 100 | 100 | 100 | 68 |
| 6-bit quantization | 8 | 2 | 12 | 2 |
| Held-out FPR (%) | 0.32 | 0.72 | 0.88 | 0.56 |
TPR (%) with 50 positive trials per dataset. Thresholds are calibrated on 2,500 scores at a nominal 1% FPR and evaluated on 2,500 separate scores; all rows share the same threshold and negatives.
The achieved FPR is below 1% on every dataset, and detection is at or near 100% under all geometric attacks, insertion, noise, 10% deletion and 8-bit storage. The 6-bit row identifies the minimum workable precision, which gives a practical guideline of 8 bits or more. These results confirm that the method delivers strong protection at the intended FPR. We will add this table to the new version.
We hope these responses fully address the reviewer's concerns, in particular the question of end-to-end stability. The new analyses confirm the robustness of the proposed method, and we would be grateful if the reviewer would consider raising the score.
Response to weaknesses/questions 1-3
We thank the reviewer for the thoughtful review and for noting that the method integrates invariant identification, keyed addressing, angular encoding and blind detection into a single pipeline, removing the need for original-copy alignment. We respond to each comment below.
W1 (Self-induced change to fingerprints).
The reviewer is concerned that watermark insertion may alter the geometric information the method relies on. Writing can indeed change a fingerprint: the anchor stays fixed, but rotating one of its neighbours changes the local geometry. Table 3 measures these changes and the bit-reading accuracy after writing. The detector combines votes from several carriers per bit, so individual carriers can fail without losing the bit, as long as correct votes remain the majority. The analyses below quantify this, and they show that the self-induced disruption is well absorbed.
Q1 (Redundancy vs. invariance).
The reviewer asks how much robustness comes from invariant carrier identification, from angular encoding and from redundancy. We isolated each component by changing one part of the full method at a time:
TPR (%) and held-out FPR (%), averaged over SIFT, DEEP, nomic and GIST; 50 positive trials per dataset. Thresholds are calibrated per dataset and variant at a nominal 1% FPR. Single vote uses one randomly selected carrier per bit from the same watermarked database.
Removing either invariant addressing or angular encoding collapses detection under rotation to 0.5–1%, while removing majority voting drops detection to 24.5% under deletion and 27% under quantization. Only the full method performs well in every column. This confirms that each component is necessary and that the gains come from their combination. We will add this ablation to the new version.
Q2 (Boundary effects).
The reviewer asks whether a small feature change crossing a quantization boundary can cause a discontinuous change in keyed assignments. If the fingerprint is unchanged, the key assigns the carrier to the same bit. If it changes, the carrier may be missed or assigned elsewhere. Under the keyed hash, however, such a carrier lands on a pseudo-random position with a pseudo-random target bit, so it acts as a random vote rather than a systematic error. A bit is recovered as long as correct votes outnumber incorrect ones. The ablation above shows how much this redundancy helps: single-vote decoding falls to 24.5% after 10% deletion, whereas the full method retains 94–100% detection (Table 2). Boundary effects are therefore effectively neutralized by design.
W2 & Q3 (Carriers remaining after writing and attacks).
The reviewer notes that Theorem 1 covers carrier assignment before writing, and asks whether enough correct carriers remain afterwards. We measured this directly:
Equal-weight averages over the four datasets, 50 trials each; positions out of 64. A matched correct carrier is an originally written carrier recovered with its original fingerprint, position and neighbour pair, and read correctly. Original carrier identities are used only for evaluation, not for detection.
After writing, about 75% of carriers are recovered correctly and over 95% of positions keep a correct majority. Rotation leaves these numbers unchanged. Detection does not require all 64 bits, so it stays high even under 20% deletion. This closes the gap between Theorem 1 and end-to-end recovery and confirms the end-to-end stability of the method. We will add this analysis to the new version.