- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 1
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper studies last-iterate convergence of Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) in extensive-form games. The authors propose a general payoff perturbation framework based on Bregman divergences, extending the existing KL-based approach. They provide convergence analysis for continuous-time perturbed FTRL in monotone games and introduce a separate perturbation for two-player zero-sum games. Experiments on several benchmark games compare the proposed PFTRL variants with CFR-based methods and show that PFTRL can achieve low exploitability, although PCFR+ performs better in most cases.
Critical strengths
- The presentation of this paper is complete.
- The topic of this work is interesting and useful for the game field, especially imperfect-information games.
- The paper seems to provide a set of solid mathematical proofs.
Critical weaknesses
- The writing style of this article is rather difficult to understand. In the introduction, the author does not clearly summarize their contributions. This writing style is not friendly to the readers.
- The structure of Section 4 and 5 is rather chaotic. The logical connections between lemmas, theorems, and corollaries are not clear enough, making it difficult for readers to understand the necessity of reading this section or what information they can gain from it. For example, what is the relation among Theorem 3, Theorem 9, and Theorem 11?
- The presentation in Figure 1 fails to effectively demonstrate the advantages of the proposed method. From Figure 1, the baseline method appears to outperform the proposed method.
Questions for authors
Please review my weaknesses.