- Rating
- 4
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 3
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 3
Read review
Paper summary
The paper studies simultaneous optimistic updates applied directly to behavioral strategies in finite two-player zero-sum extensive-form games with perfect recall. At each information set, the algorithm uses ordinary counterfactual values and performs independent Euclidean projections. It is proven in Theorem 6.1 that behavioral sequences can approach the Nash set with a sufficiently small fixed step size.
Critical strengths
- The result targets Nash equilibria of the original game. It does not replace the game with a regularized objective.
- The paper explains why separate local projections differ from a global treeplex proximal update. The proof does more than change coordinates.
- The strictly complementary reference equilibrium gives two useful controls: positive reach weights and positive dual slacks.
- The adaptive scheme avoids needing a safe threshold in advance. The experiments measure the current played policy's exploitability, which matches the last-iterate claim.
Critical weaknesses
- The update description is inconsistent. Section 5.1, lines 271–272, says that prediction and correction evaluate different profiles. Equation (2) and Algorithm 1 use the same previous-profile oracle for both projections.
- The guarantee is asymptotic. The safe threshold depends on equilibrium-related quantities. The adaptive theorem shows that step-size halving eventually stops.
Questions for authors
none
3 comments
Thank you the response. I have read it and I will keep my rating.
Thank you for your constructive feedback and continued positive evaluation of our work.
Thank you for your positive assessment of our work and for your helpful comments.
On the Update Description in Section 5.1
You are correct. Both projections use the same value vector vi,I(πt−1), as stated in Eq. (2) and Algorithm 1. We have corrected the sentence in Section 5.1 accordingly.
On the Asymptotic Guarantee and the Step-Size Threshold
We agree that the convergence guarantee remains asymptotic. The purpose of the adaptive variant is to remove the need to know the equilibrium-dependent step-size threshold in advance. Theorem 6.4 guarantees that, from any positive initial step size, only finitely many halvings occur and the output sequences converge to the Nash equilibrium set. Although the bound on the number of halvings depends on equilibrium quantities, the algorithm does not require these quantities as input.