My main concerns are centered on the assumptions required to establish the explicit linear last-iterate convergence rate of IREG-PRM+, as detailed below.
1. Limited justification for the unique, strictly complementary equilibrium assumption.
Theorem 4 relies heavily on Assumption 1, which requires the existence of a unique, strictly complementary Nash equilibrium (NE). While this is a mathematically meaningful regularity condition, the paper does not sufficiently discuss the class of matrix games for which it holds or its implications for games with non-unique or degenerate equilibria.
In particular, the authors do not provide a concrete payoff matrix A to illustrate Assumption 1 and its role in the convergence analysis. Such an example would help readers understand the applicability of the theoretical results and the extent to which the assumption restricts the class of games under consideration.
Since the explicit linear last-iterate convergence analysis in Theorem 4 constitutes a substantial portion of the paper's theoretical contributions, I believe a more thorough justification of Assumption 1 and a discussion of its limitations are necessary. Without such clarification, it is difficult to assess how broadly the claimed linear convergence rate applies beyond the regular setting considered in the theorem.
2. Insufficient theoretical justification for the spectral step-size condition in Assumption 2.
Another critical concern is Assumption 2, which requires the limiting step size and the largest singular value of the value-centered payoff matrix to satisfy
$
\eta_\infty \sigma_{\max}(B)<1.$
This condition is essential for establishing the linear last-iterate convergence rate in Theorem 4. However, the paper does not prove that IREG-PRM+, when initialized and executed according to its standard implementation, necessarily converges to a limiting state satisfying this condition.
Although the experiments provide encouraging evidence that the condition holds on the tested instances, empirical observations alone cannot establish that it is guaranteed by the algorithm's dynamics. Moreover, the authors do not provide an explicit payoff matrix together with a corresponding convergence trajectory that illustrates how the limiting regret norms lead to the required spectral condition.
I would encourage the authors to provide either a theoretical sufficient condition guaranteeing Assumption 2 for the trajectory generated by IREG-PRM+, or a more detailed characterization of the matrix games for which this condition can be expected to hold.
Given that the validity of the claimed linear rate depends critically on Assumptions 1 and 2, I am not fully convinced that the paper establishes a broadly applicable closed-form linear last-iterate convergence guarantee for IREG-PRM+. Rather, the current result appears to be a conditional local convergence characterization whose applicability to the algorithm's actual trajectories remains insufficiently understood.
3. Potentially overstated contributions in the Introduction.
The Introduction states:
"We derive a closed-form linear rate for a regret-matching dynamic with no restart, no smoothing and no step-size parameter."
While it is true that the algorithm does not require restarting, smoothing, or a manually specified step-size parameter, the linear convergence guarantee in Theorem 4 still relies on the restrictive conditions imposed by Assumptions 1 and 2.
Although these assumptions are stated elsewhere in the paper, I believe the high-level contribution statement does not sufficiently emphasize the conditional nature of the theoretical result. As currently phrased, it may give readers the impression that the unmodified IREG-PRM+ algorithm enjoys an unconditional linear last-iterate convergence guarantee.
I suggest that the authors explicitly qualify this claim by emphasizing that the closed-form linear rate is established only under the unique-equilibrium and spectral stability conditions. This distinction is especially important because the unconditional global convergence result and the conditional linear convergence result are fundamentally different theoretical guarantees.
4. Inaccurate characterization of related work on linear last-iterate convergence.
The Related Work section states:
"For regret-matching-type dynamics the linear last-iterate theorems of Cai et al. (2025); Meng et al. (2025); Perolat et al. (2021); Liu et al. (2023) restart or modify the update."
I believe this characterization is imprecise and potentially misleading, as these studies investigate different algorithmic frameworks and convergence targets.
Specifically, Cai et al. (2025) and Meng et al. (2025) investigate regret-matching-type algorithms and establish linear last-iterate convergence guarantees toward Nash equilibria of the original, unregularized matrix games, under their respective algorithmic conditions.
In contrast, Perolat et al. (2021) employ a regularization-based learning framework involving optimistic follow-the-regularized-leader (OFTRL), which is algorithmically distinct from regret matching. Moreover, their linear convergence results concern equilibria of regularized extensive-form games rather than necessarily the Nash equilibria of the original unregularized games.
Similarly, Liu et al. (2023) establish linear convergence results in regularized game settings, whereas their convergence guarantee for the original unregularized games is sublinear.
Therefore, grouping these studies together as examples of regret-matching-type dynamics achieving linear convergence through restarting or modifying the update obscures important differences in both their algorithmic designs and theoretical objectives.
I recommend that the authors revise this discussion to distinguish between (i) regret-matching-type algorithms and other regularized learning methods, and (ii) convergence to Nash equilibria of the original games and convergence to equilibria of regularized games. Such a distinction would help clarify the precise novelty of the present work relative to existing results.
5. Limited experimental validation on representative extensive-form games.
The empirical evaluation primarily focuses on randomly generated matrix games. Although the paper includes experiments on Kuhn and Leduc poker, these experiments mainly investigate the proposed progress-monitoring mechanism rather than the spectral condition underlying the linear convergence analysis.
While the theoretical results are developed for matrix games, certain extensive-form games can also be represented in normal form, as demonstrated in the experimental setting of Cai et al. (ICLR 2025), Last-Iterate Convergence Properties of Regret-Matching Algorithms in Games.
I therefore encourage the authors to conduct additional experiments on representative game instances derived from extensive-form games, particularly to investigate whether the spectral stability condition
η∞σmax(B)<1
continues to hold for the limiting trajectories of IREG-PRM+.
Such experiments would provide stronger evidence for the practical relevance of Assumption 2 and help establish whether the proposed linear convergence characterization extends beyond randomly generated matrix games.
Overall assessment.
Although the paper provides an interesting explanation of norm saturation and establishes valuable global convergence results, I remain concerned about the scope and practical applicability of its explicit linear last-iterate convergence guarantee. In particular, the lack of a theoretical connection between the actual trajectories of IREG-PRM+ and the spectral condition required by Theorem 4 substantially limits the strength of the main rate result.
I would be more convinced by the paper if the authors could provide stronger theoretical or empirical evidence supporting the applicability of Assumptions 1 and 2, clarify the distinction between conditional and unconditional convergence guarantees, and more accurately position their contributions relative to existing work.