- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
The paper studies last-iterate convergence to Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games with bandit feedback. It proposes log-barrier mirror descent with a fixed regularization coefficient and periodically updated anchors, claiming an anytime, high-probability exploitability rate of for matrix and extensive-form games. It also establishes a fixed-horizon, constant-probability lower bound. Experiments on four EFG benchmarks show competitive last-iterate performance.
Critical strengths
- The paper studies an interesting and relevant theoretical problem. Convergence of the current strategy under limited feedback is valuable and substantially harder than convergence of averaged strategies. The theoretical results appear comprehensive and sound, though I did not check all of the proofs in detail.
Critical weaknesses
- The theoretical contribution is only partially novel and feels incremental relative to prior works. The main convergence result appears to be primarily an algorithmic and analytical extension of Fiegel et al. (2026). It matches their O(t^{-1/4}) rate and retains the same overall proof architecture. The main additional technical work appears to involve controlling the anchor-induced bias and intra-epoch drift, together with a Taylor-based residual analysis and sharper bounds on the whitened game operator. These refinements may be useful, but their significance beyond adapting the existing framework to periodically updated anchors is not yet sufficiently clear.
- Algorithms 1 and 2 require an initial strategy satisfying a small residual condition involving the unknown game operator. The paper does not provide an uncoupled bandit procedure, or sample-complexity accounting, for obtaining this initialization. Consequently, the guarantee appears conditional on a nontrivial starting point. How can each player obtain such an initialization using only its own bandit observations, and what additional sample complexity does this require?
Questions for authors
See weaknesses.