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Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

Minimax Last-Iterate Convergence in Matrix Games with Observed Actions

Abstract

We study last-iterate convergence in unknown two-player zero-sum matrix games with bandit payoff feedback and observed opponent actions. For games with actions per player, we develop an algorithm achieving a duality gap of with high probability, simultaneously at every round . This improves the dimension dependence of the best previously known guarantee by a factor of . The rate matches a standard bandit lower bound, establishing minimax optimality in both the number of actions and the number of rounds, up to logarithmic factors. The algorithm is computationally efficient, requiring only time and memory per round. Our technical contribution is a joint design of adaptive averaging and corrected exponential weights that absorbs estimation variance, together with a potential argument that bounds phase durations.

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