- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
The authors introduce Physical Response Attack (PRA), a black box framework that identifies physically informative perturbation directions on which to attack a trained neural PDE solver. The authors demonstrate their method on the Poisson equation, Darcy flow, and Navier-Stokes.
Critical strengths
While there has been some prior work on neural operator attacks, the topic is nonetheless interesting and novel, and I believe the authors should receive credit for exploring this direction. Further, the proposed PRA attack is interesting in contrast to prior works because it does not rely on solver or model internals and is fully black-box.
Critical weaknesses
The authors frame PRA as a neural operator-specific attack, when it appears to not take advantage of the distinct properties of a neural operator and instead would be more aptly applied to general “neural PDE solvers.” Neural operators specifically are resolution agnostic in their input and output; one could imagine an attack that takes advantage of discrepancies across resolutions for neural operators, or perturbations that function differently at different resolutions. As far as I can see, PRA only assumes access to a model and solver at one specific resolution. As such, I believe the operator-tailored framing of the paper may be slightly inaccurate.
Furthermore, I believe it would be important to emphasize and explain the importance (e.g., is it for safety and security reasons?) to explore attacks against neural PDE solvers, or neural operators in general. Given that this paper sits at the intersection of the neural PDE solver and adversarial attack communities (and given that these communities historically do not overlap much), it would be important to justify to both why this line of work should be explored.
While I believe that the numerical methods are sound and thorough, there are still a few other empirical axes that I would recommend the authors explore:
- How does the performance of PRA compare with other attacks as a function of the perturbation size?
- It seems from Table 3 that PRA uses more solver calls and frames than some other methods, such as SPSA. Correct me if I misunderstood, but it seems that this cost is variable and depends on factors such as the size of the search space. As such, I would recommend exploring also how the effectiveness of PRA changes as the computational budget for solver/model passes changes.
Questions for authors
It almost seems as though the solver results in Figure 3 contain some artifacts (e.g., lines or ringing), especially for the smoother PRA perturbation (than the other inputs). Is this a realistic response/can you explain why this is happening? If anything, for instance, it seems that FNO has the better output than the solver in Figure 3b.
Q1. Resolution-related issue.
Thank you for the valuable comment. While resolution independence is indeed a characteristic of neural operators, this paper investigates the discrepancies between the responses of neural operators and a ground-truth solver under input perturbations. Furthermore, all of our experiments are conducted on neural operators, and the proposed method is not tied to a specific discretization and can be applied at any resolution.
Q2. Is investigating the adversarial robustness of neural PDE solvers practically meaningful, particularly in terms of safety and security?
Thank you for the valuable comment. Investigating the security and robustness of neural PDE solvers has important practical implications, particularly as neural operators are increasingly adopted as computationally efficient surrogates in safety-critical applications. For example, Roy et al. (2026) investigated adversarial vulnerabilities in neural-operator-based digital twins for nuclear thermal-hydraulic systems, demonstrating that physically plausible input perturbations can substantially increase prediction errors. This highlights that adversarial vulnerabilities in neural operators are not merely theoretical concerns but can pose real risks to the reliability of engineering systems.
Q3. Artifacts in the solver results in Figure 3.
Thank you for the valuable comment. We clarify that our Navier–Stokes trajectories were generated by directly solving the governing equations on a 64×64 grid, rather than by downsampling trajectories from a higher-resolution simulation.
At ν=10−4, the weak viscous dissipation allows increasingly fine-scale vorticity structures to develop, which may not be adequately resolved by the 64×64 discretization. Although the 2/3 dealiasing rule mitigates aliasing errors, it does not eliminate truncation errors associated with unresolved spatial scales. Consequently, the direct 64×64 solver may exhibit high-wavenumber spectral accumulation and ringing artifacts, which are absent or substantially reduced at higher resolutions (We will provide further explanation in the appendix)
In contrast, FNO learns an approximate solution operator through spectral convolutions in the Fourier domain rather than explicitly reproducing the numerical integration procedure. Its use of truncated Fourier modes introduces a spectral bias toward low-frequency structures, which suppresses poorly resolved high-frequency components while preserving the dominant large-scale flow patterns. As a result, FNO may produce smoother predictions than the numerical solver.