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Paper summary
The paper introduces Policy-Constrained Diffusion Agents (CoDA), a training-free method for enforcing task-level security policies during diffusion-model decoding. At each denoising step, CoDA identifies policy-relevant regions in the model’s provisional output and projects their token distributions onto policy-compliant values, using structured constraints such as tool allowlists and multi-token argument-value restrictions. The authors evaluate CoDA with DiffusionGemma and LLaDA-2 Mini on four AgentDojo suites under static and adaptive prompt-injection attacks, using both manually constructed oracle policies and automatically LLM-selected policies. With oracle policies, CoDA reports zero attack success in the adaptive evaluation; automatically selected policies retain much of that protection but still allow some attacks, particularly in Banking.
Critical strengths
1-CoDA constrains security-sensitive fields during generation, so its core protection need not depend on recognizing the attacker’s wording. This is a consequential design choice for prompt injection, where attacks can adapt to detection-based defenses.
2-The comparison between repeated denoising-time enforcement and applying the same policy only at the end helps isolate the value of enforcing constraints throughout generation. Evaluation across two diffusion paradigms also provides some evidence that the approach is not tied to a single sampler.
Critical weaknesses
1-CoDA can only enforce restrictions that the policy expresses and that its parsers identify in the generated output. The paper itself notes that open-ended semantic constraints are out of scope, while oracle policies are manually specified and refined. The nonzero adaptive ASR under LLM-selected policies—most notably in Banking—shows that policy specification remains a material failure point. Thus, the zero-ASR result supports a conditional guarantee over the tested constraints, not a general guarantee against prompt injection.
2-The evaluation covers two diffusion models and four AgentDojo suites, with LLaDA-2 Mini evaluated on a 25% stratified subsample in the adaptive setting. Some results also show substantial utility degradation—for example, oracle CoDA’s adaptive Slack utility with LLaDA-2 Mini is 7.41%, versus 25.93% for the vanilla agent. Broader tests and uncertainty estimates are needed to judge how reliably the security–utility trade-off generalizes.
Questions for authors
1-What happens when a tool call or security-sensitive field is malformed, ambiguous, or not recognized by the structure-identification logic? Does the runtime fail closed by rejecting or withholding execution, or can such an output proceed without the relevant constraint? This affects how broadly the claimed enforcement guarantee applies.
2-For each adaptive-attack result, please report the exact number of evaluated task–attack units and uncertainty estimates, and clarify which results use the full suite versus the 25% LLaDA-2 Mini subsample. How sensitive are the reported ASRs and utility scores to task sampling and attack-search randomness?
3 comments
[Part 2]
Q1. What happens when a tool call or security-sensitive field is malformed, ambiguous, or not recognized by the structure-identification logic? Does the runtime fail closed by rejecting or withholding execution, or can such an output proceed without the relevant constraint? This affects how broadly the claimed enforcement guarantee applies.
Malformed or incomplete tool calls that fail the agent framework's parsing or schema validation are not executed. However, enforcement of syntactically valid tool calls remains conditional on correct identification of security-sensitive fields. To assess this assumption empirically, we audited 5,661 Oracle-policy episodes, covering 24,988 executed tool calls and 260 non-executed incomplete calls, with zero observed parser-coverage bypasses (reported below).
| Suite | Episodes | Executed Native Calls | Incomplete (Not Executed) | Coverage Bypasses |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Banking | 1,296 | 3,056 | 11 | 0 |
| Slack | 945 | 4,093 | 2 | 0 |
| Workspace | 2,160 | 9,718 | 94 | 0 |
| Travel | 1,260 | 8,121 | 153 | 0 |
| Total | 5,661 | 24,988 | 260 | 0 |
Q2. For each adaptive-attack result, please report the exact number of evaluated task–attack units and uncertainty estimates, and clarify which results use the full suite versus the 25% LLaDA-2 Mini subsample. How sensitive are the reported ASRs and utility scores to task sampling and attack-search randomness?
DiffusionGemma and its baselines were evaluated on all 629 eligible AgentDojo task–attack scenarios (105 Slack, 240 Workspace, 140 Travel, and 144 Banking), using up to 100 unique attacker queries per scenario. LLaDA-2 Mini originally used a 25% stratified subsample with 20 queries per scenario due to computational constraints.
As detailed in W2, we have extended LLaDA-2 Mini, and will continue to update as new results arrive. These results maintain 0% Oracle ASR, while observing a smaller utility degradation on Slack. We additionally report 95% Wilson confidence intervals to quantify scenario-level uncertainty.
We again thank the reviewer for their valuable feedback.
Thanks for reviewing, please let us know if you need any further clarifications
Thank you again for your review. We wanted to follow up on our clarification that CoDA’s guarantees depend on correct policy specification and identification of policy-relevant fields. We also analyzed the Banking policy-selection failures, audited parser coverage across 5,661 episodes, and added full-suite LLaDA-2 Mini results for Slack and Banking with scenario counts and 95% Wilson confidence intervals. Please let us know if any part of the scope of enforcement, the failure analysis, or these additional results needs further clarification. If these responses address your concerns, we would appreciate it if you would reconsider your rating in light of the revised manuscript.
[Part 1]
We thank the reviewer for their valuable feedback and appreciate their recognition of CoDA's approach to enforcing security constraints during generation, the benefits of iterative denoising-time enforcement, and its evaluation across different diffusion architectures.
W1. CoDA can only enforce restrictions that the policy expresses and that its parsers identify in the generated output. The paper itself notes that open-ended semantic constraints are out of scope, while oracle policies are manually specified and refined. The nonzero adaptive ASR under LLM-selected policies—most notably in Banking—shows that policy specification remains a material failure point. Thus, the zero-ASR result supports a conditional guarantee over the tested constraints, not a general guarantee against prompt injection.
We agree that CoDA's security guarantees are conditional on correct policy specification and identification of policy-relevant structures, rather than universal protection against prompt injection. Crucially, CoDA separates two distinct challenges: policy synthesis, which requires interpreting user intent, and policy enforcement, which mechanically restricts generation to authorized behavior. While automatic policy synthesis remains an open challenge, CoDA provides reliable enforcement of correctly specified, identifiable constraints without relying on stochastic LLM-based verification.
Importantly, with DiffusionGemma, all three automated policy selectors achieve 0% adaptive ASR in three of four suites. Our analysis of all 54 successful static Banking attacks (reported below) further identifies over-authorized tool capabilities as the source of these breaches, with no observed bypass of an active constraint. These findings distinguish policy-selection failures from enforcement failures and clarify the scope of CoDA's security guarantees.
send_moneyupdate_scheduled_transactionsend_moneysend_money,update_scheduled_transactionsend_money,update_scheduled_transactionW2. The evaluation covers two diffusion models and four AgentDojo suites, with LLaDA-2 Mini evaluated on a 25% stratified subsample in the adaptive setting. Some results also show substantial utility degradation—for example, oracle CoDA’s adaptive Slack utility with LLaDA-2 Mini is 7.41%, versus 25.93% for the vanilla agent. Broader tests and uncertainty estimates are needed to judge how reliably the security–utility trade-off generalizes.
The original 25% stratified subsample was motivated by LLaDA-2 Mini's higher inference cost (7.2× longer per episode than DiffusionGemma). To assess broader generalization, we are extending the evaluation to the full AgentDojo grid using the same 20-query attack budget as the original experiments.
The full Slack and Banking evaluations (249 scenarios) are now complete, with CoDA (Oracle) maintaining 0% ASR. On Slack, CoDA's utility improves from 7.41% on the subsample to 18.10% on the full suite, narrowing the gap relative to Vanilla (25.71%). We also report 95% Wilson confidence intervals to quantify scenario-level uncertainty. Results are shown below; remaining suites and LLM-selected policy evaluations are ongoing and will be updated once finalized.